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“In this important and ambitious book, based on the command of a massive 
 literature and illuminated by shafts of insight, Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla challenges 
the stereotype of early modern Spain as a society incapable of responding to the 
demands of an increasingly globalized world. Using a comparative approach that 
embraces other European states of the period, he explores to striking effect what 
the joint Spanish-Portuguese possession of Europe’s first global empire meant to 
the peoples of the Iberian peninsula.”
—Sir John Elliott, Regius Professor Emeritus, Oxford University, UK
“This book is seminal. It provides the facts and the history required to rescue the 
histories of state formation, institutional development and imperial expansion in 
Iberia from the condescension displayed by neo-liberal economists and historians to 
the contributions of Southern Europe to the early modern preparations and pre-
conditions for early breakthrough in the North to industrial market economies.”
—Patrick Karl O’Brien, FBA Emeritus of Oxford and 
London Universities, UK
“A comparison that seemed obvious but that only now begins to be seriously made. 
Beyond similarities that seemed probable and imaginaries about mythic differences, 
the first two great European political spaces (the Iberian empires) of the early mod-
ern era are here studied in their complexity and multileveled interconnections.”
—António Manuel Hespanha, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 
Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
“While the early modern history globalization has substantially progressed in 
recent years, there has been a surprising tendency to keep the Iberian Empires on 
the periphery. This new work by Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla corrects this view and 
puts them back in the center. His thesis is that both Spain and Portugal con-
structed the first world-wide empires and hence were fundamental actors in the 
political, military and economic foundations of early globalization.”
—Carlos Marichal, El Colegio de México, Mexico
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Over the last few years, the history of empires has undergone something 
of a renaissance. This is due in part to the new interest in global history 
and the privileged status it has acquired in academic circles. This volume 
tries to explore the relations between globalization and empires, two 
developments or phenomena that are often considered complementary 
but should not be confused.
In recent years, economic historians have entered into debate about the 
degree of globalization prior to the late nineteenth century. For Williamson 
and O’Rourke, the late 1800s saw the beginning of this process, with an 
identifiable tendency towards the convergence of economic variables, 
especially prices.1 Discussion has tended to turn on the use of terms such 
as hard or soft globalization, primitive globalization, the first globaliza-
tion, and so on. These are debates of great interest.2 But a few preliminary 
observations are needed. The first is that I find the definition of Flynn and 
Giráldez (also evident in Williamson and O’Rourke) to be somewhat 
restrictive, as they propose that the economic historian must define global-
ization primarily from the perspective of the ‘exchange’ of ‘products’ and 
‘its long-lasting impact’ ‘on all trading partners’ (2002). While I agree 
with many of their statements about the importance of silver in this pro-
cess, I have tried to demonstrate that although the economies of the 
1 See, among others, O’Rourke and Williamson (2002, 2005).




 sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not meet these criteria—as 
Williamson and O’Rourke argue—those economies did create connec-
tions that would be decisive for the political economies and the construc-
tion of the state and, in this way, the allocation of resources in Europe and 
its colonies. My approach also starts from the conviction that global his-
tory is not only important because of what it tells us about non- European 
worlds but also because it offers us a different perspective and overall con-
text for Europe itself, and may even allow us to reinterpret it in light of the 
new vantage points thus acquired. Indeed, this may be its most important 
contribution (Yun 2007). These two presuppositions are the basis of the 
book, which attempts to employ them in a concrete form to understand 
the internal history of Spain and Portugal, drawing comparisons between 
them and other countries and exploring the way in which globalizing 
forces conditioned relations with other areas of Europe. For this reason, 
the debate is not always focused on the history of mercantile relations or 
the classic literature on ‘world economies’ of Wallenstein but also on some 
of the classics of the new institutional economics, such as Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson.
Another of the purposes of this book is to use this perspective to 
approach the history of empires and the processes of state building in 
Iberia, using the concepts of monarchies and composite states.3 It also 
attempts to challenge some stereotypes and views that, although anachro-
nistic, have resulted in a highly negative understanding of Iberian societ-
ies. To the extent that it looks at problems of statecraft, a basic purpose of 
this book is to analyse the effects of war on society. This aspect of Marte 
contra Minerva (Yun 2004) which was largely ignored by its readers is 
vital in understanding the pacts between elites and central power and the 
forms of organizing coercion and its effects on society.
Empires and the political formations of this period cannot be understood, 
however, by a study focusing exclusively on what we could call formal institu-
tions. Above all, an analysis of informal institutions—and personal rules—is 
required, something which is not present in the studies of D. North and his 
co-authors but which remains essential from our point of view: the family, 
the extended lineage of family and the kinship relations it entailed, patronage 
and friendships, reciprocity, prestige, and so on. An analysis of these informal 
institutions is vital not only to understand political organizations and their 
dynamics but also the political economies of the time and the forms of 
3 Some ideas in Yun (1998).
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resources allocation.4 It may, of course, be difficult to distinguish between 
formal and informal institutions (Grafe 2012). This is even more the case 
when we deal with Old Regime societies in which the separation between the 
public and the private is not clear and in which institutions such as the family 
are very regulated by the law. The exercise is, however, without doubt of 
considerable heuristic value. This study will try to set out the internal dynamic 
of elites, in which reciprocity and conflict were two sides of the same coin and 
vital to any understanding of political dynamics as well as economic and ter-
ritorial expansion, including the establishment and nature of empires. Also 
the relations between the different local and regional elites and the central 
power of the state is also constitutes a central part of my arguments. Another 
crucial argument is that these informal institutions developed in contexts of 
great political and jurisdictional fragmentation, which created enormous 
competition for resources. From this perspective, it becomes essential to dis-
cuss how the institutional framework affected the allocation of productive 
factors and economic growth or recession. The conclusion is paradoxical, 
because although this institutional framework explains some of the most 
negative aspects of the economic behaviour of these societies, it is obvious 
that the final effect of these (supposedly) inefficient institutions (inefficient, 
i.e. from the perspective of the new institutional economics) could very well 
be economic growth of a notable scale within the parameters of pre-industrial 
societies. Such was the case when the available resources and the ecosystems 
in which they were inserted acted positively. And this may be true not only 
for territories in Europe but also for the colonies.
From a heuristic and methodological point of view, a study of the sort 
undertaken here has obvious roots. Comparative history and what is some-
what unfortunately called ‘transnational history’ are undoubtedly among the 
creditors.5 While the work of authors such as D. North appears continually as 
a point of discussion, this is only possible in the context of a critical use of 
their own concepts and ideas. Bourdieu’s theory of capital reconversion has 
been useful to the extent that it allows us to link economic and political fac-
tors and explains the decision-making process of historical agents in general 
and of elites in particular (Yun 2011). And I have also found inspiration in 
the theory of organizations of H. Simon and others (Yun 2011).
4 A good number of studies of political economies have focused only on mercantile institu-
tions, the state, the judicial system, and the consulates. See, for example, the innovative book 
by Hough and Grier (2015).
5 My theoretical approach in Yun (2007, 2014a).
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I have adopted a narrative structure in order to provide the reader new 
to this area with the basic facts upon which my conclusions are based. I 
have also included conclusions from chapters and papers published 
 elsewhere and focused on related phenomena. This is done in the hope 
that they broaden perspectives and tie in with important and ongoing 
debates but do not require a lengthy narrative description of these parallel 
processes and forces. I am aware that this narrative strategy can give place 
to some repetitions, but I also want to think that in many cases this is good 
for those readers who prefer to read only particular chapters of the vol-
ume. Lastly, this study approaches the life of the two empires from a top-
down perspective, but there is a complementary perspective still to adopt 
by looking at the empires from below and by analysing how the different 
local societies established some of the limits for the elites’ negotiations. 
Arguments are always based on choices, and I had to make mine. I do 
really hope that further research will address the problem from this other 
perspective and illuminate many aspects that are less explicit here.
In or around 1450, Europe began to emerge from the ashes of the crisis 
of the fourteenth century. This recovery would be the result of a series of 
internal forces, the role of the institutions being perhaps the most signifi-
cant of them. The process, moreover, would entail a fundamental qualita-
tive leap forward in the long process of globalization, by which the 
different regions of the planet would come to be tied together by ever 
tighter bonds.
In light of this growth, an overly pessimistic and anachronistic vision of 
the Iberian economies has prevailed. This view underlined their archaic 
character and held that they were barely expansive. Such an interpretation 
is hardly surprising when many historians have worked backwards, 
 influenced by very negative visions of the Iberian countries and their 
empires prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, 
many scholars have subscribed to a simplistic idea of empires as a source of 
growth, and the result was—and is—a perception of the Iberian empires 
as historical anomalies (Yun 2010).
Some scholars, for example, wrote of the formation of a semi-periph-
eral economy, whose function was simply to construct a bridge for the 
transfer of primary materials from America to Europe, with manufactured 
products flowing back in the opposite direction (Wallerstein 1979; Frank 
1978). A few years ago, it was even normal to think that America’s riches 
had been bestowed upon a country lacking the technical and institutional 
means necessary to face the challenge of the New World, Castile being the 
domain of warriors and priests and therefore unable to take advantage of 
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this gift from Providence. Spain, in other words, was not qualified to build 
a more dynamic economy capable of supporting the development of capi-
talism. Other scholars described the Spanish economy of this period as 
one unable to generate development and even growth (Cipolla 1976, 
p.  233; Kamen 1978, p.  25). Others, E.  Hamilton prominent among 
them, considered that the flood of precious metals out of America caused 
ravages in the Spanish economy: it raised salaries—and, therefore, the 
costs of production—thus pushing back industrial investment, at the same 
time that it increased the price of Spanish manufactures, thus lowering 
their competitiveness in relation to those of other countries (Hamilton 
1934, Spanish translation 1975). Even Keynes liked this opinion and 
made it his own (Keynes 1936). As perhaps had to be the case, some his-
torians have seen this as evidence of the Spanish and Portuguese way of 
life—specifically, their alleged dedication to the culture of honour, disap-
proval of manual work, and even lack of entrepreneurial spirit—and 
argued that these cultural norms hindered a genuine long-term economic 
development.1 For Pierre Vilar the Spanish empire embodied ‘the supe-
rior phase of feudalism’, one that necessarily led to a profound and endur-
ing decadence (Vilar 1974). Working from the theories of Max Weber on 
the role of the Protestant ethic as a motor of capitalism, D. Landes has 
written of Spain’s self-imposed intellectual isolation and its adherence to 
a form of Catholic intolerance that would have aborted any process of 
technical and economic developments (Landes 1998). This vision dove-
tails with the view of the Iberian economies as being subject to an iron law 
of decreasing agrarian returns due to the farming of increasingly poor soils 
and the inevitable contradiction that had to emerge with evidence of 
demographic growth and the development of cities (Braudel 1976; Anes 
1994). More recently Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson have applied 
the ideas of the new institutional economy, already tested by Douglas 
North, to illustrate the supposedly predatory character of Spanish abso-
lutism and underline the weakness of property rights and the lack of posi-
tive institutions. These features, they postulate, created high transaction 
1 This idea was present in the work of Sánchez Albornoz, in which the warrior condition 
of the Spanish in the Middle Ages was a ‘psychosis’ which was inherently inimical to the 
development of manual and commercial activities. His phrase ‘neither feudalism nor bour-
geoisie’ neatly encapsulates many of these ideas (1976, vol. I, pp.  678–703). Echoes of 
Sánchez Albornoz’s idea could be still noticed—albeit phrased more elegantly—in the work 
of leading historians such as Bennassar (1976).
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costs and heightened levels of risk, both of which were very negative for 
economic development (Acemoglu et al. 2005).
Visions of this sort have led to exaggerations that recent research has 
either entirely dismissed or, at the very least, nuanced. Indeed, some of the 
above theories would be unacceptable today. This section proposes to 
revise many of these areas. It will focus on an analysis of the institutions 
and political systems that emerged from the crisis of the fourteenth cen-
tury. To this end it aims to set out the most important of the dynamic 
forces in the development of feudal society, with special reference to the 
situation in the Iberian Peninsula (Chap. 1). In addition, an analysis of this 
sort requires us to consider the context of globalization, empire, and 
growth during the sixteenth century, thus providing a critical overview of 
a few of the old ideas and stereotypes (Chap. 2). This will also set out a new 
characterization of economic growth in the sixteenth century (Chap. 3). 
The basic thesis is that medieval societies were subject to an internal 
dynamic within their elites that obliged them to search for ever-greater 
resources. These tensions were the basis of the political instability of the 
fifteenth century; they would shape the transaction formulas at the heart of 
the dominant coalition2 composed by the different elites and would result 
in the very different political systems that emerged in the Iberian Peninsula.
2 I use the expression in the same way as North et al. (2009). Such a term does not mean 
here a complete political agreement among the elites but rather as a sort of pact that is not 
exempt of internal tensions, on the bases and general structures of the epoch’s society (see 
Chap. 4).
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CHAPTER 1
Global Context and the Rise of Europe: 
Iberia and the Atlantic
Historians remain convinced of the importance of the changes that 
occurred in the European economies between 1450 and 1550. Whether 
these processes are seen as the result of a partnership with Asia or as the 
beginning of the European miracle, the scale of the transformation is 
undeniable. It would affect the entire planet (Jones 1981). Changes such 
as these were the result of the convergence of global forces, manifested 
above all in the development of a technology that made possible the oce-
anic discoveries and overseas expansion. But, fundamentally, they were the 
outcome of internal transformations that took place in the institutions that 
regulated social life, in the structure of landlords’ rents, property rights, 
and political systems. The coincidence of these two processes unleashed a 
series of unexpected opportunities.
Global links and international exchanGes in europe 
and the iberian peninsula
The Global Forces and the Portuguese Atlantic Expansion
Ever since Marco Polo’s famous voyages to China, the Italian city-states, 
and above all Venice and Genoa, had initiated a series of contacts with Asia 
whose effects in Europe were immediately felt (Fernández-Armesto 
2006). Trade in silks, spices, and other products characterized by their 
6
high price in relation to their weight would be one of the keys to the 
rebirth of the Mediterranean, the formation of banking capital, and the 
emergence and development of the techniques of commercial exchange. If 
the European elites fought among themselves on the battlefield, in their 
claims to prestige and in their efforts to immortalize their lineages, then 
equally they competed in their search for the exotic, their intention being 
to outstrip their rivals in the consumption of oriental spices and silks and 
in experimenting with the aesthetic and hedonistic effects of extremely 
expensive products imported from the Orient (Brotton 2002). In this way, 
and despite not being manifested in high volumes of trade, the demand 
for such goods would change the international commerce of this period. 
It would also spark oceanic exploration, which would be the result of the 
search for new sea routes by which to acquire these luxury products. 
Furthermore, Flynn and Giraldez (2002) have argued that the increasing 
value of precious metals, and particularly of silver, in Europe is due to the 
China’s shift towards the collection of taxes in this metal, which increased 
the world demand for them.
Yet, it would be a mistake to reduce this primitive globalization of 
Europe to changes caused by contact with the Far East. Something more 
than the desire for these products was needed before the leap overseas 
could be made, and this was also related to the interchanges between civi-
lizations. From the medieval period, contact between the different civili-
zations of the Mediterranean produced a range of cultural and scientific 
exchanges (Abulafia 2011). The Iberian Peninsula being the crossroad of 
Christian, Arabic, and Jewish cultures, it brought together the most 
advanced forms of knowledge of the age in the fields of arithmetic, trigo-
nometry, and cartography. This cross-cultural fertilization was crucial for 
expansion. The knowledge acquired by the Mallorcan school of cartogra-
phy; the science that was transmitted from the Fenix de las Maravillas del 
Mundo, written in 1268 by Ramón Lull; and the expertise of the Mallorcan 
Jew Abraham Cresques, among others, would pass to Lisbon, which at the 
time benefited from an effervescent intellectual atmosphere thanks to the 
enthusiasm of Henry the Navigator and a brilliant group of marine adven-
turers, Christopher Columbus among them. The cross-fertilization of 
ideas that flourished in Iberia resulted in developments such as the transla-
tion into Latin of the Ptolemy’s Geographia; the progress made in the 
representation of meridian and parallel lines; the use of the compass and, 
shortly afterwards, of the astrolabe, which meant that it was easier to check 
and correct routes at sea; and the use of the Iberian caravel, a creative 
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hybrid that mixed the advantages of the Northern and Southern European 
ship types.1 Even inventions such as the printing press, of Chinese origin, 
helped to reduce the chances of error in the reproduction of maps (Bagrow 
1964, pp. 65 and ff.). From the fourteenth century, Europe appropriated 
another Chinese invention, gunpowder, thus acquiring the military capa-
bility necessary to undertake its expansion.
The so-called rise of the West, which is often considered a unique phe-
nomenon in human history, can be overrated. It was not an exceptional 
event. The world had lived through similar processes at other times—for 
example, in classical Rome, in the steppes of Mongolia—and on many 
occasions. Indeed, something similar was happening at the time. From the 
medieval period, Arab merchants had been systematically extending their 
reach into North Africa and towards South East Asia. From ‘Asia Minor’, 
the Ottomans expanded into the Maghreb and the Balkans (Casale 2010). 
Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European expansion, 
always identified with the Atlantic navigation routes, had its counter-
weight in the extension of Moscow’s territories towards the Ukraine and 
the Orient (Céspedes 1990; Kennedy 1988, Chap. 1; Darwin 2008, 
pp. 118–25). These processes were important, not only because they pro-
vide a relativist perspective that challenges the historical exceptionalism 
with which the history of Europe is sometimes viewed but also because 
they created the communication networks that made the old continent’s 
expansion a step towards globalization.
So how, in this context of expansion, did Iberians venture into the 
Atlantic? An extraordinary array of resources available to the Portuguese 
and Castilians led to their voyages of discovery along the coastlines of 
Africa. Moreover, these ventures were also the result of local forces that 
connected to global developments.
Portugal’s Atlantic vocation only began during the fourteenth-century 
crisis. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first significant leap from the 
Iberian coastlines, the natural frontier of these kingdoms, should have led 
to the conquest of Ceuta (1415). The Portuguese were seeking an entrepot 
much as they would in Ormuz or Macao more than a century later 
(Thomaz 1994, p. 23). Overseas expansion also entailed a way of continu-
ing the Reconquista, which had transformed itself into a means of 
 reproduction and social development in this society. Some historians have 
1 For the cartographical improvements, see Bagrow (1964, pp.  65–107). On the tech-
niques of navigation, Chaunu (1977).
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understood, therefore, that although these explorers were searching for 
wheat fishing banks and other primary materials (Godinho 1969), the true 
reason for their expansion cannot be found in the need for foodstuffs, as 
Portugal’s population had been practically stagnant since the Black Death. 
(Thomaz 1994, p. 17; Mattoso 1997, p. 327).2 Nor could early overseas 
expansion have been the enterprise of a nascent bourgeoisie taking its first 
commercial steps. Rather, above all else it entailed a way of giving free rein 
to the expansive needs of the nobility and the internal conflict that it was 
generating within Portuguese society during this period (Thomaz 1994, 
p. 27 and passim). This line of action, which remained important until the 
adventure launched from Ceuta that cost the life of King Sebastian (1578), 
would be completed with the exploration of the Saharan coasts and the 
Atlantic islands. To this end there existed incentives linked not only to 
local forces but also to globalization itself, such as the need for African 
gold and the desire to secure it directly, thus cutting out intermediaries, 
the Saharan traffickers; this option was ever more important as general 
prices were falling and so the purchasing power of gold was rising (Vilar 
1969; Godinho 1969).
The phases of this expansion are well known, and there is no point in 
setting them out again here.3 Often presented as private enterprises—and 
even as having a non-Portuguese component—Portuguese expansion 
would quickly assume a handful of definitive characteristics. It was fre-
quently marked by a system of razias (very common during the Reconquista 
and based fundamentally upon piracy and raiding) in search of slaves, 
gold, malaguetta pepper, and other products. As was often the case in 
imperial ventures of the day, these razias were usually undertaken in the 
hope of securing concessions and privileges from the king who, from an 
early stage, reserved the so-called right of conquest and taxes levied on 
general commerce for himself. Moreover, at the same time, a peculiar phe-
nomenon emerged—the ‘merchant state’ (Thomaz 1994). That is to say, 
the king assumed the role of trading directly and—it almost goes without 
saying—claimed for himself the monopoly over gold deposits, such as 
those of San Jorge da Mina. Moreover, if the monarch often offered con-
cessions to trade, conquer or raid from points on the coast, from 1469 
2 This having been said, Thomaz proposes a close correlation between immigration from 
the north eastern zone of the country, the most highly populated, and the repopulation of 
the Atlantic islands (1994, p. 17).
3 See Godinho (1969), Parry (1990, Chap. 6), and Chaunu (1977).
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he also proceeded to lease royal rights to merchants. In this way he broke 
with the system that depended upon concessions to fidalgos, nobles in 
general, escudeiros, and adventurers who had not always been born in 
Portugal (Thomaz 1994, p. 137). This was a system that sought to exter-
nalize the costs of the enterprise to the king and addressed the difficulty of 
mobilizing human resources that were very limited but, at the same time, 
created many problems of control for the Crown.
The outcome would be a society of few ties or links that would seek 
stability by conceding advantages to the casados, that is, those men who 
contracted matrimony and settled down more or less definitively overseas. 
It was also one that intensively tested the social codes of the metropolis—
above all else it challenged the traditional frontier between merchants and 
nobles, who were often all corsairs—and began a process of intermingling 
with local societies that would give rise to figures such as the famous lan-
çados, armed men who undertook pillaging operations, usually by travel-
ling on the great rivers (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 51–2). These groups 
came to exercise an enormous power of mediation between the metropolis 
and the local tribes, particularly with regard to commerce and piracy.
This rather unstructured system did not, however, prevent the forma-
tion of a genuine framework tying together the different points of this 
empire. Moreover, from the middle of the century, commerce began to 
impose itself upon the various raiding activities, to which it was, in any 
case, very closely related. By then, the Portuguese had arrived at Cape 
Verde and, thanks to the autonomy of navigation that the caravel bestowed 
upon them, were pressing ahead with the colonization of the Azores 
(Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 32–3, 92–3). Indeed, on these islands they had 
begun to expand the cultivation of sugar cane, a luxury product in this 
period and a symbol of social distinction (Mintz 1986), as well as the pro-
duction of wine in Madeira and other products in the different areas of the 
archipelago. These same forces built upon themselves: sugar further 
increased the need for slaves (Lisbon was an active market from the very 
beginning), who could be captured in the conquered territories or else-
where along the African coastline, thus feeding the plantations and further 
strengthening the momentum towards exploration and conquest. At the 
same time, the increasing supply of gold fostered the development of trade 
in the area and also in Portugal, as well as stimulated commerce between 
Portugal and Europe. It has often been pointed out that products exported 
to the feitorias (enclaves for trade and military actions) did not constitute 
a large volume of commerce. Nevertheless, these exports, however limited, 
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stimulated the trade in goods from Europe and, above all, Morocco; this 
situation particularly ensued with respect to the wealthier feitorias like San 
Jorge da Mina (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp.  60–1). By 1475 hopes were 
growing that Africa could be circumnavigated and Asia reached by sea 
(Thomaz 1994, pp. 142–5).
By this juncture—after 1478 and a long period in which the adventur-
ers’ actions were the norm—the Castilians controlled the Canary Islands 
and, with Genoese financial backing, began to extend the cultivation of 
sugar. As in other episodes of this age, this expansion responded to global 
stimuli and employed financial and technical resources with a markedly 
transnational component. In 1492, and above all thanks to Portugal, the 
Atlantic was opening up and becoming a dangerous but promising theatre 
of action for the Iberian peoples: its currents and winds were known; the 
economy which would later come to characterize it had begun to take 
shape; people, animals, and plants were now circulating among its seas and 
islands (Russell-Wood 1992). And the sea passage to Asia was open.
Towards a European Poly-nuclear Recovery
 European Recovery and Property Rights
A large number of explanations have been advanced for Europe’s eco-
nomic recovery. During the last decades of the twentieth century, a debate 
took place that showcased unilateral explanations such as those of Postan 
(Malthusian), Wallerstein (Marxist with an accent on relations of commer-
cial dependence), and Guy Bois or Brenner (also Marxist, with emphasis 
on the relations of production). All offered important insights.4 Yet the 
most plausible general explanation should not only encompass a combina-
tion of them but also include the effects of institutional transformations 
and the evolution of agrarian property rights. The recovery, in any case, 
was based upon regional processes of different rhythms and intensities that 
only in their second phase created synergies sufficient to constitute a gen-
eral phenomenon across the whole of Europe.
It was logical that from a very early stage, Lisbon, Seville, or Guadalquivir 
Valley, all of them linked to Atlantic commerce, should experience rapid 
growth. Toulouse, involved in the trade of pastel dyes since 1430 and also 
4 See Postan (1966), Bois (1976), Wallerstein (1979), and Brenner (1993).
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connected to international trade, experienced significant expansion. In 
northern Italy the profits from this new commerce were invested in agri-
cultural improvements and urban economies, such as those of Florence or 
Genoa, which expanded between 1444 and 1460 (Goldthwaite 1980, 
p. 33; Heers 1961, pp. 504–5). However, many other regions experienced 
serious problems. Immersed in the Hundred Years War, Normandy’s 
agrarian production fell intermittently until 1450, while its commerce suf-
fered ‘alternative phases of depression and recovery’. Breton commerce 
went through a similar pattern of boom and bust, and Catalonia, ever 
more marginalized from the main maritime artery that ran from Genoa to 
Mallorca, Valencia, and Granada, could not react.5 The Hundred Years 
War affected the volume of traffic in the English Channel, the very sea that 
was destined to serve as the great artery of European trade from the sec-
ond half of the fifteenth century. The precariousness of the emergent fiscal 
systems forced governments to finance these wars by manipulating their 
currencies, thus provoking more uncertainties for commerce. Above all 
else Europe desperately needed more money. Specie was now required not 
only for long-distance commerce but also for more modest operations, 
even if in effect this meant using ‘black money’, copper coins of low value 
(Spufford 1988). In such a situation, monetary instability entailed nega-
tive consequences. Furthermore, the elites’ demand for goods from the 
Orient provoked a continual drainage of metals away from Europe, the 
result of which was a serious monetary deficit that was impossible to over-
come through the established channels of securing gold and silver.
From 1460 to 1470, a pattern of expansion can be discerned, although 
this was not yet a general one. Nevertheless, regional circuits had begun 
connecting to each other more firmly. Fear of social uprising had led to a 
highly sophisticated system for supplying food in many European cities, 
something which was also positive for growth. The agrarian multi-activity 
(domestic industry, the muleteer trade, local or low-scale peddling, etc.), 
and crop-diversification (i.e. the cultivation of products for the market 
combined with those destined for self-consumption), widened the spec-
trum of resources available to the peasantry, thus advancing demographic 
and economic recovery. As a result of these and other changes, in France 
5 On Normandy, see Bois (1976, pp.  63–4, 117–22) and Mollat (1952, p.  542). On 
Brittany, Touchard (1967, pp. 377–8); for Catalonia, Vilar (1962, vol. I, pp. 419–20).
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the proportion of children per family rose from 1:1  in 1350–1410 to 
1:4 in 1440–1510 (Neveux et al. 1975, p. 140).
Are we facing a situation of lower seigniorial pressure upon agrarian 
activities leading to an improving standard of living for the peasantry, as set 
out by G. Bois many years ago (1976)? It is probable that a change along 
these lines did occur in many areas. But the factors behind this situation 
were more complex than the French historian allowed. In addition to the 
burden of the rents and seigniorial taxes, the peasantry also faced new 
demands made by the monarchy, whose fiscal system was increasingly 
developed and effective in many regions. Moreover, landlords’ incomes 
were also subject to a logic of extensive increase because of the foundation 
of new estates, which meant that the pressure fell on an increasing number 
of peasant families. And yet, notwithstanding these observations, we might 
also consider a series of factors which Bois did not contemplate and which 
might even lead us to strengthen his overall interpretation. The growth of 
seigniorial demands upon an ever-increasing number of vassals and peas-
ants frequently affected a rural population that had been, until this point, 
free of seigniorial charges. Therefore, these new extractions perhaps had 
fewer detrimental effects, at least in the short term. Furthermore, if land-
lords and royal tax collectors now demanded to be paid in coin, then this 
encouraged the commercialization of agrarian products by the peasantry as 
a means of obtaining the cash needed to pay these new extractions. It must 
also have given impetus to the rural manufactures and their commercializa-
tion as well as to the transport systems—especially the carting sector. 
Additionally, there were many great nobles who actively sought to attract 
trade fairs and weekly markets to their domains as a source of income and, 
therefore, a means of sponsoring commercial and industrial activities.6
In this context the opening up of the German silver mines provoked a 
‘pre-revolution’ of prices (Braudel and Spooner 1967). But, what could 
be the importance of a factor that affected only a marginal aspect of the 
economy of the time, such as prices and the circulation of high-quality 
specie? In reality, the flow of money acted in the context of an incipient 
urban network that would be decisive in providing dynamism to crucial 
zones of overland trade, such as those of the imperial territories. From this 
moment the Rhine artery served for the diffusion of English and Flemish 
textiles into the markets of central Europe. The valley of the Rhone and 
6 For Castile, see Ladero (1994) and Yun (1987). For England, Wilson (1959).
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the fairs of Lyon served to unite Northern and Central Europe with the 
south of France and Catalonia, where Germans sought light dyes and saf-
fron. The Central European region also developed, as German industries 
(fabrics, copper, and iron) expanded into Silesia and Bohemia.
This network gave rise to a system of fairs based upon centres such as 
Lyon, Nuremberg, Frankfurt, Vienna, or Krakow, which were also connected 
with the Brabant region, Castile, and Flanders (Pach 1968, pp. 310–1). 
The heart of Europe was recovering thanks to this more fluid overland com-
merce, and this energizing circuit was completed after the conclusion of the 
Hundred Years War (1453) and the pacification of Castile (1479), dragging 
in its wake goods such as Castilian wool, Ibizan salt, Biscayan iron, and the 
wines of Oporto. This trade brought the North Sea into closer contact with 
the Mediterranean (Childs 1978).
Europe witnessed the birth of a new model of economic expansion, one 
which had its roots in a closer linking of the peasant economies with the 
market; a broader spectrum of productive activities; a more fluid and 
better- organized overland commerce, which was completed by the inter-
linking of decisive circuits of maritime trade; and the overall advances in 
the sophistication and security of international commerce as well as the 
mental apparatus and horizons of Europeans.
This expansion cannot be explained by subordinate economic relation-
ships between the distinct regions. The European recovery appears in 
principle to be better explained by the model of poly-nuclear growth set 
out by H. Van der Wee (1990) or J. Israel (1990), than by a system of 
hierarchical relations, as Wallerstein suggested some time ago (1979).
 The Iberian Peninsula
This broad tide had a dramatic impact upon the Iberian Peninsula, where 
growth was not delayed once the different forces began to combine and 
reinforce a series of arteries binding internal commerce with the zones of 
the coastal areas.
The Atlantic areas were, by now, exhibiting signs of incipient dyna-
mism. In Andalusia, from the fifteenth century, the flow of Sudanese gold 
towards the coast of North Africa had attracted the Genoese who, pushed 
forward by their fierce rivalry with the Venetians, had established 
 themselves in Malaga, Cadiz, and, later, Seville. The presence of the 
Ottoman Turk in Asia Minor and the reduction of the production of sugar 
in Egypt left the market open to the Genoese, who expanded into Madeira 
and the Canary Islands. On the coastal estates of Huelva’s local aristocrats 
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in southern Castile, nobles such as the Medinasidonia and Niebla gained 
access to abundant African fisheries and the wheat of the Maghreb. The 
Canaries, conquered by Castile, served as a magnificent bridgehead from 
which to extend the cultivation of sugar cane (Fernández Armesto 1982, 
pp. 13–5). The abundance of available lands in the Guadalquivir Valley fed 
continual emigration from the north and advanced the formation of great 
noble estates producing food crops for the swelling cities. But the 
Andalusian axis was nothing more than a part of a line of expansion that 
had another pivot on the Portuguese coasts and, more concretely, in 
Lisbon. In this way a tendency was carried out that led to a greater depen-
dency upon Castile’s economy and society, and that would be the basis for 
Portugal’s political neutrality (Thomaz 1994). Here contacts with Africa 
and the Canary Islands fed the slave trade, while the docks saw the arrival 
of unprecedented quantities of wood, peppers, sugar, gold, wine, and 
other products coming not only from Africa but also now from the 
Madeira islands and the Azores (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 84–93). Lisbon 
and Oporto were becoming the most dynamic parts of the Portuguese 
economy; the products that passed through these hubs were found, in 
increasing numbers, in Antwerp (Van der Wee 1963). The Atlantic front, 
running from Cadiz to Oporto, was establishing itself as more and more 
relevant to European patterns of trade. A key factor in all of this was the 
gold brought from the Sudan to Portugal, which also fed trade with the 
north of Europe and was crucial for the strengthening of the Atlantic front 
of the Old World. Not only Portugal but the whole Luso-Atlantic area 
would be now more closely linked to the north of Europe.
This vitality was equally discernible in the strength and vigour of the 
Cantabrian ports, which served as arteries connecting the north of Europe 
with the interior dynamism of Castile and the Duero Valley.7 Castilian mer-
chants were favoured by changes in the Flemish markets and by the pro-
duction of new and lighter cloth of a high quality (Van der Wee 1988, 
pp. 329–36). This thriving commerce, reflected in the foundation of the 
Universidad de Mercaderes, a trade guild, and, in 1494, in the Consulado de 
Burgos (Consulate of Burgos), would be accompanied by the development 
of maritime insurance and the export of wool, salt, wine and Basque iron 
7 On the connections with Britany, see Touchard (1967). Childs (1978) studies the links 
with England and Munro (1973) stressed the positive effects on Castilian wool trade of the 
English protectionist bullion acts.
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to satisfy the increasing demand generated by the European economy’s 
recovery. It was also accompanied by an ever-growing trade in the import 
of fabrics, artwork, and luxury items from Flanders.8
The activation of Mediterranean trade was accompanied by a displace-
ment of the commercial centre of gravity from Barcelona to the Mallorca- 
Valencia axis and the increasing presence of the Genoese in these areas. 
This network incorporated two trade routes: one came from the East and 
the Near East; another ran from Genoa to North Africa. But the expan-
sion of Genoese interests into Castile and Portugal would also enhance the 
connections between the western Mediterranean and the north of Europe 
(Iradiel and Sarasa 1989, pp. 103–6).
These axes of expansion linked to international commerce converged in 
the Iberian inlands and were the basis for an impressive development of 
commerce and financial techniques on the peninsula. Furthermore, this part 
of Europe was a crossroad that necessarily saw its dynamism reinforced.
Institutions, Political Economies, and Regional Forces
From the fourteenth century, the demographic problems derived from the 
Black Death tied into difficulties originating from the involvement of the 
Iberian kingdoms in various phases of the Hundred Years War, as well as a 
series of internal conflicts which, in turn, became mixed up with factional 
disputes.9 But if the problems had common roots, the responses, set out 
in the respective polities’ institutional systems, underlie their different pat-
terns of economic recovery.
It should not surprise us that Portugal should be one of the first territo-
ries to recover economically. The stability of its political system was a deci-
sive contributing factor to this recuperation. But behind this phenomenon 
there stood the imperial expansion itself, which strengthened the king eco-
nomically, as he controlled taxes paid by the Cortes, another stabilizing 
factor. The abundance of African gold afforded the Crown a greater degree 
of monetary availability and helped to avoid currency devaluation, thus 
providing security to domestic commerce (Thomaz 1994). But, above all, 
such an expansion offered an outlet for aristocratic tensions, reduced the 
degree of internal conflict, and afforded the chance to reduce the pressure 
8 Bilbao (1987, pp. 51–2); Van der Wee (1988, p. 330) Childs (1978, p. 89 and Chap. 4).
9 For a synthesis of the political history of this period and the role of war, see Mackay 
(1980).
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on peasants and vassals (Thomaz 1994). At this moment the new property 
systems were consolidated: these were based on enfiteusis (in which land 
was conferred by estates through long-term lease agreements) which 
offered good farming conditions to peasants. Moreover, the development 
of Atlantic trade favoured the growth of population centres between Galicia 
and Lisbon, with the riverside settlements—above all, those of the Tagus—
also benefitting. This also improved the conditions for commercialization 
of peasant produce, some of whose goods (above all, wine) were hence-
forth exported to the north of Europe.
This process did not lead to the disappearance of differences between 
the more populated region to the north of the Tagus and the more sparsely 
populated areas to the south, towards the Algarve, which were also posi-
tively affected by the new commerce and enjoyed climates and soils that 
were kinder than those of the Alentejo. Moreover, this pattern was consis-
tent with a certain difference originating in the respective institutional 
systems: to the north, the seigniors wielded enormous authority; in the 
large zone to the south of the Tagus, the great councils, sometimes under 
the domination of the Military Orders, shaped the society and institutions 
that regulated the assignment of resources (Mattoso 1997, pp. 528 and 
ff.). From 1450 population began to grow for the first time since the Black 
Death, and by around 1500 it had superseded its levels in 1348 (Mattoso 
1997, p. 333). From this point the growing workforce helped to maintain 
the expansive rhythm of the noble economies.
According to the most common interpretation, in the Crown of Castile, 
the abundance of available lands after the demographic crisis served to 
strengthen the development of sheep and livestock breeding and, conse-
quently, of an economy based upon wool exports.10 This is, however, only 
part of the picture. The recovery would depend to a great degree upon the 
institutional framework and how it came to regulate the assignment of eco-
nomic resources. A key development was the rise of a new fiscal system 
based on two types of taxes: the tercias (the two ninths of the tithe ceded by 
the Church to the Crown) and the alcabala (a local tax of Muslim origin set 
in theory at 10% of commercial transactions). The latter was conceded ini-
tially only as an annual service by the Cortes but became permanent without 
ever being formally renewed by them. Contrary to what would happen in 
the Crown of Aragon, the King of Castile retained a high degree of freedom 
of action over both the collection and use of taxes of this sort.
10 This traditional view is set out in the classic study of Klein (1979).
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It was one thing to create laws, consolidate royal jurisdictions, and 
obtain taxes yet quite another to ensure their enforcement, integrity, and 
collection. In fact, since the fourteenth century, and in a climate character-
ized by continual conflict, the Castilian sovereigns had found themselves 
forced to alienate the right to collect tercias and alcabalas to the nobility; 
they were also compelled to create new seigniorial estates as a means of 
maintaining clients in this group. Thus, the royal demesne, theoretically 
inalienable, was progressively reduced. To exacerbate this situation, the 
collection of royal taxes was not at all easy on the noble estates. As a result, 
by 1450 the economic basis of the new nobility had been established: 
large-scale livestock herding, landownership, and alienated royal incomes.11 
And this pattern was not only applicable to the aristocracy but also to the 
ecclesiastical institutions. Moreover, in exchange for their help, a few 
monarchs had ceded privileges, jurisdictions, and even royal taxes to the 
cities.12 Thus, the cities’ rights of lordship (urban señorío) and their con-
trol over common lands and privileges became more defined. As might 
have been expected, many of these privileges and sources of income were 
acquired by towns represented in the Cortes, and many of these were cities 
situated in the Duero and Guadalquivir Valleys. The development of this 
institutional system helped to shape the patterns of economic growth. 
Even when facing considerable geographical obstacles, the emergent 
urban networks served to advance the greater integration of large eco-
nomic spaces. The consequent links and connections were visible in com-
mercial routes which, in turn, fed into the larger international networks 
described above. From the coasts of Cantabria trade flowed down, invigo-
rating the economy of the Duero Valley. From Seville, the arteries ascended 
up to Toledo, passing through Córdoba and La Mancha. The commerce 
of Lisbon would tie in with the fairs of Medina del Campo and the Duero 
regions and with the traffic of Seville in the Guadalquivir Valley. A multi-
tude of annual fairs and weekly markets scattered throughout these regions 
served to tie the local economies with the international circuits. The 
strengthening of the cities facilitated the concentration of agrarian incomes 
in them, which in turn fed their economic activities and thus benefited a 
growing group of artisans and businessmen.
11 Suárez (1975), Martínez Sopena (1977), Quintanilla (1979), Cabrera (1977), Mata 
(1987), Atienza (1987).
12 Rucquoi (1987, vol. I, pp, 293–310), Diago (1993, pp. 181–206), Sánchez (1989), Jara 
(2000).
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The other side of Castile’s institutional development—the strengthening 
of the seigniorial estates of the nobility and the Church—would also have 
positive effects for economic growth. The emigration of peasants towards 
the south obliged many landowners of the northern Meseta to try to 
retain their population; to this end they ceded the right to use extensive 
tracts of land to rural communities, a trend which would increase agrarian 
output. The possession of alcabalas and tercias, as well as the privileges to 
stage markets and fairs, redoubled the interest of the aristocracy in spon-
soring trade and in settling populations in their lands. In Andalusia, the 
great estates situated near important urban centres took advantage of a 
more regular pattern of commercialization and benefited from the arrival 
of a workforce and the growing urban demand (Collantes 1977).
In addition to the increasing production of cereals, wine, olive oil, and 
other products, economic expansion was evident but the livestock econ-
omy. In the case of sheep, production was organized into local and regional 
guilds or unions (mestas), as well as in the great association called the 
Honourable Council of the Mesta (Bishko 1978). Economic growth took 
place in the industrial and commercial sectors. With regard to the first, 
change was evident in the potential of the urban guilds but also in the 
emergence in some areas of a rural and urban cycle often controlled by a 
merchant-businessman (a real verlager, in many senses). The flowering of 
these commercial and financial activities was evident in many cities. Burgos 
and Seville are the best known examples (Pike 1978; Casado 1987).
The evolution would be subtly different in the Crowns of Navarre and 
Aragon. The repopulation formulas applied there were similar to those of 
Castile and had given rise to the emergence, next to the feudal nobility, of 
towns with well-defined seigniorial jurisdictions and diverse ethnic and 
religious populations. But these regions’ emergence from the crisis had 
been different, and some institutional variations are visible.
Navarre had been hemmed in between France, Castile, and Aragon, three 
of the most powerful political formations of the period, a fact that reduced 
its opportunities for overcoming the crisis through territorial expansion. 
Only a policy aimed at ensuring diplomatic equilibrium among its three 
neighbours—and, above all, between Castile and France—allowed the king-
dom of Navarre to survive as an independent political entity until 1515. 
As a result of this inherent limitation, the fiscal capacity of the kingdom was 
lower. As in Castile, the alcabalas were appropriated by the high nobility 
(Usunáriz 1997, p. 71). But the difficulties in increasing the yield of these 
taxes limited the scope for the extension of the nobles’ incomes, a trend 
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which redoubled the conflict between the different factions of the kingdom, 
in which the nobility played an important part.
The territories of the Crown of Aragon (the kingdoms of Aragon, 
Mallorca, and Valencia and the principality of Catalonia) also displayed 
marked differences to those of Castile. The Cortes were characterized by 
a system of a balance of power between king and kingdom that was much 
more formalized institutionally than in Castile. These assemblies’ greatest 
strength lay in their capacity to pass legislation and the fact that they were 
convened periodically and as separate assemblies representing the king-
doms or, as was the case in Catalonia, the principality. As in Castile, the 
royal patrimony had been exhausted, above all in Aragon. But the power 
of the Cortes and the Delegations of the Cortes (Diputació) would impose 
noticeable limitations on the monarchy’s capacity to create an indepen-
dent and efficient fiscal system. A good deal of royal income would come 
from the monarch’s negotiations with cities such as Zaragoza, Barcelona, 
Valencia, or Palma de Mallorca to obtain cash advances in exchange for 
royal privileges, financed through the sale of municipal bonds (censals). 
These procedures would restrict the possibility of conferring royal incomes 
upon the nobility in the way that had occurred in Castile and led the 
Aragonese nobility to overcome the crisis by reinforcing its jurisdictional 
rights and its capacity to change the legal framework in the Cortes. In the 
kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, the large size of the Morisco (originally 
Islamic) communities and their social weakness allowed landlords to 
increase peasant servitude and the duties on family  production.13 But the 
Christian vassals were not to escape the demands of the nobility either, as 
a good part of its income was based upon monopolies, tithes, and ‘various 
other forms of payment and taxation, but always very high ones’. Likewise 
the landlord retained important privileges of precedence in the sale of 
products, which, in markets that were less developed than those of Castile, 
also had a negative effect on peasant commercialization of any surplus 
(Lacarra 1972, pp. 135–6, 175).
The effects of this institutional framework in shaping models of 
economic growth in the Crowns of Navarre and Aragon were obvious. As 
in nearly all of Europe, the very favourable relation between population 
and available land created adequate conditions for expansion. But formal 
13 The Cortes of 1423, 1436, and 1461 renewed the landlords’ ‘right to mistreat’ their 
vassals and consecrated their judicial autonomy, which became the crucial part of the agree-
ment between king and kingdom in some areas (Iradiel and Sarasa 1989, p. 648).
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political institutions would shape the different patterns of development 
and the distinct political economies of each kingdom.
The strip of land that encompasses today’s regions of Navarre and 
Aragon was perhaps the least dynamic in economic terms. In both territo-
ries the urban network was less developed or depended too heavily upon 
the macrocephaly of Zaragoza, around which it gravitated. The new aris-
tocracies were not as active as their Castilian counterparts in promoting 
commerce, due to their incomes depending less heavily upon it. Agriculture 
had a number of strong points. A Morisco agriculture existed, often based 
upon irrigation systems and exhibiting high levels of productivity. The 
extension of the enfiteusis system fed peasant commercialization. But, in 
contrast to Castile, the payment of land rents in proportion to production, 
as well as the landlord’s monopolies upon the sale of agrarian products, 
limited peasant commercialization and the chances of developing an agrar-
ian and population growth cycle similar to that of Castile. The urban net-
work was less dense in Navarre and Aragon than in Castile. This fact, 
together with a trade pattern based upon exports by major merchants of 
commodities obtained by leasing seigniorial rents, reduced the positive 
effects of commerce upon producers. Economic growth was palpable, and 
symptoms of improvement can be perceived in the living conditions of 
peasants and in the expansion of the livestock economy (Laliena 1987). 
But these areas’ demographic and productive dynamism lagged behind 
that of Castile.
From the point of view of its resource endowment, Catalonia was one 
of the peninsula’s areas with the greatest economic potential. Nevertheless, 
in Catalonia, an increase in the landlords’ pressure upon vassals unleashed 
situations of social instability and had negative effects on economic growth 
even more serious than those of Castile. The issuing of municipal bonds 
diverted capital away from commercial development. The macrocephaly 
of Barcelona created provisioning problems and accentuated its depen-
dence upon wheat imported by sea. This situation not only contributed to 
increase the city’s debts due to the need to pay for foodstuffs but also 
encouraged the flight of money out of the principality and thus contrib-
uted to monetary instability. The shift of Genoese trade towards Valencia 
and Seville worsened the state of affairs. Moreover, as R. S. López and 
Vicens underlined years ago, Catalonia did not count upon a domestic 
market in its hinterland that would have allowed it to ‘face the onslaught 
of the crisis’ (Vicens Vives 1974, p. 213). The Catalan economy recov-
ered, but the recession would last until the end of the fifteenth century.
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In Valencia there existed the vestiges of serfdom—in particular this was 
true among the Morisco population—and a very solid pattern of seigniorial 
jurisdictions, even when set against the authority of king, had emerged as 
the solution to the problem of the maintenance of aristocratic power. As in 
the kingdom of Aragon, the relative autonomy guaranteed to the land-
holders in the enforcement of the terms of contracts served as the basis for 
the collection of incomes derived from their lands. In addition to share 
cropping, the renting out of individual farms (by enfiteusis) and monopo-
lies, as well as the tercias, constituted important parts of landlords’ income. 
Some of these landlords, as was the case with the Gandía family, also 
received important incomes from sugar mills. As in Aragon, the crisis had 
helped to strengthen the position of a minority of well-off workers. The 
dimensions of the farms they owned were to increase, as did other factors 
or trends in their favour. But, above all, and in contrast to Aragon and 
Catalonia, the shift of international trade towards Valencia made it one of 
the peninsula’s more important commercial and artisanal centres. With 
70,000 inhabitants in 1480, its role as intermediary between the 
Mediterranean and the hinterlands of Castile and Aragon intensified, at the 
same time as its industrial base grew and expanded (to incorporate wool 
and silk textiles, paper, the printing press, and—of course—construction) 
(Furió 1995). In these circumstances a commercial agriculture developed 
which produced goods for both local markets and export. It was based on 
the direct commercialization of peasant production thanks in part to the 
favourable conditions created by the enfiteusis. Next to non-traded cultiva-
tion, the growth of market-oriented products such as sugar cane and the 
white mulberry tree (tied to the production of silk) also became stronger. 
This does not mean, however, that we can speak of a regional growth 
marked by harmony and balance. The capital’s overwhelming demand for 
resources compelled the authority to source wheat from Castile and Sicily, 
and paying for these imports had to be met by the exportation of sugar 
and, above all, silk.
A similar combination of factors explains Mallorca’s economic expan-
sion. Even if a good part of the nobility had ploughed their investments 
into municipal debts, the crisis had favoured them by the formation of 
farmsteads of a considerable size which would give rise to a form of agri-
culture that was intensively commercialized and based upon a paid labour 
force, replacing obsolete and residual forms of slavery. As it became 
increasingly important to the Mediterranean trade systems thanks to the 
Genoese alliance, Mallorca appeared to have strengthened its (by now) 
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traditional commerce with Africa and with areas of Italy and the Iberian 
Peninsula. In turn these links had positive consequences for its industry. 
Yet the Mallorca economy was a long way from being a balanced one. 
Exports seldom compensated for imports of Sicilian wheat and the acqui-
sition of municipal bonds by Catalan merchants accentuated the flow of 
money out of the island.
social conflicts and political reGimes
Aristocratic Lineages, Local Oligarchies, and Conflict
The great estates are preserved best by extending them, and since they can-
not remain unchanged it is inevitable that they decline unless they are 
expanded.14
These were the words that an astute observer, don Pedro Pacheco, mar-
quis of Villena and favourite of Henry IV of Castile (1424–1474), used to 
refer to a structural phenomenon in European societies of his time: the 
expansive logic of the aristocratic houses and estates. Several decades later, 
Nicolò Machiavelli devoted his Il Principe to the problem of the stato 
which had to be preserved (conservato) and often expanded in order to 
maintain the prince’s status. This expansive dynamic was linked to the 
conflictive environment of the time, in which the only means of preserving 
bloodline, status, and prestige was through a continual struggle for power 
against peers. Events in France, and especially the process of the formation 
of great seigniorial estates, which were sometimes spread out or scattered 
over considerable distances, provide a good example of how families could 
accumulate new resources (Nassiet 2000). The Portuguese case (described 
above) provides further evidence of this dynamic. As in Castile, a crisis had 
emerged in the oldest aristocratic lineages (e.g. the Sousa) (Thomaz 1994, 
pp. 443, 458–9), but a new generation had emerged whose clashes would 
reach previously unseen proportions and would result in expansionist 
tensions.15 If today’s businesses live in a world of economic competition 
determined by market share and technological progress, the noble houses 
14 Del Pulgar, (1971, p. XIV).
15 Mattoso (1997, p. 454) has pointed out that one of the keys of the noble houses’ behav-
iour was their necessity to ‘acrescentar’ (expand) their dominions.
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of the 1400s existed in a context of military-political conflict that drove 
them to expand their estates and to fight for political and economic 
resources. This was their way of avoiding extinction.
The historiography has also emphasized the political context, particu-
larly the idea that in a highly fragmented institutional and jurisdictional 
system, maintaining status with respect to peers required violence, which 
therefore became normal. In this way, the political structure’s main com-
ponent, jurisdiction, overlapped with the lineages’ internal conflicts. The 
study of these features of medieval societies shed new light on the dynam-
ics of the epoch’s political economy.
This expansionism was also rooted in the internal dynamics of the family 
and the lineage. Until well into the modern period, the seigniorial family 
had to live beneath the spectre of extinction. As in all classes wielding high 
disposable incomes in the ancien régime, birth rates were very high. But, at 
the same time, martial activities brought a high mortality rate, above all in 
sons, which resulted in a limited capacity for biological reproduction (Clark 
2007). This having been said, it is now known that the need to guarantee 
masculine line of succession led to practices which markedly encouraged 
the birth rate, not only in regard to sex but also in the speed and frequency 
in the celebration of second nuptials. But, more important—and as hap-
pens in businesses today—the behaviour of these groups was determined 
by their perceptions and short-term anxieties and not by long-term statis-
tics (which are of course the backbone of modern studies). It is known that 
many families found themselves having to provide new political and eco-
nomic resources for their offspring, provisions made in the hope that they 
would live to inherit them. Quite frequently these arrangements were made 
during the childhood or even before the birth of a beneficiary. For these 
reasons there was, in the short term, a clear and recurring desire to ensure 
the expansion of estates and resources.16
The predominance of the extended family pattern among the aristoc-
racy and the extension of its webs of kin solidarity towards distant relatives 
and social and political clients accentuated the desire to expand the 
patrimony as a way to satisfy the promotion of the collateral and secondary 
members of the lineage. The same effects drove the need to provide dow-
ries and favourable marriage alliances for female members, who were also 
16 Many examples of these practices can be found in the collection of studies edited by 
Costa and Rodrigues (eds.) (2004).
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crucial to the families’ economic and political strategies. In the Iberian 
kingdoms, the institution of mayorazgo (entailed estate) or the morgadio 
in Portugal, aiming at preserving the patrimony intact for the eldest son, 
redoubled the desire to search for new estates with which to compensate 
second-born sons. These institutions also compelled families to pay higher 
dowries to facilitate favourable marriages or the entrance of daughters into 
the Church.17 Lawsuits and disputes over rights of succession, a manifesta-
tion of this inner conflict, ate up increasing quantities of money and 
resources, thus feeding the need for more.18 This dynamic within the rul-
ing families unleashed friction for the control of areas of strategic impor-
tance.19 Advances made in military techniques and fortifications, and the 
consequent increase in the cost of these technologies, reinforced the need 
for expansive policies (Cooper 1991, vol. I.1, pp. 83–6).
The political economy of the estates reinforced this outcome. The exer-
cise of seigniorial power led to the cession of part of the seigniorial income 
to local forces or agents in order to cement alliances, thus enhancing the 
expansive logic of the estates and the conflict inherent in them. Increasingly 
widespread possessions led to greater monitoring and administration costs 
and so created a vicious cycle in the expansion of these estates.20 Political 
and social competition entailed additional costs of legitimization and 
patronage, namely, expressions of cultural magnificence springing from the 
chivalric mentality displayed in concepts such as ‘the life of fame’ (la vida 
de la fama) and immortalized by the most cultured noble patrons, such as 
Jorge Manrique, in stunning works of art. This familial munificence also 
had to be manifested in artistic patronage and the foundation of religious 
establishments that could support relatives and clients within the house-
hold.21 This spiral of escalating commitments, which reinforced the anxiety 
for expansion and the search for additional estates and resources, must have 
been quite common in this era. Around this time, another Castilian noble, 
17 Although from a later period, the dowry of 85,000 ducats that the Almirante of Castile 
paid to the Count of Benavente, setting this sum against his income, can be added to the 
previous example. Osuna, leg. 424, Archivo Histórico Nacional (hereafter AHN).
18 See the case of the Mendoza family in Nader (1986, pp. 129–54).
19 See the case of the conflict between the Stúñigas and Mendozas in Ladero (1982, p. 173).
20 See the case of the Benavente and their need to multiply the number of administrative 
units (mayordomías) in Osuna, leg. 424. AHN.
21 See Cabrera (1977, pp. 325–30) or the testament of the Duchess of Alburquerque in 




don Gómez Manrique, expressed the ‘agony’ of the lords and monarchs 
due to the fact that ‘the more land/they have in more dominions/the 
more immense agonies/they face night and day with payments and wars’.22
One of the main outcomes of this need to expand estates was the 
noble’s quest to secure royal demesne and voracity for the usurpation of 
Crown taxes which, as we have seen, were essential components of the 
political confrontation. This would be crucial to political developments.
These trends coincided with two convergent features of late medieval 
societies: first, the urban patriciate’s involvement in a similar dynamic of con-
flict and its predisposition for expansion; and second, the increasing impor-
tance of urban government for the reproduction of the patriciate’s status.
One could state that there were demographic reasons for this first feature, 
if we consider the high index of family turnover within wealthy nonaristo-
cratic groups in Old Regime Europe and the pressure or need that it created 
for the expansion of their own patrimony.23 But this was especially true when 
they had evolved more towards noble forms and felt the same types of social 
pressures and constraints as the high nobility, which was a normal process in 
fifteenth-century Castile and Europe in general.24 Moreover, the process of 
internal change that this group was experiencing was in itself a source of ten-
sions and a catalyst for internal conflicts. Though a uniform model of evolu-
tion never existed, the cases of Valladolid, Guadalajara, Segovia, and Córdoba 
offer good examples. Here the patriciate families lived in a state of perma-
nent internal tension that very often superimposed itself upon aristocratic 
and dynastic rivalries and was also intimately linked to family or clientele 
strategies as well as to the need to increase their political and symbolic power 
within the ayuntamientos (town halls). The entrance of the Jewish converso 
families into the ranks of the patrician elite certainly did not smooth over 
these clashes but rather created new disputes.25
But this was just a part of the story. The strengthening of the towns and 
cities as they acted as agents for the Reconquista and the emergence of this 
22 ‘Cuanto mayores tierras/tienen en más señoríos,/más inmensas agonías/sostienen 
noches e días con libranças e con guerras/’.
23 This is the main argument of Clark (2007), which, as we will explain below, is taken here 
in a different way. The material and visual culture of the period, of which Memling’s portrait 
of a merchant family is a good example, is very expressive in this respect.
24 In the case of Castile, this social ascension was materialized in what Suárez (1975) called 
the formation of a ‘new nobility’.
25 See examples in Rucquoi (1987, vol. II, pp. 189–213), and Yun (1980).
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urban elite had led to the growing importance of the urban señorío and the 
ayuntamientos as spaces of power and political action, as well as their serv-
ing as key factors for the preservation of the political and economic capital 
of the oligarchies and the middling nobility. Thus, the expansion and pres-
ervation of the urban señorío and its privileges also became the spigot for 
the patriciate’s political conflicts with the big landlords and the king. 
Underpinning those conflicts, there was also a line of political thinking 
according to which the king’s main obligation was the defence of the royal 
demesne and patrimony, including the taxes (principally the alcabalas) 
voted by the Cortes and paid mainly by the cities. This idea also explains 
the continuing protests made by the cities in the Cortes against the alien-
ation of the demesne as well as their bargaining with the Crown over their 
eventual support for the concession of political and economic privileges in 
exchange of voting new services (Haliczer 1981). No doubt, this political 
position by the cities implied a contradiction of great impact and signifi-
cance, in that the patriciate families were often allied with particular 
 aristocratic households but collectively opposed their interests before the 
Crown. But this situation would also open up one of the most important 
lines of conflict until the end of the sixteenth century (Chap. 4).
A dynamic of this sort was not only the result of the needs of the great 
lay lords and the urban patriciate. It was also derived from the growth of 
ecclesiastical institutions. In order to understand this, it is necessary to 
consider that the church hierarchy was an institution in itself—with its 
own dynamic but also subject to specific interest groups—and, at the same 
time, a safety valve for tensions originating in the heart of the aristocracy 
and the urban elites. A large number of individuals from both groups 
entered into the great ecclesiastical institutions and through them, and 
their extraordinary influence, contributed not only to the reproduction of 
the interests of the different families but also to smooth over their own 
conflicts (see also Chaps. 4 and 5). The result was a high degree of ten-
sion: first, because, as we have seen, the need to support these institutions 
through donations further increased the basic imperative that drove for-
ward both the patricians and aristocrats; and, second, because church 
institutions expanded not only by receiving donations but also by pur-
chases or usurpations,26 which clashed with the expansion of the noble 
estates and threatened the royal demesne, contributing in this way to 
cities’ uneasiness (Cabrera 1977, pp. 140–72; Owens 1980, 2005).




A similar process was taking place in many rural communities where, at 
the same time as a system of power based upon the concejo, the peasant 
community, was being set in place, a group of well-off peasants was able to 
establish itself and to grow progressively stronger. From the remensas, the 
elite of the peasant society of Catalonia, to the Castilian labradores (a sort 
of yeomen) who enjoyed a strong degree of representation in the village 
town halls, this group extended its capacity for political action both within 
rural communities and beyond them. Its political activities were mainly 
directed to protecting the collective rights of communities, which of 
course guaranteed the concejo significant privileges or advantages. The 
importance of the right to use the communal village fields, in conjunction 
with the significant extension of these common lands in this period, bound 
these well-off peasants to the rest of the peasantry. At the same time, this 
defence of the commons also became the main reason for conflict with the 
landlords, who usurped these resources in spite of the specific alliances 
that they often established with the well-off peasants.
To complete this portrait, it has also been said that the growing dyna-
mism of both urban and agrarian societies led to friction in the heart of the 
cities and mid-ranking towns. The gap between a highly dynamic minority 
on the one hand and the artisans and the overflow population of low- skilled 
or unskilled workers on the other created conditions ripe for uprisings. 
Above all this was the case in the populous cities of the south, such as 
Córdoba and Seville, and in centres such as Valencia, Barcelona, or 
Zaragoza. As we shall see, tensions resulted in conflicts involving accusa-
tions of ethnic or religious impurity; they also led to struggles between rival 
groups and lineages that challenged the traditions of coexistence and gave 
vent to popular demands manifested more or less explicitly (Mackay 1972).
Isabella and Fernando: From Crisis to War and Expansion
 Bargaining Power
These tensions became more evident from the middle of the century when 
Henry IV (1425–1474) applied an erratic policy in Castile. Known as 
‘Henry of the Favours’ (Enrique de las Mercedes), on account of his efforts 
to win over the high nobility by conceding taxes and parts of the realm, he 
also attempted to deal with the claims by the Cortes, taking measures to 
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balance out the situation by introducing the so-called tasa de señoríos.27 
Yet these measures proved largely inadequate, and the king had to initiate 
a policy of monetary devaluation. The outcome was a reaction by the 
nobles, whose incomes in cash were depreciated, and the cities, whose 
commerce was adversely affected (Mackay 1981, pp.  87–104). He was 
also unable to control local revolts. In the cities of Andalusia and Galicia, 
a series of conflicts between urban or rural noble factions exploded and 
even paved the way to more radical peasant protests, leading the authori-
ties to unite to suffocate the rebellion (Valdeón 1975, p. 171). Complaints 
about the usurpation of royal patrimony led to uprisings in many of the 
towns (Haliczer 1981).
In the Crown of Aragon, the tensions became very evident during the 
reign of John II (1398–1479). In Catalonia the rebellion of the remensa 
peasants, infuriated by the efforts of the landlords to overcome their prob-
lems by resurrecting the old feudal rights, superimposed itself upon the 
pre-existing conflict between the urban factions of Barcelona. Here, the 
tension was between the so-called Busca, mainly artisans, and the Biga, 
composed of members of the patriciate, financiers, and those whose 
incomes derived from the city’s debts (censals). The former were in favour 
of a protectionist policy and monetary devaluation that ensured the com-
petitiveness of their goods in the international markets. The latter were 
inclined to call for monetary stability, hoping to retain the value of their 
censals. Conflicts within the nobility and the patriciate were also seen in 
Zaragoza, Teruel, Huesca, Mallorca, and Valencia, where different fac-
tions locked horns to secure a slice of the available political and economic 
resources. In Navarre the tensions between different factions with a pro-
nounced noble character (the beamonteses and the agramonteses) took the 
form of an authentic civil war that pitted prince Charles of Viana against 
his father, John II of Aragon.
Traditional historiography usually considers the marriage of Isabella 
and Ferdinand as a turning point in this process, the outcome of which 
was political order. Probably it was. Yet the ‘Catholic monarchs’ were not 
able to impose an unrestricted form of absolutism, as has sometimes been 
suggested. Political stability was rather the outcome of social transactions 
and bargaining with the elites.
27 The ‘tasa de señoríos’, often considered a concession to the nobility on the grounds that 
the king acknowledged the landlords’ right to collect the alcabalas within their señoríos, was 
in fact a mutual concession between king and nobles (Yun 2004, p. 62) See also Nueva 
Recopilación, lib. IX, tit. XV, f. 93 v.
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
29
Isabella and Ferdinand’s arrival on the throne was the result of a long 
period of political instability and a civil war. By this juncture a sector of the 
aristocracy had taken to the idea that the only way out of the near- 
permanent chaos that threatened the established order was a strong mon-
archy. There were sound political reasons for this conclusion, but economic 
ones were also important. The civil war in Castile had demonstrated to 
many members of the elite the need for a strong monarchy that guaran-
teed the political and fiscal system (Haliczer 1975, 1981, pp. 56–8; Perez 
1989). The same could be said of the Catalan nobility and the elites of 
Barcelona, who were ever more convinced of the need for the king’s arbi-
tration. Castilian cities were at this point convinced that they had to ‘sub-
ordinate their own ambitions to the conservation of the “power and union 
of the royal crown”’.28 The movement of the Hermandades, coalitions or 
‘brotherhoods’ of cities that signed pacts for mutual defence, reflected the 
need for domestic pacification.
For these reasons the ability of the Crown to push through reforms 
depended upon a policy of negotiation and bargaining which was often 
twofold. In Castile the creation of the Royal Council consolidated the 
power of the king over the nobility. But this same council continued to 
protect the corporate jurisdictions of the nobles, Church, and cities. The 
creation of the regional courts, the Audiencias and the Chancillerías 
strengthened the superiority of the king’s justice over the landlords’ pri-
vate jurisdictions. But, crucially, the lay and church estates retained their 
courts, and they continued, therefore, to exercise their power of enforce-
ment as first instance courts. The reform of the Castilian fiscal system was 
also highly significant. In the Cortes of 1476, the kings managed to obtain 
a huge service, but they were again reminded of their duty to preserve the 
integrity of both the realm and royal taxes. The consequence was a series 
of measures aimed at the closer control of the royal debt and at limiting 
any further usurpation or donation of the royal patrimony.29 These mea-
sures culminated in 1480 when the juro’s interest rates (paid by the 
Crown) were decreed and orders were given that all those who had 
28 González Alonso (1988, p. 254). This idea was made very clear in the reminder of the 
Cortes of Ocaña (1469) to the king that he was obliged to rule and keep peace in the king-
dom. Patronato Real, 69, doc. 18. AGS. The idea was also very prominent in Castilian poli-
tics, as similar notions were expressed in the Cortes of 1455, ibid., 69, doc. 14, fol. 14. AGS.
29 All grandees of the kingdom were obliged to swear that they would never usurp the royal 
patrimony, and it was also decided to limit the grants and concessions given by the kings 
(Nueva Recopilación, Lib. IX, Tit. VIII, ley XV and Lib. V, Tít. X ley III).
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received or usurped the royal demesne since 1464 had to return it.30 But, 
at the same time, this policy was a long way from proposing a complete 
break with the nobility or the erosion of its institutional and economic 
power. The application of these measures was done in a very selective way 
depending on the families involved. Moreover, acceptance of the restora-
tion of the royal patrimony provided the nobility a means of consolidating 
part of its achievements over the previous decades, at the time that the 
kings increased their incomes and improved their means of collection 
while the cities achieved a political success that they could exhibit before 
the eyes of the kingdom.
The same was true in Catalonia. Here the uprisings that followed the 
Cortes of 1481 convinced Ferdinand that the only means of proceeding 
was through agreement. The so-called Sentence of Guadalupe (1486) rec-
ognized the right of the landlords to maintain their leasehold upon 
the land (dominio eminente) and jurisdictional control over their estates, 
thus guaranteeing them part of their income. But the same Sentence also 
recognized the freedom of the peasantry and abolished the landlords’ 
so- called bad practices. Overall this measure resolved the conflict by 
benefitting the landlords and more powerful peasants and recognized the 
social changes that had occurred over the previous centuries at the expenses 
of the lower peasantry (Vilar 1962, vol. I, p. 509). Ferdinand was not, 
therefore, a liberator king who subjugated the nobility to the benefit of 
the peasants: rather he played the role of an arbiter who guarantied exist-
ing social relationships. Something similar happened in the kingdom of 
Aragon, where the Sentence of Celada (1497) consecrated the power of 
the landlords, recognizing their privileges and power to the detriment 
of the rights of the peasantry.
Royal policy with regard to cities was also double-edged. The kings 
employed all available means to increase their control over them. The insti-
tution of the corregidor, an official representing the king in the town coun-
cils, became a permanent feature of the political landscape and the Crown 
put in place a series of reforms aimed at limiting the involvement of the 
great nobility and restricting the penetration of local government by noble 
clienteles (Lunenfeld 1987). The intervention of the Crown was aimed at 
the appointment of skilled personnel to town and city offices, which was 
also a way to increase its power for arbitration among local factions 
(Belenguer 1976, pp. 197–201; Amelang 1986, p. 41). During most of the 
30 Patronato Real, Libro 15, AGS.
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reign, the alcabalas were collected through their being rented out, a mea-
sure that demonstrated royal authority and exasperated local oligarchies 
who complained that it frequently resulted in excessive collections.31 The 
Santa Hermandad, based on the model of the urban hermandades, was 
converted into an instrument under the ever more direct control of the 
monarchs (Lunenfeld 1987, pp. 47–9). But on the other hand, the cities 
and their oligarchies retained a high degree of autonomy. For this reason 
peace brought with it a sudden deluge of confirmations of city and town 
privileges.32 Many corregidores fell into the subtle but complex networks of 
local factions, rivalries, and solidarities, and the power and influence of 
many aristocrats upon urban clientele networks were notable in big cities 
such as Córdoba, Seville, and Murcia, and others, particularly in the South. 
In the Crown of Aragon—and not only there—the overall consequence of 
these reforms was the strengthening of the oligarchies and of the direct 
channels of communication between the monarchy and the cities, some-
thing which served to strengthen both of them and allowed them to bypass 
the Cortes, which often were too slow and unwieldy in this regard.33 In 
Castile the farming out of tax collection was to be selectively and gradually 
replaced by the encabezamientos of cities, a system by which the tax collec-
tion was ceded to the local councils which, therefore, gained fiscal auton-
omy. This system was destined to constitute one of the cornerstones of 
both the political system and of the patterns of economic behaviour over 
the coming decades (Chap. 4). All of this came accompanied by a strength-
ening of the power of the municipal authorities in the management and 
regulation of guilds and corporations, as is showed by the case of Cuenca 
(Iradiel 1974, pp. 86–97).
 Foreign Wars for Domestic Peace
As important, if not more so, for political stability was the war against the 
Nazarí kingdom of Granada. The fact was perfectly understood at the 
time, to the extent that, as late as 1580, Jerónimo Zurita would write:
31 See the case of Córdoba in Actas Capitulares, 12, 22 de mayo, 28 de junio, 5 de julio, 
Archivo Histórico Municipal de Córdoba (hereafter AHMC) and Registro General del Sello, 
julio 1506, s.f. AGS.
32 Registro General del Sello, legs. 147501 to 147507 (from January to July 1475) passim AGS.
33 See the case of Barcelona in Amelang (1986, pp. 41–2). In Zaragoza and Valencia, dia-
logue was crucial for the concession of subsidies paid by emitting more censals which were 
highly attractive to the patriciate (Belenguer 1976, p. 45).
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Princes … should remember that this [domestic peace] can only be properly 
achieved by conquest and conflict, which have to be sustained perpetually for 
the glory and prosperity of their state and the growth of their dominions.34
With these words the chronicler and historian of the Crown of Aragon 
set down the expansive principle that Fernando del Pulgar had previously 
detected in many noble households. The difference was, of course, that 
Zurita was writing about the monarchy as a whole. What he possibly did 
not know was that this period—the conflicts that stretched from the War 
of Granada (1482–1492) to the arrival of Charles V in 1517—was to be 
decisive. Not only did this cycle of conflict, which continued with the 
Italian wars and the expansion into Africa, represent a key moment for the 
continuity and expansion of a seigniorial society. It would also be a key 
moment in the refinement of a theory about how to finance these wars 
and the role of the kingdom and of the king’s patrimony to this end.
The effects of the war upon the relationship between the monarchy, the 
cities, the aristocracy, and the Church are difficult to exaggerate. The cam-
paigning, in fact, began as a medieval conflict, with nobles and towns 
mobilizing troops and armed retinues and leading them on the battlefield. 
But this struggle also marks the beginning of the ‘military revolution’, the 
character and impact of which will be discussed below. Thus, in its last 
phase, the war would require unprecedented levels of expenditure, mili-
tary technology, and manpower. It therefore presented the monarchy with 
what was to become the great problem facing the fiscal systems in the early 
modern period: the financing of a military apparatus that no longer was 
sustained purely by the nobility or the cities but rather depended upon a 
more sophisticated financial system and a more centralized logistical 
apparatus.
The immediate outcome was for the Crown to appeal to the auxilium 
of the nobility, consisting now not only of military assistance but also of 
the advancement of money, on the proviso that compensation would be 
made at the end of the war by the Crown’s turning a blind eye to the taxes 
and lands usurped by the nobles. In this way, a system was established 
which kept some medieval features of the auxilium and subsequent royal 
34 Jerónimo Zurita, Historia del rey don Hernando el Catolico: de las empresas y ligas de 
Italia, Zaragoza, 1580, vol. 1, p. 5 (edition by A. Canellas López and revised by M. Canellas 
and A. López, Zaragoza, 1989, 6 vols.).
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compensation. But this was done not only by conferring jurisdictions and 
feudal rights upon the nobles but also by recognizing the revenues and 
rights that they had misappropriated. With regard to the urban oligar-
chies, war presented a unique opportunity to establish a relationship of 
mutual commitment with the monarchy, thus opening the door to the 
possibility of the conferral of titles of nobility or even of estates in the new 
domains won in the fighting (Gerbert 1979).
The conflict also affected relations with the Church and led to the cre-
ation of new revenue streams. Preached as a crusade and in part financed 
by bulls sold and promoted in sermons by churchmen, it gave rise to the 
concession by Rome of two services that would continue after 1492, the 
‘crusade’ (cruzada) and the ‘tenth’ or ‘subsidy’ (décima or subsidio). It is 
highly significant that, though they had to be negotiated with the Pope, 
both were beyond the control of the Cortes, meaning that they quickly 
became, in Ladero’s words, ‘the object of envy of the other European 
kings’. Moreover, to help finance the conflict, the Pope conceded to 
Ferdinand the title of Grand Master of the Military Orders and, with it, a 
basic source of patronage. This gave him the support of a nobility seeking 
to enjoy the estates and honours of these organizations. Thus, the war not 
only enhanced the alliance between the monarchy and Church but also led 
to new sources of income and patronage that ‘overlapped with the previ-
ous one without replacing it’ (Ladero 1973, pp. 238, 245) and that was at 
the free disposal of the Crown with no limit imposed by the Cortes.
The War of Granada was an episode in a much larger cycle of events, 
one which had already led to the conquest of the Canary Islands and 
which would also lead to the campaigns in North Africa. These conquests 
had a religious component but also were aimed at securing access to 
Africa’s gold, slaves, and land, mainly for sugar production (Fernández- 
Armesto 1982). The outcome was, again, a reinforcement of the relations 
between the Crown, the nobility, the Church, and the towns. The former 
extended its domains. The Church again projected the conflict as a cru-
sade, which brought it increasing economic and political resources and, in 
turn, justified the prolongation of the concession of the tercias to the 
Crown. The members of the urban patriciate found ways of achieving 
social and economic advancement in these campaigns. Accords were 
signed with the Genoese investors in sugar plantations, thus strengthening 
links to a group that was destined to serve as the financial nerve system of 
the empire.
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This effort to project power abroad was extended from 1494 with 
involvement in the Italian Wars against France. Aimed at defending 
Aragonese interests, this conflict was in large part financed by Castilian 
funds and served as a way of testing the mettle of many second-born sons 
of the Castilian nobility. Thus the novelty in this cycle of war abroad lay 
not in its political or diplomatic consequences but rather in the justifica-
tion for conflicts fought in distant lands whose purpose was not the 
defence of the kingdom of Castile itself nor the defence of Christendom. 
While the War of Granada was fully justified by the age-old duty of 
Christian kings to defend Christendom, the Italian campaigns did not 
appear to fall under the same umbrella. This difference was even more 
significant in that the wars of Italy were not at all cheap. Through them 
new military strategies led to long, expensive and exhausting conflicts 
(Hale 1985, pp. 48, 63).
A large part of the funds that paid for these campaigns came from the 
ecclesiastical subsidies and the cruzada. But one other important innova-
tion emerged: now debts accumulated from contracts (asientos) for the 
payment of troops in Naples and Sicily, where in effect Aragonese interests 
were being defended, were being met with services voted by the Cortes of 
Castile. In other words, the cost of a conflict that was difficult to justify 
from a strictly religious perspective and went against constitutional prin-
ciples established throughout Europe was being levied upon the kingdom 
of Castile (see Chap. 4). How were the wars of Italy helping to defend 
Castile or Christendom? Was the King of France really the enemy of 
Christendom?
The line of response to such questions was developed by Ferdinand 
himself, who in the text of the Holy League convened by the Pope 
expressed the notion that France was acting against the interest of 
Christendom, an argument that was to be repeated later on in the Cortes 
of 1512.35 And a few years later, in 1515, the convocation of the Cortes 
once again turned on similar criteria and referred to the obligation to 
defend the Church of Rome, using ideas justified by a comparable concep-
tual framework. In this way, the war in Naples reinforced a series of inter-
linked—but not always harmonious—interests and established an 
innovative line of argument that would be key to the political, institu-
tional, and, therefore, economic evolution of Castile and, indeed, of Spain 
as a whole.
35 Patronato Real, legs. 60, f.26 and 69, 49. AGS.
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To recapitulate: Isabel and Fernando had arrived at a certain equilibrium—
an unstable one, it is true, but an equilibrium nonetheless. Navigating 
through negotiations and pressures leading in different directions, they had 
succeeded in momentarily lessening the structural tensions within the elites. 
Their policies would result in different political systems. In Castile they had 
engineered one of relative fiscal centralization, with a certain capacity for 
obtaining funds from the Cortes. In Aragon, the fiscal system had evolved to 
a far lesser degree. War had been crucial in this process and had served to 
satisfy the expansive needs of the nobility, the urban patriciate, and, indeed, 
even the Church. But finally, it had not resolved the basic problem of the 
alienation of royal patrimony, and at the same time, it created a new series of 
tensions with the Cortes in Castile—the debate over the use of the taxes and 
services of the kingdom for campaigns which did not benefit it directly, a 
theme which would be central to subsequent Iberian history, as we shall see.
Portugal: The Bases for a Precocious and Enduring 
Political Stability
Between 1449, when the Crown managed to pacify the last concerted 
attempt at noble rebellion, and 1822, when Brazil was lost, Portugal lived 
the longest period of political stability enjoyed by any European country 
in the early modern period (Thomaz 1994, p. 131). This stability, largely 
due to the imperial regime, had some parallels in Castile. As we have just 
seen, this kingdom was not free from tensions similar—or even identical—
to those seen in other polities of the time. Mattoso (1993, p. 459 and ff.) 
has even written that the coexistence of the nobility appears to have been 
based on the continuous discord. However, as in Castile, efforts had been 
made to channel existing tensions. From the end of the fifteenth century, 
the nobility’s needs for social consolidation and extension started being 
satisfied by overseas campaigns initiated by the Crown and even by involve-
ment in the Castilian wars on Granada (Thomaz 1994). At the same time, 
the Crown had made several attempts to satisfy the noble lineages’ expan-
sive tendencies by ceding possessions belonging to the royal demesne 
(Disney 2009, vol. I, pp.  132–40). But, above all, the involvement of 
many lineages in the imperial project had served to alleviate tensions; 
revealingly, many second-born sons—whose status was directly threatened 
by inheritance rules—were present in these wars of conquest (Thomaz 
1994). To the extent that the empire was also a commercial venture, it also 
offered a considerable number of members of the urban classes ways to 
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satisfy their needs. The blurring of boundaries within the African ventures—
and, above all, in the colonies—served to dilute the frontier between these 
groups, providing each with what it most desired: the merchants acquired 
noble status, and the nobility obtained money and wealth. Portuguese 
Atlantic expansion had thus served the same purposes as the War of 
Granada, which it, in fact, predated.
In the overall Western European picture (see above), the Portuguese case 
was also peculiar in certain regards. Here the ‘domain state’  continued to be 
the outstanding feature of its development. A sizeable part of the Crown 
lands was ceded and recovered in successive cycles, a process that created 
tensions in the kingdom and its councils. But, much more important, 
Atlantic expansion had allowed the amplification of this patrimony and 
expanded the king’s revenues. Around 1459, in response to the wars with 
Castile, the Cortes had ceded to the king the sisa tax, very similar to the 
Castilian alcabala and administered by the municipalities (Mattoso 1993, 
pp. 521–4).36 But colonial revenues allowed for the development of a fiscal 
system that only demanded a limited commitment from the kingdom.
The result was a situation very similar to that of Castile, although some 
important degrees of nuance are needed in our analysis. In these condi-
tions, the monarch retained a high degree of power. This was consistent 
with the efforts to strengthen royal justice (Mattoso 1997, p. 516). The 
Cortes had become an integral part of the political system, but its advance 
was less important in comparison with the situation in Castile, principally 
because of the lesser development of the tax state in Portugal. This fact, 
together with the expansion of foreign trade, helps to explain the very 
limited evolution of the urban network and its polarization in Lisbon and 
Oporto. The equilibrium between Crown and nobility was increasingly 
obvious, even if the relationship was governed by tensions and periodic 
concessions, above all after the series of crises and was periodically deep-
ened by the temptation among the nobility to turn its loyalty towards the 
Castilian monarch. The promulgation of the Ley Mental (1434), which 
recognized that the seigniorial estates belonged in the final instance to the 
king, who was periodically required to renew his conferral of them upon 
the nobility, contributed to creating a difficult equilibrium but one which 
36 It is worthwhile underlining that one of the reasons for the cities believing that the king 
was facing financial difficulties was not only his involvement in wars but also the concession 
of his patrimony to the nobles.
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led to overall stability. It is important to note that, in this context, the 
House of Braganza had distinguished itself and managed to be the excep-
tion to end-of-century attempts to recover parts of the royal patrimony 
that ceded over the previous decades (Disney 2009, vol. I, pp. 134–5). 
This reduced the gap with the ruling house of Avis and created a consider-
able distance between that family, the Braganza, and the rest of the fidal-
guia. But, in any case, the oppressive tendencies of the nobility towards its 
peasantry, if considerable, could be tempered, and, this being the case, it 
was possible to maintain forms of land cession and property rights similar 
to enfiteusis.
The resulting political economy would not lead to the disappearance of 
tensions which were, after all, structural. But it did create an institutional 
framework that was crucial to understanding the history of Portugal in the 
coming centuries. It is very revealing that, in contrast to other areas of the 
Iberian Peninsula, there were hardly any movements or protests resem-
bling the Comunidades or Germanías.
iberian state formation in european perspective
Comunidades and Germanías
The political equilibrium established by the Catholic Kings was broken by 
Isabella’s death in 1504, and this rupture would unleash the comunero and 
the agermando rebellions of the years 1519–1521.37 These were not iso-
lated events but rather sprang from constitutional problems that were 
present, in one form or another, across Europe. But, above all, they 
deserve to be considered from the perspective of the development and 
consolidation of the elites which have been mentioned previously, even if 
the historiography dedicated to them has almost always pointed in another 
direction.
The economic growth and the wars of the last decades of the fifteenth 
century alleviated the internal tensions. But these tensions, being struc-
tural in nature, had to manifest themselves in many ways. By 1500 it was 
again obvious that many aristocrats needed to expand their incomes and 
to obtain loans. They were involved in constant competition to secure 
revenues, sometimes even usurping the royal patrimony and the demesne 
37 For a detailed analysis of these movements, see Perez (1976) and Durán (1982).
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lands held by the towns.38 These abuses even provoked serious exchanges 
between the corregidores and the high nobility (Haliczer 1981, pp. 91–123). 
On many occasions struggles of this sort were extended into the cities 
through the noble clienteles and sometimes even involved the lowest 
social strata of the city.
In Castile, the instability was increased by the mounting burden of the 
monarchical apparatus, which had the same need to expand its income as 
did the nobility. These needs were aggravated by the campaigns in North 
Africa and the outbreak of war in Italy. Taking these factors into account, 
it is possible to explain not only the continual demands for the increase in 
taxes made on behalf of the Crown during the first decades of the century 
but also the resurgence among the cities of the doctrine stressing the abso-
lute need to secure the restitution of royal patrimony.39 In the Crown of 
Aragon, a similar increase in royal spending had led to a general rise in the 
‘services’ (in effect, taxes) of cities such as Valencia, Barcelona, or Mallorca 
(Durán 1982).
Insofar as it had overseen an important phase of economic develop-
ment, the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella had strengthened even further 
the tendency towards social change in some urban environments. Many 
cities had witnessed the strengthening of an urban elite formed not only 
by members of the lower nobility but also by merchants, lawyers, and uni-
versity graduates, who were educated in a concept of legality which the 
monarchy itself sometimes failed to respect. Economic development had 
also reinforced a sector of artisans, a sort of middle class. But in all of these 
cities, the chasm between the rich and powerful on one side and the poor, 
38 See, for example, Aragon in Abadía (1998, p. 66) and some Castilians cases such as the 
Duke of the Infantado and the Count of Benavente in Osuna, leg. 410, exp. 58, and leg. 418, 
exp. 4, núm. 4; AHN. Cámara de Castilla, legs 3, f. 181 and 172, leg. 2, and others. AGS. On 
the usurpation of lands, see Cabrera (1977). For the particular case of Córdoba, see Actas 
Capitulares, 2 and 31 December 1518; 3 January 1519; 1 March and 27 April 1520; and 24 
September 1522. AHMC. The fights between nobles were very well described by Corona 
(1958). For the Crown of Aragon, see Durán (1982), Serra (1988, pp. 49 and ff.), and Colás 
and Salas (1982, pp. 70–1).
39 On her deathbed, Queen Isabella herself voiced her concern about the alcabalas that had 
not been reclaimed from the nobility (those of ‘toleration or permission’, as they would 
come to be known) and her desire for the rules of redemption set down in 1480 to be applied 
with rigour. Patronato Real (libros de copias) libro 18, ff. 192 vª–194ª, AGS. The text is 
included in the famous Cédula de Medina del Campo of 24 November 1504. A complete 
version can also be found in Nueva Recopilación, Libro IV, titulo XV, ley, I.
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vagabonds, and politically displaced on the other had grown alarmingly. 
This generated urban tensions which were often blended with anti-Jewish 
sentiments and actions and an increasing rejection of the Morisco minority 
(Yun 1980). All of these tensions contributed to an atmosphere of desper-
ate millennialism that coincided with the strengthening of the theory that 
underlined the inalienability of the royal demesne and the need for 
 collective action for the ‘common good’ and against tyranny (Maravall 
1970, pp. 108–33).
Despite these similarities, the dynamic of the Comunidades and that of 
the Germanías was to be different.
The Comunidades of Castile reflected to a large degree the problems set 
out above. By 1520, the discontent expressed itself in demands for the 
reform of the fiscal system. But it was not only a question about the vol-
ume of taxes but also about their genesis and use. It is often forgotten that 
Charles V sought to claim services from the Cortes in order to pursue his 
dynastic and personal ambitions, something which, obviously, appeared to 
go against some crucial constitutional principles (Perez 1989, pp. 26, 33 
and ff. and Chap. 4). On top of this came the dissatisfaction of the cities 
represented in the Cortes due to the interference of royal power in their 
affairs and the usurpation of the royal demesne over the previous years. 
Furthermore, many of the alcabalas, whose collection had been ceded to 
the cities since 1494, were again farmed out to the highest bidder, which 
provoked a storm of criticism not only from the urban elites but also from 
the lower ranks of craftsmen who had seen their taxes rise during a time of 
successive bad harvests and economic difficulties.
Moreover, Charles V had the dubious merit of radicalizing the discon-
tent of the Cortes when, in 1518 and with the intention of attracting the 
nobility to him, he acknowledged the right of the ‘great nobles and 
knights’ to collect the alcabalas and sought to raise more taxes without 
attempting to reclaim a single square foot of the royal patrimony that had 
been usurped over the previous years. At the same time, his claim to be 
able to appoint foreigners to offices in the Castilian administration went 
not only against the interests of the nobility and the patriciate of the cities 
but also against the most deeply entrenched political principles of the 
time, while his absence from Castile could easily be interpreted as a separa-
tion between the king and his kingdom in the political sense—rather than 
in the physical one—of the term.
If these tensions provided the catalysts for rebellion, they were also 
extremely important in shaping events and the subsequent evolution of the 
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conflicts. A rebellion that began with a certain aristocratic passivity quite 
quickly took a dramatic turn of events, with the popular mobilizations at 
municipal level, the creation of the Junta, a sort of council of towns, and a 
process of radicalization in both cities and countryside. During this initial 
phase, we see a divided aristocracy that, later on and with a few exceptions, 
quickly closed ranks when the rebellion assumed a markedly anti-seigniorial 
character (Gutiérrez Nieto 1973). But even this solidification of the nobil-
ity against the rebellion was marked by a certain reticence and hesitation, 
the intention being to prevent the king from triumphing immediately and 
to secure grants, favours, and reparations as rewards for their efforts on his 
behalf. We also see that the cities went as far as to organize an action in 
defence of the integrity of the ‘kingdom’ and were also clearly made ner-
vous by the movement against the aristocracy, although they were carried 
along by the revolt and later revived their most trenchant criticisms of the 
nobility for its misappropriation of the royal patrimony. And, above all, we 
find that when the community, led by craftsmen and the urban middle 
class, became radical and conflicts began to emerge between cities, their 
urban estates, and their lands, and when the anti-landlord campaigns in the 
countryside became more virulent, the disquiet and unease began to spread 
among the very leaders of the comuneros themselves. These elites therefore 
acted against a movement that clearly threatened to subvert the established 
order—an order that they were not only duty-bound to defend but that it 
was also in their interests to protect.
The comunero movement might well have changed the balance of 
power and altered the course of history. In fact, when compared with the 
conflicts of the fifteenth century, what is surprising is the highly developed 
political theory espoused by its leaders. But, looking back at previous 
events, the eventual outcome cannot be said to have been a surprise: the 
great winner was the Crown, and the result was a new political equilibrium 
that consecrated the existing relationships of power and institutional sys-
tems. This would be decisive for the pattern of economic development.
The Germanías also revealed the basic problems of this society. The need 
to enlarge the incomes of the landowners had been manifested in the exten-
sion of the jurisdiction of the nobility and clergy. At the same time, in the 
absence of a fiscal apparatus as developed as that of Castile, the nobility had 
increasingly subscribed to the censals sold by the cities. The dynamic that it 
created had to be different to the one in Castile and, obviously, had to affect 
the physiognomy of the conflict in a different way (Durán 1982, p. 414). 
Industrial development—above all in Valencia and its surroundings—had 
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reinforced the power of the artisans at a moment when municipal power was 
becoming increasingly elite in nature, thus creating a crucial tension. The 
coincidence of these factors with increasing fiscal demands paved the way for 
protest and a rebellion which invoked the need to sanitize public finances 
and to root out corruption in the administration.
This discontent coincided with rural upheavals against the landlords 
and was exacerbated by the effects of plague and the danger of attacks by 
pirates and bands of nobles. The wave of protest gave rise to several differ-
ent movements in the areas around Valencia and Barcelona; Lerida and 
many other areas of Catalonia, as well as in the south of Aragon, were also 
affected. In these zones, where the municipal reforms begun by King 
Ferdinand were creating better conditions, the uprisings would take the 
form of violent but very localized episodes. In contrast, in the city of 
Valencia and in Mallorca, the movement of the Germanías would come 
close to being a genuine revolution. Here, the Council of the Thirteen, 
which basically represented the craftsmen, raised the flag of the libertats 
(freedom). Its programme aimed not only at municipal reform and the 
overhaul of the justice system, both of which, it was alleged, had become 
dominated by the gentlemen (cavallers), but also the re-establishment of 
the municipal patrimony on a healthy footing and the disappearance of the 
taxes created to deal with the accumulated debt.
All of this led to a revolutionary programme which had the Italian 
republics as its model and which also resulted in an attack upon the 
Moriscos, considered a pillar of the seigniorial machinery. The end came in 
the form of a seigniorial reaction that would crush the revolution. In 
Mallorca the diffusion of the movement into the rural areas appears to 
have been provoked by the demands of the forans, the rural population 
around the capital, to redistribute the payment of the taxes between the 
city and the surrounding countryside, which was also subject to these new 
impositions (Durán 1982, passim).
As with the Comunidades, the Germanías were the product of a society 
that had seen marked commercial growth and was searching for new 
formulas of political organization. Both led, essentially, to the same 
conclusion—the shoring up of the argument that the monarchy presented 
the solution to the problems of the time. However, to the extent that 
these were structural problems with very deep roots, neither conflict can 
be said to have been the solution to these difficulties but rather the clearest 
manifestation of them. They also presented, perhaps, a cause for reflection 
for the ruling groups in both kingdoms.
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Western Monarchies. The Iberian Kingdoms in Comparative 
European Perspective
It is not difficult to recognize different models of political organization 
and institutional evolution in Western Europe around 1520. To a certain 
extent, all of the models can be seen as a means of overcoming the ten-
sions of medieval societies, and all would leave their imprint on the politi-
cal economies and, therefore, on the subsequent patterns of economic 
development of the different areas of the continent.
In France the monarchy was strengthened with a relatively efficient 
system for the mobilization of resources and as a result the Crown was 
capable of extending its patronage ties towards the ruling groups of soci-
ety. The policy of territorial unification had led to the extension of the 
dominions of the king at the cost of the independent or semi- independent 
princes (Provence and Brittany, above all), at the same time that a new fis-
cal system had been established, developed, and linked to the needs of the 
army. Despite the complexity and territorial diversity of the system, a dis-
tinction can be made between direct taxes such as the taille, which fell on 
property, and indirect ones such as the gabelles, which were levied on the 
purchase of a handful of products. A large part of the tax collection system 
was, moreover, under the control of the generaux des finances and was 
controlled by the King’s council.40
Yet a system of this sort was some way from serving as the basis for an 
unchallenged absolutism or a unified institutional system. Considerations 
of political theory and institutional framework compelled the Crown to 
enter into a series of pacts which were similar in form and scope to those 
of the Iberian Peninsula (see Chevalier 1994). The doctrine of Gallic 
Church, which protected the independence of the Church not only from 
the interference of the Pope but also from the meddling of the king and 
which had been consecrated in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, had set 
down the rules of this equilibrium. However, the king’s ability to meddle 
in ecclesiastical patronage had increased considerably. The Concordat of 
1516 had set down a new status quo with Rome. In this accord the Pope 
was freed of any theoretical subjection to conciliar authority, and the king 
increased his scope for patronage in the Church. The result would be an 
40 See Chevalier (1994). In 1524 Francis I created Tresorier de l’Epargne (1524), which 
would manage the incomes arriving to the central treasury and allocated financial administra-
tion to the Conseil d’Etat. More details in Wolfe (1972, pp. 86 and ff.).
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ever greater involvement of the Church in the interests and programme of 
the Crown, which exercised its right to nominate clergy to benefices to 
favour the great families of the kingdom. The Gallic Church thus emerged 
as an institution in which the powers of the Crown on the theoretical and 
institutional levels were limited but which, in reality, was closely tied to the 
interests of the king.
Even more evident was the political and institutional entente with the 
urban patricians. The first step in understanding this must be to recognize 
that the authority of the king was not homogeneous. If he had ample 
powers in some areas, then in others—this was the case in Languedoc—
the provincial estates not only voted the taxes, but they could also deter-
mine the form that they took; it was even quite usual for the collection of 
these revenues to be the responsibility of these local powers. From 1484 
the King of France had to wrestle separately with this multitude of états 
provinciales, something which required considerable efforts and obliged 
him to make specific concessions from which the cities in general and the 
urban elites in particular often benefited. In addition, the sale of offices 
ended up creating another form of relationship (and balance) between the 
Crown and the urban elites, at the same time as the issuing of municipal 
rentes—debt bonds, very similar to censales—subscribed to in the majority 
of cases by the patricians increased their interests in the regular function-
ing of the fiscal-financial system which guaranteed them the collection of 
their yields.41
Nor were the high nobility alienated from the new political construc-
tion. As in Castile, the aristocracy had gained control of the collection of 
certain royal taxes during the reigns of Charles VI (1368–1422) and 
Charles VII (1403–1462); but, on the other hand, it was denied the right 
to collect the taille in many areas. This limitation did not deprive it, how-
ever, of the chance to profit from the process. Not only did the nobility 
consolidate its exemption from the payment of certain taxes, but very 
shortly it also converted itself into the principal beneficiary of the rafts of 
41 Russell Major spoke of ‘an increase in popular participation in government’ (1980, p. I), 
and B. Chevalier lucidly described the agreement between the king and the ‘bonnes villes’. 
In his view the system was grounded on the king’s respecting the autonomy of the cities 
when collecting taxes in exchange for cash advances. This system guaranteed the cash avail-
able to the king, lowered his tax collection costs, and reduced the jurisdictional conflicts. The 
cities, for their part, retained a part of the fiscal income and could shift the fiscal burden to 
the countryside (1987, pp. 144–9).
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pensions and offices granted by the Crown; the payment of the salaries 
due to the holders of these positions depended, of course, on a healthy 
royal patrimony. From 1516, thanks to royal patronage, the great families 
also increased their presence in ecclesiastical offices. Given these develop-
ments, it is not surprising that historiography, led by the work of Russell 
Major (1981), has rejected the idea, proposed by M. Bloch, of the inexo-
rable decline of the French aristocracy. The strength of the aristocrats is 
even more clear if we consider that, in addition to the extraordinary reve-
nues derived from the Crown, many high nobles were able to increase 
their regular or ordinary incomes and to manage successfully their private 
patrimonies and estates.
As in many areas of Castile and Portugal, this interlinking of mutual 
interests at the summit of the monarchy would confer stability upon the 
political system and, therefore, support the established social order. The 
reinforcing of the rural community, the increasing economic power of a 
peasantry that had diversified its sources of income as it emerged from the 
crisis, and the formation of a peasant elite which found itself caught 
between the preservation of the forms of local government and an alliance 
with the great landlords halted the process of deterioration of rural society 
(Neveux et al. 1975, pp. 134–55).
Though things were quite different in England, a few determined early 
steps had also been made towards the process of political centralization. 
Whereas in France the Parliament (États généraux) had been unable to 
transcend regional interests, from a very early stage, the monarchy of 
England was required to form a relationship with its Parliament that rep-
resented ‘the community of the kingdom’. But this difference did not 
imply that in England there had been a greater development of the king-
dom as a fiscal unit nor that new and undreamt of possibilities now lay 
before the king, his high nobility, leading clergy, or urban rentiers.
The English Crown had maintained the greater part of its demesne 
estates and patrimony. Moreover, the incorporation into the Crown of the 
estates of extinguished noble families during the Wars of the Roses and the 
reorganization of the royal lands by Henry VII (1485–1509) served to 
keep it intact as a provider of considerable sources of income. At the same 
time, the lands of the Crown could be used as a fountain of royal patron-
age through their temporary cession to the nobility. However, the chances 
of exploiting the fiscal system of the kingdom and the development of the 
tax system were much smaller than in France or Castile. The king could 
recur to subsidies granted by Parliament, but these had to be approved 
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and renewed by the assembly and were even controlled by it through its 
capacity to oversee the collection and use of these monies. In reality, in the 
fifteenth century, the financial resources of the Crown were comparatively 
meagre. Aside from the monies collected from the royal estates, its regular 
permanent revenues depended upon tolls and other impositions of a feu-
dal type which did not provide the quantities—nor anything like them—
that were collected in Castile through the alcabalas or in Portugal through 
the sisas and the empire (Russell 1988, pp. 31–8).
At the same time, the main forum for political relations between the 
king and the kingdom was Parliament. This had been the case since the 
time of the war with France. More than simply a gathering of delegates 
representing different cities and their urban patriciates, the House of 
Commons represented the kingdom as a whole. Given the very low level 
of development of the jurisdictional and fiscal functions of the cities and 
their relatively minor demographic importance, their relationship—direct 
or indirect—with the Crown was much less decisive for the political equi-
librium of the kingdom than was the case in France or Castile. In the last 
instance, Parliament cannot be described as a gathering of deputies who 
were dependent upon and controlled by their respective local oligarchies 
but rather a group that made little or no effort to seek to increase the 
privileges of the municipalities. Although the political equilibrium and the 
reproduction of the social system depended to a large extent on the bilat-
eral relationships that bound the king to the aristocracy, gentry, and 
Church, these relations were catalysed largely through Parliament. If 
Westminster was to see its political role diminished during the reign of 
Henry VII (1457–1509), the impact of this relationship upon the model 
of overcoming the medieval crisis was already established.
All of this created a situation that was subtly different from that of France. 
If, thanks to the improvements in the management of the Crown lands, the 
King of England had increased his chances of using patronage to control the 
nobility, then the limited character of this type of transaction (which, in any 
case, was not easily extended over time), the control of Parliament over a 
large portion of other royal finances and the very limited development of 
the royal bureaucracy—without doubt, England represented a much less 
evolved form of tax state than did Castile or France—made it very difficult 
for the monarchy to subsidize the nobility in a systematic and generous way. 
At least it could not do so to the point that the needs of this group were met 
during the fifteenth century (Dyer 1989, p. 47). It is very probable that this 
situation had been one of the causes of the attack launched by the English 
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aristocracy upon the peasant and communal village economies in some parts 
of the countryside and whose most obvious manifestation lay in the enclo-
sure of communal lands. The figures presented by R. Allen demonstrate that 
these enclosures were especially intense towards 1524. At the heart of all of 
these changes lay the fact that, in distinction to Castile and France, the 
English rural community had never developed its military powers.
From the perspectives of the kingdoms of France and England, the 
peculiarities of the Iberian Peninsula may be seen in a clearer light.
The parallels are obvious. As has been emphasized, the case of Castile 
offers some noticeable similarities with France. In both kingdoms rela-
tively strong fiscal systems were emerging and would allow for a certain 
degree of royal autonomy (with the limitations that we will see). These 
fiscal systems also became a way to nurture aristocratic incomes.
But, even then, the differences between Castile and France were notice-
able. In France these transfers to the nobility consisted mainly in the 
appointment to offices and the concession of temporary or lifetime grants. 
In Castile the contemporary equivalent was the encomienda of the military 
orders and the offices in the army and administration. But the lion’s share 
of these transfers consisted in the more or less legal cession of alcabalas, 
tercias, and parts of the royal patrimony, which provided the nobility with 
a permanent and regular source of income. Thus, the economic bases of 
the Castilian aristocracy were to be even stronger than those of their 
French counterparts, and part of the agreement’s renewal would consist in 
a pact of silence regarding the rents that had not in fact been given by the 
Crown but simply usurped by the nobles—and which were, therefore, of 
dubious legality in the eyes of the Cortes. (See Chap. 4 below.)
At the same time, the case of Castile goes against a certain number of 
the ideas set out a few years ago on the role of these extraordinary incomes 
as a mechanism that reduced the pressure of the landlords on the peas-
antry. Without doubt, these revenues and concessions did have this func-
tion at certain moments, but the history of Castile until (at least) 1520 
demonstrates that access to the royal fiscal system did not prevent the 
nobles from trying to extend their lands by assuming control or ownership 
of soils belonging to communities or the royal estates themselves. In other 
words, the aristocrats sought revenues from additional sources.
Comparison of the models of the different polities of the Crown of 
Aragon and the kingdom of Navarre invites a number of observations. 
Looked at as fiscal systems, the similarities with England and, therefore, 
the differences from France and Castile are clear. In none of these 
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kingdoms did the monarchy succeed in establishing a fiscal system that was 
as accessible (and as easily manipulated) and developed as was the case in 
France or Castile. In these polities, as in England, the most important 
source of income that the kingdom offered its ruler (the ‘subsidies’ of one 
kingdom; the ‘services’ of another) could not be alienated or conferred 
upon the aristocracy or could only be done so with considerable difficulty. 
Pensions and offices offered the best and, indeed, almost the only means 
of patronage and of overcoming the nobility’s economic problems. But at 
the same time—and in contrast to the situation in England—the Crown of 
Aragon had established fiscal-financial relationships with a number of cit-
ies (above all Pamplona, Zaragoza, Barcelona, Valencia, and Palma de 
Mallorca) that clearly did provide the urban oligarchies with an additional 
source of income in the form of censals.
Nor can the relationships between landlords in these kingdoms and their 
vassals be easily identified with those of England. In all of these areas, the 
effort to overcome the difficulties faced by the nobility had been expressed 
in the pressure applied upon vassals and lands. But the results would be 
very different from what is usually referred to (although often debated) for 
England. In the kingdom of Aragon and, in certain respects, in Valencia, 
the power of the nobility would be directed not only towards the acquisi-
tion of additional land but also—and mainly—to deepening its existing 
rights of jurisdiction and even forms of forced labour, something which in 
turn was favoured by the presence and numerical importance of a Morisco 
minority, which was seriously disadvantaged in terms of its rights and legal 
conditions. In Catalonia the tensions in the heart of the aristocracy were 
overcome thanks to formulas designed to provide the nobles access to the 
ecclesiastic tithe (diezmo) and that led them to share cropping. These rev-
enues, in contrast to the English model based upon the extension of aristo-
cratic properties, would provide the predominant type of rent available to 
these groups. They would constitute along with the censals and a number 
of incomes derived from royal offices, the nobles’ most important source of 
income. At the same time, the Sentence of Guadalupe had made it as difficult 
for the principality to follow the Aragonese model as the English or the 
Castilian ones. This was because it had allowed a free peasantry to consoli-
date itself, liberated from many of the landlords’ demands and among 
whom it was possible to find a rural elite with rights over the soils that it 
farmed, a feature which would serve to paralyse any attempt by the great 
families to accumulate territories by force. The case of Mallorca also has its 
own specific characteristics. Here the possession of censals would give the 
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nobility in general a significant portion of the revenues extracted by the 
centralized fiscal system and the municipal financial apparatus. But, pro-
gressively, the agrarian relationships pivoted upon the formation of large 
latifundia whose effective control would be ceded in the form of ‘pose-
sions’, an arrangement that would lead to a limit on the availability of lands 
for the lords and nobles (Jover 1997).
The differences and contrasts between Portugal, France, and England 
also deserve attention. In Portugal the royal financial system had begun to 
develop, as in France and Castile, and the kingdom was increasingly 
involved in a tax system of notable proportions. But the development of 
the empire, and the funds obtained from it, would progressively marginal-
ize the importance of the kingdom’s contribution. Thanks to the empire, 
the needs of social reproduction of the fidalgos had been given an outlet, 
and this would limit their interest in strengthening their jurisdiction or 
acquiring peasant property (this does not, obviously, mean that no incen-
tives existed for these actions). The Portuguese imperial venture also led 
to an urban jurisdictional network that was weaker than its counterpart in 
Castile and in which only some cities such as Lisbon and Porto exercised 
considerable force and weight.
This overview of the very different political, institutional, and economic 
trajectories found in the history of Western Europe makes clear that the 
Iberian kingdoms did not present any exceptional or unique paradigm. 
On the other hand, it is evident that a number of models emerged, each 
subtly different, even if many common denominators can be found.
* * *
The Iberian kingdoms had been the great protagonists of the phase of 
globalization that initiated the ‘rise’ of the West. This was in part due to 
the convergence of global forces (the circulation of technical knowledge 
and previous commercial development) but can be explained above all by 
the action of forces and needs that were present across all of Europe and 
that would materialize in Iberia in a very specific way. The elite’s need for 
consolidation and extension, and in particular the needs of the nobility, 
had been at the root of the first leap into the Atlantic and can be seen as 
little more than a continuation of previous actions and practices typical of 
the Reconquista. The involvement of the peninsula in ever-expanding 
commercial routes, allied to changes in the institutional system and prop-
erty rights, had helped the economic recovery and brought about a certain 
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relaxation of the tensions between the social classes. At the same time, 
important lines of tension were emerging: the fight for the royal demesne, 
the debate over the use of the kingdom’s resources, and the importance of 
royal patronage, thanks to its increased ability to capture resources and 
consequent tensions over their use, were among the most important of 
these points of prospective conflict. In any case, and despite the difference 
between them, two exceptional powers—Castile and Portugal—were 
emerging, both driven by clear expansive vocations and able to nullify 
internal tensions as they established their respective empires. The different 
institutional patterns that would condition the political economies of the 
Iberian World were more or less consolidated by 1520.
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CHAPTER 2
Iberian Overseas Expansion and European 
Trade Networks
In 1526, Charles V married Isabel of Portugal. In doing so he put in place the 
groundwork for the dynastic union with the last of the peninsular kingdom to 
have escaped the gravitational pull of the Habsburgs. At this point the 
Portuguese and Castilians were involved in collaborations, entanglements, 
and conflicts stretching from Asia to America, thus forging the foundations of 
a global system. Clearly, this system was precocious and sophisticated, simulta-
neously partitioned and interconnected (Subrahmanyam 2007; Bethencourt 
2013). In spite of that sophistication, paradoxically, this imperial experience 
has provided the basis of a very negative interpretation of the history of the 
Iberian Peninsula. According to this interpretation, oceanic expansion con-
verted Iberia a ‘semi-periphery’ within Europe, serving simply as a conduit for 
the export of raw materials, some of them obtained from their colonies, to the 
north of Europe, while industrial products manufactured in the ‘centre’ of this 
emergent world economy—in other words, in the north of the old  continent—
would flow in the opposite direction (Frank 1978; Wallerstein 1979).
Sailing the atlantic, conquering america
In 1492, the Spaniards made the leap into America. In 1497–1499 Vasco 
da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached India. In 1520, 
Ferdinand Magellan sailed through the straight that would take his name, 
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and following his death Juan Sebastian Elcano returned to Spain as the 
first man to circumnavigate the world (1522). What was behind these 
names? Columbus was not of Castilian origin: he was Genoese and had 
acquired much of his knowledge in Portugal. Magellan, sailing on behalf 
of Charles V, was in fact a subject of the King of Portugal. If these details 
are apparently superficial, they should not blind us to the fact that from 
the very beginning of the primitive globalization, these initiatives were the 
result of cross-border entanglements and patterns of knowledge that were 
profoundly interrelated.
Challenges and Tools
When in 1519 Cortés landed in Mexico and began to take an interest in 
this ‘second America’, the gold reserves of the Caribbean were nearing 
exhaustion. The following years would see the conquest of both Mexico 
and Peru, where the Spanish found extensive political formations that 
were overcome so rapidly that one historian has observed that by the 
1540s the New World ‘was already conquered, in so far as Spain would 
conquer it’ (Davis 1976, p. 52). But the extraordinary speed of the con-
quest should not lead us to forget the problems posed by it and by the 
control of these vast new domains.
America was, perhaps, seen by many as a promise. But it presented, to 
all and sundry, a challenge of dimensions that were difficult to imagine. 
This most definitely was the case for Castile, which faced not only the chal-
lenge of conquest but also the struggle to control and to exploit American 
peoples and wealth.1 America was a distant continent of vast, unimagined 
proportions, with ecological and geographical conditions ranging from 
deserts to rainforests. Europe’s best sailors and cartographers took some 
time to represent a geographical reality that was, in the first instance, 
unfathomable. After the exhaustion of Caribbean gold reserves, Spain 
faced the problem that some of the riches that the Spaniards were seeking, 
such as Inca gold and silver, were found in particularly remote and inhos-
pitable areas. This having been said, the richest areas would turn out to be 
1 A definitive study of the global impact of what could be called the ‘globalisation of 
America’ has yet to be written. This is not the place to undertake any such effort. Here we 




just to the north (the Aztec confederation) and to the south (the Inca 
Empire) of the Caribbean Sea, which quickly emerged as the cornerstone 
of interactions with the Iberian Peninsula.
Geography and environmental systems imposed serious constraints 
upon communication. Dependence upon the winds and the ocean cur-
rents led to long stationary periods during voyages and caused lengthy 
delays in travel across the oceans. Even after a communication system was 
organized, Chaunu has calculated that a round trip between Andalusia 
and Mexico took some eighteen and a half months, of which only five 
were actually spent in sailing. In the first place, this posed a political prob-
lem due to the delays affecting orders and communication between the 
metropolis and the colonies (Chap. 7). But it also constituted a serious 
financial drawback, resulting in a long period in which capital would be 
immobilized, with the subsequent high costs for traders. In addition, 
given the unpredictability of the weather, the inevitable and long delays, 
and the need for security, vessels were loaded with as many foodstuffs, 
weapons, and ammunitions as possible. While these measures represented 
sensible planning, they proportionally decreased the voyages’ overall prof-
itability. The increase in the vessels’ dimensions, moreover, would bring 
new problems when the convoys came to pass over the sandbars at the 
mouth of the Guadalquivir River. In effect, they were often forced to wait 
for high tides near the Cape of San Vicente, the area of maximum danger 
for corsair attack. These were some of the reasons why trade was skewered 
towards goods that were very expensive relative to their weight, such as 
gold, silver, or slaves, and made use of others, such as hides and leathers, 
as a kind of very low-cost ballast freight, whose function was to balance 
outgoing loads (Chaunu 1977, p. 45).
There were also problems of a more strictly social—or human—origin. 
The conquest and organization of territory were relatively rapid in the 
areas where extant political structures were more advanced. In this regard 
it was important that the Aztec confederation and Inca Empire were mini-
mally centralized and that, with the fall of their centres of power, Spaniards 
took control of extensive and efficient networks apt for the ruling of their 
territories. But the limitations on the control of territory were very con-
siderable across much of the continent, where there remained many tribal 
societies in inhospitable areas that were very difficult to access (and often, 
also, these were of relatively little interest to the conquistadores). In any 
case, the problem lay not only in conquering distant regions but also in 
maintaining them. This is to say that the question was how to mobilize 
 IBERIAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION AND EUROPEAN TRADE NETWORKS 
54
resources—human and technical—for conquest or how to incentivize this 
process without relinquishing control of these territories. But it also con-
cerned how to maintain a small group of colonists in situ among a popula-
tion that dwarfed them.
Yet even where conquest had been achieved, it was not always easy or 
possible to exploit the available resources. As the Portuguese had exploited 
well-established trade routes in the Indian Ocean, the Castilians took 
advantage of extant tributary networks. However it was difficult to force 
the population to toil for its conquerors. Moreover, no labour market 
existed to provide a workforce. Of course, Indian institutions existed for 
the use of forced labour in return for the exchange of gifts and compensa-
tions (Menegus 1991). But to get these to function on the necessary scale 
was a major problem. The most sought-after resources in the initial 
phase—gold and silver—were not easy to obtain and posed technological 
problems. During the first phase, in fact, the progress in mining was based 
upon a ‘mixing of European techniques and those inherited from the old 
settlers’. But towards 1550, and despite the abundance of mineral depos-
its, ‘diminishing returns’ started to make themselves felt (Sánchez 1989, 
vol. I, pp. 311–2) that could only be overcome by a technological leap 
forward. For silver mining this meant addressing the basic technical prob-
lem of mineral amalgamation. This had to be done with mercury, a prod-
uct then available only in Europe and China, which obviously increased 
the final cost of production (Sánchez 1989, vol. I, p. 324). And these are 
only a few of the examples of the difficulties faced by these crucial sectors 
during the conquest.
The situation can be better understood if we also consider the shock 
that the discovery of this New World was provoking among Europeans. As 
is well known, the mere existence of America and its inhabitants com-
pelled Europeans to reject the authority of traditional ideas and start to 
envisage reality from a platform provided by empirical observation (Elliott 
1972), as would the later discoveries of Kepler and Galileo. Over the 
course of the sixteenth century, empirical observations would progress in 
auxiliary sciences such as botany and through the collection of words or 
the study of languages such as Quechua.
The encounter between different civilizations also affected the concept 
of the Indian and led to discussions about his status as a human being. On 
the one hand, for the first Dominicans, the Amerindian embodied an 
unblemished soul, the clean slate (tabula rasa) described by Aristotle 
upon which the values of the most pristine forms of Christianity might be 
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inculcated. On the other hand, for the conquistadores the indigenous 
communities represented mostly an untapped reservoir of expendable 
labour. In this sense, the challenge lay not in the existence of a new reality 
that needed to be understood but rather that it produced an array of inter-
pretations that were seized upon in competing fields of interest. In juridi-
cal circles controversies of this sort were very prominent in what Tomás y 
Valiente (1992) called the ‘critical stage’ between 1511, when the first 
voices were raised against the exploitation and even the enslavement of the 
Indian, and 1566, with the death of Bartolomé de las Casas, who had been 
the most resourceful and committed defender of the rights of the indige-
nous population.
These challenges notwithstanding, until very recently scholars have 
held that Castilian society was poorly equipped for this endeavour. In this 
light, the negative effects of the conquest were easily explained.2 But 
Castile was in fact one of the areas of Europe best prepared for a challenge 
of these proportions. It boasted human capital and institutions well-suited 
to such a gigantic undertaking. It stood in the vanguard of navigational 
advances and had seen the emergence of advanced forms of military orga-
nization that some historians have considered to be a key element in 
Europe’s unique historical trajectory (Hale 1985, Chap. 2). Financial 
techniques and institutions were already highly developed and would 
shortly be supplemented by the emergence or adoption of systems such as 
the Italian commenda and compagnia, crucial to any drive to accrue the 
capital necessary for the colonial adventure (Macalister 1984, p.  98). 
Castile boasted a multitude of foreign merchants, with Italians and, spe-
cifically, Genoese, keen to become involved in Seville.
In addition, the Iberian Peninsula harboured local institutions that for 
centuries had overseen campaigns of military expansion and colonization 
that were almost unique in Europe (with the exception of expansion east-
ward from Germany). The control of territory in the New World came to 
be based upon municipalities very similar to those that had been formed 
in the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista, with the establishment of 
the town council (the cabildo), the local by-laws (ordenanzas), the munici-
pal district (alfoz), and the extensive communal estate over which the 
2 John Elliott (2006), however, has recently called our attention on the pioneering charac-
ter of this Castilian enterprise and underlined that the English expansion into the New World 
involved a high degree of imitation of it. See also Cañizares-Esguerra (2006).
 IBERIAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION AND EUROPEAN TRADE NETWORKS 
56
town would exercise its jealously guarded jurisdiction (Weckmann 1993). 
As civic ceremonies and rituals emphasized, all of these bodies or institu-
tions served the king and his justice (Macalister 1984). In contrast to the 
later English programme, Iberian colonization was very much directed 
from above (Elliott 2006, pp.  117–9). After the first problems with 
Columbus alerted the Crown to the need for caution in order to avoid any 
relative loss of power, Castile would resort to pre-existing formulas, such 
as capitulationes, a type of accord between the king and a conqueror that 
maintained royal sovereignty in exchange for the governmental and eco-
nomic concessions in recently discovered lands (Aram 2008; Carrasco and 
Céspedes 1985, p. 291).
As we have seen, the monarchy maintained a fiscal apparatus rivalled 
only by France. The creation of the Council of the Indies (1524) gave it 
a central body capable of directing and controlling—or attempting to 
control—the New World’s political organization. Castile had also over-
seen the development of judicial institutions that would become basic to 
the regulation of social relations in the New World. The Castilian 
Chancillerías served as a model for the Audiencias responsible for the 
administration of justice in America, while the Aragonese viceroyalties 
provided a template for a political figure—the viceroy—who might be 
seen as a kind of ‘alter ego’ of the king in the overseas dominions. Both 
institutions increased the government’s ability to regulate social life and 
territory and thus its coercive power. They operated thanks to a bureau-
cracy of lawyers trained in some of the Old World’s best universities 
(themselves representative of one of the earliest and most impressive man-
ifestations of the ‘educational revolution’ sweeping over the continent) 
and whose judgements and interpretations would lead to the emergence 
of the so-called Derecho Indiano (Indian Law), a pioneering effort to 
adjust Castilian legal traditions to the specific circumstances of the Indies 
(Tomás y Valiente 1992, pp. 325–45). This group of royal officials and 
interpreters of the laws of the kingdom together with the alcaldes mayores 
and the corregidores, the main authorities at the municipal level, exercised 
judicial and governing powers. At an early point, the Crown obtained 
from the Pope the right to nominate bishops (derecho de presentación) in 
the Indies. In fact, Rome had previously allowed the Crown to claim all 
tithes paid by its American subjects. In addition to providing the Crown 
significant revenues, these measures gave it a valuable source of patronage 
and offered it a high degree of control over what was to be one of the 
main pillars of the colonization—religion and religiosity.
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At the same time, the problems in establishing a labour market were 
overcome through the repartimientos de indios, that is, the temporary dis-
tribution of Indians as a workforce for the colonizers, and the encomienda, 
which saw a certain number of Indians given to the colonists on a perma-
nent basis, with the natives being obliged to pay tribute or work in 
exchange for protection and being taught the Christian religion. Moreover, 
ownership formulas that were common on the peninsula, such as the may-
orazgo, entailed ecclesiastical property and others, gradually extended to 
the New World, where they would have an enormous impact on institu-
tional frameworks and property rights (Coatsworth 2008).
The basic infrastructure for the control and processing of information 
in this vast empire and in the European territories took the form of the 
creation of central archives such as that of Simancas, maps and geographi-
cal accounts (Relaciones geográficas) or descriptions of territories, and 
memoriales or reports. This information gathering occurred on a scale 
never before seen (Parker 2001). In addition to these surveys describing 
the new continent, visitas, or traditional visits involving the dispatch of 
officials to oversee the control of the administration, were undertaken. 
Juicios de residencia were also commonly used to evaluate the performance 
of officials at the moment of their replacement. All of these measures con-
stituted a governmental attempt to achieve self-sufficiency in obtaining 
one of the most expensive resources of the time, information (Brendecke 
2012). The 1560s and 1570s witnessed a genuine offensive on this front, 
with law graduates (letrados) providing coherence to the American legal 
system. Or, at least, this was the intention (Rivero 2011). From 1569 to 
1571, Juan de Ovando was charged with reforming the Council of the 
Indies, the organism overseeing and upholding the laws of the Indies, with 
the aim of giving it a more central role. Parallel to this reform, the govern-
ment created notary offices (escribanías) to register contracts and thus 
contributed to the regulation of economic and social relationships, some-
thing which at least offered the possibility of reducing transaction costs or, 
more accurately given the starting point, of converting an unmeasurable 
degree of insecurity into a risk that could at least be assessed with some 
degree of precision.
Over the century the fiscal system slowly was implemented within the 
apparatus for the mobilization of American resources. The collection of 
taxes such as the alcabalas and levies on alum, snow, playing cards, salt, 
and other goods proceeded at rates similar to those on the peninsula. This 
system was based around a growing number of cajas, treasury districts, 
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established in the more important cities (TePaske and Klein 1982). In 
addition, the system for the transfer of funds from one caja to another 
(the so-called situados) was advanced. This arrangement, in turn, would 
become vital for the defence of territories and, in contrast to what 
occurred in Europe, based its efficiency on the absence of political and 
jurisdictional barriers between the different regions (Marichal and Souto 
1994; Marichal and von Grafenstein 2012). The system stretched as far as 
Manila (Alonso 2012).
A sophisticated convoy system was also organized, combining warships 
and commercial freighters, aiming to guarantee the Crown’s commercial 
monopoly and to resist attacks of corsairs from countries such as England 
and, later, Holland. Based upon a delicate balance between geography, 
climate, technology, and human and nautical resources, this system was 
organized from the House of Trade (Casa de la Contratación) in Seville 
(1503) (Parry 1990, pp. 53–6; García-Baquero 1986, pp. 23–30). The 
convoys would become the basis of the Carrera de Indias, a description of 
which gives a clear idea of the high degree of sophistication often present 
in the colonial system (Map 2.1).3
3 The system, as it began to be regulated during the 1560s, was as follows: each year Sanlúcar 
de Barrameda witnessed the departure of two fleets, one in May and the other in August; both 
sailed with armed protection and were loaded with wine, oil, textiles, luxuries, swords, books, 
grains, and other goods sought by a colonial elite with high purchasing power. Their voyages 
lasted between five and six weeks. The May fleet headed to Vera Cruz (Mexico) and the 
August convoy towards Nombre de Dios and, after 1597, Portobello (Panama), where they 
unloaded their cargoes and retired to overwinter in Cartagena de Indias. The outward journey 
was relatively easy, all things considered; the real problems lay in coordinating the return to 
Spain, which depended upon uniting in Havana at the beginning of summer, before the arrival 
of the hurricane season. The fleet from New Spain, loaded with silver, cochineal, and other 
products, could do this quite easily, even though it had to set sail from Vera Cruz in February 
so as to take advantage of the trade winds. Its voyage lasted three to four weeks. Problems 
were greater for the galleons that had to collect the silver coming from the mines of Potosí to 
Panama; here precision and timing were crucial, and the whole operation depended on the 
co-ordination of many linked factors. Ideally, the linking up would be achieved in March, so 
that it would be back in Havana before the hurricanes. But for this to occur, it was necessary 
that it should rain early in Bolivia—an uncommon occurrence—so that the mills could pre-
pare the ore and melt the silver into ingots. When this process was accomplished, a long chain 
of llamas carried it down from Potosí to the port of Arica (15 days), where it was sent to 
Callao in Lima and then loaded and shipped, aboard special vessels, to Panama (20 days). 
From there it was transported on the backs of mules across the isthmus to Nombre de Dios 
or Portobello (at least four days travelling), where the fleet awaited it.
If this delicate mechanism of synchronicity and co-ordination worked, the fleets could 
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The Carrera de Indias belies the old myth of Spain being a country 
with little organization or technological capacity; it also demonstrates the 
development of methods of observation and organization as a means of 
understanding nature, oceanic currents, and winds. This methodology 
was already evident in the process of oceanic expansion. But it developed 
even further thanks to the voyages and the foundation, in 1508, of the 
School of Pilots of Seville (Schäfer 2003). In this same period, medical 
doctors such as Monardes and theorists such as Arias Montano and Acosta 
would make a considerable contribution to the use of empirical observa-
tion as a means of understanding the New World (Aram and Yun 2014). 
New technologies in the mining sector would also be crucial. The exhaus-
tion of ground-level deposits and the crisis in silver production based on 
the traditional smelting furnace were resolved by the development of a 
method for its amalgamation with mercury, which reduced costs and less-
ened the technological dependency on the peninsula, thanks to the exploi-
tation of the mines of Huancavelica (Sánchez 1989, pp. 310–32). The 
Spanish empire was in reality a stage for scientific and technological devel-
opment that barely resembled the pessimistic visions of it to which we 
have become accustomed (Barrera-Osorio 2006, pp. 6–12). This technical 
capacity quickly manifested itself in another series of advances that would 
have a marked effect upon the sixteenth century and ran from the use of 
animals such as mules to the introduction of sugar mills.
Political Control, Bargaining, Resistance, 
and Environmental Failures
Despite Iberian societies’ extraordinary capacity to mobilize material, 
institutional, and human resources, the outcome would not be an 
American society that was tightly controlled from Castile. In the first 
place, the very means of financing the conquest led to forms of negotia-
tion that would have an enormous impact upon the political economy of 
time to cross it) and so enter into what was a very safe harbour. In fact the galleons often 
reached it between September and October and so were forced to wait for high tides or high 
river levels to overcome the bar; alternatively goods could be unloaded onto barges. This task 
was carried out near the Cape of San Vicente, the area of greatest danger for attacks from 
corsairs or pirates; this problem would be more common as the size of ships increased over 
the course of the second half of the sixteenth century.
Elliott (1990, pp. 41–3), on the basis of the reconstruction of Báncora (1959).
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the colonies and the imperial system sensu lato (Chap. 7). Moreover, the 
conquest was a disaster and a failure in humanitarian, demographic, and 
ecological terms.
In distinction to modern empires of the nineteenth century, Iberia’s 
sixteenth-century imperial enterprises were not paid for in economic cur-
rency dispatched from the metropolis or other colonies. Rather, they were 
financed through a multitude of accords made at the local level between 
the king and the conquerors and colonizers, including the religious orders. 
These negotiations had no jurisdictional framework as defined and formal-
ized as in the composite monarchies of Europe, in which the cities, nobles, 
and Church exercised legal powers of coercion (Chap. 1). For reasons set 
out (above), the Crown took great care not to cede effective jurisdiction to 
private individuals. This has sometimes led to the impression that the gov-
ernment of America was based upon the unanswerable and absolute power 
of the king. Yet the very system of conquest, based on capitulaciones and 
general concessions of political rights and economic privileges by the 
Crown to the conquerors, created a form of do ut des and depended upon 
the exchange of privileges in the use of natural and political resources that 
from the very beginning nuanced the effective power of the king. What the 
conquistador—Columbus himself is the most evocative example—received 
was the recognition of his ‘privileges’ to use resources or to govern in 
return for his extending the dominions and resources of the king. The 
encomiendas and repartimientos of Indians also implied this type of transac-
tion. Both were based on the Crown’s ceding of tributary advantages or 
the use of a workforce in return for colonization. From this basis sprang 
the later problems faced by the monarchy in revising the conditions it had 
set down for the first conquistadores, as did the settlers’ subsequent revolts 
and obstructionism, both of which were fully justified from their point of 
view. The empire was built on an exchange between the Crown, which 
saved the most precious of all resources—money—by conferring political 
and social capital, and the effective capacity for enforcement upon the col-
onists. This was done, however, on the grounds of the preservation of 
royal jurisdiction and the creation of formal institutions of government 
that were, in appearance, at least, dependent upon the king.
A process of this sort did not avoid permanent conflicts. An attempt to 
institute reforms in 1542 known as the Leyes Nuevas provoked settlers’ 
rebellions. The policy on encomiendas, for instance, the suppression of 
vacant ones, triggered considerable resistance among their holders. In 
Peru things went as far as open conflict in 1544. It proved possible to 
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avoid this outcome in New Spain thanks to the necessary adjustment being 
made in time, but in 1564 a new wave of discontent broke out and led the 
rebels to name the son of Cortés as their legitimate king.
The other step to the articulation of dominion, the relations between 
colonials and Amerindians, led to more than one flare-up and resulted in 
armed uprisings. As early as 1536, this difficult relationship led to the 
Peruvian rebellion of Manco Cápac, giving vent to forms of dissent that 
would last until 1572 and would lead to the foundation of the indepen-
dent kingdom of Vilcabamba and the spread of millenarian beliefs that 
encouraged resistance. Attitudes were, clearly, changing. In this period, 
‘rebels’ not only learnt to fight against horses by constructing pits or 
throwing balls at their legs but also, according to the account of Titu Cusi, 
son of Manco himself, reinforced their old religious beliefs by identifying 
the Christian deity as a false God consisting of nothing more than painted 
cloth and clearly bettered by the visible gods—the Sun and the Moon—
who communicated with their people. The emergence, from 1564, of the 
religious movement of the Taqui Ongo was consistent with these develop-
ments and with the traditional cyclical conception of history. This pro-
gramme assumed a messianic character and announced the resurrection of 
Pachacamac and a victorious revolution against the Spaniards. These 
beliefs would become so enduring and deep-rooted that they would resur-
face in the eighteenth century. The same could be said of the forms of 
frontier resistance, such as that of the araucanos (in today’s Chile, and 
which lasted until the nineteenth century and displayed a remarkable 
degree of military adaptability), and uprisings in the humid zone of 
Mexico, among the Chichimeca, who would never in fact be conquered. 
Indeed, it has even been argued that ‘the entire colonial history is marked 
by resistance and revolts’ (Bennassar 1980, pp. 221–52).
In the midst of such unrest, the encomenderos certainly became progres-
sively stronger and created the conditions for political bargaining with the 
Crown on a new basis. The demographic crisis, leaving huge unpopulated 
spaces, provided the encomenderos with a pretext to dominate peoples and 
to control their land. Some encomenderos proclaimed themselves owners of 
the possessions—principally the land—of greatly diminished or entirely 
absent communities. By the middle of century, ‘much of the Mexican pla-
teau had fallen into the hands of a few wealthy individuals’ (Davis 1976, 
p. 57). In areas devoted to mining, which held such enormous interest for 
the Crown, the needs for labour led to similar processes and changes. With 
the demographic recession and technological innovations, mining became 
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a high-cost activity that relatively few settlers could afford to enter. These 
developments were accompanied by a remarkable effort by the merchants 
of Lima and the ecclesiastical institutions to finance mining operations, 
making efforts that were decisive in providing liquid funds for a key sector 
of the colonial economy. Such developments cemented in place another 
important facet of the relationship between the monarchy and its subjects, 
the basis of which was a flexible application of the law and which allowed 
the Crown to claim its share—the ‘royal fifth’—of production. This 
‘accord’ would prove to be the basis of the great cycle of American silver 
flowing onto the peninsula between 1550 and 1600–1610. If it wanted to 
make the Indies a source of income, the Crown had to facilitate the work 
of these merchants and ecclesiastics. Its relationship with them, if usually 
marked by tensions, was always based upon reciprocal and mutual need.
The understanding between local authorities and the Crown was 
reflected in the decentralization of the Derecho Indiano, something which 
even permitted the survival of indigenous laws and customs. Common to 
all of these developments was recourse to the long-established Castilian 
tradition of ‘obeying but not complying’ with the law, a custom used by 
the municipal councils of many cities as a way to ‘oppose the authoritari-
anism of the King and his officials’ (Tomás y Valiente 1992, pp. 337–41).
This mixture of pressure, resistance, and asymmetric transaction was 
also clear in the process of the religious acculturation of the indigenous 
population—and, indeed, in the limits to this process. Anthropologists 
have shown that the efforts to change the culture and mental world of the 
Indians had certain limits, in large part because of the syncretic nature of 
many religious beliefs. As the case of the Maya makes clear, the outcome 
was often a hybrid type of religion that displayed on the one hand a capac-
ity for resistance and, on the other, the negotiating structures that had to 
be adopted (Farris 1984, pp.  442–536). Religious syncretism entailed 
another way of compromising, one paid for in blood in many cases but not 
less important than the other accord with the king: this was the agreement 
that the local chiefs and indigenous lords should not only organize the 
collective tasks to pay the tribute but also its transfer, a part of which they 
duly retained for themselves (Menegus 1991). The relationship was also 
based upon the Church, whose expansion implied the development of 
another important actor in political and economic affairs as well as reli-
gious ones. The Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits acted as mediators 
between colonists and Indians and were subject to the same exchange of 
forms of capital, including economic resources, with the monarchy.
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From the demographic and humanitarian point of view, this system and 
the contact between these two worlds resulted in a catastrophe without 
precedent in the history of humanity. A key starting point to understand 
sixteenth-century America is the way the combination of ecological forces 
and institutions led to what Las Casas called the ‘destruction of the Indies’, 
the demographic catastrophe following the conquest. Whatever the popu-
lation figures of America in 1491, it is clear that the indigenous population 
was sizeably reduced in the following decades. Thus, for central Mexico—a 
region that has generated considerable controversy—Borah and Cook 
postulate a fall from 25 million inhabitants in 1519 to 1.38 in 1595. This 
is, perhaps, overly dramatic. But, even taking more recent attempts at revi-
sion by scholars such as Zambardino (from between 5 and 10 million to 
2.2 and 3 million in 1568), it is impossible to deny that the Amerindian 
population fell between 50% and 70%. This obviously entailed dramatic 
consequences for the economy of the area and workforce  availability. Some 
calculations even suggest a fall of between 60 and 80 million inhabitants 
in 1500 to 10 million in 1600, including European immigrants.4
As it is well known, this breakdown in American history has been the 
cornerstone of the so-called Black Legend, which portrays Spain as a cruel 
country destroying not only American resources but above all native 
American populations and cultures.
Over the last few decades, however, a rich vision of the ecological clash 
of these two worlds has emerged and has gone a long way towards explain-
ing the ‘means’ of conquest—in other words, the environmental factors 
that facilitated this process. The ‘ecological imperialism’ analysed by 
Crosby was, no doubt, a key factor (Crosby 1988). Diseases such as small-
pox ruined the lives of thousands of Indians (and strengthened their belief 
in the divinity of the Spaniards, whose resistance to the epidemic was far 
higher). Focusing upon illnesses, John Elliott has written that ‘the most 
effective of all the allies for the imposition of European supremacy was not 
human, but rather biological’ (2006, p. 112). Plants such as white clover, 
which quickly spread through Peru as fodder, displaced the Incas from 
fields that had been vital for their livelihood. The pig, an omnivore requir-
ing high quantities of carbohydrates, competed with the Indians for high- 
calorie foods. Semi-wild cattle spread very quickly throughout Mexico and 
other regions. Together with proliferating numbers of horses, they helped 
4 See figures in Maddison (1995) or some different but equally meaningful estimates in 
Romano (2004, Chap. 1).
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destroy much of the foliage that was very delicately balanced in some 
zones.5 This vision somewhat shifts the accent from human action and 
cruelty to more impersonal factors and, no doubt, contributes to a less 
maniquean view of the ‘destrucción de las Indias’.
Yet one needs to consider ecological imperialism not only as the encoun-
ter of flora, fauna, and microorganisms, as is usual, but also in relation to the 
role played by the institutions, cultural beliefs, and patterns of knowledge 
regulating the uses of resources and ecosystems. Today it is clear that the 
logic of how the encomienda functioned would be crucial. Amerindians 
were awarded to the encomenderos as a workforce or as tributaries for a tem-
porary period designed to be cancelled at some point, when the Indians 
would revert to the Crown. Hence there emerged a tendency towards the 
quickest possible exploitation of the Amerindian population as an essential 
part of this drama. In the same way, the repartimientos of indigenous peo-
ples and the use of mitas (personal labour services that the Indians had to 
perform in the mines) involved the massive displacement of individuals from 
their communities to the mining areas, thus exerting a dramatic effect upon 
the original social structures and demographic equilibrium. These institu-
tions, moreover, did not act in a vacuum but, rather, in combination with 
environmental forces. The settlers’ efforts to maximize profits—an objective 
inherent to their cultural beliefs and aspirations—came on top of intensive 
rhythm of work that these institutions demanded of the Amerindians and 
for which the physiology of the native population was entirely unprepared. 
In many areas the diet of the Amerindian population—and diet is a crucial 
component of all living beings in any ecological system—was based on car-
bohydrates drawn from the manioc plant, maize, potato, and other crops; 
physiologically, such natives were unprepared for the encomenderos’ demands 
for continuous exertions in the fields and mines (Bennassar 1980). On the 
other hand, the destruction of the original ecological systems combined 
with forms of social and institutional organization unprepared to confront 
the ensuing environmental challenges. The introduction, for example, of 
European crops and technologies associated with the new institutional 
frameworks created by the Spaniards arrived but spread too late to avoid the 
demographic catastrophe.6
5 Crosby (1988), McNeill (1977, pp. 176–207).
6 The results of the work in progress of Bethany Aram and her research group, ‘ArtEmpire’, 
should clarify many of these questions, which are often absent from the relevant 
bibliography.
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The institutional component of this process, if often marginalized by 
historians, was highly significant. Legislative measures were clearly unable 
to stop or prevent the exploitation of the Amerindian population, nor was 
the medicine of the time capable of meeting the challenges posed by the 
‘microbial unification of the world’, in Le Roy Ladurie’s memorable 
expression (1973). Las Casas denounced this situation to Charles V at the 
very moment of the emission of the ‘New Laws’ (Leyes Nuevas, 1542), 
which sought to supress the encomiendas (and in fact did so in certain 
areas), and attempted to end the exploitation of the Indian. The logic of 
Las Casas’ programme lay not only in human rights and religion, as has 
often been said. It was also based upon the peninsular experience of a 
continual stripping away and usurpation of the royal patrimony (Chaps. 1 
and 4), it being somewhat of an obsession of the Crown to avert a similar 
process in the Americas. In fact, this was what was occurring from the very 
moment that subjects of the king—the Indians—died in harsh labour sys-
tems. But the remedy was worse than the illness. The new measures 
unleashed even more ferocious desires for exploitation of the workforce. 
Legislation camouflaged, but did not prevent, abuses in a distant world in 
which the capacity of enforcement of the royal courts—and, therefore, 
their ability to arrest abuses—was very limited (see below). The need for a 
labour force justified wars of conquest often based upon the idea of the 
existence of cannibalism (this was not always certain), which was seen as a 
symptom of barbarity. The notion of the barbarous served to justify not 
only war but also forced work systems such as the repartimiento, which 
were thought to offer the redemptive and civilizing power of work to the 
barbarian population (Córdoba 2013). As is well known, the New Laws 
were also the pretext for the trade in American slaves, something legal and 
consistent with the cultural beliefs of the period.
In this way and to an extent, the Black Legend emerges as a rhetorical 
excess that undervalue the context of events and with profound conse-
quences on the image of Spain. Such is even more the case considering 
attempts to avert the catastrophe, at least on paper and in some of the 
Crown’s acts. At the same time, a purely ecological vision, based solely 
on flora, fauna, microbes, and so on, overlooks the human and institu-
tional components of the process, especially if the period’s cultural 
beliefs, in which humanitarianism and human rights were much less 
developed than today but were already in the mind of people such as Las 
Casas, provided the foundations of this institutional framework. Between 
both extremes lies a third more complex, but also more realistic and less 
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maniquean, possibility. The environmental problems, illnesses, interests, 
and abuses combined with certain political economies that neither acted 
nor were capable of acting to avoid a process of resource destruction that 
implied, even in the midterm, a disaster with characteristics new in the 
history of humanity.
The Portuguese Empire and Asia: Bargaining, Diversity, 
and Limits
At the conclusion of the reign of Manuel I of Portugal (1465–1521), the 
Portuguese were present on both the northern and eastern coasts of 
Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and even in the Chinese Sea. Moreover 
they had created a genuine Atlantic system that connected a range of 
archipelagos with the metropolis and with Africa and which was extended 
as far as Brazil.
Rounding the Cape of Good Hope early in 1498, Vasco Da Gama had 
sailed the coasts of East Africa with just two ships. Beyond this point the navi-
gation became easier. Shortly afterwards he discovered that the coasts of the 
Indian Ocean were very navigable, although dangerous during the monsoon 
season. As with the great American empires—those of the Incas and Aztecs—
the pre-existence of communication networks was vital to the giant strides 
subsequently made by the Europeans. Da Gama took more than a year to 
return to Lisbon with two great achievements (Parry 1990, Chap. 7).
The first of these was profit and, more important, he compiled informa-
tion regarding the seas and coasts, language difficulties, societies, and reli-
gions. In Lisbon many intelligent Portuguese believed that, if conquered, 
India ‘would weaken the forces of the kingdom to such an extent that it 
would be without those necessary for its conservation’.7 But money and 
information was all that King Manuel—although partly mistaken—
required to embark upon a campaign of conquest.
As we have seen, the Portuguese empire was certainly not a work of 
Minerva—no empire, in fact, has ever been. A mixture of violence, piracy, 
fortresses, and factories, it included, when necessary, a form of diplomacy 
that went as far as the formal submission to local kings or the provocation 
of a massacre as a lesson to the others. Such methods served to overcome 
7 ‘Debilitaría tanto as forças do reino que ficaria ele sem as necessárias para a sua conserva-
çao’. Quoted by Romero Magalhães (1997, vol. III, p. 521).
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the resistance of the Venetians, the Mamelukes of Egypt, and the Ottoman 
Turks, who looked unfavourably upon this new competitor—one who 
was, to make things worse, a Christian (Godinho 1982–1987). The strat-
egy employed in these early phases demonstrated what would be the great 
strength and principal weakness of the Portuguese empire: the control of 
chain of key coastal positions, Goa (1510), Malacca (1511), and Ormuz 
(1515). Ormuz, an enclave ceded thanks to an agreement with the Safavid 
Persian dynasty that was confronting the Ottoman Empire, allowed for 
the control of the Persian Gulf and the chance to pressure the Turks in the 
Red Sea with the aim of cutting their involvement in Indian Ocean com-
merce. Goa opened up trade to India and constituted an excellent step 
towards the East. Malacca allowed Malaysia to be approached, thus mak-
ing the Spice Islands (one of the principal foci of commerce in the area) 
reachable and allowing trade in the Chinese Sea, even touching Japan 
(Magalhães 1997, vol. III, p. 446). From the 1530s the expansion would 
be slowed and more focused on the consolidation of positions in this area. 
In 1529 the Portuguese had to recognize Castilian rights to the Moluccas 
(Indonesia). The Portuguese efforts against the Turk in the Red Sea ended 
in failure, and until 1555–1557 they were unable to establish themselves 
in Macao, where the Chinese reaction to the violence that they had used 
would stop them in their tracks (see the Portuguese routes in Map 2.1).
Enterprises of this sort capitalized Portugal’s relatively few advantages, 
as a distant and small country with, consequently, very limited demo-
graphic resources. Nevertheless, to face the Muslim merchants connected 
to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade, the Portuguese called upon artil-
lery-bearing ships of huge dimensions. The broadside (andanadas) tactic, 
consisting of bombarding enemy ships from the greatest possible distance, 
allowed the Europeans to sink or incapacitate their adversaries before 
direct hand-to-hand fighting—in which their adversaries’ more numerous 
crews would have prevailed—could take place. This tactic also enabled the 
Europeans to sow panic in enemy ports and enclaves, sometimes with the 
aim of conquering them but, more often and simply, to make a show of 
strength. Obviously, the practice did not lead to the conquest of large ter-
ritories, which would have been impossible from Portugal. The compari-
son with the Ottoman Empire, which had by this point conquered 
Mameluk Egypt, is revealing. The trade in spices in Antwerp afforded the 
Portuguese access to the timbers of the Baltic, while the Turk was making 
use of the woods of Anatolia and therefore facing extremely high transport 
costs (Headrick 2010, Chap. 2).
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The development of the sugar economy in Madeira, the Azores, Santo 
Tomé, and Cape Verde was followed by the emergence of Brazil. On Vasco 
da Gama’s return from India, King Manuel immediately charged Pedro 
Álvares Cabral, un fidalgo da casa del rei, to sail for Brazil, a zone to the 
east of the line drawn by the Treaty of Tordesillas and, therefore, a land 
recognized as belonging to Portugal for exploration. This was followed by 
later expeditions along the eastern shores of South America and brought 
about contact with the Amerindians. Although trading concessions were 
made and some factories (feitorias) were created, at this point the country 
was too committed to the Indian Ocean in order to make great progress 
elsewhere (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp.  204–12). The halt in Portuguese 
expansion in Asia in the 1530s may be the reason for its subsequent atten-
tion to South America, where the French were gaining territory and seek-
ing to obtain the wood (pao) of Brazil, a dye product very much sought 
by the businessmen of Nantes and Brittany and by the tapestry producers 
and tailors of Europe (Lockhart and Schwartz 1983, p. 181).
After 1550, however, Portuguese expansion in Asia slowed down 
largely due to confrontations with highly developed states and empires 
that were absorbing some of the West’s military techniques (Darwin 2008, 
p. 74). Attacks upon Turkish positions in the Red Sea did not bring about 
decisive conquests, and the Portuguese dream of reaching Suez disap-
peared for a period of time. Indian Ocean piracy marked the Portuguese 
system. A realistic policy had led Portugal to abandon enterprises in North 
Africa, which came to be dominated by the rivalry between Charles V and 
Süleyman (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 125–9). By the mid-century, the dif-
ferences between the Portuguese empire in Africa and Asia and the Spanish 
in America (and, indeed, the Portuguese dominions in Brazil) were already 
very clear: the Portuguese had encountered very solid political formations, 
with highly developed military technology (at least in comparison with the 
Aztec and Inca empires) and highly evolved internal social and economic 
systems and ecosystems adapted to European illnesses after centuries of 
contact. Together with the scarce population of Portugal, these circum-
stances explain the empire’s highly limited capacity for penetration and 
domination. All of these factors would be decisive for the history of the 
empire.
As was the case for Castile in America, the system for the acquisition 
and control of territory had been based upon ceding political capital to 
private agents who would conquer and exploit the lands on behalf of the 
monarch in Lisbon. That is to say that feitorias and capitanias donatarias 
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were created (above all this was the case in Brazil, which was divided into 
12 such districts) each with the prerogative to penetrate into the hinter-
land (Lockhart and Schwartz 1983, Chap. 6). These districts were very 
similar to the metropolitan senhorios, and the government ceded the right 
to govern them in return for the conquest (Weckmann 1993). Another 
option was to employ a system of contrato in which private individuals 
received privileges to make use of the land. These were negotiated rela-
tions (Hespanha and Santos 1998, vol. 5, pp. 351–66) characterized by 
their very low cost to the royal exchequer, although, of course, they had a 
high opportunity cost for it in terms of its capacity for political control. In 
the case of Brazil use was also made of the foundation of cities (usually 
coastal ones), the outcome being that the population density of the hin-
terland would be noticeably lower than in Spanish America. These arrange-
ments were conditioned not only by the difficulties in penetrating the 
hinterland but also by their character as enclaves within export-orientated 
economies that acquired slave labour from abroad and in return sent prac-
tically all of their produce overseas. As a result, royal influence in the cities 
of the Portuguese colonial world would be less marked and slower to 
establish itself than was the case in the Castilian colonies (Lockhart and 
Schwartz 1983, Chap. 6).
This having been said, it was obvious that the proper exploitation of 
this extensive network of contacts depended upon certain regulatory 
efforts and government from above. As in Spanish America, institutions 
with a strong centralizing tendency were established above the rudimen-
tary ones on the ground. In fact, the Portuguese oriental empire was 
divided into two differentiated zones (Boyajian 1993) with interdepen-
dent but individualized institutions. The Casa da Índia, founded in 1503 
and later imitated in Castile, was charged with regulating maritime space 
and overseas commerce and oversaw the royal monopoly in trade between 
Lisbon and Goa. Moreover, in theory the Portuguese system had a clearer 
monopoly than the Castilian one: while in Seville the Crown only regu-
lated the trade between private individuals and attempted to respect the 
privileges of each city as a commercial licence holder, in Lisbon the king 
himself reserved the right to trade in determined products. The second 
institution was the powerful Estado da Índia, whose governor or viceroy 
was appointed by the monarch, resided in Goa, and was charged with the 
costs of protection, diplomacy, and enforcement in the Asian colonies. 
The Estado da Índia was charged with controlling and regulating Asian 
trade, a very important part of which was in private hands (Boyajian 1993, 
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Introduction). Following the annexation of Portugal by the Habsburgs, 
Philip II (Philip I in Portugal) introduced centralizing projects in the 
Estado da Índia, with the creation of the Conselho da Fazenda (Miranda 
2010) being of particular importance. In Brazil the office of the captaincy 
royal was created, with similar functions and its headquarters in Todos os 
Santos (Bahia), whence it governed Portuguese America. As in Spanish 
America, those captaincies that had been ceded in the phase of conquest 
were repurchased or redeemed to restore their government to the Crown 
(da Cunha and Monteiro 2005, p. 202). The Inquisition was used by the 
king to his own benefit and with an eye on the defence of his overarching 
or ‘superior’ authority (Bethencourt 2009). Equally the King of Portugal 
obtained from the Pope the right of patronage, known here as the ‘presen-
tation’ of bishops, which conferred a notable power not only on political 
affairs but also, indirectly, on religious ones. And the King of Portugal also 
obtained the privilege to control the Misericordias in the empire and 
beyond it (Marcocci 2012, pp. 107–8).
Such methods are sometimes seen as a form of unconstrained absolut-
ism that would shape the Portuguese empire: in reality, they were no such 
thing, and the system did not lead to the imposition of total or all- 
encompassing monarchical power and, as a result, to institutional unifica-
tion. In the Indies and in Africa, the distances and frontier character of 
many territories obliged the Crown to bargain with local actors of 
Portuguese origin and to negotiate with them over the administration of 
coercion, taking as a starting point the very heterogeneity of these territo-
ries and, consequently, the mixed nature of the resulting administration 
(Hespanha and Santos 1998, pp. 351–8). The very administrative reform 
programme itself, and the creation of the Conselho da Fazenda, was unable 
to overcome the enormous differences between tax-collecting centres and 
so led to negotiations between Goa and the local administrators. As a 
result, they retained a high degree of autonomy that led to ‘systematic’ 
corruption being accepted (Miranda 2010). The outcome was a negoti-
ated process in which powers were ceded, thus implying a certain degree 
of autonomy. The African coasts, for example, were often in the hands of 
lançados, bandeirantes, and slavers, mixed with local populations, who 
exercised considerable autonomy (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 49–54). This 
was also the outcome in the capitanias donatarias, whose officers enjoyed 
considerable room for manoeuvre. The cities founded in Brazil fell into 
the hands of groups that enjoyed a notable degree of freedom of action 
and who received their privileges in return for their governmental and tax- 
 IBERIAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION AND EUROPEAN TRADE NETWORKS 
72
collecting functions (Fragoso 2001, p. 47). In distant frontier territories, 
such as Brazil, the slavers operated with a high degree of autonomy and a 
de facto scope for negotiation that even allowed them to compete with the 
coastal cities in their power relations with the Crown (Lockhart and 
Schwartz 1983, Chap. 6). Overall the system, being based on the conces-
sion of institutional advantages in return for services or the mobilization of 
material resources, tended towards the creation of privileges that limited 
the right of the newcomers in regard to the previous negotiations with the 
Crown (Fragoso 2001, pp. 44–5). The viceroys and governors themselves, 
supposedly conduits for the transmission of the king’s power, exercised a 
high degree of freedom of manoeuvre. The same can be said of bishops 
and clergy and, especially in this period, of the Jesuits who often pursued 
their own interests rather than defend the authority of Madrid or Lisbon 
(Valladares 2001, passim). And this tendency was even clearer in cities such 
as Macao, where the Portuguese authorities shared and negotiated the 
decision-making process with the Chinese (Hespanha 2001, p. 171).
This flexible form of articulating the power of the king and his vassals 
in the colonies was completed with pliable formulas of negotiation between 
the Portuguese settlers and the original populations. Here one of the keys 
was the creation of informal and complex relations, which included good 
doses of both initial violence and later matrimonial alliances and mestizaje 
(Subrahmanyam 2005). This fact is evident in Asia, where one of the cru-
cial reasons for the survival of the imperial system lay in the capacity of 
merchants to mix and communicate with local societies. The fact that the 
very term casados (married) was used to describe the permanent residents 
of the Portuguese enclaves gives us an idea of the importance of these 
arrangements (Disney 2009, vol. II, pp. 147–9; de Sousa 2010). In Brazil 
the success of the capitanias, many of which had disappeared within a few 
decades of their creation, depended upon the establishment of informal 
networks that generated solid pacts with the local societies (Lockhart and 
Schwartz 1983, pp. 184–90). And this not only afforded an enormous 
scope for mediation to those who formed these pacts: it also increased 
their capacity to establish accords with Lisbon.
To the extent that these negotiations were extended and became used 
in different contexts, the result was what L. F. Thomaz (1994) called the 
different status of the territories composing the Estado da Índia and A. M. 
Hespanha has called ‘a multiple colonial state’ (2001, p.  170) and the 
emergence of a society where diversity and transactions between diverse 
social and religious identities marked the political economy.
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Apart from reasons rooted in the need to govern at long distance and 
over a society in which political negotiations largely depended upon privi-
leges conceded by the king, this combination of negotiation and auton-
omy is due to the rise in the imperial sphere of informal global networks 
that generated a high degree of self-sufficiency. We will return to this point 
in Chap. 7. For the moment it is to be noted that the pattered applied to 
the case of the Jesuits, who by 1600 had created a global network and 
even were one of the solutions set upon by the Crown for the maintenance 
of Portuguese control in areas such as Brazil, China, and Japan. And this 
was also the case for merchant networks that, like the ones created by 
Jewish businessmen around their common identity and which gave them 
a presence in the colonies, took the form of well-forged grids that served 
to circulate news, information, capital (sometimes as dowries), and mer-
chandise. These emerged at a very early moment and henceforth grew 
only in strength (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007).
overSeaS trade and european economieS, 1492–1580
Silver and the Price Revolution
The establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese empires meant an enor-
mous step forward for the process of globalization. But what were the 
consequences of this first phase of globalization for Europe?
The question of the impact of the American economy on the old conti-
nent entails consideration of the arrival of precious metals and the so- called 
price revolution, the inflationary process that existed across Europe during 
the sixteenth century. Studies have demonstrated the existence of two clear 
cycles, the first lasting until the middle of the sixteenth century and marked 
by the shipments of gold and a slow increase in silver imports. The second, 
running from 1560 onwards, saw significant amounts of precious metals 
and, above all, an explosion in the amount of silver entering Seville.8 
According to Barret, between 1492 and 1600, about 17,000 tons of silver 
and 280 tons of gold were produced in America, constituting, respectively, 
74% and 39% of the world’s total output between these dates (Barret 1990, 
p. 225). The impact, truly global, was particularly marked in Iberia.
8 See above all Hamilton (1975), Attman (1986), Barret (1990), or TePaske (1998), Feliu 
(1991) and Reis (2016).
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Contemporary thinkers such as Azpilcueta and Bodin explained that a 
greater amount of monetized silver necessarily made prices rise, and 
Hamilton’s studies as well as a long list of works on all Europe, and more 
in particular on the different Iberian territories from Portugal to Castile, 
Valencia or Catalonia have pointed in the same direction.9 Other histori-
ans have emphasized the importance, at least in Spain, of population 
growth as a key to inflation, underlining that prices grew faster in relative 
terms during the first half of the century and pointing out that in this 
timeframe the arrival of metals was proportionally lower, while population 
growth was pronounced.10 This argument was challenged by Harry 
Miskimin on the basis that the growth of American remittances must also 
be understood in terms of their relative increase, which was higher in the 
first half of the century with regard to the existing stock of money than in 
the second half of the century.11 Evidence for and against each one of 
these arguments has been presented in academic debates.12
Despite the huge interest of this debate from the perspective of eco-
nomic theory, the most interesting element for many historians is not the 
question of whether or not the quantitative theory of money summed up 
in the Fisher equation is correct. As Miskimin himself has noted, this equa-
tion represents a tautology, and, consequently, it is ‘fruitless to wonder 
whether or not it is the “truth” behind the European economy of the 
sixteenth century’ (Miskimin 1989, vol. XIII, p.  181). The important 
thing is not so much to determine if inflation was the result of American 
treasure as to study how the increase in monetary circulation connected to 
other factors and developments.
A long time ago, authors such as Y. S. Brenner drew attention to the 
fact that, even while retaining the quantitativist paradigm by themselves, 
9 As is well known, the proponents of this theory have begun from the application of the 
equation of Fisher, which in its simplest form is usually set as MV = PT, where M is the mon-
etary mass, V is the velocity of monetary circulation, P is prices, and T is transactions. The 
increase in the availability of metal would have been the basis for an increase in the monetary 
mass that would explain inflation. It would reach very low levels—around 2% annually—in 
comparison with today’s rates, which proved, nevertheless, significant rate for the time 
(Hamilton 1975).
10 Braudel and Spooner (1967), Nadal (1959), Vilar (1969, pp. 107–9).
11 Harry Miskimin (1981). As (at least) a working hypothesis, Miskimin’s argument can 
also be applied to the so-called pre-revolution of prices generated by the growing production 
of gold and silver in Central Europe.
12 See a more developed version of these ideas in Yun (2004, pp. 128–38).
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population growth and economic development in the sixteenth century 
could cause an escalation in monetary velocity and thus induce an increase 
in prices. This view has been subsequently developed through the consid-
eration of urban growth, in principle an indicator of the existence of an 
increase in the technical division of labour. According to Goldstone 
(1991), the sixteenth century witnessed a growing specialization of labour, 
suggesting a higher degree of intensity in the exchange of goods and 
 services and, therefore, an increasing monetary velocity which could have 
encouraged inflation.
To clarify the real situation requires, however, a series of preliminary 
remarks. It is quite possible that the importance of the currency and, in 
particular, of gold and silver coin is sometimes exaggerated. Copper coins 
were still often instrumental in small trade. In addition, the economy of 
sixteenth century moved, in many periods and in many regions, through 
transactions in which the intervention of cash was non-existent.13 
Moreover, the fact that at the highpoint of the century American treasures 
barely amounted to 7.5% of the gross domestic product of Castile—that is 
to say, possibly less than 0.5% of European total GDP—underlines that, in 
macroeconomic terms, its importance was lower than some have imagined 
(Yun 1998). However, the recognition of the marginal character of mon-
etary circulation in some areas of Europe and in some segments of the 
economy does not imply that there was not a correlation between the 
variables set out above.
Although it can only be a suggestion, a comparison between New 
Castile, in the centre of the peninsula, and other areas of Europe is very 
indicative of the way in which these factors were intertwined. A compara-
tive analysis shows how four variables, monetary circulation (measured 
both by the increase in the amount of silver in circulation and by currency 
devaluations), commercial and industrial development, and population 
growth, may very well explain the evolution of prices. In any of these dif-
ferent areas, they increased more when any one of these variables was 
combined with the others to provoke a rise in prices (Yun 2004, pp. 133–6). 
And, although this data may require a more robust quantitative exercise, 
everything suggests that in reality it was the different intensity with which 
13 Frequently, remuneration for rural and urban work, or part of it, was paid in specie. This 
also occurred with payment to servants and maids in the seigniorial houses and ecclesiastical 
institutions. In 1566 the Count of Benavente dedicated more than 60% of his wheat income 
to the payment of servants and similar costs. Osuna, legs. 242, 483, exp. 2, AHN.
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these four factors combined that determined the rate of the evolution of 
prices in these disparate and distant regions.
The effects of this rise in prices on the Spanish economy will be consid-
ered later. Of immediate concern is the question of how the globalization 
promoted by the Iberian empires would encourage and transform trade 
between the regions of Europe.
Although its importance has been exaggerated, the world-wide increase 
in monetary circulation was clearly one of the reasons for the price revolu-
tion. Certainly money in itself did not create trade, nor was it the only 
thing that contributed to the improvement in methods of payment and 
facilitated transactions (this was still more true for ‘good money’ coined 
from silver or gold). Systems of compensation to account, letters of 
exchange, whose endorsement was extended, or the cheque, clearly more 
widely used during the century, helped to secure these outcomes. However, 
the abundance of good coin was undoubtedly a factor that cannot be over-
looked in attempting to explain such a process; this is especially true if we 
consider that if many of these operations and methods of payment saved 
on the use of cash, in the end they also implied monetary transactions, 
even if these involved lower quantities.
In addition, and despite its limited use, the growing amount of good 
money led to the development of a form of international trade which, even 
though it was different from local commerce, was also closely related to it. 
Taking into account the interaction between the development of urban 
networks and the deepening of rural market circuits, the maintenance and 
development of these networks—encouraged by the more long-distance 
trade and, therefore, by the growing use of gold and silver coins—acceler-
ated the economic changes that had been taking root among peasant fami-
lies and had begun in the previous century. And this took place in spite of 
the fact that in many regions of Europe gold and silver were rarely used.
The abundance of precious metals and their steady flow into the coffers 
of the monarchies made it easier to achieve stability in the value of the 
European currencies against silver. In turn, this led to a greater degree of 
exchange rate stability among the different European currencies them-
selves.14 Only France underwent repeated currency depreciations. This 
stability is important not because of the insights it offers into the relations 
14 See the chart of Braudel and Spooner for evidence that the sixteenth century, and specifi-
cally the first half of it, was a period of relative stability in this regard when compared to the 
seventeenth century (Braudel and Spooner 1967).
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of currency exchanges. Rather, it is significant because it accustomed mer-
chants to operate in a world where monetary manipulations, although in 
existence, were more exceptional, thus contributing to a certain sense of 
security which was a guarantee for the development of business.
If, as it has been said, the output of German mines had exerted a relative—
but decisive—effect on the commercial growth of the last decades of the fif-
teenth century and the first of the following century, then so when, from 
1530, the American mines began to take over, they would become a factor—
not the unique one but certainly an important one—in bestowing upon an 
increasingly commercialized economy the means of payment that constituted 
the essential lubricant of this development.
Markets and Trade Networks
Due in part to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories, the possession 
of colonial empires has often been considered an important factor in eco-
nomic growth and industrialization. According to these ideas, empires have 
played a crucial role in obtaining colonial raw goods and developing over-
seas markets for European industries. Fundamentally, Wallerstein (1979) 
continues this basic approach, although his vision is a much more refined 
one, and he and others have used dependency theory to interpret the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries. The Spanish and the Portuguese empires, 
in this long- standing paradigm, were missed opportunities already in the 
sixteenth century; dependency theory has strengthened even further this 
vision of the history of Iberia and Europe in general. The Castilian and 
Portuguese imperial ventures have, therefore, been seen as anomalies in the 
history of modern empires (Yun 2010).
The basis of this idea has been, however, highly criticized by some histo-
rians. Years ago, P. O’Brien (1980) drew attention to the extremely small 
size of colonial markets and the difficulty of attributing a decisive role to 
them before 1750. Whether or not this was a useful model for the British or 
European economy of the 1700s, its application to the situation of Castile 
and, indeed, to the old continent in general in the 1500s is very convincing. 
Indeed, for some time I have been arguing that something similar to this 
model is a good fit for the Spanish empire (Yun 1998, 2004, 2010).
Furthermore, in contrast to the common opinion among historians, the 
chances of the emergence of high demand for Castilian (or European) 
goods in America or in Asia were not that great. In order for a powerful 
colonial market for European products to emerge, it was first necessary for 
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the local society to pass through a complex process of acculturalization, 
which matched local demand to the European patterns of consumption 
and industrial production. Moreover this change could only be achieved in 
the long term and by non-commercial mechanisms that were more closely 
connected to violence, war, and the creation of intra-colonial circuits of 
trade (Yun 2013). The demographic crisis brought about in America by 
contact and conquest further reduced the potential capacity of this market. 
Around 1580, when smuggling was only just beginning in earnest, annual 
shipments to the Indies were not greater than the internal trade of a city 
such as Córdoba. Quite possibly, the amount of textiles being exported to 
the overseas dominions did not reach the quantity sold on the market of 
this city (Yun 1998). Although often forgotten by economic historians, 
this is entirely logical: around 1580 only 250,000 white settlers lived in 
Spanish America, meaning that the potential demand for the products 
from the Old World was rather small. This signified the equivalent to 
between 4% and 5% of the existing theoretical additional demand of the 
Iberian Peninsula. At this juncture, a number of local industries in sectors 
such as textiles were also emerging, while construction (one of the most 
important) and other branches were largely tied to essentially regional cir-
cuits and had a very small impact upon the industrial sector of the metrop-
olis. The rise of the American empire was not, therefore, an extraordinary 
missed panacea for Iberian industrial development, simply because the 
opportunity was rather small until around 1580 at the earliest.
And this context must inform our understanding of the evolution of 
the European economy in general and of the Spanish economy in particu-
lar during the sixteenth century.
In short, the first phase of this primitive globalization does not seem to 
have been based on the creation of very dynamic overseas markets for 
European (or Castilian) industrial products. Moreover, Europeans soon 
were able to use American silver to level their balance of trade with Asia—
the true centre of the world economy, contrary to the preaching of an 
overly mechanical application of dependence theory—thus making it 
unnecessary to increase their exports to Far Eastern markets, and, there-
fore, the need to develop an industry able to balance or compensate its 
trade with the East.
But it is also obvious that, from a commercial point of view, there can 
be no doubt that this process saw an increase in the movement of goods 
at the global level and, in particular, a rise in those heading to Europe. 
Even scholars such as O’Rourke and Williamson (2002), who have 
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 relativized the impact of this period’s international trade in the process of 
globalization, have shown that the increasing flow of pepper into Europe 
was crucial for the fall in the real prices of this commodity, a trend that 
demonstrates the relevance of this commerce. Other products reveal the 
same pattern. In Graph 2.1 the evolution of sugar and pepper prices in 
relation to the price index in Andalusia shows a similar trend. It is also 
evident that globalization produced an exponential increase in the slave 
trade, and the same happened with products such as cacao, cochineal and 
other dyes, and many other goods.
This process also facilitated a growth in intra-European trade. A high 
proportion of the Portuguese cargoes that arrived in Lisbon from Asia and 
Africa to be re-exported to Northern Europe were compensated by an 
inverse trade of tin, copper, lead, mercury, wood, alum, and other goods 
towards Portugal. The arrival of American silver into Europe, via Spain, 
had similar effects. It not only enhanced previous trade from Northern 
Europe to the Iberian Peninsula but was also a positive factor in allowing 
for more Iberian, and in general Mediterranean, commodities, such as salt, 
wool, and others, to be exported to the north.
To what extent, then, did this commerce break with the poly-nuclear 
model of development that previously existed in Europe (Chap. 1)? The 
answer to this question allows us to provide a more in-depth analysis of 
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Graph 2.1 Sugar and pepper prices in regard the prices index in Castile
Sources: My own elaboration based on data from Hamilton (1975, Appendix III, IV and V) 
and Reher and Ballesteros (1993). Prices of sugar and pepper from Old Castile.
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Spanish silver and the products of the Castilian and Portuguese Atlantic 
economy that arrived in the Low Countries and England also encouraged 
the connections with the faraway areas of the Baltic Sea.15 Thus, Northern 
Europe, and, in particular, Antwerp, was greatly favoured by the commer-
cial development of the Atlantic front and the Iberian trade with America, 
Africa and Asia (Van der Wee 1963, vol. II, Chap. 6). The beginning of the 
rise of the city was related to the arrival, from the start of the century, of 
Portuguese cargoes. Until the 1530s Lisbon merchants, many of them of 
converso origin, faced the problem of not having sufficient quantities of 
African gold to meet payments for spices and so sought in Antwerp the 
silver and copper that the Fugger and the Welser obtained through the lease 
of the royal mines of Tyrol. This also contributed to enhance the trade 
between Iberia and the north of Europe.
The first impact of this new connection was quick to make itself felt on 
the functioning of European commercial circuits. If until this juncture 
products from Asia were unloaded at Venice and then redistributed across 
Europe, now they would descend from the Low Countries, through the 
fairs in Lyon, while silver and copper from Central Europe was sent up to 
Antwerp in increasing quantities (Gascon 1972). This transformation was 
accompanied by a greater dynamism of overland continental trade, evident 
in the increase in the movement of cattle from Denmark, North Germany, 
Hungary, and Central Europe towards the Netherlands (for the European 
routes, Map 2.1).
The aftermath of the difficulties of the 1520s saw the decisive moment 
for Antwerp, a city which, despite the persistence of certain problems 
symptomatic of fluctuations in American trade, would now experience an 
unprecedented phase of expansion (Van der Wee 1963). It then forged 
increasingly close connections with England and developed its own luxury 
goods and linen industry, thanks largely to the Low Countries’ growing 
links with Iberia, one of the main markets for its manufactures, which it 
exchanged for wool and other raw materials.16 Mid-century Antwerp was, 
15 To give just one example, trade in rye rose from 20,900 tonnes in 1490 to 46,200 tonnes 
in 1557 (Zytkowicz 1985, p. 66). We might also consider the growing quantities of furs, 
wood, wax, salted-fish—Iberian salt was already common in the Dutch provinces—and many 
other heavy but widely dispersed items whose consumption was growing.
16 Pach (1968). Van der Wee (1988) underlines the importance of the Castilian market for 
Flemish production (tapestries, high-quality fabrics, all types of artistic objects, etc.).
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therefore, a commercial and industrial centre of the first rank. It was the 
meeting point for select and expensive products from the south and the 
heavy and popular products of the north. And it also served as a point of 
redistribution throughout Northern and Central Europe for Iberian silver; 
sugar, spices, and many other Atlantic, African, and Asian goods; and a 
sizeable part of Italian production. In addition, the city’s economy was 
based on a powerful and diversified industry that was increasingly tied to the 
production of high- quality and artistic goods. Antwerp oversaw the emer-
gence of certain trading techniques and financial developments (Van der 
Wee 1988, pp. 184 and ff.). From the beginning of the century, German 
houses (the Welser and the Fugger) had displayed through Antwerp their 
interest in financing businesses in the Portuguese and Castilian colonies 
and in advancing monies to Charles V; now the city saw the emergence of 
methods conducive to the streamlining of credit (Ehrenberg 1955).
Political factors were important to all of these changes. The formation 
of the dispersed composite monarchy of Charles V did not presage the 
disappearance of the numerous existing trade barriers among his territo-
ries. All were governed by different constitutions and a diverse array of 
commercial and political elites, and each one of them would retain its juris-
dictional specificities. A genuine process of economic integration as it is 
understood today was all but inconceivable. The fiscal and monetary diver-
sity of these territories and the existence of corporations of local merchants 
staunchly determined to maintain their privileges created barriers to out-
side penetration of many sectors and regions. However, the formation of 
this complex and dispersed political network in Western Europe also would 
have some positive effects for the internationalization of commercial net-
works and the integration of regional economies within this territorial 
mosaic. The consciousness of having a shared king gave an elite of busi-
nessmen close to the Court a certain security in regard to the stability of 
commercial links. That Charles implemented a policy of monetary stability 
in some of his domains no doubt helped deepen relationships between 
them. The case of Flanders and Castile and the relations of exchange in 
relation to silver is a good example. Although caution should be exercised 
in approaching this theme, Graph 7.2. demonstrates how, if the seven-
teenth century was characterized by both currencies being prone to con-
siderable fluctuation, the sixteenth century, above all until 1569, would be 
marked by a high degree of stability and, therefore, predictability.
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Political factors would also have a definite impact upon international 
trade for financial reasons. Despite the so-called Castilian monopoly on 
American trade, the Fugger penetrated into the colonial economy by 
 contracting asientos with the king in exchange for the import of goods 
which were traded in Europe (Kellenbenz 2000). And the same can be 
said of the penetration of the Welser into the slave trade that was present 
across extensive areas of Europe (Kellenbenz 2000, p. 225). The growing 
ease with which Spanish wool was travelling to Flanders, and with it the 
ever more fluid trade of Flemish and German goods into Castile, was 
related to the loans that these bankers, together with the Genoese, pro-
vided to the Emperor and which, given the ban on exporting currency 
from this kingdom, led to the repatriation of their loans and the interests 
accrued on them by sending commodities to other areas of Europe (Ruiz 
Martín 1990a). The growing trade in silk between Granada and Italy orig-
inated in the lease that Charles, always needing money, conceded to the 
Genoese for this commerce.
But did the emergence of the Atlantic and this growing trade represent 
a setback for the Mediterranean economy? Did it lead to a more polarized 
economy with a dynamic North and a retarded South? It would appear 
that it did not. Certainly, there were some areas in the South that drew 
benefits from this process. Among them is the obvious case of Genoa. 
Favoured by the vacuum left by the expulsion of the Jews, and having 
gained access to monarchy’s finances, the great bankers consolidated 
Genoa’s fortune. If German bankers were able to capture part of the pro-
duction of raw materials in Iberia, Genovese connections were not 
weaker—on the contrary (Carande 1987, vol. I, pp.  295–315). Their 
hand would be greatly strengthened after 1528, when Genoa in effect 
became a protectorate of Charles V, who, in turn, would create the fairs in 
Besançon as a means of counterbalancing the weight of the fairs of Lyon, 
while the Tuscans became the allies of the King of France. These develop-
ments would extend the influence of the Genoese into the North and the 
Netherlands, which would be decisive for the splendour of Genoese bank-
ing during the reign of Philip II and the establishment of a commercial 
and financial network unprecedented in Europe (De Maddalena and 
Kellenbenz 1986). As early as the 1540s, the Genoese were already the 
largest foreign colony in Flanders after the Castilians. Venice also resisted 
the pull of the North. From the 1520s it reacted with noticeable results in 
the spice trade, and the importance of the Venetians in Lyon’s spice trade 
recovered up to 85% by 1533–1534 (Gascon 1972, p. 646), thanks to 
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new routes through Asia Minor and Aleppo. In the lagoon city, many 
resources were ploughed into industry, a sector that would diversify in 
response to the demand for quality that would, in turn, encourage further 
industrial diversification and boost new and very dynamic sectors such as 
printing, glassware, and others (Sella 1957; Lane 1973, pp. 308–12). If 
the Genoese were able to cope with financial competition from German 
banking in the Court of the Habsburgs and even, through it, to control 
sectors strategic for trade, Tuscan banking would further strengthen its 
position in the market of Lyon, where it established strong bonds of finan-
cial and political complicity with the King of France (Gascon 1972). Such 
developments took place while the Florentine industry maintained a 
remarkable rate of growth that would reach its climax in the 1560s 
(Malanima 1982).
Despite the importance of colonial trade and the development of the 
Atlantic front with its links to the global economies of America, Africa and 
Asia, the European economy did not fit the model applied to it in a 
mechanical application of the theory of dependence. Far from leading a 
hierarchical relationship of subordination with regard to a central axis, the 
growth of the first decades of the century remained a process based upon 
various centres (see Chap. 1). One needs to think also that, despite the 
striking development of the Atlantic façade, the penetration of interna-
tional trade into family economies and regional markets was still too small 
to determine the models of economic growth of large geographic areas.17 
This consideration, of course, does not preclude recognition of the crucial 
role of Atlantic trade in the working of the commercial networks within 
Europe.
These arguments lead to a consideration crucial for our case: the nota-
ble capacity that, from a relatively low level of use of resources, could be 
achieved by institutions that were apparently inefficient in generating 
growth according to the model of the new institutional economics. As a 
matter of fact, this international commerce, like the incipient trade with 
America, Africa and Asia was based on economic privileges and on the 
monopolistic access to resources and information.
17 A comparison is instructive: the annual remittances of American silver that were paid to 
private individuals in Castile for commercial sales, services, and inheritance came to 2250 mil-
lion maravedís in 1590–1591, when the gross domestic product of Castile was worth 
30,000 million (Yun 1998, p. 131, n. 25).
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iberia in the global economy: lowering  
tranSaction coStS
An Export Economy?
The increasing role of the Iberian Peninsula in the expansion of foreign 
trade was clearly expressed by indicators such as the almojarifazgo of 
Seville or the periatge of Barcelona (Yun 2004, pp. 147–51). As was the 
case for Europe as a whole, incipient globalization may have induced a 
series of changes of great importance in patterns of consumption. The 
ever-easier access to foreign products, the expanding availability of meth-
ods of payment, and the increase of income derived from domestic eco-
nomic growth would activate the demand for products of all kinds in the 
Iberian kingdoms. The rise of prices in the Iberian Peninsula must also 
have attracted foreign manufactured products. The fact that this economic 
growth was accompanied by the development of access to easy credit for 
privileged groups (see Chap. 4) would give further impetus to a form of 
ostentatious consumption that was already prominent in the societal mores 
of the time and which was satiated primarily with exotic, rare, or expensive 
goods usually sourced from abroad. The growing devotion of Iberian aris-
tocracies and elites to the culture of the Italian and Flemish Renaissance 
would pull in the same direction (Brotton 2002). Partly as a result, a pat-
tern of conspicuous consumption and ostentation took hold among the 
nobility and urban patriciate that was clearly linked to the cultural shifts 
experienced by these groups. As early as the reign of Charles V, many for-
eign travellers in Iberia referred not only to the spices consumed there but 
also to the rich clothes and the damask and taffeta that adorned the per-
sons and homes of the nobles and great businessmen or to the ornamental 
richness of the churches and palaces.18 Demand of this sort was met by the 
consumption of expensive fabrics and objets d’art imported from Italy and 
Flanders, whose industries quickly benefited from this demand,19 as did 
18 N. Popielovo Viaje de Nicolás de Popielovo, in García Mercadal (1999, vol. I, p. 300), J. 
Munzer, Viaje de Jerónimo Munzer. Ibidem, p. 309, 310, 374–5. Guicciardini Relación de 
España, Ibidem, p. 585.
19 Van der Wee (1988). Dámaso de Frías, a traveller of the epoch, refers to the ‘alteration 
of the costumes, customs and manners of living that we see in all of Spain since the Flemmish 
entered into it’, specifying the abandonment of ‘temperance’ and the ‘old parsimony in eat-




their counterparts in France (Rouen and Nantes above all). And it would 
seem that this process was increasingly influential as the reign wore on as 
new lifestyles, linked in part to the palace and the adoption of more refined 
habits, took root (Checa 1988, pp. 195–216).
This trend would even further encourage the reverse flow of exported 
raw materials from the peninsula to the rest of Europe. Wool shipments, 
undoubtedly the most important of all of the Spanish export products, 
increased threefold in volume during the first half of the century. The same 
thing occurred in Aragon where, in addition to wool, leathers and saffron 
were also prominent in exports (Gómez Zorraquino 1987, pp. 87–98). 
Sugar and silk were exported from Valencia in growing quantities, as was 
silk from Granada and Murcia and the alum of this latter region.20 From 
the middle of the century (the start of the second cycle of the Atlantic 
economy), the role of Castile and Portugal as bridges in the trade of raw 
 materials coming from the New World was accentuated as large quantities 
of cocoa, hides, sugar, cochineal, and other products arrived, part of which 
was exported to other areas of Europe (Phillips 1990, pp. 58, 80, 70).
Several factors contributed to these changes. In Castile, the improve-
ment of the fairs system pivoting around Medina del Campo, Medina de 
Rioseco, and Villalón was, without doubt, one of them. These were insti-
tutions whose commercial regulation would help reduce an initially very 
high level of transaction costs and risks. For some time these fairs had 
constituted an important meeting point for foreign merchants and 
Castilians. During the sixteenth century, the co-ordination of payments 
between the Castilian fairs and those of Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom 
was established on near-perfect footing, as was the internal trade fair 
 circuit within Spain (Carande 1987, vol. I, p. 331). Links of this kind fur-
ther reduced information costs and uncertainty and guaranteed spatial and 
temporal convergence of supply and demand, thus allowing the establish-
ment of a regular system (and therefore one of more predictable opera-
tions involving fewer risks) for transferring funds between them. The 
increasing importance of fairs allowed the monarchy to channel payments 
through them, thus permitting it to borrow from and make repayments to 
asentistas and bankers present at these gatherings. In turn this practice 
provided a stimulus to large-scale businessmen who, needing money to 
20 Furió (1995, pp. 244–5), Pérez and Lemeunier (1984, pp. 77–9). Cortés and Vincent 
(1986), Ruiz Martín (2005).
 IBERIAN OVERSEAS EXPANSION AND EUROPEAN TRADE NETWORKS 
86
meet their commitments to the king, channelled growing quantities of 
products and bills of exchange through these meetings. (Abed Al-Hussein 
1982). During the middle years of the century, the annual amount paid by 
the king in this way could even touch 2,000,000 ducats, a figure of signifi-
cance if we consider the gross annual income of the monarchy in Castile 
might reach five or six million at this point (Yun 2004).21 The impulse 
behind the fairs was also linked to the development of the American econ-
omy that forged sudden, and intense, ties. Around 1520, of 186 letters 
negotiated with fairs from Seville, 107 referred to trade with Lyon and 
only 79 with the other fairs of Castile (Otte 1986). But this ratio, if itself 
of some importance in a year of civil war and intense conflicts in Medina 
del Campo, would rise during the following decades. The fairs became a 
circuit linking the whole global economy, from Southeast Asia to the 
Caribbean, Lisbon, Seville, and Antwerp, and reaching as far as the more 
developed areas of Italy. Its importance with regard to the development of 
foreign trade is therefore undeniable.
A similar result emerged from the foundation and development, begun 
in the fifteenth century, of consulates in Castile that were similar to the 
existing ones in the Crown of Aragon. The Consulate of Burgos was 
established in 1494. Bilbao followed suit in 1511. Seville, where by 1503 
the Casa de la Contratación already existed, would have to wait for the 
Real Provisión of 1543 and the ordenanzas of 1556.22 The effects of this 
type of institution would be immediate. Despite friction between them 
(especially between those of Bilbao and Burgos) and the not-so-positive 
future evolution (see Chap. 5), the consulates would initially improve the 
organization of the convoys and maritime insurance system. Above all, 
they enabled special courts and arbitration systems to reduce transaction 
costs by making judicial review a more agile, rapid process (as is specifically 
clear from the ordenanzas of Burgos and Seville) and so increased guaran-
tees of responsibility and agreement among their members.23 Membership 
in a consulate created bonds of trust and even, in some cases, of shared 
responsibility among merchants, traits which were especially valuable in 
21 Dirección General del Tesoro, Inv° 24, legs. 490, 1299, 1458, 815, 1432, 491, 492, 494, 
495, 561, 561 bis, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 
AGS.
22 Basas (1994, pp. 25–40) and García-Baquero (1992, pp. 57–84).
23 Basas (1994, pp. 33–6) and García-Baquero (1992, pp. 74–9).
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
87
the operation of trading diasporas. While networks such as that of Burgos 
(active across Europe and particularly in the north of the continent) had 
been created much earlier, there are good reasons for thinking that these 
organizational improvements substantially increased their projection into 
the Netherlands during the first half of the sixteenth century.
The development of powerful financial networks across the peninsula 
would also contribute to the expansion of international trade. Here it is 
worth repeating that the export of wool, silk, and colonial products was 
activated by the advancing of money in the form of the renting out of royal 
incomes and taxes by merchants and bankers. The same happened with 
alum, a mordant necessary for the production of fabrics, which was pur-
chased by the Genoese from the marquis of Vélez and the duke of Escalona 
through similar mechanisms (Ruiz Martín 2005). Sugar was purchased 
from the duke of Gandia in Valencia, as was the saffron, wool, and other 
products that formed part of the seigniorial rights of Aragonese nobles, 
who rented them out to financiers in return for the loans necessary to over-
come their liquidity problems.24 Even without these institutional advan-
tages, these networks were able to absorb a large part of production. Thus, 
the merchants of Burgos acquired wool through a system of advancing 
credit to the shepherds when they were most in need of money—that was 
before the wool itself had even been shorn from their sheep. The Genoese 
not only used mechanisms of credit based upon the king’s  revenues or 
those of the aristocratic houses. Their loans to the banks and merchants of 
Seville involved in the Carrera de Indias also served to give them indirect 
access to goods from America.25 On the east coast, the Genoese not only 
secured the purchase of Granada silk through financial mechanisms. They 
also purchased wine, raisins, barilla, sugar, and other products sold to them 
by growers in need of cash; their actions were clearly favoured by lower 
costs achieved through well-established, well- oiled networks and their 
control of these trade circuits (Pérez and Lemeunier 1984).
These ties (accords between businessmen and the monarchy or with 
individuals through the leasing out of rents or simple credits) also explain 
the erection of entry barriers and the consolidation of oligopolistic mecha-
nisms that reduced the capacity for the distribution of wealth of this trade. 
This would become notorious later on. But, again, for the moment and 
24 Carande (1987, vol. III), Halperin (1980, p. 27), and Gómez Zorraquino (1987).
25 Edwards (1977) and Fortea (1981, pp. 341–5).
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under certain conditions, such connections could lower transaction costs 
and risk in the context of institutions that the new institutional economics 
considers inefficient.
A Semi-periphery of Europe? Domestic Trade 
and Institutional Improvements
The development of foreign trade and the export of raw materials created 
significant tensions within the peninsular economies. Many sectors of it, 
such as high-quality textile production, found themselves having to 
 compete with powerful importers of goods of a similar—or, indeed, 
higher—quality and with exporters of raw materials essential for the elabo-
ration of their own merchandise. Likewise, the barriers to entrance created 
by the groups of contractors and financiers who secured a large share of 
raw materials through financial mechanisms further reinforced this situa-
tion and were conducive to the financial subordination of Iberian banking 
by the great cosmopolitan international financial houses (Ruiz Martín 
1990b). But does this situation justify reference to a ‘semi-periphery’?
There are reasons to think that it does not. Castilian bankers were 
mainly focused on the internal market. But it is also true that, thanks to 
their international links and the commercial expansion, some of them were 
able to operate in cross-border spaces and to use more modern techniques 
to that end. They developed considerably during the first half of the cen-
tury, as is demonstrated by the rise to prominence of families such as the 
Ruiz, the Maluenda, the Bernuy, the Salamanca, or the Calatayud and 
many others (Carande 1987, vol. III). Some, like the financiers of Seville, 
did so in collaboration with the Genoese. Others, like the young Simón 
Ruiz who, according to his brother, Andrew, ‘would not confine himself to 
having all the treasure of the world’, acted independently in the interna-
tional arena (Lapeyre 1955, p. 74, n. 176). All of them mastered the art of 
the letter of exchange and the account books (Lapeyre 1955). And a simi-
lar development occurred in Portugal. Certainly, the role of international 
bankers in providing loans to the king in the Low Countries was crucial 
and was going to condition the development of the Portuguese banking 
system. But, at the same time, these decades witnessed the development of 
international commercial and financial networks through the agency of the 




Though we will come back to the manufactures’ development below, it 
is important to note here that there were also industrial sectors within 
Iberia that would take advantage of international ties. Córdoba leathers 
and other embossed leather goods were exported by the Genoese them-
selves and even arrived in significant quantities in Flanders, where they 
would be much imitated (Van der Wee 1963). The textile industries of 
Córdoba and Segovia were able to begin to adapt to demand for higher-
quality merchandise thanks to the replacement of cruder dyes (sourced 
within Spain) by pastel (an import) and thanks to the alum extracted by 
the Genoese capital in Murcia (Fortea 1981). Cochineal, brought from 
America, would bring noticeable improvements to fabrics and light cloths 
(Marichal 2014). The Basque iron industry faced intractable problems 
due to competition from other areas after 1550, but its expansion to reach 
‘optimal production’ seems undeniable up until that date—an expansion 
for which domestic demand was partially responsible but which, in view of 
exports to England, should also be seen as the effect of external demand 
favoured by the increasingly close relationship between the economies of 
the peninsula and Europe (Bilbao 1987, pp. 49–57). One manifestation of 
the expansive capacity of domestic industry can be found in the petition 
made to Charles V in the Cortes asking him to raise the quota of wool that 
had to remain in Castile in 1552. This was precisely the moment at which, 
in Córdoba, the growth of the textile industry meant that ‘the tensions in 
the wool market took on a whole new dimension’ (Fortea 1981, p. 350).
The expansion of ties with the international and colonial economies 
was, together with the military needs of the Crown, the fundamental cause 
of the development of both the military and merchant navy, which had 
been growing since the fifteenth century and which enhanced the naval 
industry and the demand for wood, iron, copper hemp and other industrial 
products. This fact, though poorly known, is no longer in doubt. The idea 
of a limited and insufficiently developed Spanish navy can no longer be 
sustained, although it has been reiterated in a great deal of the interna-
tional literature (Casado Soto 1998). It was always supported by the 
Crown, which above all else was interested in the construction of succes-
sively larger vessels (Carande 1987, vol. I, pp. 351–414). In the Crown of 
Aragon, Barcelona became the most important construction centre for 
galleys in the peninsula (Goodman 1988, p. 96). By the mid-century it 
was already facing a crisis of ‘accelerating demand’ for maritime transport 
vehicles (Casado Soto 1998, p. 353). This explains the expansion of this 
industrial sector in cities such as Seville, Bilbao, and the aforementioned 
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Barcelona. The Iberian countries became central points for the develop-
ment of naval technology. This was even clearer in Portugal, where the 
size of the navy increased dramatically between 1500 and 1560 (Costa 
1997, p. 265). In the Portuguese capital, this sector also activated demand 
for industrial products, above all in the cities of the lower Tagus and the 
zones between Porto and the Galicia frontier. For these reasons it has been 
even possible to speak of a ‘state capitalism’, due to the direct involvement 
of the Crown in these businesses, which were crucial for its trade monopoly 
(Costa 1997, p. 262).
While encouraging the export of raw materials and the import of 
industrial products, the Castilian fairs also had positive effects on the 
domestic economy which gained in consistency and internal coherence. 
The trading system based upon synchronized periods between meetings 
held in the different places served, moreover, to reduce transaction costs 
and transport risks also for products moving within the internal market 
too. Many merchants from different regions of the peninsula, including 
Portugal, approached these gatherings with the guarantee that they could 
securely buy and sell their products in an environment of intense com-
mercial activity and relatively abundant liquidity and with the confidence 
that they could defer part of their payments if necessary (Yun 1987, 
pp. 186–95).
The fairs were a stimulus for the development of agriculture and animal 
husbandry. The benefits were felt from the vineyards of Medina del Campo 
to the wheat fields of the Tierra de Campos and across the northern pla-
teau where livestock herds grazed (Yun 1987). And they also sparked many 
other commercial sectors. The effect of these developments was to boost 
interregional trade between the plateau of Castile and the snow- topped 
mountains of Cantabria. Areas such as La Rioja awoke to their industrial 
vocation thanks to the effects of these periodic reunions.26 And they had 
the same effect as had on the textiles of Segovia and even, further afield, 
those of Cuenca. Fair meetings carried forward the creation of the internal 
market, as is demonstrated by the presence at them of merchants from as 
26 Although little studied, this theme is mentioned in numerous references found in the 
Archivo Histórico Municipal de Medina de Rioseco, hereafter AHMMR. See, for example, 




far afield as Córdoba, Seville, and Granada and the regular circulation of 
bills of exchange originating in these cities (Fortea 1981, pp. 395, 398). 
During this period, the financial market of Medina del Campo  continued 
to serve the industry of Granada by advancing capital to it (Abed Al-Hussein 
1982). The contribution of the fairs system to the formation of the Iberian 
trading network can also be shown in regard to Portugal, whose traders 
sold sugar, spices, and other overseas products into it; they also purchased 
cloth, not all of which was manufactured abroad, with considerable quan-
tities produced in Segovia or Cuenca. Some time ago, P. Vilar provided an 
account of the intensification of traffic between Barcelona and Medina del 
Campo, explaining how the latter served as a staging post for the fabrics 
and leathers which the Catalans exported to America and how soap carried 
to Portugal through Castile was exchanged for ‘brazil’, a dye that undoubt-
edly helped to boost the textile industry (Vilar 1962, vol I, pp. 333–4).
The increasing interconnection of the domestic market was also the 
result of many other currents and flows that bound different circuits 
together. Relations between Andalusia and Portugal, and Lisbon in par-
ticular, appear to have been established before the annexation of 1580, 
as is demonstrated by not only the increasingly important role of the 
Portuguese in Seville but also their presence in Córdoba. Toledo acquired 
its ‘role of regional redistribution centre’, where the markets sold textile 
products from the northern and southern plateaux and even from 
Valencia and the kingdom of Aragon; and this came at a time when its 
relations with Andalusia and Portugal also intensified through the supply 
of Atlantic and Asian products in exchange for products coming from 
different mainland areas (Montemayor 1996, pp. 238, 255–61). Trade 
between Castile and Aragon was also reinforced. Isolated data provided 
by Lapeyre on Castilian customs has revealed that Catalan fabrics and 
Perpignan cloth were both imported and, moreover, that an intense 
trade was maintained with Valencia, where Castilian wheat was sold in 
exchange for goods including silks, citrus fruits, and rice (Lapeyre 1981, 
pp. 47–9). These expansive trends in internal trade are clearly visible in 
some commercial indicators of a more quantitative character (Yun 1987; 
Montemayor 1996).
Political and institutional reasons also pulled in this same direction and 
contributed to the reduction of risks and costs of transaction in long- 
distance commercial operations within the Peninsula. In regard to the cur-
rency, the Emperor’s reluctance to undertake devaluations is well known. 
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He was loathed to introduce measures that, indirectly, would have meant 
a certain convergence of the monetary systems of the various kingdoms 
during the first third of the century.27 There were sound financial reasons 
for this policy. However, Charles V’s reluctance disappeared in 1537 with 
the order to issue escudos of 22 carats equivalent to 350 maravedís, which 
seems to have positive effects.28 In a similar vein, the reduction of the 
vellón to 5.5 grains in 1552 facilitated lower-level trade and the circulation 
of fractional currency, vital for local and regional trades and the develop-
ment of commercial and artisanal activities, in which this type of coin was 
commonly used (Hamilton 1975, pp. 69–70). The beneficial effects of 
these operations are better understood in light of the reflections of Sargent 
and Velde on ‘small change’ (2002).
Another important advance was found in the policy of appointments and 
the creation of notaries. This phenomenon, always interpreted from the 
perspective of power relations and whose limits we will study, has a certain 
relevance as means of guaranteeing contracts in a society that until this 
point had based its guarantee on personal knowledge or the  endorsement 
of intermediaries known by both the seller and buyer. In these years the 
role of the notary or scribe came to be defined in great detail, although this 
policy actually stretched back into the fifteenth century.29 In 1503 the 
Crown sought control of the appointment system, with the aim of ensuring 
the competence of the office holder,30 while Charles V was concerned 
because the appointments of these officials were approved by the justice of 
27 See Hamilton (1975, pp. 67–8). The requests of the Cortes for the reduction of the 
quantities of silver and gold in the different coins (the ducat or ducado y la blanca, above all) 
can be found in Actas de las Cortes de Castilla (hereafter ACC), M. Danvila (ed.) (1861), vol. 
IV, p. 328 y 388–93, among others.
28 This measure brought the currency into line with the monies then circulating in France 
and Italy, thus limiting its outward flow towards these countries and improving its interior 
circulation in more important transactions. At the same time, it also served as an incentive to 
trade between Castile and Aragon, as there was now a standard measure with the money that 
had been circulating in Catalonia since 1535 (Hamilton 1975, p. 69).
29 In order to prevent the appointment being made by arbitrary methods that might result 
in the naming of unqualified individuals, in 1480 the Catholic Kings decreed that ‘no title of 
scribe of the chamber, nor of public scribe, should be given to anyone other than a qualified 
person, one examined in the council and with licence from the king’. At the same time, their 
duties and requirements were defined (Nueva Recopilación, libro IV, Tit. XV, ley I).
30 This was done at the same time as appointments made by other means were revoked. 
Nueva Recopilación, libro IV, Tit. XV, ley V.
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the town or city in question.31 Yet, piecemeal legislation was handed down 
that regulated the formal conduct of these officials, with the aim of improv-
ing their status as bondsmen for contracts, something which was in princi-
ple positive for trade and transactions in general.32
Although the regulation of notaries and scribes produced no decisive 
qualitative change, this sort of measure may well have had some positive 
effects, especially if we consider the relatively insecure initial situation.33 
This policy would strengthen with the improvement of the Chancillerias, 
whose support for the fulfilment of contracts and judicial functions is 
well known (Kagan 1991). It resulted in legislation that provided guar-
antees on commercial transactions, contracts, and compliance,34 with 
31 In this regard, see law III (of 1534), or law XVIII, in which an order is given with the 
aim of extending the scope of action of the scribes, with the corresponding effect of enlarg-
ing their role as guarantors and so reducing uncertainty in transactions. Specifically it states 
that ‘we order the corregidores and justices of cities and towns of these our kingdoms that 
they should compel and reward the scribes of a number of them that go out into the land to 
take writs and despositations as they are asked [to do]’. Nueva Recopilación, Libro IV, Tit. 
XXV, ley XVIII.
32 An attempt was made to avoid nepotism in the actions of the scribes, who often fell into 
this trap when dealing with the networks of monasteries and religious institutions. New 
norms were set down, with annual checks, new protocols, and norms of behaviour stipulated 
for testimonies, and writs, with the aim being to guarantee the efficacy of the system. See 
Nueva Recopilación, Libro IV, Tit. XXV, passim.
33 The importance of the measures introduced in regard to scribes should be underlined. 
They were not brought about by a new drive by the Crown to set down rules and control 
social life, although at times the towns criticized these measures on these grounds. On the 
contrary, on more than one occasion, the Crown asked for the extension and strengthening 
of the powers of these officials, without doubt because of their quest to inculcate greater 
respect among private individuals, a quality that was increasingly important for the urban 
oligarchies as a means of reducing risks and increasing security in economic relationships of 
an ever more impersonal and market-orientated nature. Thus the City of Granada included 
among its petitions of 1542 that the clause should be respected that anyone using his 
 property for a censo should register it before a scribe of the council and that no alternative 
arrangement should be allowed. It is very necessary, it went on to note, for the good of these 
kingdoms that those who engage in contracts should not be misled. Patronato Real, 69–82, 
AGS.
34 Aside from the Nueva Recopilación, other collections of legislation of this period can be 
found. See the wealth of norms and rules on companies that are found in Hugo de Celso, 
Repertorio de las Leyes de Castilla, Madrid, 2000 (edited by Alvarado Planas), specifically, 
f. LXXV ff.
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provisions that aimed to standardize weights and measurements35 and 
the publication of compendia of laws.36 Although these measures were 
apparently aimed specifically at lawyers and men of justice, in all cases 
they sought to improve the legal system with the aim of building confi-
dence in commercial activities and achieving a quicker settlement of 
 disputes—a trait which, as is well known, is one of the keys to the devel-
opment of trade.
All of these measures, in themselves conducive to the integration of 
markets, were accompanied by a fall in the costs of transport. The phe-
nomenon is difficult to measure, and, indeed, no series of prices for 
transport costs can be given. But the signs are very clear. In the first 
place, prices were clearly rising, and, on the other, the supply of trans-
portation was evidently expanding, trends which will be explained later 
(see Chap. 3). These circumstances must have led to a decline in relative 
prices of transport.
In conclusion, the formation of vibrant internal commercial networks 
could be interpreted as a negative phenomenon for endogenous develop-
ment if it had served only to encourage the penetration and distribution 
of industrial products and the export of raw materials. But there certainly 
were industries which, although they had to suffer foreign competition, 
also drew benefits from the abundance of raw materials or the commercial 
advantages drawn from the expansion of the external sector. In addition 
there were sectors that were able to undertake a process of technical 
35 According to Hamilton (1975, pp. 168–9), the real advances in this regard were achieved 
during the reign of the Catholic Kings, while Charles, ‘weighed down by the burden of the 
Empire and the cares of state, had hardly any time to devote to such prosaic tasks’ (p. 169). 
We do not know the extent to which the reign of the Emperor saw an advance in this regard. 
As late as the 1570s, there were some who stated that in Salamanca a number of figures were 
‘somewhat lacking in their measurements and weights’, ‘pesas y medidas algo faltas’, Cámara 
de Castilla, Libros de Cédulas, lib. 62, AGS.
36 The collections of laws cited in this chapter should be seen in the same light. Their very 
survival implies a greater capacity to apply laws dealing with responsibility, commerce, risk, 
guarantees, and so on. As set down in the Nueva Recopilación of 1571, the new volumes use 
and cite pre-existing texts such as that of Diego Pérez de Salamanca, Repertorio de todas las 
Leyes y pragmáticas y Bulas…, Medina del Campo, 1549, or that of Hugo de Celso cited 
above (Repertorio de las leyes de Castilla… Op. cit.). In turn, this tome was first printed in 
Valladolid in 1538 and included new norms, rules, or guidelines on a wide number of matters 
such as ‘debts and debtor’ (deudas y deudor) f. XCII, ‘contracts’ f. LXXVII, ‘guarantor and 
guarantee’ (fiador y fiaduría) f. CXLV–CXLVII, ‘buying and selling’, f. LXXV, and so on.
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 development and import substitution. As we will see in the next chapter, 
the expansion of urban networks and industrial development were both 
very consistent with such developments.
* * *
Spain and Portugal created a highly complex system in their colonies. 
Certainly it is problematic to describe it as an absolutist one (meaning one 
in which the king’s authority was unchallenged and unrestrained), much as 
this has been the view of many scholars. Far from being a monolithic, well-
controlled instrument whose logic can only be explained by the decisions 
taken in its hierarchical vertex, the Spanish and Portuguese colonial systems 
emerged as a complex binding of powers and working interests, simultane-
ously delicate and characterized by relatively decentralized decision- making 
processes. This is not to deny that major efforts at centralization and con-
trol were undertaken from the Lisbon and Madrid or that, as we shall see, 
these attempts became even more frequent from the end of the sixteenth 
century. The juridical code itself helped towards this, in part because it con-
sidered the colonies as belonging to the Crown (nor should it be forgotten 
that the king continued to hold rights over the land). The result was a high 
degree of autonomy, with a diverse number of decision-making centres but 
the existence of a central power that took responsibility for the government 
and regulation of social and commercial relations. In societies as complex as 
these, where the presence of the Crown and its degree of penetration into 
the social fabric varied, these arrangements would lead to levels and forms 
of negotiation that were very different from one another and which are dif-
ficult to set within the (usual) formulas of polycentrism and centralism.
Spanish and Portuguese institutions in both empires had in fact provided 
positive results for economic growth and expansion in the peninsula. But, 
being also appropriate to a society whose development had been based 
upon war and conquest, they also had a notable capacity for destruction. In 
other words, the rules of play were shaped by mechanisms leading to both 
the capture and destruction of wealth. At times, they were highly inefficient 
in replacing lost resources, largely due to the extremely limited develop-
ment of medicine and the other tools necessary to resist death, which was 
the main challenge to emerge from the conquest. This fact was also seen in 
the way that the Spanish adapted existing American institutions to their use.
The impact of all of this in the colonies and therefore in the different 
patterns of empire had to be, however, very uneven. After 1492 a period 
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of ecological imperialism took place in America, and the European insti-
tutional systems were to prove more adept at destroying the existing pro-
ductive systems than at reconfiguring them rapidly with a more effective 
apparatus. Few episodes in the history of humanity have had such dra-
matic effects or such long-lasting ones. On the contrary, the effects in 
Africa and Asia were different. In the former, the slave trade, developing 
with Atlantic expansion, would lead to convulsions within the original 
societies. But the lower degree of penetration of the Europeans until the 
nineteenth century and their greater resistance to disease produced less 
profound social changes in Africa than in America (Headrick 2010). The 
population would even continue to grow throughout the sixteenth cen-
tury. But in regard to Asia, the scope for the decomposition of the original 
societies and the establishment of destructive (European) institutions was 
also highly reduced. This was, moreover, a world with a microbial system 
close to that of the old continent and more resistant to diseases brought 
by the Europeans.
On the other side of globalization, Europe was affected as, especially, 
was Spain but not in the way we have supposed for years. The growth of 
trade to which America, the African coast, and Asia contributed did not 
break the model of poly-nuclear development of the fifteenth century, and 
the Iberian societies did not move to the semi-periphery of this New 
World economy. In this regard the institutional framework was crucial. 
The informal mechanisms for the creation of confidence and the reduction 
of risk appear to have been efficient, as can be seen in the trading networks 
based upon personal accords, familial ties, and reputation. The expansion 
of international trade is incomprehensible if we fail to understand this. 
And these institutions overlapped with the formal institutions created by 
the monarchy in both countries in a way that was beneficial for economic 
growth. This was not because of the intrinsic nature of these institutions 
but rather because of the huge number of resources available to them. The 
benefits were manifested in improvements to the system of justice, con-
tracts, the use of money, international commercial organization, and inter-
regional trade. Attention should also be placed upon the fact that even 
institutions based upon privilege, the use of the monopoly or expensive 
and asymmetrical information, appear to have had positive outcomes. To 
put this another way, they did not abort the capacity for growth prevalent 
in a society of abundant but unexploited resources.
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This leads us not only to relativize the impact of political or formal 
institutions on economic growth but also to think that their effects depend 
directly upon the context and the quantity of available resources. These 
conclusions will only gain strength in the following chapters, which exam-
ine the internal evolution of Iberian societies.
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CHAPTER 3
Domestic Expansion in the Iberian Kingdoms
During the last decades of the twentieth century, historians became 
 convinced by the model of the economie immobile. This interpretation, 
heavily influenced by the Annales school, postulated an almost total 
absence of economic growth prior to the Industrial Revolution.1 The 
application of this model to the Iberian kingdoms—sometimes even avant 
la lettre—presented a highly negative interpretation of their economic 
development in the early modern period. Indeed, some authors even 
argued that the economy was dominated by an extensive agriculture which 
was fundamentally incapable of increasing its levels of productivity. The 
result was, it has been argued, a demographic increase that absorbed any 
expansion in production and which unleashed a crisis of Malthusian pro-
portions at the end of the sixteenth century that was followed by reces-
sion. According to the assumptions of the new institutional economics as 
practiced by Douglas North, this outcome was also the inevitable result of 
the imperfect development of property rights in Spain; this imperfection 
was, in North’s view, linked to the absence or extremely limited develop-
ment of the capitalist system of land ownership (North 1981). Yet the 
realities of the ‘Spanish case’, which have so often been taken as irrefutable 
proof of these theories or models, in fact constitute excellent examples of 
1 See, for example, Le Roy Ladurie (1966). But the idea has been taken up again recently 
in a more sophisticated way by Clark (2007).
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the limits of these visions in explaining the behaviour of the economy. 
Above all, this is true in regard to Castile but also for most of the Crown 
of Portugal.
A TechnologicAl crossroAd2
Beyond economic considerations, a negative and pessimistic vision has 
long been very present in the different views on Iberian technological 
development. It is as if the technological delay characteristic of the Spanish 
and Portuguese industrial revolution of the nineteenth century had been 
projected retrospectively, giving rise to a sort of black legend according to 
which the development of useful knowledge had been always impossible 
in the Iberian countries. It is in part a consequence of the Enlightenment 
view of Spain and Portugal, expressed by Masson de Morvillers who, in a 
famous article in the L’Encyclopédie Méthodique, inquired: ‘In two centu-
ries, in four, or even in six, what has Spain done for Europe?’ Spain, he 
added, is a country where it is necessary ‘to ask priests for permission to 
read and think?’ (Eamon 2009). In the last few years, however, histori-
ans of both science and technology have drawn attention to the capacity 
of sixteenth-century Spain and Portugal—frontiers in this aspect did not 
exist—to expand in these fields.3 They have also underlined the capacity of 
the peninsula to transfer this type of knowledge to the American colonies, 
with emphasis falling on the idea that these advances were vital to the con-
trol, conquest, and exploitation of these territories. But this process had 
its origins in Europe. Some of the keys to it will be developed in this chap-
ter: the use of the mule, of agrarian instruments made from iron, leather, 
esparto grass, and canvass, all of which were to be evident in the develop-
ment of rural industries in the Old and New Worlds. These were not revo-
lutionary technologies but did take their place in this process of piecemeal, 
widely dispersed improvement whose overall impact would be important. 
Although no diachronic studies have been attempted, it is evident that the 
use of mills to grind flour advanced, with windmills being very prominent. 
Very probably Cervantes was venturing beyond the anecdotal when he set 
technology and knightly ideals as  opponents and rivals in his two great 
2 A more elaborated and detailed version of what follows in Yun (2017). After writing these 
lines, I could read Cañizares-Esguerra (2017) who goes in depth on these ideas.
3 See the cases studied in López Piñero (1979), Goodman (1988), and Barrera-Osorio 
(2006). For a brilliant defence, Eamon (2009).
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scenes evoking the windmill and fulling hammer: logically, don Quijote, a 
noble himself, identified these two monsters as his natural enemies. As we 
have seen, improvements were also made in the field of iron production. 
The introduction of techniques borrowed from German mining in the 
quarrying of silver and other sectors was a part of this process (Sánchez 
1989). For obvious reasons, Iberian societies quickly adopted American 
dye products (indigo, the Campeche stick, or cochineal) that allowed it to 
make changes in the textile production processes.
If maritime expansion cannot be explained without reference to the tech-
nological and scientific progress achieved in fifteenth-century Iberian coun-
tries, then additional improvements in these fields were also the cause of the 
qualitative leap forwards made in the sixteenth century. The creation of the 
School of Pilots and Cartography in Seville, the Academy of Mathematics 
(founded by Philip II), the treaties on cartography such as those of 
Francisco Faleiro or Pedro de Medina and many other initiatives give the 
lie to the old stereotype of sixteenth-century Iberia being a society disin-
terested in technology (Goodman 1988). Something similar can be said of 
figures such as Juan de Monardes, a medic from Seville whose relatives were 
merchants involved in the Carrera de Indias and who brought him grasses 
from the New World so that he could study them and test their medicinal 
qualities. But this was just one part of a broader trend. What was really 
going on was the systematic amplification of forms of empirical knowledge 
gathering that would shortly culminate in Sir Francis Bacon’s consecration 
of this type of scientific knowledge as a crucial part of modern thinking. In 
reality, Monardes’ contemporaries included figures such as García de Orta, 
a converted Jew, medical doctor, and botanist from Portugal whose works 
would go around the world (Boxer 1963).4 Something similar could be said 
of engineering and hydraulics, which were set out in the works of Juanello 
Turriano (Zanetti 2012). The numerous proposals of the arbitristas were 
comparable in scope to modern patent applications (García Tapia 1990).
Though there are several examples in Joan Thirsk’s influential study on 
English projectors (1978), scholars have systematically overlooked the fact 
that some English proposals for economic improvement and the modern-
ization of its industry and mining sector depended upon introducing 
changes whose origins lay in Spain or Portugal.5 Perhaps not too many 
4 García de Orta, Tratado de las drogas, y medicinas de las Indias Orientales, Burgos, 1578.
5 See, for example, some cases quoted by the author (Thirsk 1978): stockings knitted of 
silk (p. 45), hard white soap (pp. 53–4), and Spanish leather (p. 55).
 DOMESTIC EXPANSION IN THE IBERIAN KINGDOMS 
102
hasty conclusions should be drawn from an area that still requires more 
in-depth and detailed study, but it is important not to forget the known 
contributions when attempting to reach a balanced assessment of the tech-
nological evolution of early modern Iberian Peninsula.
It is also worthwhile to remember that Iberian naval technology was cru-
cial to Dutch maritime development and that Castilian financial techniques—
with marked Italian roots—would spread in Europe in the sixteenth century 
(de Vries and Van der Woude 1997; Van der Wee 1967).
Though, as we will see, important advances took place, it is quite pos-
sible that a weak point of this technological development lay in the failure 
to adapt agrarian techniques, crucial for the economy of the time. Here, 
perhaps, improvements in organization were more important, even if they 
are sometimes difficult to separate from technological improvements, with 
which they often went hand in hand. In any case, it is important to remem-
ber the reasons for this progress, although here, again, more research is 
needed. A hypothesis can at least be presented. The Iberian Peninsula 
combined two necessary conditions: it was, first, the crossroads of techno-
logical development and cultural cross-fertilization; and, second, technol-
ogy was vital to maintaining the empire. Oceanic expansion had been 
possible thanks to the meeting of different cultures (Chap. 1). And this 
continued to be the case. Being the centre of a composite monarchy 
spread out across Europe, the enormous power of the King of Spain and 
his needs generated a strong gravitational pull upon ‘mechanics’, inven-
tors, and intellectuals from across the world. Juanello Turriano was from 
Cremona. Monardes had one eye on America and the other on Castile. De 
Orta was born in Castile, emigrated to Portugal, and travelled to Goa. 
The Welser and the Fugger, who carried American and Iberian mining 
forward, gathered their knowledge in Germany, the most advanced coun-
try of its time in this sector. Even the procedure for the amalgamation of 
mercury came from a German, who put it into practice in America 
(Sánchez 1989). And we cannot overlook the fact that many of those who 
proposed ‘remedies’, reforms, and patents—sometimes it is difficult to 
differentiate between them (Yun 2016)—were Italians and Germans, 
Flemish, and French. Not all of these proposals had much sense, of course. 
The term ‘arbitrista’ carried the connotation of madness or opportunism 
(Yun 2016). But the very fact of their existence demonstrates an intellec-
tual effervescence. This circulation of techniques and inventions, the 
sponsorship of hybrid forms that brought about new knowledge, is typical 
of the period in which the word ‘invention’ was not taken to be that 
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 different from the term ‘imitation’ and was understood as such in many 
areas of Europe, where what was presented as an invention in one country 
was very often merely a copy of something common elsewhere.
The type of networks that allowed these new inventions and forms of 
knowledge and expertise to circulate was also highly important for other 
activities. In part they were similar to the webs through which artisans 
moved (Epstein 2002). These would be very prominent in relation to 
mining, which benefited from being a sector with an almost non-existent 
degree of guild governance, thus ensuring a higher degree of receptivity 
when faced with innovation. But this was also true in relation to the circu-
lation of men, science, and ideas through princely courts and noble house-
holds. This was the case in the circuits that spread the new knowledge on 
mining, hydraulics, mathematics, and watchmaking and in which Juanello 
Turriano moved (Zanetti 2012). The same was true of many other special-
ists and inventors who proposed patents to the monarchy. But the king 
was also concerned, as were institutions such as the Council of the Indies, 
to develop new types and fields of knowledge, often being conscious that 
these areas were very poorly represented in the universities. The trans- 
frontier character of the monarchy and its elites (Chap. 4) pulled in this 
same direction, favouring the circulation of knowledge. The presence of 
books on geometry, mathematics, geography, and history (disciplines inti-
mately linked to war and to natural philosophy) in noble libraries is eye- 
catching. Questions of personal and familial prestige aside, this was a type 
of knowledge that was not confined to the nobles and that, moreover, 
revealed an interaction with the ‘mechanics’ and other intellectuals who 
played such a role in the art of war. These contacts were especially intense 
with Italy, the most important centre for the production of scientific and 
technical knowledge of the time. And this helps us to understand a phe-
nomenon that until recently was largely overlooked by scholars.
locAl insTiTuTions, regionAl ecosysTems, 
And lAnd ProPerTy righTs
But if the capacity to produce and, above all, to adapt and recycle tech-
nology was one of the keys to Iberia’s economic and geographic expan-
sion, then this growth can only be understood through a description of 
the different regional economies and land property rights. In the end, 
this economy was fundamentally a regional one conditioned by its physi-
cal characteristics.
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In an area marked by an enormous diversity of geographical and 
 institutional features, it perhaps makes sense to begin with an idea of the vast 
differences that existed between productive ecosystems and regional institu-
tions, many of which had emerged during the centuries of the Reconquista. 
This disparity was manifested in many different forms of productive organi-
zation, wealth distribution, and social domination which were to a large 
degree the result of the interplay of the three basic institutions in rural life: 
the peasant family, the rural community (often organized in concejos and 
câmaras in Castile and Portugal, respectively), and the señorío.
The so-called Atlantic Spain, the area from Galicia to Navarre in the 
north of the country, was an ecological unit. These mountainous regions 
all shared a climate of mild temperatures and frequent rainfall spread over 
the calendar year. Their abundant water supply, extensive natural grass-
lands, and thick woodland meant that they were very different from the 
Spanish and Portuguese interiors (García Fernández 1975). Yet, these 
general features notwithstanding, this was a very heterogeneous region. In 
Galicia and Asturias, the peasant community had converted itself into the 
basic unit for regulating and exploiting agrarian resources (Saavedra 1983, 
p. 17, 1993, pp. 428–51). This function was performed by the concejos, or 
rural communities sometimes made up of a number of different villages or 
settlements and sometimes by one single nucleus that organized social and 
economic life in its territory. The concejos regulated crop rotation patterns 
and controlled the exploitation of the ample and leafy woodlands, which 
were often held as communal property. With certain logical differences, 
this situation was reproduced in Navarre and in the Pyrenean valleys, 
where communities frequently grouped together to exploit the available 
resources (Zabalza 1994, pp. 65–7). The Basque Country was, however, 
slightly different in this regard, even if it did not break with the model 
entirely. Here the extended family unit was crucial—in many senses even 
more than the rural community—and the majority of these functions were 
organized around the farmhouse and on a smaller scale.6
In spite of the role of the concejos, and in marked difference to the situa-
tion on the Meseta, it is clear that the role of the peasant community as a 
mediator in the distribution of products between the peasantry and its land-
6 Even in the fifteenth century, this area had seen the emergence of ties of association 
between different towns, guaranteeing a better defence of their common interests and a bet-
ter regulation of the mountainside spaces (Fernández de Pinedo 1974, p. 62).
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lords had been reduced. In Galicia the concejos’ struggle against the rights of 
the landlords had led the latter to prefer to receive payment of rents in 
enfiteusis on a lifetime basis or even as a perpetual lease, with the individual 
famers paying them directly (Saavedra 1985, p.  443; García Fernández 
1975, pp. 190–7). Here, again, the Basque Country was the exception to 
the rule, as almost half of its peasants were landowners and farms were gen-
erally rented on shorter-term leases.7 The result across Atlantic Spain and 
the western Pyrenees was the stability of the peasant exploitation, based on 
extended family networks that were strengthened by the proclivity of the 
landlords, who were predominantly ecclesiastical institutions, to rent lands 
as units with all of their attributes (houses, space for livestock, etc.) to fami-
lies and married couples. This created rural communities in which social 
inequalities were much less pronounced than on the flatlands of the Meseta. 
But at the same time, these conditions strengthened the position of a mid-
dling group of hidalgos and intermediate nobility that lived in the more 
important centres such as Oviedo and Santiago. Shortly this social group 
would benefit from lands ceded also a foro (through enfiteusis) from the 
great ecclesiastical institutions and lay landowners. This development 
allowed such middling aristocrats to take part in agrarian production and 
converted them into a fundamental link in the chain of power and the exer-
cise of coercion on the local level. Even in the Basque Country, a mid-
ranking sector, whose fortunes originated in commerce, was consolidating 
its position in networks that distributed agricultural products (Villares 1982, 
pp. 77–95; Fernández de Pinedo 1974, pp. 58–9).
This being a zone of abundant year-round rains, these factors led to 
demographic and productive growth. In some areas this growth was based 
upon a ‘pre-revolution’ of millet, which supplemented the cultivation of 
other cereals such as wheat, barley, and spelt. Moreover, the abundance of 
woodlands and mountain pasture, together with the precise regulation of the 
use of farmable soils, allowed agriculture and livestock farming to thrive side 
by side, a development which the consequent high quantities of animal efflu-
ent further encouraged. The high quantity of woodland resources and the 
resulting opportunity to feed both livestock and people provided a large 
number of additional assets to these peasant economies and limited the 
effects of bad harvests (García Fernández 1975). A  number of auxiliary activ-
ities, some of them encouraged by the urban development of the Meseta, 
7 For the Basque Country, García de Cortázar (1988, pp. 262–3).
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supplemented incomes: transport; short-term migration to the peninsular 
interior in search of wages during the harvest of cereals and viticulture (from 
July to September), iron and carbon production, and trade in leather, woods, 
fish, and other local products to the more urbanized areas of the interior.8 
Population growth, if quite meagre in the Basque Country and Navarre, was 
highly notable in Asturias and Galicia, where clear demographic spurts 
occurred between 1530 and 1580, despite this being a period of consider-
able emigration (see Table 3.1 and Map 3.1).
These characteristics, common across Atlantic Spain, were also present 
in some of the foothills and more humid climates with a rich vegetal cover 
of the Duero Valley, such as the sierras of Sanabria, the mountains of León 
and Burgos, the high regions of Soria, or the foothills of the north of the 
central system (above all Ávila and Segovia). But overall the central  plateau 
8 Saavedra (1983, p. 50, 1985, p. 18), Anes (1988, p. 39), Lanza (1991, pp. 121, 143–8).
Table 3.1 Demographic growth in sixteenth-century Iberia
1530 1590
0.000 inhabitants 0.000 inhabitants
% growth per year
Crown of Castile
Andalusia 762 1067 0.7
Asturias 81 133 1.1
New Castile 614 1145 1.4
Old Castile 1049 1254 0.3
Extremadura 305 451 0.8
Galicia 263 504 1.5
Leon 503 633 0.4
Murcia 74 115 0.9
Basque Country and Navarre 268 296 0.2
Total 3919 5598 0.7
Crown of Aragon
Aragon 255 310 0.4
Catalonia 251 364 0.8
Valencia 273 360 0.5
Total 779 1034 0.5
Continental Spain 4698 6632 0.7
Portugal 1162 1550 0.6
Sources: My own elaboration from Nadal (1984) and Miranda (2016), applying to Portugal the ratio 
vecino/inhabitant of Nadal: 4 instead of 4.3
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(the Meseta)—the extensive flatlands of drier climate and more extreme 
temperatures that stretched from the mountains of Cantabria and the 
Sierra Morena through the valleys of the Duero, Tajo, and Guadiana 
 rivers—presented a very different panorama. Having said this, allowance 
must be made for the diversity of such a big region.
The mononuclear concejos that dominated the north of the Duero were 
succeeded by the poly-nuclear ‘communities of town and land’ (comuni-
dades de villa y tierra) to the south of the river. The latter were extremely 
hierarchical organizations where the ‘town’ controlled economic activities 
not only within its own estate but also within those of the surrounding 
rural communities. Here the rural community played also a crucial role, 
organizing and regulating the exploitation of natural resources, setting the 
crop rotation patterns (normally based on a cycle of just over a calendar 
year and in which cereals were the staple crop), and alternating between 
sheep farming and the cultivation of the vine and the system of rotating 
cornfields (derrota de mieses). This entailed the opening up of the agricul-
tural farmland immediately after the cereal harvest by August so that local 
herds could graze on the stems and stubble and fertilize the land with 
Map 3.1 Iberia in the sixteenth century
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their excrement. The result was an open field system organized by the 
community that both defended vineyards and oversaw systems of local 
transhumance running to the nearby mountains. In many cases a number 
of councils or communities of one comunidad de villa y tierra formed alli-
ances in order to exploit their pastures and woodlands, thus increasing 
their economies of scale. Moreover, many of these communities counted 
upon extensive tracts of unfarmed lands within their municipal estates; 
these terrains either had no owner or belonged to the king and thus could 
be used by farmers or livestock breeders with the council’s permission 
(Vassberg 1983).
The role of the rural council was also significant in the distribution of 
wealth between landlords and peasants. The quantities of wealth chan-
nelled through them on the Meseta were far greater than in their equiva-
lents in Atlantic Spain. These institutions often undertook to collect the 
royal or seigniorial taxes such as the alcabalas and the tercias from the 
inhabitants. Frequently the community, as a corporation, had obtained the 
right to use seigniorial lands and was charged with organizing their use 
and transferring the tribute or payment to the landowner for these privi-
leges. The community operated, therefore, as the basic intermediary 
between the rural society and the landlords, who in many cases enjoyed 
the right to appoint to local authorities and to administer justice at a basic 
level—in other words, they exercised coercive power.9
This is not to deny, however, the existence of a direct relationship between 
great lords on the one hand and individual farmers on the other. On the 
contrary, this arrangement was common and even led to the emergence of 
a wide variety of forms of direct relationships between the tenant and the 
landlord, running from enfiteusis to the short-term renting of properties 
belonging to the nobility or Church. Many seigniorial properties included 
pasturelands and woodlands that were never rented or ceded to councils but 
instead exploited directly by their owners for their livestock economy.10 This 
system was even more common in the extensive zone to the south of the 
Tajo, where large landowners controlled huge flocks (particularly sheep) 
9 In Castile at this time, ‘the farmers did not speak individually, but instead as natives of a 
municipal corporation; kings and lords communicated with their mayors more than with 
individual subjects’ (Nader 1990, p. 18).
10 See the case of Guadalajara in Gómez Mendoza (1978, pp. 88–92) or, for a different 
form, the case of the county of Feria in Badajoz and the pasturelands of the count of 
Belalcázar in la Puebla (Cabrera 1977, pp. 277–9).
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and enormous grazing lands. Many proprietors of this sort—the Monastery 
of Guadalupe, the archbishopric of Toledo, or the Military Orders—were 
closely tied to the Honoured Council of the Mesta (see Chap. 1).11
Further to the south, this large-scale property ownership and, there-
fore, social inequalities became increasingly common. Although the eco-
logical possibilities of this zone, in which summers are considerably warmer 
and rains more scarce, were more limited, these high levels of inequality 
compelled the peasantry to diversify its economic undertakings, resulting 
in the development of domestic industry, transport activities, and alterna-
tive agriculture in general. These adaptations provided families with addi-
tional incomes and allowed them to overcome the basic inequality in land 
ownership. These forms of alternative agriculture or peasant industries 
were viable thanks to the emergence of peasant markets regulated by the 
more important towns using privileges conceded by the local lord or the 
king himself.12 Markets of this sort constituted centres of commercializa-
tion for the wools of small local herds as well as for linen, esparto grass, 
hemp, and basic crude cloths. Finally, these rural markets also served as 
the focal points for myriad transport activities (Vassberg 1986, p. 238).
The Mediterranean and continental climate of the interior had lower 
rainfall levels than Atlantic Spain. Nevertheless, in these zones there thrived 
a cereal agriculture whose yields matched the European average and existed 
side by side with exceptional numbers of livestock, particularly sheep, which 
were grazed not only through transhumance between different ecosystems 
but also (and above all) between different municipalities (Bishko 1978). 
This agro-pastoral economy was noticeable for forms of communal organi-
zation and the co-ordination of resources in both the low hills and flatlands. 
Furthermore, despite the false stereotype of this being a zone completely 
dominated by the designs of the all-powerful Honoured Council of the 
Mesta, it is clear that, the main transhumance routes and certain pasture-
lands excepted, it was the local community that exercised the greatest influ-
ence over land use. This was also, of course, an important area for vineyards, 
11 Ruiz Rodríguez (1993, p. 27); Klein (1979, p. 73); López-Salazar (1987, pp. 9–18).
12 The term alternative agriculture alludes to a series of non-basic crops of considerable, if 
ultimately marginal, importance and which became a valuable source of income for many 
peasants in early modern Europe (Thirsk 1997). Noel Salomon refers to a similar phenom-
enon, placing emphasis upon artisanal production, viticulture, and transport as ‘peasant 
industries’, activities providing auxiliary incomes to peasant economies (1982, pp. 33, 111, 
291–301).
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a labour-intensive crop, whose cultivation was undertaken thanks to the 
protectionist by-laws of the rural centres. The greater cities further to the 
south, where considerable distances separated the inhabited centres from 
the farming areas, saw important changes. These were brought about by the 
replacement of the ox by the mule, a quicker beast of burden and so one 
capable of ploughing more rapidly and travelling to more distant areas—an 
important consideration given the progressive concentration of property 
and the dispersion of plots of cultivated land. The diffussion of the mule 
constituted, probably, one of the more important technical advances imple-
mented from the fifteenth century.
The predominance of hereditary systems based upon the division of 
property among all of the peasant family’s sons resulted in patterns of early 
marriage. Unfarmed and communal lands were widely accessible; many 
councils specifically reserved these for local married couples or widows. 
These conditions resulted in a zone of unquestionable demographic vigour, 
with high levels of population mobility.
Seigniorial incomes, boosted by their jurisdictional rights and the con-
sequent increase in landlords’ capacity to collect excises, were enhanced by 
lands rented on short-term, renegotiable leases and, at times, as enfiteusis. 
In some cases, owners directly exploited their estates (above all, this was 
true for pastureland and meadows). But the basis of their income lay in the 
tercias and alcabalas paid by the peasant communities as institutions.13 In 
many cases the uneven division of productive resources had created a rural 
elite of farm workers (labradores, a sort of yeomen) who regulated the use 
of resources belonging to the municipal institutions.
Thus, the Meseta was a dynamic and growing region. The solidity of peas-
ant economies in the Duero Valley and mounting urban development 
favoured the growth of production and population, which was only limited 
by its high demographic density and elevated rates of land occupancy (see 
Table 3.1).14 Further south, in New Castile, Extremadura, and Murcia, less 
solid peasant economies, with lower levels of urban density, were blessed with 
13 As it has been said before (Chap. 1), the tercias were the 2/9 of the ecclesiastic tithes and 
the alcabala an ad valorem tax on commercial transactions. Both were often ceded to the 
jurisdictional seigniors.
14 With demographic densities of 16 inhabitants per square kilometre, the highest of the 
peninsula in 1530, the population growth would have been 0.3% annually (Table 3.1).
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enormous quantities of exploitable land as yet unfarmed (their  densities 
around 1530 were 8.4, 7.3 and 2.8 inhabitants per square kilometre, respec-
tively), and this would attract new settlers from the northern areas who 
sought small plots, a salaries, or, more commonly, both. Commercial devel-
opment, which in Murcia’s case depended upon distant and sometimes even 
foreign markets, would be one of the keys to growth across this broad swathe 
of territory, as can be understood through an analysis of population figures.
From a political and institutional perspective, the rural communities of 
Andalusia also enjoyed extensive legal and coercive powers. With a more 
concentrated urban and semi-urban population, the ample communal 
estates offered abundant opportunities in the foothills to the north of the 
region and, indeed, in upper Andalusia in general; but there were also many 
opportunities in the lowlands of the Guadalquivir. These lands were allo-
cated as small plots, thus lending a degree of solidarity to the humbler peas-
ant families and anchoring the population to the soils.15 In addition there 
were a large number of unfarmed and council lands, communally owned 
and managed by the municipalities. These were dedicated to livestock farm-
ing or the production of wool. The community constituted, therefore, an 
important element in the exploitation of resources in Andalusia. It also 
played a significant role in the transfer of incomes to the landlords, who 
claimed alcabalas, and monopolies on slaughterhouses, flour and oil mills, 
and taverns, as well as taxes on the passage of commodities. The collection 
of these revenues was entrusted to the municipal authorities or controlled 
through the jurisdiction that the seigniors exercised over rural centres.16
Yet, this region had the most highly developed forms of large estates 
(latifundia) belonging to the great lords, the clergy, and even the mid- 
ranking nobility. From the fifteenth century onwards, the organizational 
basis of these latifundia was the country house or cortijo, the centre of an 
extensive farmstead boasting granaries, various kinds of mills, stables, a 
courtyard, pens, and a residence where the proprietor or tenant would live 
(Collantes 1977, p. 115). Large enterprises of this kind were usually leased 
out over six-year periods in exchange for rents paid in specie or coin. In 
some cases they were directly farmed by the landowner. Their logic was 
15 Cabrera (1977, p. 350), Vassberg (1986, pp. 168–9), and Mata (1987, vol. I, pp. 180–6).
16 Atienza (1987, pp.  234–79). For areas of the Sierra Morena, see Cabrera (1977, 
pp. 250–330).
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therefore very different from those of the family units that distinguished 
other areas to the north. In Andalusia, and more in particular in the 
Guadalquivir Valley, on the other hand, salaried seasonal work predomi-
nated; agricultural surpluses were sold in the highly populated urban cen-
tres or even sent to foreign markets. But there also existed a network of 
smallholdings; additionally, many small plots of land belonging to the 
local lord or municipality were leased out. These smaller exploitations sup-
ported a working population employed seasonally on the great estates, 
thus serving as a means of externalizing maintenance costs.
It would, however, be wrong to speak of uniform conditions across the 
region. On the contrary, a wide range of characteristics were found in 
lower and upper Andalusia. In general terms, however, Andalusia appeared 
to be a society characterized by levels of inequality that were even more 
marked than those of the north of the peninsula, and this was true not just 
in economic terms. Because its population was continually augmented by 
immigration, the lower strata of peasants played a relatively insignificant 
role in local government. Above all, this was the case in the large towns, 
where the councils were controlled by local oligarchies that were never 
entirely independent of the nobility. Familial or client relationships united 
these different factions with the great nobles, creating a very fluid and 
complex dynamic.
As in the zones of La Mancha and Extremadura analysed above, the 
abundance of both available land and salaried work in the great estates 
attracted immigrants from the north of the peninsula. The constitution of 
the great cities stimulated both the commercialization of the surpluses of 
these huge estates and their dynamism in attracting settlers. The resulting 
demographic growth, if less dramatic than in New Castile (in part because 
of the loss of people sailing for America), was nevertheless clearly evident 
in the economic dynamism of this large region (Table 3.1).
An advanced form of rural council organization that formed an important 
link in the regulation of productive resources and the transfer of landlord 
incomes had also developed in the region of Aragon. The concejos collected 
the pechos, taxes on the members of the peasant community, on behalf of the 
landlord. They also collected the symbolic rights inherent in the lord’s juris-
diction as well as monopoly rights on slaughterhouses and mills. Often coun-
cils had been granted the control of communal lands conceded by the 
seignior in exchange for a censo enfitéutico or ‘treudo’ (Colás and Salas 1982, 
pp. 33–42; Colás 1988, pp. 24–6). However, in Aragon the lords’ income 
also included revenue streams derived from a more direct and unmediated 
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relationship with their vassals in which the councils often played little or no 
part. There were also full or allodial properties, rented to peasant families or 
farmed directly by the landlord using hired workers and, in the case of the 
Moriscos, groups who were compelled to serve their lord with personal labour 
whenever this custom had not been commuted to direct payment in money. 
But this type of property, fully owned by the seignior, was less developed 
than in Castile, and, whether it was with the intervention of the community 
or without it, Aragon was ‘the world of shared proprietorship’. A long time 
previously, the lords had handed over their lands in return for a ‘censo enfi-
téutico’ or ‘treudo’, sometimes contracted out in perpetuity and paid in 
money, coin, or by a portion of the yield (Colás 1994).
The vestiges of servitude and the importance of shared property differ-
entiated Aragonese from contemporary Castilian landownership, but the 
major difference stemmed from the evolution of the jurisdictional power of 
the lords. Jurisdictional prerogatives in themselves hardly generated any 
economic income; however, here, as in Castile, certain landlords’ posses-
sion of absolute jurisdiction converted them into judges whose decision 
could not be appealed, thus marginalizing the authority of the king him-
self. The lords’ capacity for enforcement and the control of violence was 
even more marked in Aragon than in the Crowns of Portugal and Castile.
Shared property, which acknowledged the peasants’ right to cultivate the 
land, and the abundance of communal lands helped to stabilize both 
Christian and Morisco peasant family economy. Yet peasant society remained 
characterized by marked internal differences, with many farmers continuing 
to live in small holdings often based upon an intensive agriculture depend-
ing upon irrigation systems and auxiliary activities directed towards the mar-
ket (crops such as saffron, the vine and olive, etc.) (Atienza 1988, p. 147; 
Colás and Salas 1982, p. 38).
The combination of absolute seigniorial jurisdiction and the presence 
of the Morisco population, whose legal status was weaker, contributed to 
the formation of a society in which the power of the nobility was almost 
unlimited in terms of both its control over vassals and its capacity to inter-
fere with the organization of the economy.
Growth was, therefore, limited in Aragon by its relatively inflexible 
economy, which in turn can be understood as a result of the shackles of 
feudal origin, the exercise of noble jurisdiction, and the minimal level of 
urban development. Annual demographic growth was thus restricted in 
the kingdom to rates of around 0.4%—and this despite its low demo-
graphic densities (5.3 habitants per km squared) (Yun 2004). These 
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 characteristics may be seen, in part, as a consequence of the juridical 
 insecurity of peasant existence and the extremely arbitrary justice to which 
seigniorial authorities submitted rural communities.
The communities of the kingdom of Valencia also ‘possessed a great 
vitality’ (Ardit 1994, vol. II, p.  190). They constituted centres around 
which social and economic life was organized. But, at the same time, the 
majority of the land belonging to the seigniors and to the large ecclesiasti-
cal institutions was rented out, either in enfiteusis or as leases, directly to 
farmers with no form of intermediation by the community (Peris 1989, 
p. 86). In some areas, such as those around the Huerta, a region where the 
irrigation network had been extended, the use of plots of land conceded 
in enfiteusis served to reduce the differences that had emerged from the 
inequitable division of peasant property. The result was a situation of great 
variety in the distribution and structure of farmlands (Furió 1995, p. 308).
In general the coastal zones and those near the capital witnessed a form 
of agriculture that was highly influenced by the market and consequently 
was dedicated to commercial products. This was especially true in areas 
around the region of Huerta, where an intensive farming of fruit, mul-
berry trees, and vegetables predominated, and in the coastal zones and 
those near the capital. From the sixteenth century, viticulture was spread-
ing into the dry lands (those without guaranteed irrigation), producing 
raisins, almonds, and crops exported for industrial use (Halperin 1980, 
pp. 21–2, 26). These trends contributed to the diversification of peasant 
incomes and fed economic growth. In many areas, the ‘decision on the use 
of the fallow land was made by individuals, not collectives, and depended 
on the quality of the terrain’. Farmers who directly exploited their soils 
possessed thus ‘an unlimited degree of control over their lands’ and ‘an 
almost-absolute liberty in deciding which crops to grow’ (Ciscar 1977, 
p. 44; Peris 1989, p. 37). This progress was fed by the availability of capital 
from cities, merchants, and even the aristocracy, as in the case of the 
Genoese interested in sugar cane production, silk, and other products or 
the duke of Gandia, who invested with the aim of expanding the cultiva-
tion of these crops. Another positive factor lay in the need to provision the 
capital, Valencia, which was growing because of international commerce 
(Chap. 1) and the exploitation of crops such as sugar, silk, and other prod-
ucts. Cereals were sourced from across the Mediterranean (and especially 
from Sicily) and from Old Castile.
As in Aragon, the jurisdiction of the landlords had developed signifi-
cantly in Valencia and even offered a certain degree of autonomy from the 
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
115
king’s legal authority. This jurisdiction was wielded through the authorities 
named by the community government and played an important role in the 
transfer of rents to the landlords who received part of their income from 
their land through direct exploitation but whose principal income derived 
from lands conferred upon tenants in censos. Another of the most impor-
tant income streams was the tercio diezmo and regalías (rights of the king 
ceded to the landlords) and privileges linked to jurisdiction that were paid 
by the community as a whole.17
These trends resulted in highly diverse agrarian systems, ranging from 
the extensive exploitation of livestock (in the interior uplands) to the 
intensive agriculture of the meadow or huerta. In all cases they were exer-
cised with vigorous forms of feudal jurisdiction. But this was also a highly 
flexible agrarian economy, very much orientated towards the market, 
where enfiteusis served as the basis for improvements in production under-
taken by the peasants enjoying perpetual use of the land that they farmed. 
In this context, the region’s commercial development around the capital 
sparked a growth surge that was clearly manifested in the figures detailing 
demographic progress.18
Similar paradoxes can be found in Catalonia, where, nevertheless, the 
landowners’ vigour was considerably less noticeable. The idea first out-
lined by Pierre Vilar (1962, vol. I, p. 562), that the Sentence of Guadalupe 
brought about ‘a feudal restoration and a social pact that confirmed feudal 
revenues’ (Serra 1988, pp. 46–9) and created a new social equilibrium in 
the countryside (see Chap. 1) has been widely accepted.
The basic motor of late fifteenth-century growth does not appear to have 
been the rural community. As in all of Europe, it continued to be the funda-
mental unit upon which the jurisdictional power of the landlord and king was 
exercised through local authorities and delegated legal representatives. But, 
in general, their involvement in economic life was less common than was that 
of their counterparts in Castile or the region of Aragon. On the contrary, the 
key to both the rural economy and Catalan agrarian expansion was the fam-
ily, always tightly tied to the land through the mas (Elliott 1963, pp. 28–31) 
and whose role had been strengthened by the Sentence of Guadalupe to the 
17 Ciscar (1977, pp. 228–35), Ardit (1994, vol. I, pp. 92–3).
18 According to Ardit, the population may have increased between 0.25% and 0.41% annually 
between 1510 and 1609, depending on the population at the starting point (1994, vol. I, 
p. 19).
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extent that it consecrated the property rights of the peasant elite and 
 established the precedent that only by its abandonment could a property 
return into the hands of the landlord. The crisis of the fourteenth century 
and the subsequent concentration of lands appear to have led to the increase 
in the habitual size of the mas (Vilar 1962, vol. I, p.  577). These larger 
dimensions brought about an improvement in their capacity to mobilize pro-
ductive resources. Inheritance rights tended to reserve the lion’s share of 
goods for one of the sons (usually the eldest), and this custom also favoured 
the stability of the family farm, even if it prejudiced the other children. This 
explains the coexistence beneath the same roof of not only the head of the 
family but also a number of his brothers and sisters, who thus constituted a 
complex variant of the family unity and one capable of mobilizing a large 
amount of labour (Elliott 1963, pp. 28–31). But this was not the only con-
sequence of the Sentence of Guadalupe. At the same time, the establishment 
of this strata of masovers (an elite of property owners exploiting its rights over 
the mas) had contributed to the crystallization of another wider sector of 
small  peasants—the other side of the coin—who found themselves com-
pelled to rent the plots of the mas or to work upon them for a salary during 
the periods of greatest agricultural activity (Elliott 1963, p. 30).
These conditions gave rise to a form of peasant society with a high 
capacity for production. From an early point, it supported the emergence 
of masías, assisted by the security and permanence of property rights. In 
many cases this was fed by important investments in fixed capital (build-
ings, granaries, and stables) and brought about a reorganization of farms 
which, in turn, would have an impact upon production. The renting out 
in enfiteusis of plots of the mas to small peasants served to tie the work-
force to the land and consolidated the position of the humblest groups in 
rural society, thus feeding demographic and agrarian growth. These devel-
opments were accompanied by the expansion of industrial and market- 
orientated crops that diversified both resources and sources of income for 
the rural population. The result of all of these changes was the expansion 
of the vineyard, or the increasing exploitation of millet, rice and vegeta-
bles, dry fruits, hemp, silk, and saffron (the latter products tied to the 
commercial networks established by German merchants trading through 
Perpignan and the fairs of Lyon). Catalonia, therefore, supported rela-
tively dynamic and flexible agrarian systems, in which polyculture was 
made possible around the masía, whose prosperity was based ‘upon the 
size and the variety of its production’ (Vilar 1962, vol. I, p. 584).
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The collection of revenues was very seldom channelled through the 
community as such, and by the sixteenth century, all prospect of resurrect-
ing the personal remensa (the payment due to the lord for the chance to 
leave the land) and many of the feudal rights claimed by landlords in the 
previous century had vanished. This led to a higher degree of security for 
their vassals and tenants (see Chap. 1). But, at the same time, the landlord 
claimed a number of important prerogatives which allowed him to seize an 
important part of the surplus production and to participate in the agrarian 
growth brought about by the extension of this ever-more flexible and var-
ied agriculture (Duran 1982). Yet the overall equilibrium was not threat-
ened by the enforcement powers wielded by the landowners; on the 
contrary, and in comparison with previous periods, these seigniorial pre-
rogatives in fact limited the landowner’s propensity to commit abuses and 
so came to form the basis of a new period of demographic and economic 
growth. Catalonia’s population grew at an annual rate of 0.8% from 1530 
to 1590 (Table 3.1). As was the case in other southern zones of the Iberian 
Peninsula, one of the reasons for its attractiveness to settlers from the 
north—in this case, the French side of the Pyrenees—lay in a combination 
of institutions, natural resources, and economic factors.
More than an ecological unity, Portugal was a set of regions made up of 
very distinct physical components. The differences are very marked: from 
the mountainous zones of the north, such as the provinces of Entre- 
Douro- e-Minho and Tras-os-Montes, with their Atlantic climate, to the 
plains of the Alentejo and even the more mountainous zone with the high-
est rates of precipitation, such as the Algarve in the South. The role of the 
concelho (equivalent to the Castilian and Aragonese rural council or con-
cejo) was important across the country. The system for the concession of 
privileges established by the Portuguese kings was governed by the idea 
that the monarchy should not grant excessive power to any one nucleus. 
It had, however, given rise to a more homogenous and less hierarchical 
political sphere than in Castile, as above all differences were caused by 
economic activities (Mattoso 1997, pp.  205–40). Moreover, in overall 
terms long-term leasehold (enfiteusis) had developed to a significant extent 
during the last centuries of the Middle Ages, to a considerable degree due 
to the stagnation of the population at very low levels between 1350 and 
1450 and the consequent need to attract settlers to many zones of the 
country (Mattoso 1997). The north of the country had seen the establish-
ment of more seigniorial estates, while in the south the great councils were 
abundant, with extensive municipal estates and sometimes existing under 
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the jurisdiction of the Military Orders. This difference between the north 
and south—and above all between the north and south of the Tagus 
River—was perhaps one of the most important traits of the Portuguese 
economy. In any case, the farming system regulated by councils predomi-
nated across the country, with rotation timetables for cereals, at times 
combined with the vine, olive, and ovine livestock. The north, being more 
populated, was characterized by a variety of crops and natural resources 
that permitted a higher density of population, which was well above the 
peninsular average. This being the case, it witnessed the strongest forms of 
emigration, above all towards the Tagus Valley, Lisbon, the settlements of 
the lower Tagus Valley, and even in part towards Alentejo, to the extent 
that its poor soils allowed such a movement. Moreover, in addition to the 
diversity of resources, the north of Portugal was more open to the Atlantic 
through Lisbon and the cities and towns between Porto and the frontier 
with Galicia. This was a region where the impact of the oceanic and com-
mercial expansion would have a notable effect.
The poor soils and arid summer climate of Alentejo between the Tagus 
and the Guadiana meant that it was less conducive to economic activities. 
Its very low demographic densities (among the lowest of the peninsula), 
the concentration of commercial activities to the north of Lisbon, and the 
coastal characteristics meant that its openness to and interaction with the sea 
were very limited, despite its boasting almost 300 km of shoreline between 
Lisbon and the Cape of St. Vincent. Here wheat and transhumance live-
stock farming (above all in the frontier zones with Castile) had a relatively 
greater importance (Magalhães 1997, pp. 230, 239), and it is not surprising 
that pasturelands were hired out to Castilian shepherds. But the chances of 
the commercialization of peasant production were very modest, not only 
because of the absence of an attractive outside market but also because of the 
low density of the urban mesh that was, in Castile, a crucial factor in growth.
economic exPAnsion in A Pre-indusTriAl socieTy
The expansive cycle that had begun in the last decades of the 1400s was 
sustained throughout the following century. But what type of expansion 
was achieved? What were its dimensions and limits? Did it fit the model of 
an extensive agriculture surrender to diminishing marginal returns or 
yields whose surplus production is systematically absorbed by the upward 
evolution of land rents or seigniorial extractions, the result of which is a 




It should immediately be stated that the present-day definition of modern 
economic growth, based upon a continuous process of expansion in per 
capita product, must be applied with great caution to pre-industrial econ-
omies. Even if they did not achieve this increase of income per inhabitant, 
in economies which existed on the margins of subsistence, success lay in 
the simple production of more foodstuffs that allowed them to support 
more inhabitants. But the Iberian cases allow us to go further than this.
The population increase in Spain is, without doubt, evident and even 
more accelerated than in most parts of Europe, as can be seen from 
Table 3.2, which presents some corrected numbers for Spain, following the 
calculations of J. De Vries and my own estimates by using data from Nadal 
(1984) and Miranda (2016). The population of Portugal also had risen 
from some 1.2  million inhabitant households around 1527 to some 
1.5–1.6  million inhabitants at the end of the century (See Serrão and 
Marques 1998, p. 44, Graph 1; Miranda 2016). Whatever the point of 
reference, it is clear that the Spanish and Portuguese population increased 
Table 3.2 Demographic growth in sixteenth-century Europe
(Millions of inhabitants)
1500 1530 1550 1590 1600
% growth per year
Scandinavia 1.5 1.7 2 0.28
England 2.3 3.1 4.2 0.86
Scotland 0.8 0.9 1 0.22
Ireland 0.8 0.9 1 0.22
Holland 0.95 1.25 1.5 0.45
Belgium 1.25 1.65 1.3 0.04
Germany 12 14 16 0.28
France 16.4 19 20 0.19
Switzerland 0.6 0.75 0.9 0.4
Italy 10.5 11.4 13.1 0.22
Spain 4.69 6.63 0.7
Portugal 1.2 1.5 0.6
Austria-Bohemia 3.5 3.6 4.3 0.2
Poland 2.5 3 3.4 0.3
Sources: My own elaboration from De Vries (1994, p. 13) and Nadal (1984, p. 74, Table 9) and Miranda 
(2016), using a ratio vecino/inhabitant of 4 for Portugal (see Table 3.1)
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noticeably even in comparative terms with Europe from 1530 to 1590.19 
As matter of fact historians agree that in both cases the demographic 
growth was particularly intensive until 1570.
The same impression emerges when we turn from population to the 
main indicators of cereal production (Yun 2004, pp. 199–200, Graphs 4.1 
to 4.4). Even when allowance is made for the purely approximate nature 
of these figures, it is clear that the 1500s continued the long phase of 
expansion begun during the previous century. Abundant references can be 
found to indicate the expansion of other products, such as wine and olive 
oil in both countries.20 Probably this dynamism was less noticeable in the 
case of sheep, for which our data is less solid and convincing, but the 
 overall conclusion must be positive.21 In regard to the secondary and ter-
tiary sectors, if inherently more difficult to measure, the figures provided 
on urban and industrial developments are highly indicative of commercial 
and industrial growth in the northern Meseta and Andalusia and even in 
Catalonia, Valencia, and the coastal areas of Portugal.22
As traditional historiography has underlined, there can be no doubt 
that, aside from the commercial development described above, this gen-
eral economic expansion was made possible by an increase in agrarian pro-
duction derived from the extension of cultivated lands, to which many 
contemporary sources allude.23 This is evident at a local level in the per-
missive policy of many towns and councils with regard to the breaking of 
19 The figures given for Spain by De Vries (1984) (6.8 and 8.1 million inhabitants in 1500 
and 1600, respectively) appear less trustworthy than those of Nadal (1984, p. 74). Spain 
witnessed the second largest growth in all of Europe after England (0.86). Portugal is also in 
the most dynamic group with a 0.6% of growth per year.
20 In Valencia, Cáceres, and Catalonia, the data sets refer to overall production of cereals, 
wines, and other goods, which are representative of the majority of agrarian production (Yun 
2004). For other regions, see Casey (1983, pp. 266–7), Ibáñez (1995, p. 244), Huetz de 
Lemps (1967), Ponsot (1986, XIX, see chart 4.6), Pérez and Lemeunier (1984, Graph. 1), 
and Latorre (1989).
21 The number of livestock in the Mesta appears to have fallen noticeably from 1520 (Le 
Flem 1972), but it does not appear that this contraction could have been sharp enough to 
bring down the overall agrarian product. A number of cases confirm this thesis (Lemeunier 
(1977, p. 327), Halperin (1980, p. 25)). Moreover there are reasons for thinking that this 
reduction was compensated by higher levels of stationary livestock farming and short-
distance transhumance (Ruiz Martín 1990a).
22 Bennassar (1983, pp. 324–28), Pulido (1993), Elliott (1963, p. 56), García Espuche 
(1998).
23 See, for example, López-Salazar (1986, pp. 151–252). For Portugal, (Magalhães, 1997).
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new soils and the need to attract settlers by conceding fiscal exemptions 
and access to unfarmed land (Pérez and Lemeunier 1984, pp.  63, 66, 
69–72; Yun 1987, pp. 120–3). But the extension of cultivated land is also 
evident in the fact that those regions where the population density was 
lower in 1530, such as New Castile, Asturias, Galicia, Murcia, Andalusia, 
the lower Mondego, the areas around Lisbon, Alentejo, and other zones, 
were generally those that made the greatest progress over the course of the 
century. Only the kingdom of Aragon fell outside of this paradigm, for the 
reasons outlined above.
If very difficult to measure, intense bursts of interregional migration 
stood at the heart of this dynamic. Notwithstanding its notable potential 
for growth, the north-western area of the peninsula appears to have been 
sending inhabitants to the Duero and Tagus valleys for much of the 
 sixteenth century both in Portugal and Castile.24 At the same time, the 
northern Meseta was providing settlers for Extremadura, New Castile, 
Andalusia, and Murcia. This same pattern is also found in the eastern 
regions, where the kingdom of Aragon hardly grew despite its low initial 
population densities, although it clearly helped to feed the notable expan-
sion of Catalonia, even if the principal factor in the growth of the princi-
pality was the arrival of French settlers, while the kingdom of Valencia 
attracted immigrants from France, Gascony, Aragon, and Castile.25
But does the extensive character of the agrarian system mean that it 
makes no sense to speak of a growth in per capita income and productivity 
in the sixteenth century? This is in fact the most common idea among 
economic historians, and there are even those who, like Cipolla (1976) or 
H. Kamen (1978), denied some decades ago not only the existence of 
economic development but also, implicitly, the idea of genuine growth.
There exists, however, a great deal of evidence that allow us to be more 
positive and even to support a more critical view of the image of an econo-
mie immobile, as Hoffman did for the case of France (1996). As I think I 
have proved (Yun 2004, pp. 211–4) by using estimates of different regions 
such as New Castile, Catalonia, and Andalusia, there are many reasons to 
24 See the case of the migration flows to Medina del Campo in Marcos (1978, p. 272).
25 For Catalonia, see Nadal (1984, pp. 74–82). For Valencia, attention falls on the annual 
accumulative growth rates of 0.47%, and it can be supposed that these would have been still 
greater in the first half of the century. Ardit proposes a general rate of growth between 0.51% 
and 0.82% between 1530 and 1580 (1994, vol. I, p. 19). See also Furió (1995, pp. 271–4).
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think that the agrarian output increased faster than the population at least 
until the 1570s (Yun 2004, p. 213). In other words, it is more than prob-
able that total population growth in the kingdom fell beneath the expan-
sion of production for several decades.
We are faced, therefore, with an unmistakable agrarian expansion, mean-
ing an increase in the agrarian product ‘per capita’. Beyond this, insofar as 
the primary sector generated a significant portion of the total product and 
was accompanied by a phase of industrial and commercial developments, it 
is clear that this trend represented a phase of real economic growth in all 
senses. For this reason, it should not be surprising that, at the end of the 
century, the indicators for the consumption of meat among the Spanish 
should be very close to those of areas of notable economic vitality, such as 
Italy. And if, regrettably, there are only a few studies on the material culture 
of the period, it is nonetheless clear that a certain increase of production of 
consumer or industrial goods aimed at the domestic market took place, 
above all among certain sectors of the better- off peasantry, a trend that cor-
roborates the overall pattern of changes (Livi-Bacci 1988, pp. 144–5).
But the most reliable indicator of economic growth in pre-industrial 
societies is, without doubt, the coefficient of urbanization which, in effect, 
represents the proportion of the total population that does not live off 
agriculture. Growing urban population rates therefore unequivocally indi-
cate the increasing productivity of the rural sector, which was able to feed 
a higher proportion of people living in towns. This form of growth is 
undeniable across Spain and Portugal. As Map 3.2 shows the urbanization 
rates in both countries and in Castile in particular were already quite high 
by 1550 (the figures for Castile correspond in fact to 1530). Furthermore, 
the urban population not only grew more quickly than the rural one but 
did so in eye-catching proportions. An analysis of the figures provided by 
Jan De Vries shows that in Spain the percentage of the population living 
in urban nuclei with more than 10,000 inhabitants passed from 6.1% in 
1500 to 8.6% in 1550 and 11.4% in 1600; whereas the overall develop-
ment of urban centres within Europe went from 5.6% to 6.3% and 7.6%, 
respectively. This rhythm is even faster in Portugal, where, thanks in part 
to the expansion of Lisbon, the figures were of 3%, 11%, and 14.1% of the 
population in centres of more than 10,000 inhabitants (De Vries 1984, 
p. 146, Table 3.7). If we take the centres with more than 5000 inhabitants 
in England, France, Holland, and Castile, we find that one of the areas 
where this portion of the population had most quickly grown is Castile 
(Table 3.3). It had risen from an index of 62 in 1530 to 100 in 1600 
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(1591 to be exact). Castile therefore exhibits, with England, the fastest 
rate of urban growth (Table 3.3). This urban development is even more 
meaningful if one considers that Castile, which represented more than the 
80% of the Spanish population, was already by 1530 one of the more 
Table 3.3 Urban population in Western Europe
(% of inhabitants in centres of more than 5000)
France England Holland Castile
% Index % Index % Index % Index
1500 9.1 105 5.3 66
1530 13 62
1550 20.8 72
1600 8.7 100 8 100 29 100 21 100
1650 37 128
1700 10.9 125 17 213 39 134
Sources: My own elaboration with data from Wrigley (1987) and Fortea (1995)
Map 3.2 European urban networks, 1550
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urbanized areas of Europe with 13% of its inhabitants living in centres of 
more than 5000 people (more than in France or England) (see above 
Table 3.3). Likewise, by the same epoch, the 8.6% of the Portuguese lived 
in towns of more than 10,000, which is even more than in England and 
France too. It is not surprising that the most recent estimates of Spanish 
and Portuguese economic growth in terms of GDP per capita shed also a 
positive image (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Costa, 
Palma and Reis 2015).26
The Advantages of Peasant Economies and  
Increasing Productivity
What were the causes of this increase in per capita productivity that belie, at 
least in its most simplistic and absolute formulations, the argument for the 
economie immobile as well as the idea of an increasing pressure through rents 
that would swallow up any increase in production?27 Recent studies draw 
attention to the strictly relative nature of this immobility and provide rea-
sons for thinking that interpretations such as those of G. Bois (1985) and 
R. H. Hilton (1985) that used to place emphasis on seigniorial extractions 
may need considerable modification. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to 
reconsider the peninsula’s agriculture from the viewpoint of property rights 
and ensuing balance between land and labour.28
26 Gelabert (1994, p. 184). The theme was set out and quantified by Prados de la Escosura 
and Álvarez Nogal after the first version of this idea had been developed in Yun (2004).
27 The most complete vision is probably offered by Le Roy Ladurie, who coined the con-
cept. See (1966, vol. I, pp. 226–35).
28 It may seem strange to those scholars, such as North and Thomas, who have postulated 
a close correlation between individual property and agrarian growth (and, logically, by exten-
sion shared ownership and economic stagnation), but a more precise organization of the 
various ways by which soils were owned and a perfection of community practices was in fact 
positive in creating growth in the productivity levels of peasant labour. The theories of North 
and Thomas and their vision of Spain can be found in North (1981, p. 150). The passage 
above having been written for the first edition (Yun 2004), a number of colleagues have 
drawn my attention to parallels with the excellent work of Horden and Purcell (2000). 
Probably some parallels do exist. However, I would place emphasis on institutions and prop-
erty rights and their interaction with connections between regions and their respective eco-
logical systems. In any case, Horden and Purcell attempt to provide a very generic model of 
the Mediterranean (probably not unique and exclusive to the Mediterranean), while here I 
aim to study the specific key factors that allow us to define a particular phase of expansion on 
the sixteenth-century Iberian Peninsula.
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Everything indicates that the fixing of local by-laws (ordenanzas) of 
towns and villages in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries led to a 
greater balance and complementarity between agriculture and livestock 
breeding and, above all, extended the advantages of this equilibrium to 
ever-greater surface spaces. Many measures were introduced to clarify not 
only property rights but also the use of the land, with the aim of attaining 
greater security in farming: the clearer demarcation of spaces over the sea-
sons within the municipal estates, the appointment of guards to watch the 
vines and livestock, the creation of institutions such as the town shepherd, 
and other similar measures. In many cases, these initiatives were successful, 
with communal fields being used to benefit both agriculture and  pastoralism 
at different times in the agrarian calendar, given the different potential uses 
of soils and the ecological conditions of each unit or area.29 Rural commu-
nities not only improved the productive conditions of their estates but also, 
from the fifteenth century onwards, were keen to forge agreements and 
accords with other communities. The resulting sharing of pastures among 
councils, frequent in the Castilian Meseta, allowed cycles of transhumance 
between different municipal areas, as well as the short- distance displace-
ment of livestock and general co-ordination of the demands of cattle rising 
with those of agriculture. Moreover landowners themselves were keen to 
implement this type of improvement, thus achieving a greater balance and 
complementarity between different agricultural zones which, without 
doubt, would contribute to heightening overall productivity.30 In some 
areas the community coordinated the use of resources that were inherently 
difficult to regulate without collective oversight, such as water; in some 
areas of Aragon, the Spanish Levante, and the Portuguese banks of the 
Tagus River, the community would even undertake to dig and maintain 
29 The positive effects of greater security and the reduction of risks through measures of 
this sort with regard to crops were especially important for the extension of vineyards and 
other arboreal products. These were always highly vulnerable to the destructive incursion of 
livestock, above all at moments of flowering and fructification of the plant which, moreover, 
required significant investment, sometimes over several years, in work and care. See the case 
of the Tierra de Campos in Yun (1987).
30 This long phase of productive expansion contemplated the increase in Castilian and 
Aragonese livestock, which would be directed towards the zones of poorer soils, Murcia and 
Valencia (Lemeunier 1977, pp. 338–9; Ardit 1994, pp. 56–7). In Aragon local- and interre-
gional-level cycles of transhumance developed under the auspices of the landlords, which 
increased the complementarity of resources between the highlands of Teruel or the lands of 
Tierra del Moncayo, Pyrenees, and the banks of the Ebro river (Abadía 1993).
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irrigation ditches.31 In many regions, from Malaga to Mallorca and Valencia 
to Lisbon or Cáceres, the municipal by-laws prompted and regulated the 
expansion of fruit and mulberry trees in combination with other forms of 
activity and in harmony with the cycles of agricultural farming.32 This com-
plementary balance in exploiting resources was also found in the trend 
towards the specialization of products on the local level. In the Duero 
Valley, areas such as the Tierra de Medina, to the south of Valladolid, took 
steps towards specializing in viticulture, while the nearby area around 
Tierra de Campos began to focus on cereal production. This complemen-
tarity was determined not so much by the connections between these 
regions as by the effects of the growth of Valladolid, equidistant between 
both regions, due to its different ecological and institutional conditions. 
Similar movements were found in the Rioja region or in Murcia (Pérez and 
Lemeunier 1984, pp. 69, 78–9). Indeed, these regions were not so differ-
ent from many areas around Lisbon where complementarity led to more 
interregional trends: here the chance to import cheap wheat over several 
decades allowed for the extension of the vine and other products in the 
regional hinterland.
All of this brought about a more efficient and secure use of the land. It 
also led to a greater efficiency in the use of labour and in the balance 
between soil and labour. In fact, this equilibrium adapted to the different 
agrarian cycles throughout the year and, by mobilizing hands at times 
previously marked by relative idleness, forged a more efficient work cycle 
over the year.33
31 Apart from the examples cited above, see those for Valencia in Peris (1989, p. 255) and 
Murcia in Pérez and Lemeunier (1984, p. 84) or the form by which Morisco agricultural 
techniques were blended into the systems of Christian communities, bringing about notable 
advances in Ponsot (1986).
32 See the surprising case of Cáceres, where the ordenanzas or by-laws brought about the 
expansion of mulberry tree groves and fruit trees (Pereira 1991, pp. 128–32). On the devel-
opment of this type of products in Portugal, very much connected to what Thirsk called 
alternative agriculture, see Magalhães (1997, pp. 234–9).
33 The example of the peasants of Murcia is illustrative in this regard. They cared for the 
vines in March and collected the leaves of mulberry trees so that between April and June, the 
silkworms could feed on them while the labourers were cutting the barley and leaving it to 
dry between June and July. Wheat was then also harvested. Some could even work in the salt 
farms from May to September and in the trap nets in June and September; from the latter 
month, it was possible to sell some products in  local fairs, before harvesting the wine in 
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The intensification of work patterns in combination with the agrarian 
cycles was often accompanied by the interregional migration of tempo-
rary workers. The peasants of the north of the peninsula, highlanders, 
Galicians, and Asturians were increasingly present in the Castilian Meseta 
during the harvest weeks, after which they gradually made their way back 
towards their homes in a rhythm set by the ripening wheat, taking 
employment in each region for a few weeks at a time as they steadily 
moved northwards. Of course some labourers did remain in the Duero 
Valley for the grape and olive harvests in September and, after this, to 
work as peddlers and in the transport of goods to their homelands, carry-
ing with them a variety of products acquired or commissioned in Castile’s 
summer fairs (Vassberg 1996, pp. 67–77). Equally important were the 
short-distance movements, such as those of the settlers of the Castilian 
Extremadura who went down to harvest olives in Seville and of the peo-
ple of La Mancha who farmed their lands during nearly the entire year 
but descended upon Murcia between April and June to farm the silk-
worms and harvest the wheat.34
The permanent migration of people indicated the existence of a surplus 
workforce and, therefore, a decreasing marginal productivity in the zones 
of the north of the Central System (both in Portugal and in Castile), in 
France, or in upper Aragon; labour moved from these areas to ones where 
high-quality soils could be farmed and, consequently, where labour’s mar-
ginal productivity was higher. The result of a reallocation of this sort 
between land and labour could only be an overall increase in productivity 
per person.35
Despite there being very few incentives for investment for many land-
lords, there were some improvements in fixed capital and agrarian tech-
niques. As we have seen, in Galicia and Mallorca, the tendency among 
proprietors was to rent lands as units of production with everything  necessary 
October. From this point to the end of the year, the cereal fields could be prepared, but, in 
addition, in December and January, the olive harvest had to be collected. Peasants might still 
be involved in the storage of olives or the shovelling of snow. See Pérez and Lemeunier 
(1984, p. 89).
34 Herrera (1980, p. 232), Pérez and Lemeunier (1984, p. 90).
35 This is more important if we take into account that in many areas of the South, which 
had low densities in the first half of the century, there must still have been an abundance of 
good lands which had yet to be farmed.
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on them, something which shows an interest in agrarian equipment as the 
base for cultivation. As we have seen, in Catalonia the masía, whose basic 
construction represented the investment of fixed capital, was emerging as a 
productive unit in which the weight of the buildings, installations, and 
means of production increased, thus sparking a concomitant  proportional 
improvement in peasant labour productivity. In Andalusia they were now 
building small cottages in the fields where the journeymen could spend the 
night in order to save time by avoiding long-distance displacements during 
periods of work (the sewing and harvest of olives and grapes), thus allowing 
the farming of lands which were not necessarily poorer but, more simply, 
had gone unused for centuries. The cortijos not only offered the necessary 
buildings, stables, or areas of temporary lodgings for the seasonal workers 
but also increased the number of mills for cereal and olive oil production in 
proportion to the expansion of olive farming (Herrera 1980, p. 232; Elliott 
1963, p. 30).
There were technical advances in farming that, despite their relatively 
limited impact, should not be dismissed entirely. These improvements 
represented modest, but accumulative, advances. As we have seen, in 
Galicia and Asturias, a sort of pre-revolution of maize was brought about 
by millet. If the cultivation of millet had relatively modest beginnings in 
Spanish Galicia, its introduction into many regions of Portugal would be 
extensive and important. In the humid areas of the Atlantic North, the 
new species of African maize were really successful, in part due to the 
endemic scarcity of wheat, which was more apt for the plateau of 
the South, while rye was extended in the hills of the interior (Magalhães 
1997, p. 231 and ff.). The spread of new crops such as sugar, rice, and 
the mulberry tree in many areas of Valencia, Aragon, or Granada and 
Malaga represented a decisive step forward that, moreover, often took 
place in the gaps between farmed fields and could be combined with 
other crops in the irrigated meadows as a form of alternative agriculture. 
In Murcia some of these small advances—significant due to their accu-
mulative effect—ran from improvements in the measurement systems to 
the diffusion of waterwheels as a method of raising water in the irriga-
tion ditches (Pérez and Lemeunier 1984, p. 65). And, if the effects of 
these improvements were most spectacular in the irrigated zones, there 
was no shortage of progress in the dry lands, manifested, for example, in 
the system of ‘pasture and crop’ and in the progress made in the enclo-
sure of pastureland and use of fallow in combination with cereal  cropping 
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and the winter grazing of livestock in oakland (adehesamientos).36 This 
system had a parallel in the combination of olive and cereal cultivation in 
some zones of Coimbra (Magalhães 1997, p. 245). Of course, specific 
forms of property and seigniorial rent were sometimes behind these 
advances. As said above, while a good deal of landlord revenue was not 
usually ploughed back into productive investment, in the context of a 
growing population and demographic mobility, it often created the insti-
tutional conditions that allowed peasant initiatives to have free reign. 
Some of these improvements—above all those implemented in lands 
rented out as enfiteusis for a lifetime or in perpetuity—were tied to the 
interests of the peasant to optimize the productivity of soils over which 
he enjoyed complete control. There were also forms of renting land, 
such as letting in return for a proportion of the products (share crop-
ping), which created a positive stimulus towards improvement in some 
areas of the peninsula, specifically when guarantees were given that the 
landlord’s portion or share would not be increased (Miranda 2017). In 
some areas the growth of seigniorial income could be achieved by rolling 
out new crops or using new technology. One example of this was the 
duke of Gandía’s interest in expanding the growth of sugar cane and 
installing trapiches, mills to grind it, in his estates; many other landown-
ers were keen to produce silk. And, of course, in all estates there was a 
clear movement towards the repopulation of the land, something which 
lay behind the productive enhancements of the century.
As agrarian historians have often remarked, the substitution of oxen for 
mules in some areas reduced the soil yields but was compensated by a 
resultant increase in the level of human productivity per hour worked. In 
many regions overall factor productivity must have increased until the top 
36 For example, in many regions of southern Spain, the system of ‘pasture and crops’ was 
extended, generally in the ‘mountains of holm oaks’, (monte hueco de encinas), meaning on 
one surface or area, a number of different forms of farming were undertaken, ranging from 
grazing lands to cereals, thus generating a wide range of products—woods, firewood, acorns, 
and so on (Pereira 1991, p. 99). In Salamanca, Extremadura, and Andalusia, examples of 
creating enclosed pasture (adehesamiento) have been found, which do not necessarily mean 
the displacement of cereal by livestock. On the contrary, it probably represented a more 
efficient form of combining both practices within large estates reserved for communal use 
and in which integrated systems for the use of soils were in place, ‘to the great improvement 
of the ecological components of some zones’ (Valle 1985, pp. 536–8).
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earth was finally exhausted. The development of complementary activities 
outside of agriculture entailed the mobilization of otherwise idle hands. 
This resulted in the expanding use of female and male labours. David 
Vassberg has written that ‘many peasants, especially those resident in the 
mountains, spent two or three months a year as itinerant merchants, or as 
muleteers or transporters, earning extra money’. Certain towns and areas 
of course played a prominent role in these networks, above all those 
 situated in or near the frontier mountain ranges that separated these natu-
ral regions.37 Equally important was the development of activities to trans-
form agrarian products. The production of charcoal from wood was com-
mon from the meadows of the south to the mountain economies further 
north. But in some zones, it became a decisive activity, as was the case in 
the Basque Country and Navarre. For some of these peasants (above all 
those of the Basque Country), agrarian pursuits and the commercial 
exploitation of the mountain were combined with involvement in the iron 
industry (Bilbao 1987). For similar reasons, the development of this type 
of activity was also clear in Catalonia: ‘forges and mills multiplied in the 
sixteenth century along the banks of the rivers and mountain streams’ 
(Vilar 1962, vol. I, p. 545). Above all else this increase in peasant multi- 
activity was important in producing textiles and in manufacturing clay 
objects and leather goods and a multitude of other niche crafts. In many 
towns the production and sale of wool textiles, straps, farming tools, 
leather, clay, and linen products developed apace. And in some areas, such 
as the Rioja region, Segovia, Córdoba, the Algarve, Beira, between the 
Duero and the Portuguese side of the Miño region, and many others, the 
development of the domestic textile industry had the same effect of mobi-
lizing unemployed workers, while something similar occurred in many 
Morisco areas of Aragon and Castile.38
The more pessimistic models and interpretations cannot be supported 
either by the available data on the evolution of rents or seigniorial demands. 
Certainly, the extension of the farmed area and pressure on land entailed 
37 Vassberg (1986, p. 3), Ortega (1974), Salomon (1982), and da Silva (1967). On the 
role of the Moriscos in transport activities and commercialization, see Halperin (1980, p. 73).
38 Brumont (1993, pp. 135–6), da Silva (1967, pp. 29–31, 112), Fortea (1981, pp. 281–8). 
In the Morisco communities of Valencia, ‘entire villages’ of the duke of Gandía were employed 
in sugar cane cutting and the mills dedicated to its grinding, in making esparto and linen 
products, shoes, and mats (Halperin 1980, pp. 66, 70–1). For the Portuguese regions, see 
Magalhães (1997, pp. 254 and ff.).
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an increase in payments for the use of the soil. But this process was thor-
oughly shaped and delayed by forms of ownership and property rights 
that, as we saw in Chap. 1, were directed at the building up of the seignio-
rial estate’s population and the development of peasant economies.
In Galicia, Castile, Valencia, Catalonia, and other areas, the extensive 
properties let out in enfiteusis to families or communities created relatively 
secure conditions for their exploitation. The fact that they paid fixed (and 
predictable) sums for the use of the land encouraged peasants to take advan-
tage of productive improvements. Even when the lands were given on 
short-term or revisable leases, the terms of contracts included fixed clauses 
or conditions of considerable importance: one such accord from Andalusia 
relaxed the rent payment in case of natural catastrophes. Frequently lands 
were exploited over long periods by tenants belonging to one family group, 
with successive generations forging a personal relationship with the propri-
etor; for his part the landowner gained additional security in rent payments, 
a trade-off which tended to lessen the tendency to increase these demands. 
In this way the restriction of the number of potential tenants to the inhabit-
ants of a small town or village limited the possibility of raising land rents 
(Lemeunier 1998; Sebastián 1999, pp. 335–6). This and other similar forms 
of behaviour appear to have been especially important in the renting out of 
meadows and large properties for payment in coin, something which 
explains the barely noticeable increase in rents paid and even their diminu-
tion in real terms (Yun 2004; Miranda 2017). The abundance of unused 
lands (baldíos) or council lands (tierras concejiles) for which either no or very 
low rents had to be paid had a similar effect. And, on top of this, the first 
40  years of the century witnessed a marked effort to extend communal 
rights on the royal estates, with the implicit permission of the Crown.
Of course, mechanisms existed for the adjustment of land rents. From 
the end of the fifteenth century, landowners began to take an interest in 
revising the foros and censos entifeuticos sometimes in perpetuity, hoping to 
rent lands on short-term, revisable contracts and in return for direct pay-
ment in specie. It is also clear that many nobles and powerful estate owners 
were tempted to claim royal lands where doubt existed over proprietorship, 
and this trend clearly reduced the ability of small holders to expand their 
farms without renting. But this land grab not only allowed for a period of 
readjustment but was also at times difficult to accomplish. Contrary to 
what was occurring in other areas of Europe (e.g. those zones of England 
where claims of full ownership were being advanced to change the terms of 
leases), many peninsular landlords had to face not simply isolated peasant 
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families or small alliances of them but entire communities. In cases of this 
sort, peasant settlements not only resisted the ambitions of their lord by 
force but also—and before arriving at this extreme solution—enjoyed a 
notable capacity to recur to the royal law courts (the cases in the archives 
of Chancelleries are indicative of this facility; see Chap. 5), a practice that 
generated considerable additional cost to the landlord and served as a 
reminder of the value of prudence before entering into such costly lawsuits. 
The idea was that the justice system should maintain the laws of the king-
dom, and it, in conjunction with the health and resilience of the municipal 
estates, played in favour of many communities over long periods.
Even for those owners of lands ceded in enfiteusis (these were very often 
nobles and ecclesiastical institutions), there was not always much sense in 
compelling the peasants to revise rents which, aside from not being easily 
modified, were tied to other more important forms of income, such as the 
tercias, alcabalas, and others. If we take into account that many noble fami-
lies could overcome their income deficits through favourable credit arrange-
ments in the form of censos consignativos (mortgages endorsed by their 
mayorazgos—Chap. 4), it is easy to understand why, despite the structural 
tendency to revise land property rights, there were also considerable practi-
cal reasons mitigating against any such alteration.
The results of these developments were widely evident. Even in areas of 
strong demographic pressure—such as in the Tierra de Santiago or Jaén—
it was sometimes the case that the available rise in the revisable rents on 
lands was not automatically applied by landlords.39 Moreover some of 
these mechanisms could, in the final instance, be beneficial for quite a few 
of the farmers. This was because the increase in rents and the pressure of 
demand upon lower-quality lands, together with the increasing money 
supply, brought about a rise in prices which in the end benefited the more 
efficient farms and those that were less exposed to this type of burden. 
Certainly, the inflation of the sixteenth century should not be explained in 
these rather Ricardian terms; nor were prices the most important variables 
in peasant incomes. But many farmers with surpluses which were not sub-
ject to higher rents were able to obtain this benefit through the market. It 
39 Yun (2004). It should be noted how, in the cases cited, the variable remained almost 
static until at least 1540. Overall, within this expansive tendency set out according to theo-
retical formulations, the trend of this form of extraction on produce should have been stable 
until the early sixteenth century.
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is, moreover, evident that the effects of this change, if marginal, increased 
over the course of the century.
In this way, the fixed nature of seigniorial land rents created better condi-
tions for peasant businesses for several decades, while the increase in the 
productivity of work over a long period compensated for any rise in  payments 
to landlords. The combination of factors was favourable for economic 
growth and even for an increase in the levels of productivity. However, the 
theme should also be approached with an eye on other forms of extraction 
levelled on production, such as the fiscal burden. To understand this fully, a 
more general perspective is needed.
The Final Test: Industrial Development and 
Regional Urban Systems
The final and perhaps the most decisive proof of the consistence of the 
sixteenth-century Iberian economic expansion—that is, of its non-semi- 
peripheral character and of the strength of its agrarian and general domes-
tic forces—can be found in the evolution of the changes taking place in the 
industrial sector and the regional urban networks. Though some ideas 
have already been advanced (Chap. 3), these aspects deserve additional 
reflection.
The textile industry, which was to be the most affected by the importa-
tion of foreign goods, underwent changes and introduced productive 
improvements which were intended to allow it to adapt to demands for 
higher-quality goods and that were characteristics of a vigorous and dynamic 
process of import substitution. In Cuenca, for example, we know of the dis-
semination of the verlagssystem and the merchant-manufacturers who came 
to ‘put workshops in their homes’. Enjoying annual profits that averaged 
15% in 1553, this sector had, since the end of the previous century, been 
adopting itself to the ‘new draperies’ (Iradiel 1974, pp. 232–3; Reher 1990, 
pp. 27, 30). Córdoba also overcame the sector’s purely artisanal structure in 
order to facilitate the development of the ‘new draperies’ and the products’ 
adaptation to the ever-changing demands of a market of greater dimensions 
and quality (Fortea 1981, pp.  271–2). This development was possible 
thanks to the introduction of agro-urban production circuits (Fortea 1981, 
pp. 279–80). A process of this sort also led to significant progress in the silk 
industry. A number of factors were behind it: the greater availability of raw 
materials, easier access to dyes, and improvements in the workforce, largely 
as a result of the efforts of the Moriscos (Fortea 1981; Aranda 1984). 
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In  Segovia the growing weight of a new type of merchant acting as a 
verlaguer was significant. The result would be an increase in the quality and 
the wider dispersion of light cloths, which were even adapted to American 
demands (García Sanz 1987; Lorenzo 1979, p.  435). The verlagssystem, 
based upon an agrarian-urban cycle, developed in Toledo, advancing both 
the woollen cloth and silk industries. The wool industry also developed in 
the hinterland zones of Portugal, near the great livestock tracks. But the 
most dynamic sector was perhaps the one that produced cloth and linen 
fabrics, tied to domestic consumption but also—importantly—to the pro-
duction of naval canvas (Costa 1997, pp. 253–81). Across the entire penin-
sula, a trend towards the production of high- quality items (and even the 
imitation of foreign fashions) can also be discerned, particularly in the silk 
industry. This was possible thanks to access to dyes and colourants through 
the international commercial circuits. Something similar happened in 
Valencia, whose production was strongly linked to demand in Castile (‘the 
main customer for Valencian silk fabrics’), or in Barcelona, where the weight 
of the artisan sector grew thanks largely to domestic demand.40
We do not have in-depth studies of the functioning of the guilds, but 
everything indicates that, at least during the first half of the century, these 
would have been more open than has sometimes been believed. Where it 
has been possible to make accurate measurements, such as in Valladolid, it 
has been found that only 30% of apprentices came from the city itself 
(Bennassar 1983, pp. 217–21)—and it can be assumed that of these only 
a fraction came from the families of the masters who did the hiring. Despite 
later problems, many sectors displayed a certain permissiveness with regard 
to the activities of the Morisco population, whose technical expertise was 
of great importance in areas such as the production of silk fabrics (Aranda 
1984). Thus, some sectors at least responded positively to some of the 
variables that elicited such pessimism from Ogilvie (2011), who has been 
highly sceptical of the capacity of Old Regime guilds to introduce produc-
tive improvements.
A comparison of the textile production figures for a number of Castilian 
cities against those of their most active rivals in Italy is very meaningful. This 
is especially true in light of the former’s low points of departure. If, by 1560, 
20,000 pieces of cloth were produced in Venice, Córdoba reached the 
40 Montemayor (1996, pp. 201–33), Casey (1983, pp. 88–90), and Vilar (1962, vol. I).
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 figure of 18,000, to which might be added the 7000 of the surrounding 
areas, while in Segovia some 16,000 were manufactured. It must, of course, 
be added that these figures can only take us so far and that the great Italian 
centres of production in Venice and Tuscany definitely produced goods of a 
higher quality and, therefore, of higher monetary value.
Moreover, the development of other industries should also be noted. 
This is true, for example, for the construction industry and associated sec-
tors. Behind its dynamism there was the growth of population, the main 
roots of which are to be found in the expansion of the primary sector. But 
also significant was the new conception of the home and the spread among 
elites of tastes and lifestyles imported from abroad and, above all, from 
Flanders and Italy (Yun 1999c). By the 1540s the notion of the ‘nobility of 
a city’ had clearly won many minds and hearts, becoming an increasingly 
important facet of the political culture of the time and manifested ‘in the 
people and buildings and memorable things that there are in a place, with 
temples, hospitals, bridges, castles, public buildings and private homes’.41 
The result was the development of a range of industries related to construc-
tion, including metalwork and carpentry.42 The fact that construction 
developed in productive circuits restricted and closed in on themselves 
helps us to understand the huge impact of this sector on the domestic and 
local economies.
This change in the habits of consumption, coming on top of demand for 
cheaper, less sophisticated goods, also lay behind the expansion of the gold-
smith (from candlesticks to cutlery), leather, and embossed-leather trades, the 
latter two being important in Córdoba (Fortea 1981, p. 243). New eating 
habits, which encouraged the use of cutlery and tableware, gave impetus to 
the porcelain industries of Talavera de la Reina or Triana (Seville), while more 
popular tastes encouraged the clay furnaces that sprang up in many villages 
and cities across Spain (Sánchez 1989, vol. I, p. 151). Toledo also boasted 
industries dedicated to silverware and jewellery (also extremely important in 
Córdoba) and the production of swords, musical instruments, sculpture, and 
painting. Demand for these artistic products often came from churches and 
clergymen (Montemayor 1996, pp. 201–6).
41 Diálogo en Alabanza de Valladolid, en Alonso Cortés (1955, p. 250).
42 See the importance of these sectors in Medina del Campo (Marcos 1978, pp. 312–20), 
Cordoba (Fortea 1981, p. 243), or Seville (Bernal et al. 1978).
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This development was not confined to industry. Progress was achieved 
in mining thanks to technical advances of the first magnitude, linked both 
to government and private demands. The demands generated by trade, the 
army, construction, the textile, leather, food, and paper industries—all of 
these sectors fed a remarkable drive to farm unused fields; to advance the 
mining of iron, copper, tin, sulphur, and lead; to make better use of forests; 
and to produce dyes, lime, plaster, and brick (Sánchez 1989, vol. I, 
pp. 119–65).
Mining was a productive branch also tied to one of the most dynamic 
sectors—naval construction. And the development of this activity was unde-
niable. It would expand significantly in the north of the peninsula, in certain 
areas of Catalonia, and, above all, in Seville and Lisbon.
These observations explain why, in spite of the development of the 
export economy, urban growth did not conform in any way to patterns 
deemed typical of ‘peripheral economies’, which are generally taken to have 
low rates of urbanization, with the major centres found in the geographical 
periphery of the country. Regarding urbanization rates, we have already 
shown that they were high. But what about the regional distribution? 
Though one cannot speak of a peninsula urban system—that is, one stretch-
ing across Iberia—but rather of regional systems, the great dynamism of 
the hinterland is very meaningful. Areas of coastal development existed since 
the fifteenth century (Chap. 1), such as the shoreline from Barcelona to 
Valencia and Murcia/Cartagena. Seville provides another example of an 
expansive city, being tied to maritime activities for commercial exchange. 
Furthermore, the growth of the Portuguese cities from Lisbon to Porto 
(including those of the lower Tagus near the capital) was certainly very nota-
ble (Costa 1997). But the Iberian urban networks were more complex.
As regards Portugal (Table 3.4), around 1527 the number of Portuguese 
centres that passed 5000 inhabitants was very small when compared with 
Castile and the urban pattern, with the fast growth of Lisbon, reminds 
that of a peripheral economy.43 On the one side, Portugal’s cities’ growth 
43 The great difference, however, was in the very physiognomy of the urban network. The 
gap between Lisbon and the rest of the country was not only greater—for example, in com-
parison with the difference between Seville and the rest of Castile—but also grew during the 
century. It would be necessary to wait until 1600—with the boom of Madrid—to encounter 
a similar breach or imbalance in Castile. In 1527 Lisbon already boasted 55–65,000 inhabit-
ants and was the most populous city on the peninsula (Seville had hardly reached 50,000). 
In 1550, Lisbon may have reached 100,000. Porto had fewer, 13,000; by the midpoint of 
the century, this number had risen to 15,000 (Disney 2009, vol. I, p. 145).
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was based upon long-distance relations. Lisbon—and more and more 
Porto—was involved commercially with the fairs of Castile, with Seville, 
Flanders (highly significant), and, above all, Antwerp. They had also grow-
ing commercial connections with the African coasts, Asia, and Brazil. The 
dynamism of these cities was based upon their role in the process of re-
exporting goods, as well as upon the arrival of wheat from North Africa: 
for the entire century, Lisbon became the redistribution centre of the 
country at times of dearth. But, on the other side, the oceanic expansion 
allowed cities such as Lisbon and Porto to have a marked impact upon 
their respective hinterlands, in which they would generate growth. The 
series of city ports that dotted the lower Tagus and, to a lesser extent, the 
Duero were further proof of positive effects of Lisbon and Porto on nearby 
centres, as was the growth of settlements on the Atlantic seaboard and as 
of towns of the interior such as Portalegre, Evora and Elvas, connected to 
the trade with Castile (Table 3.4 and Magalhães 1997, pp. 206 and ff.). 
Hence, this urban network, while, indeed, coastal and very much 
 dependent of international trade, was not necessarily proof of a dependent 
economy as it is defined today.
Table 3.4 Urban population in Portugal, c. 1530
1530












Total urban pop. 132,302 11
Total population 1,200,000
N. B. towns with more than 5000 inhabitants
Sources: Teresa Ferreira Rodriguez (1997, p. 185) and Miranda (2016), using the coefficient 1:4.3 for the 
ratio morador/inhabitants
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In Spain the most dynamic towns remained those of the interior of 
Castile. The high degree of urbanization of the Crown of Castile and 
particularly of Extremadura, the Upper Guadalquivir Valley, New Castile, 
and Old Castile, in 1600 is very visible in Maps 3.2 and 8.1. That same 
impression emerges from an analysis of the active population of some of 
the Castilian cities already mentioned, among which the primary sector 
hardly reaches 20% of the active population and craftsmen are always 
above 50% of the total (Yun 2004, pp. 170–2). Particularly in the Duero 
Valley, these were mostly urban centres in the interior of the country, 
where the percentage of inhabitants working in industry and services was 
very high.
In conclusion, market integration and the dynamism of the agrarian 
and industrial sectors had not led to the formation of a pan-Iberian urban 
network. Rather, there had emerged a series of regional urban systems tied 
to the development of the exterior sector—and not always due to depen-
dency relations—as well as an urban network in the centre of the Crown 
of Castile with degree of dynamism comparable to that of the most devel-
oped zones of Europe. Thus, there emerges the question: how can the 
economic and institutional model that stood behind this situation be 
characterized?
PATTerns of economic growTh, mArkeT, 
And insTiTuTions
The answer to this question is complex: rather than an economic model, 
it involves regional models that developed links among themselves. 
Growth was largely based upon regional dynamics and was also made 
possible by the connections of each of these regional ecosystems to the 
outside world. The structure of these regional economies had not changed 
substantively in regard to the situation established in the fifteenth century 
(Chap. 1). On the Mediterranean front, however, Barcelona had reacted 
to Valencia’s stealing a march; the Atlantic economy was now bound 
together more forcefully around Lisbon and Seville; the corridor joining 
the Basque towns to Burgos and the Duero Valley was also strengthened. 
The zones of the hinterland, which had been the most powerful motor 
for growth, were centred on the area from Duero Valley to Toledo, some-




The key was the existence of regional economies that did not constitute 
a completely integrated interior market but nevertheless created enough 
synergies among themselves to push forward growth. This development 
was the fruit of their more thorough insertion into international and even 
global economic circuits, as well as of a number of additional factors: a 
more efficient agriculture, the existence of complementary elements in the 
use of factors such as labour (with both definitive and seasonal emigrations 
providing positive stimuli), the synchronization of crops, the growing 
commercialization of the peasant production (very dependent upon the 
density of the urban networks), the complementary and connected nature 
of the ecological systems, and organization and technical improvements in 
the productive process.
In these circumstances, property rights that were very much at odds with 
those considered optimal by the theorists of the new institutional econom-
ics, in combination with moderate levels of land rent pressure on peasants, 
in fact had positive effects. All of these factors coincided (and dovetailed) 
with a very moderate level of fiscal pressure, a variable which, if inherently 
difficult to measure on account of the enormous disparity between actual 
and theoretical rates of taxation, appears to have evolved below real-term 
values for several decades, judging by the trend of the most important exac-
tions. This occurred (see Chap. 4) in the Crowns of Portugal, Aragon, and 
Castile, above all from 1530 until 1560–1570. With regard to the latter 
period, where taxes increased noticeably in the course of the century, it is 
important to note that they hardly increased in real terms. But this was also 
the case of the sisas of Portugal, where fiscal pressure swiftly led to customs 
and duties being levied on foreign trade. Taking into account the upward 
evolution of agrarian production and population, it is obvious that the rela-
tive fiscal burden of the state on  economic activities in general, and agrarian 
activities in particular, fell until at least 1570.44
So, if at some point during the first half of the century—very possibly in 
the first 30 years of it—some burdens were increased, then it is certain that 
this change could have had only a limited impact upon the overall expan-
sive trend. These years were marked by an abundance of lands and labour 
mobility, with growing productivity in levels of both agricultural work and 
44 See the case of Córdoba in Fortea (1986, p. 76); for more general estimates, see also 
Bilbao (1987).
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land productivity, and successful resistance to any increase in seigniorial 
rents; they also witnessed a burgeoning array of auxiliary peasant activities, 
marked urban expansion, and even some degree of specialization in the role 
of the cities, with a balance of commerce that had yet to be destroyed by 
the massive importation of high-quality industrial products. If, from the 
1530s, land rents began to lose part of their rigidity, this was a slow process 
offset—above all in Castile—by a lower burden in real terms of other types 
of impositions, both in the countryside and in the city.
This pattern of economic growth logically suffered from blockages: yet, 
by the same standard, it grew to historically unprecedented proportions. 
Nothing similar would occur again in inland Spain and Portugal until the 
nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, viewed in perspective, this phase of 
growth reached rates (understood in terms of product per capita) that were 
close to those achieved in some areas of nineteenth-century Spain and 
Portugal (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013; Costa, Palma and 
Reis 2015).
Looking at this development, some historians have written of a ‘failed 
transition’ to capitalism (Casey 1985); others have postulated an agrarian 
capitalism—a dubious term in my opinion—in regions such as Andalusia. 
Moreover, the notable development of the market makes it tempting to 
consider it a central element in the working of the economy. A more 
detailed analysis of the institutional framework demonstrates, however, 
that the political economy behind this process corresponded to institu-
tional systems that are normally considered very inefficient for economic 
growth within the schemes and paradigms of the new institutional eco-
nomics (more on it in Chap. 5).
One of the best signals or indicators of this argument is found in the 
fact that an important part of the incomes of the seigniorial class and the 
great ecclesiastical institutions came through taxes rooted in privilege and 
coercion and not in the direct commercialization of the landlords produc-
tion. In this situation there were stimuli for productive improvements but 
the limits of the system would depend on to what extent there was a radi-
cal change in the institutional framework.
As regards peasant economies, a number of families’ distribution of 
work over the year were affected by the market, and their sale of commodi-
ties and labour increased. Hence, the market augmented and diversified the 
incomes of many families, contributed to the division of work, and, to a 
certain extent, encouraged a form of specialization not entirely unrelated 
to economic growth. Yet, in comparison to today’s capitalist economies, 
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the market was highly limited as a mechanism for the assignation of produc-
tive resources. In other words, the market was a very important force, but 
its impact upon the family economies and on the productive specialization 
and on the combination among land, labour, and technology will remain 
relatively small in comparison to what happens in our current economies.
The cities themselves were, in spite of their commercial and industrial 
development, units of jurisdiction, genuine urban seigniorial estates. Their 
status and character affected not only the lands under their control but also 
the organization of industrial and commercial activities in them, which 
were strongly regulated by criteria far from the optimization of the effi-
ciency of productive factors and closer to those of reciprocity and social 
assistance given to the guilds and confraternities (Chap. 5). These criteria 
even affected the specialization of functions in the cities, which, by their 
very nature, had to be limited, because, in effect, urban jurisdiction and the 
capacity for enforcement that it gave the cities implied the establishment of 
limits to commercial activities and products from other centres, something 
which, obviously, limited the transfer of goods and services between them 
and, consequently, the productive specialization inherent in all urban sys-
tems in the strictest sense of the word. It was logical that in many zones, 
and in the heart of Castile, above all, cities were highly  developed, as they 
constituted nuclei that concentrated land incomes and a diversified demand 
for goods and services that could only be met by the development of the 
tertiary and secondary sectors. Some of these cities therefore produced 
goods and services that could be exchanged beyond their jurisdictional 
frontiers, giving rise to a certain form of specialization.
* * *
This was not an economy where institutions and property rights led to 
higher levels of economic efficiency in the way new institutional econom-
ics postulates. It could even be said that, from this perspective, it is odd 
that such a significant period of expansion had taken place. But the remark-
able phase of expansion—remarkable, that is, on the scale of pre-industrial 
economies—has an explanation.
This explanation must be found in the fact that the institutions’ effi-
ciency did not depend upon their apparent similarity to those of advanced 
capitalism but rather upon how they operated in specific historical con-
texts and, above all, upon the availability of resources whose assignment 
they regulated. In other words, the efficiency of institutions resided not in 
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the fact that they were good or bad per se but in the way in which they 
positively combined with ecological factors and external changes tied to 
international commerce. The Iberian sixteenth century economic growth 
shows the role of the village communities and their forms of organizing 
agrarian systems and commercial circuits were positive in a world in which 
the availability of land and other natural resources was high and the pos-
sibilities of combining labour, migrations, agrarian seasonal complemen-
tarities, space, and commercialization were many. In this context, exclusive 
and very precise property rights (those that reserved all rights upon the 
use of land to individual proprietors) were not indispensable, as some 
visions derived from the new institutional history have presumed (North 
and Thomas 1973). Even communal properties, when combined with the 
regulation of the concejos or when in a scenario of land abundance, had 
positive effects for agrarian expansion.
It is even possible to argue that economic growth was only possible 
because of the inability of some institutions (the councils, towns, and 
landlord, above all) to control population movements and interior migra-
tions, two forces that contributed to the reallocation of land and labour in 
order to generate greater productivity. Behind everything lay the condi-
tions set by regional ecological systems that allowed both long- and 
 short- term emigrations to the south. Agrarian institutions were incapable 
of controlling and absorbing all of the wealth generated by the marginal 
activities such as the domestic production of manufactures and alternative 
agriculture. Equally, it should not be forgotten that if in theory landlords 
controlled the use of violence, then they had to exercise this right with 
moderation in areas where they encountered solid agrarian communities 
and where the development of royal justice balanced the scope for abuse 
by the mighty. The result was highly irregular, with numerous local and 
regional variations. The difference, for example, between the areas of the 
Crowns of Castile and Aragon, or even between regions such as the Ebro 
Valley and the fertile regions of Valencia (areas characterized by very dif-
ferent forms of property rights), was highly noticeable.
It is therefore necessary to set out the processes of political and institu-
tional evolution that lay behind these changes and that, in part, explain 
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The IberIan Grounds of The early Modern 
GlobalIzaTIon of europe
In the classical view of globalization as ‘the Rise of the West’, Iberian 
empires are taken to have generated world economies in which these two 
countries—both of them economically backward, it is said—were unable 
to take advantage of the possibilities offered to them by the new markets 
of America and Asia (Wallerstein 1979; Frank 1978). Today this model is 
very much under review. This is not only because of doubts concerning 
the size of these markets, which appear to have been considerably smaller 
than was once thought (O’Brien 1980). It is also because what might be 
termed ‘Iberian globalization’ is now recognized as one of several such 
processes. Similar transformations had taken place in other areas of the 
world, from Anatolia to India, Russia, and even China (up to the fifteenth 
century) (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007; Darwin 2008).
The reasons for this burst of Iberian expansion are well known—com-
mercial growth, the search for gold and new routes to Asia, the evangeliz-
ing impulse, and so on. Equally famous is the sophisticated maritime 
technology and weaponry of the Iberian peoples; this can be linked to the 
meeting of cultures and the transcultural processes and knowledge trans-
fers that had taken place in Iberia during the Middle Ages. These societies 
therefore formed the embryo of European expansion, with the birth of 
naval superiority perhaps being the key to it—indeed, it was also the main 
limitation, to the extent that no such advance was made in the military 
control of territories (Headrick 2010; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). And 
it is also clear that the analysis provided by E. Jones (1981), who  underlined 
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the decisive role of competition among states for European political and 
economic development, was very applicable to Iberia. The competition 
between Castile and Portugal, and the need of both to assert their rights 
in areas like the Canaries and the African coast, where their subjects had 
been both collaborators and rivals from the very beginning, is a good 
example of this.
But, this having been said, this conflict was rather different from what is 
commonly imagined. Both the King of Portugal and his rival and counter-
part in Castile were trying to channel, and thus control, internal tensions in 
their respective kingdoms. This struggle was in reality the fruit of the rela-
tions of solidarity and conflict that existed among the nobilities, aristocracies, 
the cities, and the Church, all of whom competed with each other and with 
the Crown for the control of resources. This was to a large extent due to the 
context of jurisdictional and political fragmentation of the societies of the 
time. In fact, if advanced capitalist economies are characterized by a state that 
regulates market competition, then early modern ones were shaped by politi-
cal ‘competition’ among social agents for the control and expansion of their 
economic, political, military, and (even) religious resources. In this game, the 
king was not an impartial referee but rather an agent who had to defend his 
interests and present himself as a third party at one and the same time. And 
it is very important to emphasize—in contrast to Jones’s interpretation and 
the others most frequently advanced by scholars—that the background to 
this dynamic was formed by relations of tension and reciprocity existing 
within each of these social agents and, in particular, in the family, lineage, and 
kinship relations that characterized them and which they tried to solve by 
expanding the resources available to each one of them. Institutions such as 
mayorazgo, important in all societies of Southern Europe, were a means of 
preserving the lineage from dissolution and thus to maintain and keep 
together a series of resources that were vital in this confrontation. But this 
institution also further sparked and sought expansion, insofar as it required 
an increase in family resources to meet the needs of the secondary branches 
of the family and the extended lineage and, consequently, the collateral pay-
ments upon which these organizations depended. Yet these kinds of needs 
were not only found among the aristocracy but also in the nobility at large 
and even among the urban classes, who sometimes projected them into the 
expansive policies and politics of the cities themselves. The entrance of family 
members into the Church, a Malthusian practice for combating this situation 
at the level of the individual, could in turn redouble this expansive dynamic 
and deepen the conflict within elites on a more general scale. Although 
J. Schumpeter (1955) suggested something like this view of elites when he 
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spoke of the processes of social ascension of the former, the  argument set out 
here goes a step further. In any case, the result was a process of ‘imperial’ 
construction that would have a unique and special stage in Iberia and that 
was manifested in the fight against Islam and, often, in the usurpation of the 
royal patrimony that had been at the eye of the storm during the fifteenth 
century. As a result of all this, by 1238 Aragon had completed its ‘re-con-
quest’ in Iberia and built an ephemeral—but impressive—‘empire’ in the 
Mediterranean that was the fruit of the Crown’s ability to coordinate and 
direct the internal dynamics of the nobility and mercantile groups (Gerbet 
1994). In 1249 the Crown of Portugal had conquered the Algarve, and its 
nobility and monarchy—supported by the Portuguese and Genoese mercan-
tile classes—threw themselves into the African and Atlantic expansion that 
the king tried, with relative success, to control. In Castile, these same ener-
gies threatened the king’s patrimony and created internal tensions that would 
lead to the conquest of Granada and the expansion into Africa and America.
All this would shape the imperial adventure. In terms of their organiza-
tional capacity, these were not archaic empires of medieval character: on the 
contrary, though the medieval component is obvious, the Iberian empires 
saw determined attempts at centralization made by their respective monar-
chies, a continuation of the medieval struggles. This was possible thanks to 
their institutional and military development and to the educational revolu-
tion that was taking place in Iberia (Chap. 4). Without these components, 
the empire would not have been possible—this was especially true for the 
one that would revolve around Castile—nor would it have taken the very 
complex form that it would eventually adopt. But without considering the 
forces behind the colonization programme, we cannot understand the 
dynamics of these empires. Originating in the needs of elites and their 
internal dynamics, with Crown finance often playing a limited role in their 
construction, the conquest instead tended to be characterized by the con-
ferral of political capital and spheres of self- government upon the coloniz-
ers in exchange for their campaigns of conquest undertaken on behalf of 
the king and the resources that they won for him. For this reason, these 
two empires would soon be grounded on a vast number of micro-negotia-
tions that counterbalanced attempts at control by the central apparatuses of 
these monarchies. Scholars often forget, even when they speak of the 
importance of religion in Iberian imperial enlargement, that the prodigious 
expansion of religious orders and  institutions in the new territories implied 
an  externalization of the costs and risks of colonization by the Crown. 
Costs of this sort were in fact met by a plethora of clerics who preached 
Christ with one hand and won subjects for the monarchs of Madrid and 
148 CONCLUSIONS PART I
Lisbon with the other. The agreements between the Habsburgs and the 
Pope, on the one hand, and the Avis and the Pope, on the other, to increase 
the monarchs’ participation and control of the resources generated by the 
Church (patronage rights, the granting of tithes to the king, etc.) are a 
manifestation of the intention of these dynasties to intervene in this process 
and the resources it generated. But this entente implied that the Crown 
recognized the wide influence of the religious orders and even of the secu-
lar church in the New Worlds. The Jesuits would perhaps be the best exam-
ple of the tension implicit in this relationship, and their expulsion from 
both empires in the eighteenth century was a manifestation of the risk of 
rupture that had always threatened this process.
The results of all this were varied: on the one hand, the Crown obtained 
enormous resources that it would try to control through a centralized 
bureaucracy based in the metropolis. On the other hand, another out-
come was the emergence of a system in which the centralization and 
autonomy of the various social and institutional agents were mixed. Given 
the vast extent of empires and the wide variety of these conditions and 
situations in them, this balance between centralization and autonomy was 
very diverse indeed. These were not centralized empires; but neither were 
they simply a chain of decision-making centres of equal importance within 
the hierarchy and capable of imposing their agenda upon the centre. The 
urban or enclave character of some colonial areas facilitated attempts at 
central control based on the use of these nodes as centres of dominium 
and negotiation with the elites. But these were—obviously—immense ter-
ritories, where the exercise of power was often difficult. The ethnic, social, 
and cultural diversity of these empires, immersed in one of the greatest 
globalizing explosions in history, would further complicate their monitor-
ing and exercise of authority. An attempt was made to combine the diffi-
cult equilibrium that arose from this situation with a policy that, while it 
did not exclude violence, attempted to be inclusive and, in the long run, 
would maintain and even increase the levels of diversity. It is not surprising 
that J. H. Elliott has emphasized that this was one of the great differences 
with the English empire in America, where an exclusive, rather than inclu-
sive, approach predominated (2006, Epilogue, pp. 594–595).
Empires such as these were able to wage war successfully on other 
empires that had begun similar processes. They did so in America and on 
the African coast, and despite a greater degree of parity, their efforts in 
Asia were relentless; here the Portuguese exercised some initial advantages 
in the techniques of naval combat, although rather fewer in terms of land 
warfare and the control of territory (Headrick 2010).
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In America, the struggle for colonial resources, the difficulty in  regulation, 
and the remarkable Iberian superiority in the exercise of violence over con-
quered peoples led to a capacity to destroy the original ecosystems that was 
unprecedented in history. The impact on the globalization process is hard to 
exaggerate. Looked at only from the demographic perspective, a global 
population of around 430 million inhabitants saw some 60–70 million dis-
appear in just 60 years, that is, about 15% of humanity. And if we extrapolate 
the growth figures of the rest of the world between 1500 and 1600 (around 
32%) and calculate the world population on this basis, the result would be 
that it would have stopped growing at around 80–90 million inhabitants. 
Even considering the major past pandemics such as the outbreak of the 
Black Death in Europe, it is difficult to imagine phenomena so devastating 
and of such great impact in the long term.1 Furthermore, the transforma-
tion of American ecosystems should also be taken into consideration. An 
institutional perspective may offer important insights into this facet of the 
‘Columbian encounters’, as ecological imperialism was clearly highly signifi-
cant in them. Moreover, if by ecosystem we mean a set of relationships 
between social and natural agents that include the institutions of different 
societies, as in the preceding pages, it can well be said that what was being 
demonstrated was the inefficiency of the Iberian institutions when it came 
to preserving and replenishing many of the resources that were being sys-
tematically destroyed. The demographic crisis in America coincided with the 
enormous cultural distance that separated the existing American societies 
and those of Europe. In turn, this cultural gulf created great differences in 
its material culture and consumption patterns. All of these factors meant 
that it was thus very difficult for dynamic markets to emerge for European 
products in general, and for Iberian goods in particular, and it would take a 
long time to generate world economies that would lead to relations of cen-
tre-periphery domination in the two banks of the Atlantic world. Indeed, 
everything indicates that, following the logic of a pre-mercantilist ideology, 
this was not the fundamental aim or assumption of the metropolis in fram-
ing its policies.
In a world with many centres of economic globalization, areas were 
found—the Indian Ocean and Asian regions in general—that were capable 
of bombarding Castile and Portugal, and through them Europe as a whole, 
with highly expensive products with high added value. This favoured a neg-
1 Obviously, these calculations are purely guidelines. The figures of Findlay and O’Rourke 
(2007, p. 161) come from Maddison (1995). See also Chap. 2.
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ative trade balance between Europe and Asia. If centre- periphery  economic 
relations existed—a very dubious proposition that we have refuted at the 
European level—these were the very opposite of the model presented in the 
literature of the 1970s. As a consequence, the effects on trade integration 
on a global scale were limited as the goods sent to Europe from the Asian 
areas constituted a very small part of its overall production; in turn, this 
perspective explains why some authors have found data that supports the 
absence of an early commercial globalization (O’Rourke and Williamson 
2002, 2005).
Given that American markets had yet to be developed and imports 
from Asia were very much focused on luxury products that were still sold 
in small quantities in relation to the size of the European economy, it is 
understandable that the poly-nuclear character of fifteenth-century 
European growth was also maintained. As far as the Iberian kingdoms are 
concerned, they could take advantage of the new resources and the price 
differential with Asia, but also that relations on a global and imperial scale 
were not primarily responsible for improvements in their productive sys-
tems. This does not mean—despite a strong historiographic tradition to 
the contrary—that productive advancements did not occur in Iberia. On 
the contrary, these clearly did occur and were remarkable precisely because 
there was no hint of an international economic subordination and the 
economic growth at European level remained poly-nuclear in character.
Contrary to what has often been said about Iberian technological back-
wardness, important advances were clearly behind this growth, based 
upon the circulation of knowledge and expertise in the region. In spite of 
the fact that the composite monarchy implied the institutional diversity of 
the different states of the Habsburg dominions, the simple fact that many 
polities belonged to the same dynasty favoured the circulation of technol-
ogy among them. Undoubtedly, the porous borders of the time were not 
an obstacle to the circulation of technological practices, but this network 
of polities accelerated it to the extent that it included areas such as Italy 
and the imperial territories of Central Europe, while both the king and 
elites were powerful agents of transmission of knowledge (Yun 2017). 
Likewise, there was a growing connection between the different regional 
ecosystems within the peninsula. These would not produce an integration 
of the internal markets similar to the one that would serve as the basis of 
industrialization in England after 1750. On the contrary, a series of eco-
nomic regions were strengthened by their links with the sea; however, 
most decisive in this regard were ties in the interior lands, which increased 
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the domestic connections but failed to create an urban system or an 
 integrated market on a peninsular scale. The limitations of the transport 
system and the composite character of the monarchy—and, therefore, the 
need to respect the borders between the various Iberian kingdoms—also 
limited market integration. But growing interregional connectivity was 
encouraged by the boom in the cities of the interior as political centres 
from the fifteenth century onwards, which in turn triggered the commer-
cialization of domestic production and encouraged ties between neigh-
bouring areas. In this context of a certain mercantile development, it is 
understandable that American silver, combined with the growth in popu-
lation and the division of labour (parallel to urbanization), should have 
produced the most intense and genuine price revolution in Europe of this 
time. Had this occurred in an economy with hardly any mercantile devel-
opment, the effects of the flow of silver would have been very different.
Moreover, growth was especially encouraged by the existence of prop-
erty rights that were apparently inefficient—at least, according to the model 
of the new institutional economics—but which, thanks to the regional eco-
logical systems in which they thrived, the abundance of resources and the 
complex factors that generated them turned out to be highly positive 
throughout most of the century. It might, indeed, be possible to talk of 
growth and development in a pre-industrial economy such as this one.
The internal confrontations among elites, and the limits placed upon 
their capacity to extract resources from society—and in the case of Portugal, 
the empire—were set down in the different political systems seen in the 
many Iberian kingdoms towards the end of the fifteenth century. Although 
all typology is a simplification, the models conformed to different patterns 
also present in other areas of Europe. Across the peninsula—if more slowly 
in Aragon—the strengthening of the power of the king, the market, and the 
cities had paralysed any development that would have led to a greater sei-
gniorial control of the peasant labour force, and, of course, this had reduced 
the chances of developing a peasant servitude system. Portugal and Castile 
in fact gave rise to forms of absolutism  characterized by a high degree of 
manoeuvrability of the central power (this was very close to the French 
model), which did not imply a reduction of the enormous power of the 
regional and local elites and their capacity to monopolize the economic, 
political, and military resources. The expansion of such elites had been based 
on increasing the size of the pie rather than on substantial changes on how 
it was distributed; this having been said, by the end of the fifteenth century, 
Portugal was already advancing towards a system in which the monarch 
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exercised a remarkable degree of power thanks to colonial  revenues. The 
territories of the Crowns of Aragon and Navarre evolved towards forms of 
absolutism combined with more solid parliamentary systems that, although 
very different to it, are more reminiscent of the English model in terms of 
its effectiveness in containing the power of the king. In all cases it proved 
very difficult to expand the resources of the nobles, elites, and king at the 
same time; in Castile this was for geostrategic reasons and in Aragon because 
its expansive cycle had been consummated much earlier. In short, then, 
Castile and Portugal were creating powerful systems for pumping resources 
and opportunities for elites through state and fiscal apparatuses that were, 
by the standards of the time, remarkably efficient. In the Crown of Aragon, 
it was impossible for the nobility and elites to benefit from comparable 
mechanisms. This meant that seigniorial jurisdiction became an essential 
consideration and factor for them, particularly in the kingdom of Aragon 
itself, which also shied away from the English model.
Of course, the different characteristics of these polities varied in pro-
portion to each case. But the most important thing is the diversity of the 
constitutions and political practices of these territories. This was all the 
greater if we take into account that within each of these political formations, 
there coexisted very different legal systems and a wide variety of customary 
norms. When comparing the Iberian Peninsula’s political formations with 
those found in the Holy Roman Empire or the Italian Peninsula, we tend 
to emphasize the proto-national character of Iberian states. But internal 
diversity and jurisdictional fragmentation were also very prevalent in the 
 peninsula. This would be decisive—even more so when the inheritance of 
Charles V is taken into account—for their government and, this is often for-
gotten, for their respective imperial ventures. These empires would become 
the solution to the problem of the elites’ social consolidation and expan-
sion. In other words, globalization—and the way in which European glo-
balization was taking place—would have a decisive impact not only upon 
the models of economic development but also upon the state-building pro-
cesses and the reproduction of asymmetries that would leave an indelible 
mark on the history of Europe. This does not mean that these elites and 
the social and economic systems on which they were based were going to 
remain immutable; if anything, the very opposite was the case. And this is 
the subject of the next chapters.
Even if it did not create voluminous colonial markets for most of the six-
teenth century, the first wave of globalization was crucial for its impact 
upon institutional and social fabrics. Also crucial in this regard were 
empire, war, and the establishment of a composite monarchy spread out 
over a good part of Europe.
From a general perspective, it is usual to speak of a military revolution 
that brought about profound changes in the financial and political struc-
ture. Usually viewed in terms of the process of modernization, this trans-
formation supposedly paved the way for a centralization of the state 
systems for resource extraction and led to the appearance of fiscal states 
that heralded a leap forward for Europe (Yun 2012). Very interestingly, 
these two processes have been stressed often in the Castilian (Spanish) 
case. This section aims at discussing these aspects of European history by 
considering the case of Iberia. In doing so—and more importantly for our 
arguments—we will also consider the role of the empires and the compos-
ite monarchy in the reproduction and evolution of the peninsula’s political 
economies and social fabric, as well as their possible effects on the institu-
tional framework which regulated the allocation of resources. Our starting 
point is that the historical changes associated with this situation need to be 
studied from the consideration of the conflicts and the redistribution of 
power at the heart of these states.
PART II
State Building and Institutions
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CHAPTER 4
The Empires of a Composite Monarchy, 
1521–1598: Problem or Solution?
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the Iberian kingdoms’ 
involvement in a complex and global composite monarchy affected the 
structural social tensions within the elites studied in Chap. 1. It will also 
discuss to what extent the resolution of the internal conflicts within the 
different kingdoms, and particularly within Castile and Portugal, led to a 
centralized military fiscal state, as is usually thought to have happened. It 
is, therefore, necessary to consider not only the fiscal apparatus but also 
the whole system for resource mobilization, thus challenging the vision 
that places emphasis only on taxes. In other words, we need to follow the 
arguments of J.  Schumpeter, according to which tax systems (and by 
extension the mobilization of resources for war) are in fact a subproduct 
of social structures.
This line of thought leads us to reject the old stereotype of a society 
dominated by obedience to the king but also to question the model (pop-
ular in the 1980s) that emphasizes the high number and intensity of 
clashes between the monarchy and the Cortes, the cities, the aristocracy, 
and even the Church.1
1 See part of this literature in Fernández Albaladejo (1992) and Owens (1980) for Castile. 
For the Aragonese territories, Colás y Salas (1982), Solano (2001), and Gil (1988).
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Why Castile?
The Problems of a European Composite Monarchy
Charles V (1500–1558) inherited a collection of very different territories 
dotted across Central and Western Europe.2 His patrimony was probably 
the most extensive European political enterprise ruled in Europe by one 
person since the Romans. When the sprawling American territories and 
Portugal and its empire were added to this inheritance (in 1580), it became 
the most far-reaching territorial amalgamation known to history. The divi-
sion of the Habsburg dominions between the two branches of the House 
in 1556, with the split of the Austrian (Ferdinand and his successors) and 
Spanish lines (Philip and his heirs), had not significantly diminished the 
dimensions of this dynastic conglomeration and the problems that ruling 
it entailed (Bérenger 1990).
This ‘collection of kingdoms’ created a ‘problem without precedent’ as 
far as it involved conflicts between logics derived from very different polit-
ical agendas (Koenigsberger 1971, p. 4). Charles V understood that God 
had placed such vast terrains in the hands of his family ‘for the good and 
universal peace of Christendom’3 and, it might be added, for the advance-
ment of the House of Habsburg. But in each one of his territories, there 
were political projects framed according to its own internal interests and 
which did not fit in the Emperor’s plan. It is understandable that he 
attempted to move according to ‘the line of least resistance’ (Koenigsberger 
1971). But it was, however, inevitable that, given the dispersion of his 
states, their status as frontier regions scattered across Europe, and the 
multiple forms of power expressed in them, they would be the main rea-
son for the ‘mounting tension’ that marked the history of the continent 
from the sixteenth century onwards (Rabb 1975).
First the Italian Wars against the French Valois; then the religious con-
flicts against the German princes, with the rebellion of the Netherlands 
2 To be more precise, this composite monarchy included the Low Countries, the Franche-
Comté, Tyrol, Austria and the states of today’s southern Germany, Castile (and its con-
quered territories in America), Navarre, Aragon and the Italian states (Naples, Sicily, and 
Sardinia), the presidios or coastal forts of North Africa, and, later, the state of Milan. Bohemia 
and Hungary, inherited by his bother Ferdinand, were also associated directly or indirectly.




from the 1560s; and finally the campaigns against England, exponentially 
increased the demands and costs of conflict and transformed the character 
of war and the means of waging it in Europe. But, more important, the 
military tensions in which Charles V and Philip II were involved coincided 
with the apogee of another global polity: the Ottoman Empire. After tak-
ing Constantinople in 1453, the Turks had advanced into the western 
Mediterranean and the Balkans; to the East, they had moved into the Red 
Sea and as far as the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Casale 2010). In 
parallel, they took the North Africa thus building up ‘a vast tri-continental 
empire’ (Darwin 2008, p. 73). Based on reconciliation between Islamic 
traditions and dynastic absolutism, as well as on equilibrium between 
regional powers and centralization, the Ottoman Empire became the main 
enemy for Christendom and a problem for the economic contacts with 
Asia and within the Mediterranean. It was a power, therefore, which the 
Habsburgs simply could not ignore and one of the main reasons for war-
fare in Europe and religious rearming in the Mediterranean. This was even 
more so as long as the sultans were able to form temporary alliances with 
the French Valois (Braudel 1976, vol. 2).
The challenges facing the European states, and the Iberian monarchies 
in particular, must be understood in this context. On the one side, the 
‘military revolution’, even if it remains a debatable concept, obliged them 
to instigate profound changes in the extant political and fiscal architecture 
(Parker 1995), which also affected the internal distribution of power. It 
also implied—it is said—what Joseph Schumpeter called the transition 
from the ‘domain state’ to the ‘tax state’: that is, to a state based not only 
upon the resources of the prince but also the greater commitment of the 
different kingdoms to tax payments.4 However—and this is often forgot-
ten by economic historians—this shift had to be achieved in the context of 
a fiscal theory that was based upon four pillars, all of which had been mani-
fested in the comuneros revolt: that the king should pursue his dynastic and 
personal policies with his own means (what the English referred to in the 
formula ‘to live off his own’); that he could not collect taxes without the 
consent of his subjects; that fiscal contributions should only be spent to 
benefit the kingdoms that approved them, and not others; and that the 
royal patrimony could not be alienated without the kingdom’s permission 
(Gilbert 1972, pp. 101–10).
4 Schumpeter (1991). The ideas of J. Schumpeter have here a heuristic value rather than a 
historical one. But their explicative potential is important (Yun 2012).
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All these principles, on their own a problem for the rulers, interlinked 
with some technical difficulties, the most important being the need for 
credit to finance war or, in other words, the need to get loans situated 
upon future income. Furthermore, borrowing large sums of money on 
short-term repayment schemes involved punitively high rates of interest or 
non-monetary compensations in the form of privileges. The solution to 
this situation lay in obtaining a stable and predictable source of income, 
one that permitted the consolidation of short-term loans in longer-term 
repayment schemes at lower interest rates. But, in addition to this consoli-
dation of loans and since most of them were used to pay for faraway cam-
paigns, it was also crucial to be able to transfer funds across borders, which 
on many occasions entailed contravening the states’ fiscal constitutions.
The Habsburgs were not, of course, the only dynasty to experience 
credit problems. As we shall see, similar troubles beset the rulers of France, 
England, and many other polities. But for the Habsburgs, these difficulties 
were a case apart. The dispersion of their domains and the Habsburg’s 
geopolitical strategy led them to require more money than any other ruler. 
They had to negotiate with a large number of distinct assemblies, all of 
them of very different ilk; finally, not only did they need stable and reliable 
incomes, but it was also essential to arrange and, if possible, justify the 
transfer of funds between distant polities whose interests were difficult to 
coordinate.5
Contrary to what has often been thought, the process by which Castile 
became the fiscal and military backbone of the empire was not linear. It is 
also doubtful that everything depended upon the availability of men and a 
population easily recruited for war.6 Moreover, around 1520 Flanders and 
the southern German territories offered potentially greater financial 
resources than did Castile. In these regions, advanced financial systems 
had emerged thanks to market-oriented economies, which enabled them 
to provide the state military and fiscal resources.7
5 This was recognized by contemporary observers, such as the traveller M.  Suriano, 
‘Relación de España. Hecha al regreso de su embajada cerca de Felipe II en 1559’, in García 
Mercadal (1999, vol. II, p. 305).
6 As is well known, most of the soldiers fighting in Europe were not Spanish but Swedish, 
German, Flemish, and so on (Hale 1985).




The states of Burgundy and Flanders, tied to the imperial territories of 
Germany by strong economic bonds, had emerged at a very early stage as 
the pillars of Charles V’s power. Here a dense web of patronage was 
extended, bringing enormous social, political, and even economic advan-
tages to the Burgundian and Flemish nobles. Antwerp’s commercial and 
financial development during the first half of the sixteenth century was 
one of the bases for the collection of funds (Braudel 1996, pp. 270–1). 
The connection between Flemish banks and German banking houses 
would allow the Emperor to make use of the services of families such as 
the Fugger and the Welser, who were also tied to him by their interest in 
exploiting mines (Carande 1987, vol. III, pp. 33–5). This axis, however, 
suffered a number of fiscal deficiencies. Like his uncle the Emperor 
Maximilian—who liked to laugh at the French and their fiscal subjugation 
by their king—Charles V had to base his finances in these states on incomes 
derived from renting out mines, which were used both as guarantees and 
to consign payments (Ehrenberg 1955, pp. 31–42). The proposals of the 
Estates General of the Low Countries always had to be discussed and 
approved by the provincial estates, and their final vote required unanimity, 
meaning that opposition from any one of a number of parties could 
become an obstacle to the Emperor’s ambitions (Koenigsberger 1971, 
pp. 27–33; Tracy 1985, pp. 29–69). Furthermore, in all of these territo-
ries, the local assemblies were charged with collecting the monies they had 
voted through a convention that ensured that they kept part of these taxes.
Conditions were even more complex in the Mediterranean theatre. In 
Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, the contributions depended above all on 
the voting of extraordinary subsidies for specified purposes or campaigns 
and were very much controlled by the Diputaciones and Generalidades 
(see Chap. 1). It was, therefore, very difficult to use revenues secured in 
this way for operations that might involve the transfer of funds from one 
state to another (Tomás y Valiente 1982, pp. 41–50). In Navarre a num-
ber of additional problems emerged. The proximity of France, the almost 
continual conflict experienced after 1524, and the affection felt by a sector 
of the nobility for the Valois cause created conditions that made the 
Crown’s appeal for contributions even more problematic.
In Sicily and Naples, similar circumstances prevailed. In spite of attempts 
to introduce reforms, marked limitations on the availability of funds 
existed (Muto 1980, pp. 28–35; Calabria 1991, pp. 42–5). A large chunk 
of the contributions were based on the system of donativos, basically forced 
loans that also had a negotiated element. These contributions were  seldom 
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extended for more than three years and therefore relatively unstable; 
moreover, they were always made in return for important concessions by 
the Crown. Furthermore, both kingdoms—and Sicily above all—lived 
under the continual threat of Turkish attack, thus making them very vul-
nerable while also obliging the Crown not to burden them excessively in 
order to preserve their political loyalty and stability.8
The situation in Castile was not noticeably better. Although often for-
gotten, there in fact existed very large fiscal demarcations (Yun 2004). 
Moreover, a degree of confusion reigned over rents, on where and how 
they were collected and from whom, above all when the seigniorial estates 
and royal demesne were concerned. Duties such as the crusade service 
(cruzada) easily ran into problems and local resistance. Further complicat-
ing matters, these taxes had to be negotiated with the Pope, which created 
a certain instability. The resulting irregularities created disputes between 
the different social orders and were exacerbated by abuses in revenue col-
lection. On Charles V’s arrival, some revenues were encabezados (granted 
by the cities at a fixed amount in exchange for the right to collect them), 
but many others were not, leading to problems in execution.9 This situa-
tion created a swarm of collectors, taxmen, and treasurers, few of them 
averse to lining their own pockets, while the local authorities often also 
retained a healthy share for themselves (Carretero 2000). These problems 
were aggravated by a great number and forms of overlapping jurisdictions. 
Moreover the monarchy’s organization, based upon Consejos (Councils) 
with two crucial, but sometimes clashing, duties—the oversight of the 
king’s authority and upholding the laws and customs of the many king-
doms over which he ruled—further limited the Crown’s effective execu-
tive power (Fernández Albaladejo 1992).
Castile, we have seen, was a relatively rich kingdom, with a developing 
economy. But even in 1520–1530, its economy was very different from 
the more market-oriented economies of Flanders or Italy. Moreover, after 
the expulsion of the Jews, Castile clearly lacked great financiers capable of 
arranging the transfer of large funds from one dominion to another. Those 
groups who would later be capable of doing this had not yet reached a 
sufficient level of organizational maturity. And the Indies were not yet able 
to provide the funds necessary to establish and maintain the king’s credit.
8 According to Koenigsberger, the island was the ‘most lightly-taxed of the kingdoms of 
the emperor’ (1971, pp. 47–9).
9 See, for more details based on primary sources, Yun (2004, pp. 261–3).
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As the comuneros’ conflict had made clear, Castile was no less insistent 
than Christendom’s other kingdoms that its resources should not be used 
for nondomestic causes or distant foreign wars waged in the defence of 
Habsburg interests (Perez 1976, pp.  546–7, 550–4). Pointedly, the 
comuneros had reminded Charles V that ‘the monarch cannot use at his will 
the possessions of the crown that do not belong to him as his private prop-
erty’. Furthermore, very much in tune with medieval theory (Chap. 1), the 
comuneros had reminded Charles V that it was his duty to ensure that ‘all 
that is alienated from the royal crown should be returned to it’.10
These arguments did not disappear in 1521; rather they survived at a 
subaltern level and certainly complicated the mutual understanding 
between king and kingdom (Carande 1987, vol. II, pp. 49–50). Indeed, a 
number of old problems linked to the alienation of the royal patrimony 
returned to the spotlight. In its meetings of 1523, 1524, and 1528, the 
Cortes complained about royal taxes that had been illicitly alienated to (or 
by) the nobility; they also railed against what they considered the fiscal 
disadvantages of the royal demesne in regard to private seigniorial estates. 
As we shall see, these petitions for redress would not be entirely ignored.
Aristocratic discontent must also be considered. Having been the 
great ally of the Crown against the comuneros, the aristocrats found that 
their financial difficulties could not be properly addressed simply by a 
distribution of the booty captured from the rebels. The situation was 
very fluid. In 1524 Charles V, pressured by the great estate holders on 
one side and the cities on the other, revalidated the 1504 legislation 
about the reversion of alienated incomes to the Crown. This measure was 
not likely to improve relations between nobility and king. The Church 
also failed to provide a network for the secure, reliable, and efficient col-
lection of hefty funds. True, these years witnessed the establishment of 
the Council of the Crusade (Consejo de Cruzada), in part in response to 
the demands of the campaigns in North Africa. But the King of Castile 
had not only to negotiate the payment of sums with the Pope but also 
the precise figures to be collected from each diocese, monastery, and 
abbey (Perrone 1998). For all these drawbacks, the ecclesiastical services 
did in fact become an important financial resource, even being included 
in a number of asientos. But these services were neither reliable or pre-
dictable nor easily collected.
10 See Patronato Real, 4, 84. AGS. and Perez (1976, pp. 548, 549, n. 129).
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Castile was not compliant or docile; nor was it particularly enthusiastic 
about Habsburg strategy. It was not the great panacea to the king’s prob-
lems in 1517, or even in 1521, in the wake of Villalar. In short, contrary 
to an old view that only underlines a relation of obedience and agreement 
between kingdom and king, the monarch’s margin for manoeuvre was 
quite limited.
Castile, a Nervus Belli
And yet, despite all of these factors, Castile became the backbone of the 
Habsburg empire for many decades.
A precise reconstruction of what the Habsburgs secured from their 
respective territories is very difficult. The rulers themselves would have 
been hard-pressed to present a clear idea of these contributions—an indi-
cation of the enormous difficulties that the dynasty had to face (Comín 
and Yun 2012). This having been said, the facts and figures that can be 
reconstructed speak for themselves. By the 1530s Castile was providing 
some 70% of the Habsburgs’ resources in Western Europe (Comín and 
Yun 2012). Naples and the Duchy of Milan were the next most important 
contributors (Table  4.1). Even allowing for a healthy margin of error, 
these figures demonstrate the enormous burden that fell on these king-
doms. When they are viewed in the long term, the conclusions are no less 
striking. In real terms the incomes collected from Castile multiplied by 
more than a factor of ten between 1500 and 1600.11 This rise had been 
much quicker than in the other polities for which figures are available, 
such as England, France, or Holland (although calculations here are a 
matter of complexity the outcome can be easily accepted as an order of 
magnitude. See Graph 4.1). This growth was rapid until the 1560s, when 
the treasures arriving from America first came to make their presence felt. 
But they continued throughout the reign of Philip II, thanks to the 
increasing fiscal pressure and the second cycle of receipts of American sil-
ver brought about by the improvements in amalgamation techniques. This 
period also witnessed a more rapid increase in the contributions of other 
kingdoms, such as Navarre, Catalonia, and Naples, although everything 
indicates that the share of the royal income provided by Castile  continued 
to be higher. In comparison with Naples, for example, the proportion 
11 See Comín and Yun (2012, p. 237, Table 10.2).
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between Castile and the Italian kingdom had been something like 5:1 in 
the middle of the century; by the end of the century, it was around 3.5 to 1.12 
This trend was important (see below), as it provided an indication of the 
tendency in the next century (Chap. 8); but it does not, fundamentally, chal-
lenge the idea that in the sixteenth century Castile (and the Indies) had 
become the sinews of war.
This pattern helps to explain the increase, still more difficult to measure, 
of debt (meaning asientos, short-term loans taken at high rates of interest, 
as well as borrowing consolidated as juros) (Yun 2004, p. 318, Graph 5.7). 
This rise was also noticeable during the time of the Emperor but contin-
ued to grow throughout the second half of the century, as A.  Castillo 
showed a few decades ago (1963). In particular, it led to a considerable 
increase in the amount of consolidated debt.
This helps to explain the increase in the size of military forces and war 
spending, another variable that is notoriously difficult to pinpoint. In 
regard to Castile, we know that the ‘ordinary’ budget for defence passed 
12 Data from Thompson (1976, p. 288) and Calabria (1991, p. 134).
Table 4.1 Charles V’s incomes in different territories of the Habsburg composite 
monarchy
(Data in grams of silver, circa 1535)













Low Countries 7,234,405 9.9
Total 72,917,338 100.0
Sources: Comín and Yun (2012)
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from some 740,000 ducats in 1559 to 3.4 million in 1598. To this sum we 
should add the 3.45 million ducats assigned to pay for the war in Flanders 
(Thompson 1976, p.  288). This trend suggests a ninefold increase in 
costs, which is maybe exaggerated but which far outstrips any rise in prices. 
The military budget therefore increased in both real and nominal terms, 
even without taking spending in Flanders into account. Again, Castile paid 
the lion’s share. More than 50% of its budget was spent on war; in contrast 
Naples spent something like 30% (six million against one million).13 The 
13 See Thompson (1976) and Calabria (1991). For Castile, only the budget for Flanders 
and defence is included here. Military costs in Naples increased from 1.3 to 3.5 and 3.3 million 
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Graph 4.1 Crown’s revenues in England, France, Holland, and Castile, 
1500–1701 (current English pounds. Index: 1581–90 = 100)
Sources: My own elaboration from Comín and Yun (2012).
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
165
difficulties of these calculations notwithstanding, the Low Countries, 
Sicily, or Milan operated on a similar scale but with lower overall budgets 
(Parker 1972, pp. 139–57).
By the end of the century, the Habsburgs had established a system that 
transferred funds from one state to distant theatres of war. By this juncture 
a multitude of loans, including many raised in Flanders, had been set on 
the incomes of Castile, which was now financing campaigns in Portugal or 
the Azores, while other kingdoms, such as Naples, were paying for troops 
deployed on the Iberian Peninsula itself (Rodríguez-Salgado 1992, 
pp. 85–116). This development did not mean that the Castilians had for-
gotten their basic constitutional principles, of which they continued to 
remind the king whenever they could.14 These same practices were also 
evident in Naples and Milan (Calabria 1991, p. 55). Indeed, sometimes 
the Castilian assembly could see the value of financing a frontier conflict 
that did not affect Castile directly. Thus, during the War of Navarre against 
France and the conquest of Fuenterrabía, the Cortes and public opinion 
were entirely convinced by strategic concerns (Navarre was seen as the 
gateway to Castile) and the need to defend the Pyrenees frontier.15 On 
other occasions arguments of a religious kind were used, although these 
were often clumsy or forced.16 And there was no shortage of reasons why 
it was necessary to offer a hand to Hungary or to arm the fleet of Genoa.17 
14 In its petitions to the Cortes of 1542, Córdoba alluded to the ‘war of our holy faith 
against infidels’ as ‘the office and exercise of kings’ and the only justification for the collec-
tion of taxes raised for this purpose. Patronato Real, 69, 61 AGS. Fray Antonio de Guevara 
justified war only when it was undertaken for ‘that which for us He wanted to offer his blood 
on the Cross’ (‘Aquel que por nosotros quiso su sangre en la Cruz ofrecer’ (Relox de 
Príncipes, 1994 [1529], 757).
15 In 1523, when the recovery of Fuenterrabía was being planned, Carlos alluded to the 
fact that the King of France had ‘attempted to occupy its lands for the discord that there was 
in these kingdoms at that time’. Patronato Real, 70, 22. AGS.
16 Even if it proved impossible to hide the true reasons for it, this served as the means for 
justifying the continuation of campaigns in Italy against Francis I: ‘the need to provide for 
the good and universal peace of Christendom and the conservation of his imperial authority, 
of his kingdoms and estates’; all of which, our source concludes, ‘is necessary for the service 
of God, His Majesty and Christendom’. Patronato Real, 70, 19. AGS.
17 On 5 December 1526, the Emperor summoned the Cortes to ask for extraordinary taxes 
in order to help his brother; the argument was that the Turk ‘wants to overcome and subject 
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Similar lines of argument had first been deployed in 1544, when it was 
deemed necessary to provide an extraordinary tax (servicio) to counter the 
alliance between the Turk and the King of France.18 Castilian society found 
more than a grain of truth in the king’s plea for assistance. Indeed, this 
argument was precisely why this particular appeal proved so effective.19
The monarchy’s composite character and its collateral effects would 
also prove decisive. These mechanisms were linked to the development of 
powerful commercial and banking networks within this political complex, 
which created political ties between the monarchy and the bankers and 
facilitated the transfer of funds to distant theatres of arms. The first of 
these conduits to emerge belonged to the leading German families, such 
as the Fugger and the Welser; later the Genoese rose to prominence, 
although they had actually begun earlier. The Centurione, the Balbi, the 
Spinola, the Sauli, and others advanced funds in return for access to the 
economy of Castile and America and for asientos offering high rates of 
interest.20 These great houses acted in coalition and had acquired or estab-
lished networks spanning across the old continent, something that allowed 
them to achieve more than even the increasingly powerful Castilian bank-
ers: to transfer funds across Europe with a certain degree of alacrity and a 
high level of security, making use of letters of exchange linking the great 
fairs of Castile, Seville, Flanders, and Italy.
These families—this is important in order to avoid erroneous arguments—
were closely tied to the Habsburg dynasty and to its monarchical imperial 
the Christians’ and what he did was ‘a very great offense to God, Our Lord, and his holy 
Christian religion by taking and occupying the lands and estates of the Church and of the 
Christian princes’. The Emperor also reminded the deputies of his responsibility before God, 
who ‘put us here to reign over the Earth and gave us this Empire and estate, with which we 
serve him’. He also appealed to ‘these kingdoms of Spain’ that ‘were among the first to 
believe in the faith of Our Redeemer and Saviour Jesus Christ and baptised by the water of 
the Holy Spirit and are so zealous for our Holy Catholic Faith’, Patronato Real, 69. 63. 
AGS. In regard to the armada of Genoa, he placed emphasis on its strategic importance, 
alluding to its ‘proximity to Africa and Turks that live there and come [here] every day’. 
Patronato Real, 69, 74, AGS.
18 Patronato Real, lib. XVIII, ff. 29v°-37r°. AGS.
19 In 1539 cities such as Jaen recognized the Emperor’s ‘enterprises in the defence of our 
holy Catholic faith and the good of these kingdoms’ and thanked him for them. Patronato 
Real, 69. 80. AGS.




system through bonds that were not simply economic (Herrero et al. 2011). 
The Genoese links, for example, were founded on the political settlement 
arrived at in 1528: here the families that controlled power in the republic 
made a pact with the Emperor, who became the referee of the internal rela-
tionships between the old and the new nobles (nobili vecchi and the nobili 
nuovi) in order to guarantee the political status quo of the city as well as his 
alliances with it (Canosa 1998). Genoa thus remained an independent repub-
lic although, in reality, it existed as a satellite state of the Habsburg conglom-
erate thanks to a collaboration based on the interlinking of both political 
agreements and financial services. Furthermore, for the Genoese the alliance 
with the Habsburgs, renewed in 1575, was founded upon the possibility of 
obtaining political and social capital, in part through a long process of fusion 
with the Castilian nobility, a trend that would in turn shape the history of the 
kingdom, as we shall see (Canosa 1998).21 Genuine clientele networks 
formed among financiers who were capable of circulating political and eco-
nomic capital between areas. This trait goes a long way towards explaining 
the effectiveness of these networks, as these were not simply families but 
rather coalitions of alberghi, densely configured and close-knit associations 
with a very strong political component (Grendi 1997). In other words, to 
study the financial relationships between the Crown and the Genoese asentis-
tas purely in terms of interest rates and other economic variables is to simplify 
things and to adopt an erroneous rationale.
The establishment of this system for the transfer of resources can be 
explained as a sort “primitive” financial revolution beginning in the 1530s 
and set down in the general agreement for the alcabalas. As we shall see, 
this financial revolution was, in reality, a process that would take shape in 
the second half of the sixteenth century in Holland but would reach its 
maximum expression in England after 1688 (Brewer 1990). In the first 
case, it would consist of a process in which representative assemblies would 
achieve control over the budget and, by extension, over state spending and 
the consignment and repayment of debt (Tracy 1985). It would allow ‘the 
contracting of long-term loans and the development of a consolidated 
debt, guaranteed by the authorities’. The system served to offer guaran-
21 Among the Genoese families that established strong links with the Castilian aristocracy, 
one could underline the Spínola, very tied to the dukes of Albuquerque (Rodríguez Villa 
1905).
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tees to subscribers with a consequent fall in interest rates (‘T Hart et al. 
1997, pp. 18 and ss.). What happened in Castile was very different, but it 
at least shared some of these traits. The situation was not entirely new, as 
from before 1530 the services voted by the Cortes to the Crown were 
used as a guarantee to the asentistas, who obtained a monopoly over their 
exploitation. Indeed, loans were even taken out against the guaranty of the 
‘ordinary’ services or those made by the ecclesiastical institutions.22 But 
the encabezamiento of 1538 represented a clear step forward. In that year, 
the king and the Cortes finally agreed that a fixed sum would be decided 
upon and set down for a long period of time. In exchange for these con-
cessions, Charles V agreed that the collection of taxes was to be adminis-
tered by the cities according to quotas shared out among them. Obviously, 
this accord was favourable to the cities and the kingdom in general (and has 
always been seen as such), as it conceded them a margin for manoeuvre, 
and the quantities to be levied would fall in real terms due to inflation. But 
this agreement—and this has often been forgotten—also meant that the 
king obtained a secure, reliable, and predictable source of income, allowing 
him to win the confidence of lenders and to consolidate his debts upon it. 
As a result, the monarch gained an unprecedented capacity to assume 
debts, thus permitting him to raise the situado, the quantities paid as inter-
est on loans, to above 8000 million maravedís by the end of his reign.23
During the following decades—and above all during the reign of Philip 
II—the figures for the encabezamiento de alcabalas would form the basis 
for discussions between king and kingdom (for this reason they were 
closely monitored by the asentistas). It should be stressed that the Cortes 
of 1559, 1563, and 1575–1577, meeting in the aftermath of royal bank-
ruptcies, presented moments when institutional breakdown was a genuine 
possibility. But the upward revision of figures on these occasions allowed 
the consolidation of debts and permitted the system to function once 
again. Even at the end of the century, when in the 1590s the millones sys-
tem was established, the eventual solution followed similar lines: the cities 
assumed responsibility for the collection and administration of the tax 
through rates which they themselves created and set (Fortea 1990).
22 The Cortes alluded to how the service of 1525 was requested to meet ‘debts of very 
great quantities of gold’. See Patronato Real, 70, 19, AGS.
23 These ideas were developed in detail in Yun (2004), but had previously been presented 
in Yun (1998, 2000).
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The system could be implemented thanks also in part to the treasures 
coming to the king from America. These shipments allowed the Crown to 
take asientos, short-term loans, with the guaranty of the American silver and 
then, in a second step, to consolidate those loans as juros (long-term public 
debt) endorsed by the alcabalas and other incomes. This meant a crucial 
step forward in another (neglected) dimension: since the warranty for the 
asientos was the American treasure, which belonged to the king, this opera-
tion escaped the control of the Cortes and could be used for any purposes. 
But, the second step also implied that the incomes of the kingdom—the 
alcabalas endorsing the juros—were also used to finance campaigns that 
had little or nothing to do with the interest of the kingdom but rather 
originated in the king’s personal agenda. Though the cause of continuous 
complaint, this system thus camouflaged a crucial problem that was both 
technical and constitutional.
These developments also allowed the Crown to proceed to reduce its 
levels of interest payment on juros, which were to become (and remained 
until 1700) one of the cheapest forms of public debt in Europe. At their 
emission, they were, in fact, cheaper than English and Dutch debts (at 
least until the middle of the seventeenth century) and they were at the 
same level as some of the more economical debts emitted by the solvent 
city- republics of Italy (see Graph 4.2).24 The south of Europe was in fact 
precocious in achieving a reduction of the nominal interest rates levied on 
consolidated debt without proceeding to a fully fledged financial revolu-
tion (Yun and Ramos 2012, pp. 20–5).
This (apparent) long-term efficiency has recently inspired some (highly) 
optimistic assessments from the macroeconomic perspective (Drelichman 
and Voth 2014). However, and even if we accept many of the nuances 
proposed by these studies (see also the same revisionist line in Comín and 
Yun 2012), the macroeconomic perspective and the principal figures of 
income, debt, and expenditure are not sufficient in themselves. Furthermore, 
this view does not capture all of the sharp edges, drawbacks, and catches 
which are crucial to any genuine understanding of what happened. In fact, 
even leaving aside for one moment the effects (nearly always negative) of 
fiscal extraction on the economy (although these are often exaggerated), 
there are many obscure tones and shades to our canvass. Thus Castilian 
24 On the juros’ interest rates and its evolution, see Álvarez Nogal (2009).

























Graph 4.2 Interest rates of the public debts in Northern and Southern Europe, 
1450–1800. (a) England, France, the Netherlands, and Austria. (b) Bologna, 
Florence, and Venice. (c) Milan, Naples, and Castile
Sources: My own elaboration from Epstein (2002, Table 2.1, nominal interest rates on public 
debt in Europe, c. 1270–1750) and Pezzolo (2012, Table 11.1, interest rates on govern-
ment loans in Italy, 1450–1799). All trend lines correspond to an exponential adjustment.
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debt increased more quickly than did incomes throughout much of the 
century—a factor leading to instability. Things were even worse in the 
short term, when war needs created genuine traumas for the functioning of 
the financial system. Moreover any study of debt and of the quantities 
involved in it is highly unlikely to paint a general picture of sustainability 
(needless to say, comparisons with today’s ideas of sustainability are 
misleading.)25 The frequent royal bankruptcies were the result of the 
25 Drelichman and Voth (2014, p. 33) have even spoken of a relatively low volume of debt 
in respect to the GDP of Castile (not more than 60%). Even beyond the weakness of their 
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 periodical imbalance between debts and incomes. These were often accom-
panied by—sometimes heralded by—the recurrence to forced loans, the 
seizure of American treasure belonging to private individuals, or the 
Crown’s delay of payments scheduled in the fairs of Castile.
(pp. 34–35, 116–25). The problem lies in estimating the total debt beyond the juros. This 
debt was, without doubt, small in relation to today’s economies and had limited effects upon 
growth, to the extent that not all of the economy was monetarized. But taking into account 
the part of the economy that worked through monetary transactions, it has to be concluded 
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It is true that the bankruptcies and the requisitions of American treasure 
were not the unmitigated catastrophe of legend, as they subsequently led to 
negotiations and agreements with the bankers and businessmen (the medios 
generales, in which both sides sought a compromise) (Sardone 2018). This 
should not surprise us. For a long time, historians have been aware of the 
negotiated character of the royal bankruptcies.26 But these manoeuvres and 
talks did not prevent moments of high risk for the financial and commercial 
economy in general and the relevant businessmen in particular, who were 
the most exposed and vulnerable within the financial system to violent jolts 
of this sort.27 It should be added that the entire system functioned through 
frequent negotiations with elites for ever- greater services to the Crown, as 
was the case, for instance, with the ecclesiastical institutions: these talks also 
created uncertainty. At heart—and in spite of the figures—the fiscal system 
of the kingdom was more or less efficient but also very weak. In the end this 
ship, whose sustainability had been sublimated, was re-floated—or, more 
precisely, the inevitable shipwreck was averted for another day—by burning 
a few more of its planks of wood. It survived, in other words, thanks to the 
constant alienation of the three elements—royal patrimony, state struc-
tures, and royal sovereignty—that it was supposed to sustain and protect 
(Chap. 1). The sale of alcabalas, tercias, jurisdictions, noble titles and 
offices, and unfarmed or common land belonging to rural communities 
became a slow, but unstoppable, drip feed over many decades, despite the 
complaints of the Cortes and the kingdom in general. And although a 
degree of legal subterfuge was introduced into most sales (it was commonly 
stated that the Crown could repurchase the rights or goods in question 
whenever it so desired), these clauses were never activated.
All in all, the fiscal system had been effective for the Crown but very 
demanding for the kingdom and the elites. But the whole picture cannot 
be understood if we do not consider it in a wider perspective which takes 
into account its social context, although this has often been ignored by 
recent studies on financial history. This will also help to situate finances in 
a broader scenario which is crucial for this book: the system of mobilizing 
resources in general and its implications for the political economy.
26 See Lovett (1977) and Rodríguez-Salgado (1992).
27 The fact (mentioned above) may have been important on account of its producing 
short-term alterations in the money market. This effect got worse from the 1550s. According 
to Abed Al-Hussein’s figures (1982, appendix 2, pp. 365–6), a greater quantity of delay in 
fair payments, and a longer period of payment, can be found as the century progresses, some-
thing which obviously provoked reasons for uncertainty.
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a ConfliCtive PaCt
The Challenges of a Dynamic Society
From 1521 the cycles of great upheavals and civil wars that affected France, 
the German territories, or the Low Countries were absent from Castile. As 
we shall see, religious reasons in part explain this divergence (Chap. 6). Yet 
the social tensions derived from the dynamics within elites (Chap. 1) and 
from social and economic change were a day-to-day reality.
Documents detailing the popular political culture of the Castilian and 
Aragonese towns make it very clear that for many peasants the most 
important values were not necessarily those of obedience to the king. 
Ideas such as the ‘zealous service of God and the republic of the poor’ 
could come to be more crucial and might even collide with the demands 
for loyalty (Yun 2004). The conflict against the seignior, which burst forth 
during the revolts of the Comunidades and Germanías, was ever present in 
the Chancelleries of Castile throughout the sixteenth century and emerged 
not infrequently in Aragon (Kagan 1991). And this legal confrontation 
was just one facet of a sort of shadow boxing which sometimes even spilled 
out into actual violence and encompassed everything from collective dis-
obedience to disputes over the use of agrarian resources.
All European societies of this period were characterized by a high degree 
of mobility (Vassberg 1996). But a case might be made for the Iberian 
states being above average in this regard, as regular and seasonal emigra-
tions were extremely important for the peasant economies of the peninsula 
(Chap. 3). Another key factor, common to all European continental soci-
eties, was the multitude of jurisdictions. The result of mobility and the 
plurality of jurisdictions presented difficulties in maintaining social control. 
The inherent anonymity of a population working far from home or its 
place of origin created significant problems for the authorities, as did pop-
ular forms of socialization. Those who migrated from one place to another 
were often poor or vagabonds, who constituted a source of concern and 
conflict. The growth of the cities ensured that their internal social relations 
were increasingly tense and more difficult to control and order. Figures 
from picaresque literature such as Rinconete and Cortadillo or Lazarillo de 
Tormes reflected a reality that has shone through many historical studies.
But the internal tensions of this society were not limited to problems of 
this sort. The need for expansion felt by the lineages and the urban elites 
remained present during the sixteenth century.
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Many noble households found that their status maintenance costs grew 
more quickly than did their disposable incomes. This was especially true for 
those lineages whose revenues were badly adapted to the general increase in 
prices (Yun 2002a). The strengthening of the judicial system—above all in 
Castile—and the solidity of the rural community in many areas made it more 
expensive and difficult to revert to force and to the usurpation of lands and 
taxes as a means of expanding seigniorial rents at the expense of the royal 
patrimony (Kagan 1991; Owens 2005). The tension between spending and 
incomes was becoming increasingly marked.28 If in the fifteenth century the 
seigniors had had to build fortresses and equip and arm retinues, now they 
had even more reasons to spend money, military burdens aside. Matrimony 
had become a way of obviating and resolving conflicts and forming alliances 
between nobles: as a result ‘the number of dowries shot through the roof’ 
(Atienza and Simón 1989).29 The establishment of cadet branches was 
another significant expenditure. The expansion of the seigneurial domains 
to provide collateral branches with a property and so avoid interfamilial ten-
sions also required investment and spending. Royal service, which was 
essential for the social promotion of both first- and second-born sons, con-
stituted another significant form of spending. The Renaissance lifestyle 
entailed a need for ever-more expensive and luxurious palaces, thus pushing 
up the costs of social legitimization; similar programmes might also lead to 
altruistic spending on welfare, charitable institutions, and religious founda-
tions.30 The result, in both Castile and Aragon, was an increase in nobles’ 
debt from the 1520s, which threatened to dissolve both inherited patrimo-
nies and ‘free’ possessions (those that were not entitled and therefore not 
subject to the mayorazgo) (Yun 1987; Abadía 1993, 1998).
The expansionist dynamic felt by the second-rank nobility and the 
urban oligarchies would be no less decisive than in the previous century 
and led to a policy designed to capture political and economic resources 
(Casey 1989, pp. 52 and ff.). The result was, once again, a fight for the 
amplification of patrimony or for the control of the key positions in the 
administrative and political systems, none of which could be acquired 
without expenditure. The growing prevalence of the mayorazgo increased 
28 See the case of Castile in Jago (1982) and Atienza (1987) and that of Valencia in Casey 
(1983). For more details from a general perspective, Yun (2004).
29 See also the complains of the Almirante de Castilla in Diversos de Castilla, 37, n. 36, sf. 
AGS.
30 Viñas (1970) and Checa (1988).
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these needs to the extent that, as for the high nobility, it required them to 
enlarge their patrimonies to compensate the lesser branches of the family 
in one way or another. The increasingly elitist nature of local government 
added pressure on rival factions to place their clients and creatures in the 
mayoral offices at a time when these institutions were gaining political 
relevance (Yun 2004). Although self-regulating mechanisms existed, these 
tensions were manifested in bitter factional and group conflicts over the 
control of municipal offices.31 A wave of banditry swept through many of 
the rural zones of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Navarre, often encour-
aged or sponsored by groups of local nobles.32
A further additional tension in the cities was the rise of businessmen 
who sought to gain access to the mayorazgos and town councils. Families 
such as the Dueñas and the Salamanca in Burgos, the Espinosa of Medina 
de Rioseco, and the Alcázar of Seville provided good examples of this sort. 
Bernabé Ortega represented this impulse in Medina del Campo. This 
trend was more destabilizing when it became mixed up in the religious 
problem. Spanish society decisively rejected crypto-Judaism, and any man-
ifestation of it might be considered as evidence of tainted lineage. Together 
with the notion of purity of blood, this rejection created a model of con-
formity upon which the ideal of an imagined community was formed. 
These developments would convert these themes into a source of discord 
among the elites. An accusation of crypto-Judaism or impure blood—
whether true or not—might act as a corrosive poison that would end up 
affecting all members of an urban oligarchy and, in particular, their ability 
to reproduce their status through matrimony. That is to say, any such alle-
gation would hit the key social capital that was crucial for the reproduction 
of the group. The case of the dispute between the Sotos and the Riquelmes 
in Murcia, explored in an excellent study by J. Contreras, demonstrates 
that quarrels of this kind were not simply evidence of social and religious 
discrimination against a minority.33 They were much more than this, pro-
ducing enormous tensions in the very heart of the oligarchies and affect-
ing the very consolidation of the dominant coalition.
31 See, for example, the case of Murcia in Contreras (1992) and Ruiz Ibáñez (1995).
32 Elliott (1963), Torres (1994, pp. 103–19), Reglá (1966), Vilar (1962), Colás y Salas 
(1982, pp. 159–81, 208–76).
33 The studies on the subject are many. For the families cited as examples, see Yun (1987), 
Lohman (1968), Pike (1966, 1978), Abed Al-Hussein (1982), and Contreras (1992).
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Absolutism As a Threat to the Dominant Coalition
The development of absolutism would accentuate two forms of conflict—
the first within the dominant elite and the second between its different 
social sectors and the king.34
As we have seen, the evolution of royal authority reduced the nobility’s 
chances of recurring to violence or to the usurpation of lands. Its problems 
would have to be addressed with other solutions. During the first years of 
Charles V’s reign, the Crown’s policy of trying to reclaim alienated rents 
gained momentum. In 1524 measures that had been favourable to the 
aristocracy in Castile were revoked. Something similar happened in Navarre. 
Both Charles and his son repeatedly appealed to their nobility for military 
help, thus obliging them to meet additional military costs, at least in prin-
ciple. The campaign against Tunis (1535), the repression of the Moriscos in 
Granada (1568–1571), the annexation of Portugal (1580), and even aux-
ilium requests in specific instances compelled many nobles to mobilize 
troops and incur costs that threatened their economies. The advance and 
improvement in the organization of royal justice also posed a threat to the 
seigniorial jurisdictions. This was the case not only in Castile but also in 
Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, where seigniorial jurisdiction was even 
stronger but where a new generation of jurists and judges sought a balance 
of legal power that was more favourable to the king. Philip II even used the 
Inquisition in Aragon against the elites of the kingdom and, more gener-
ally, its laws and customs. He applied laws regarding the ownership of salt 
mines and undersoil wealth that went directly against the interests of the 
seigniors and in favour of those of the Crown.
The conflict between, on the one side, the urban oligarchies and the 
Cortes and, on the other, the king has assumed a crucial role in recent 
interpretations of this period. The increase in fiscal pressure was, without 
doubt, the most important—or most visible—cause of these tensions. Each 
round of negotiations over taxes was accompanied by a din of complaints 
and grievances. In Castile one of the worst moments came with the revi-
sion of the alcabalas in the 1560s and 1570s and actually resulted in armed 
conflicts in some cities (Jago 1981, 1985, 1989). Debates over the millones 
tax in the 1590s were equally fraught (Fortea 1990). Despite the manoeu-
vres to hide or justify it, the fact that some of these funds were used to 
pursue interests outside the kingdom further aggravated the situation.
34 For what follows, see Yun (2004, Chaps. 5 and 6).
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The efforts by Philip II to make use of the Inquisition against his 
rebel secretary, Antonio Pérez, unleashed an open conflict between the 
Crown and the Justicia, a sort of chief magistrate, and the city of 
Zaragoza.35 Mention should also be made of the Catalan Cortes of 
1585, which were especially difficult. Justified as a reform to end fraud 
and maladministration, a new tax (the fifth, el quinto) would further 
intensify the stand-off between the Catalan elites and the monarchy 
(Hernández 1996, passim).
The growing fiscal pressure on the Church and the continual demand 
for services provoked conflicts not only with Rome but also with the 
Assembly of the Clergy of Spain. Episodes such as the interruption of 
the ecclesiastical services (in 1519, 1533 and 1556) and the excommu-
nication of Charles V by the assembly indicated an undeniable degree 
of tension (Perrone 1997). And the difficulties between Philip II and 
the clergy and, indeed, with Rome were even more keenly felt. The 
Crown’s demands on the Church also increased during the second half 
of the century (Ulloa 1977). By this period some of the services 
demanded of the clergy had become so regular that, despite being sub-
ject to negotiations, they were used to endorse the asientos and even to 
consolidate juros (Ulloa 1977, p. 567). The increase in tax collection is 
all the more significant to the extent that by this time there emerged 
symptoms of a slowing down of the overall growth of Church income 
(Yun 2004). For this reason, the tensions between the ecclesiastical 
institutions and the Crown did not come to an end, above all during 
the negotiations over the subsidio. Furthermore, even if many of these 
concessions were justified by the need to defend Christendom, there 
remained a notable unwillingness to deploy the forces and funds of the 
kingdom in wars fought far from its borders or for the sole furtherance 
of dynastic interests. This was even the case when funds were collected 
by, or from, the clergy.36
35 Colás and Salas (1982) and Gil (1988). A more detailed version of this conflict within 
the argument of this book, in Yun (2004, pp. 364–76).
36 Already during the Comunidades, Augustinian and Dominicans friars in Salamancas 
complained that ‘it is unreasonable that His Caesarian Majesty should spend the incomes of 
these kingdoms in the other lands that he has, as each one of them is enough for itself and 
this kingdom is not obliged to any of the others, nor subject [to them], nor conquered nor 
defended by foreign men’, Estado, 16, 416, AGS.
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A Crucial do ut des
Conflict is, however, just one side of the story. The relationship between the 
Crown and the elites was in fact twofold. The other side of the coin was the 
pact between the elites and the Crown that facilitated the former’s social 
consolidation and resilience, as well as the maintenance of mutually benefi-
cial relationships.
For the Castilian aristocracy, many of the new measures, like the plans 
for the reversion of alcabalas to the Crown, ended in nothing more than 
the paper on which they were written. Moreover, the demands of the 
Crown gave rise to a new system for financing noble debts, one that 
allowed them to mortgage the incomes of the mayorazgo through censos. 
This was, in reality, a legal fiction as in theory possessions tied to the may-
orazgo were inalienable and therefore could not be used as collateral for 
borrowing. The formula that came to be used, therefore, was that it was 
the rents generated by these possessions that served as payments and as a 
collateral for the capital taken out in censos. This allowed them to replace 
short-term borrowing taken out at high interest levels for long-term loans 
given on much more favourable terms (Yun 1987). This manoeuvre 
relaxed the pressure on debts and was similar to the effects obtained with 
asientos and juros by the Crown. In fact the rate of interest charged on 
censos was set as equal to that on juros.
The adoption of this system is highly indicative of underlying develop-
ments. In effect the king granted permits to use the censo to encourage the 
nobility to continue to play its part in the auxilium of the Crown (Yun 
1987). This auxilium, moreover, quickly came to be understood in the 
broadest terms, including diplomatic service (habitually paid for by the 
diplomats themselves), their presence at court, and participation in royal 
tours. But, from the very beginning, these permits were granted to resolve 
the problems of the noble family, whose stability was understood to be 
important for the health of the kingdom. Thus, censos were used for a wide 
variety of purposes: to pay for dowries, to cement matrimonial agreements 
approved by the king, to finance the careers of second-born sons, to buy 
rents sold by the Crown and so expand the incomes and dominions of the 
lineage. All in all, these were uses that served the expansive dynamic of the 
seigniorial households and relaxed their inner tensions.
Of course, censos did not solve all of the nobility’s debt problems, which 
continued to grow on account of being a substantial part of the logic of 
aristocratic economies. But things did not stop there. From the last decades 
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of the century, the king, taking advantage of the growing circulation of 
money, proceeded to lower the interest rates on juros, which also affected 
the official interest rates levied on censos and allowed many noble families to 
reduce their borrowing costs (Yun 1987). When these debts led to unsus-
tainable situations, they resulted in the seizure and management of the 
seigniorial estate by royal officials. Although these arrangements have been 
considered another absolutist attack on the nobility, they only lasted until 
the financial health of the mayorazgo was restored; furthermore, the sei-
gniors retained full legal ownership of the estate and received a pension 
from its revenues throughout the period of royal management (Atienza 
1987). The king’s intervention in the señoríos was the opposite: a crutch to 
allow them to keep walking. It is to be noted that, contrary to the argu-
ments that view absolutism as a simple means for the reduction of the 
power of the nobles, all these measures were taken while invoking the pleni-
tudo potestatis of the king and justifying the importance of the mayorazgos 
as institutions that preserved the correct order of the ‘republic’ (Yun 2004).
The auxilium was also a motive—when not the pretext—for the grant-
ing to the nobility of favours, grants, salaries, and assistance that raised 
their political and social capital as well as their incomes. Often these 
rewards came together. In 1600 the Count of Benavente obtained an 
annual salary of 60,000 ducats as viceroy of Naples, the equivalent of the 
revenues of his estates at this time. And to this we might add additional 
sources of income, not all of them easily located or entirely licit, as well as 
the political power which this office entailed. The king also took advan-
tage of other instruments to help good relations with the nobles. The 
Military Orders were exploited as a means of patronage, with the conces-
sion of their encomiendas and military habits used to confer prestige, influ-
ence, and income (Yun 2004).
This do ut des was also clearly manifested in the overall relationship with 
the urban oligarchies. Despite the bitter negotiations over precise figures, 
both the system for the setting of alcabalas in Castile and the increase in 
ordinary services across the kingdoms framed obvious fiscal pacts between 
the Crown and local oligarchies. The fact that the alcabalas were main-
tained for long periods beneath the rate of inflation contributed to the 
calming of tempers. But, above all, even in the most tense moments, the 
rise in taxes was implemented while respecting and even increasing the 
autonomy of the cities that collected them, thus benefitting the oligar-
chies. The forms generally chosen for collection—the renting out of rights 
to persons close to the oligarchy or the division of taxes through branches 
of economic activity—gave a big power to local elites. Even the service of 
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the millones in the 1590s, which provoked a wave of protest, was finally 
approved in Castile thanks to the cession to the cities of the rights to col-
lect and manage this new duty (Fortea 1990).
The millones and other forms of taxation compelled the Crown to con-
cede rights for the emission of city debts, which allowed the cities to make 
advance payments on the promised sums. Opportunities such as these 
were accompanied by permits for the creation of municipal taxes to pay 
these debts with the money collected (Ruiz Martín 1994). This facilitated 
the control of municipal properties by the loaners, who were none other 
than the members of the urban oligarchy itself and the powerful local 
ecclesiastical institutions (Yun 1990). Moreover, one of the results of this 
system was to justify debts that were taken advantage of by the cities and 
the local elites, who were able to buy offices from the king, acquire juris-
dictions and privileges, take possession of unfarmed land, and so on. In 
this regard there were certain parallels with the profits taken by the nobil-
ity on the censos levied on mayorazgos. The result of all of this was, in the 
first place, a greater meshing and dependence of the destinies of the mon-
archy and those of the oligarchies. Another consequence was their 
enhanced capacity for renovation without this leading to great changes in 
their internal dynamic (Soria 2000).
Something similar happened in the Crowns of Aragon and Navarre, 
although some important points of divergence should be noted. As we 
have seen, here tensions coalesced into violent conflicts.37 But the eventual 
resolution of the crisis is in itself evidence of the intense relationships 
forming between the elites and the monarchy. It also underlines the role 
of these ties in facilitating the elites’ social consolidation and extension.
In Aragon, as elsewhere, the political theory of the period reflected this 
union with the king. According to this ideology, the ‘embodiment of the 
body politic as a whole’ resided in the ‘union of king and kingdom’ or the 
‘king with Parliament’—this was a chamber very much dominated by the 
high nobility (and in this respect substantially different from its counter-
part in Castile).38 In conformity with this representation, the collection of 
37 The literature on this theme is extensive. An overview, with some modifications of previ-
ous arguments, is provided in Yun (2004, Chap. 6).
38 Though these expressions refer to the Crown of Aragon (Gil 1991, p. 80), the fact is 
even clearer in Castile (Fernández Albaladejo 1992). In Valencia ‘un reciproco y mutuo 
contrato entre vuestra majestad y dicho reino’ (‘a mutual and reciprocal contract between 
Your Majesty and his kingdom’) was also acknowledged (Casey 1983, p. 243).
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services voted in their respective Cortes fell to the Generalidades and 
Diputaciones, for their own benefit and that of the elites.39 The balance 
between the king and kingdom was also maintained thanks to the 
Audiencias and, above all, the survival of the Council of Aragon which, 
like the other councils, represented the laws and customs of the kingdom 
before the king himself. The very organization of judicial power itself, 
established in institutions such as the Justicia de Aragón which defended 
the rights and by-laws of the kingdom against royal aggrandizement, dem-
onstrated the limits of the king’s power and would end up producing an 
equilibrium. In the aftermath of the conflict of 1591, the king sought to 
make an example of Aragon and introduced reforms to both the Cortes 
and the Diputación. These measures meant that the monarch could now 
appoint the Justicia de Aragón and a ‘foreign viceroy’ (meaning a non- 
Aragonese person). But, far from proceeding to suppress the privileges 
upon which the jurisdictions of seigniors and cities depended, a new equi-
librium was sought between local powers and the monarchy. Therefore, 
despite the appointment of viceroys born outside the kingdom, this insti-
tution exercised an important role as an intermediary between local elites 
and the royal Court.
The nobility was not seriously prejudiced. In Aragon the king’s permis-
sion was not as indispensable as it was for the management of censos taken 
out on mayorazgos in Castile. But the system, applied in a way that was not 
dissimilar to that of Castile, also allowed seigniorial economies to resist 
(Abadía 1993, 1998). In Aragon censos on their own benefit were gener-
ally set down by noble households on the incomes of the towns and vil-
lages within their seigniorial estates: the fact that the nobles exercised a 
high degree of control over these settlements was decisive in this regard. 
On the whole the Aragonese nobles were less involved in the ‘enterprises’ 
or campaigns of the Habsburgs than their Castilian counterparts: their 
rewards and remuneration were correspondingly smaller. But their involve-
ment not only increased over time but also drew in a disproportional num-
ber of the greater houses, like the Requesens and the Gandía. Some of 
these families came to intertwine themselves to such a high degree with 
their Castilian counterparts that it becomes pointless to speak of any dis-
tinction or division between them. True, they maintained many rivalries 
over jurisdiction (indeed some disputes were even of a judicial nature), 
although these tended to be limited in scope.
39 Gonzalez Antón (1989, pp. 664, 666) and García Cárcel (1989, p. 685).
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The elites of the most important cities, such as Zaragoza, Barcelona, 
Valencia, and Pamplona, found their situations moderately favoured and 
improved across a range of issues. The system for the collection of taxes 
was itself based upon the cities’ marked autonomy, which reinforced the 
oligarchy’s political capital. The growing emission of municipal debt, 
nearly all of which was purchased by the oligarchies, increased their politi-
cal and economic power. These developments were reflected in the elites’ 
increasing domination of the urban governments, a trend that in turn 
favoured understanding between the Crown and the oligarchies by creat-
ing channels for better communication (Amelang 1986, pp. 45–6; Furió 
1995, p. 256). Moreover, after the uprisings of 1580, the urban elites of 
the kingdom of Aragon increasingly integrated themselves into the mon-
archy’s judicial and bureaucratic apparatus (Gil 1988). The fact that this 
trend was much clearer in the ecclesiastical administration resulted in there 
being no effective structural division between the Church in Castile and 
Aragon. Individuals drawn from these elites moved seamlessly between 
the two realms: this, again, was an important factor.
In Castile, as in the territories of the Crown of Aragon, the sale of juris-
dictions, noble titles, unfarmed lands, rents, and censos and juros set on 
municipal finances served to satisfy the needs for social promotion and 
consolidation of many members of these families (the sums involved were 
rather different across these kingdoms). The growth of the royal bureau-
cracy also created employment opportunities for them. The granting of 
military habits and the enrolment in royal armies, in whose regiments 
more and more Spaniards were active, had a similar effect (see the data 
given by Wright 1982). Another opportunity—the chance to seek office 
within the ranks of one of the most expansive churches in Europe—fur-
ther eased the fortunes of the oligarchies, who provided many members of 
the ecclesiastical elites.40
The opportunities open to the oligarchies to take advantage of the 
growth of the ecclesiastical institutions were just one part of a broader 
process: despite the pressures exerted by the Crown, the Habsburgs were 
able to renew their pact with the Catholic Church and thus to provide it 
with an outlet for expansion as an institution of power with an economic 
character. The Catholic policies of the Habsburgs led to the growth of the 
number of institutions and offices, as did the stream of donations and 
40 We will return to this matter in the next chapter; see also the case of Córdoba in Soria 
(2000).
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endowments made by the faithful and the related rise in ecclesiastical rev-
enues. America was essential to this process. It was a vast virgin territory 
into which the ecclesiastical economy rapidly expanded, with the religious 
orders (the Dominicans, Franciscans, Hieronymites) being particularly 
voracious colonizers from the first moments. But it was the Jesuits, active 
from the second half of the century and in whom the presence of the low 
nobility and the oligarchies was important from the very beginning, who 
expanded at an unprecedented rate. America was also crucial to the growth 
of the secular clergy and led to an intense relationship between it and the 
monarchy, one that reinforced the bonds of mutual interest. From 1508, 
when the Crown obtained the right to ‘present’ (in effect, to appoint) all 
ecclesiastical benefices from parishes to bishoprics, its control over the life 
of the Church was combined with a unique capacity for patronage. In 
1543 the monarchy won the right to set episcopal jurisdictions, thus rein-
forcing and extending its powers in America. Between 1511 and 1564, it 
created 22 dioceses; appointments in them were controlled by the Council 
of Indies. Clergy even had to swear loyalty to the king. Ecclesiastical 
patronage over the Indies (the right to name bishops) was considered the 
‘richest stone, the most beautiful pearl, in the royal diadem’. Apart from 
wealth, this right gave the Crown the ability to create ecclesiastical clien-
tele networks that were unparalleled in Christendom. It was a form of 
reaching a general deal with the clergy and the elites, from whose number 
the clerical elite was recruited (McAlister 1984, pp. 94–7).
To understand the ‘contract’ between Crown and Church, it is impor-
tant to note that some of the services rendered by it, such as the Bull of the 
Crusade (the source of tax income that most grew in this period), were not 
in reality paid from the pockets of the clergy but by the faithful, who were 
encouraged by the clergy to acquire these Bulls. Moreover, as with the cit-
ies, the churchmen did not always offer their resources free of charge. For 
example, the negotiation over the excusado allowed the ecclesiastical institu-
tions to strengthen or obtain certain economic privileges, principally in rela-
tion to the ‘sale of cereals without any limitation’ (Álvarez 1990, p. 125).
The relationship with the Crown and the image of a common enterprise 
in defence of the faith increased the Church’s spiritual capital and prestige. 
The country’s growing identification with the anti-Protestant and Counter-
Reformation causes enhanced cultural beliefs that were highly positive in 
respect to the Catholic Church. The result was a flow of donations and 
charity from the faithful, who saw it as the principal bastion in the defence 
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of Christendom.41 Thanks to all of this, the entailed properties in the cler-
gy’s hands were extended, and overall ecclesiastical incomes increased even 
more quickly than the Church’s contributions to the king.42
Philip II has passed into history as a king in constant tension with 
Rome, a staunch defender of his right of ‘presentation’ of bishops and 
indefatigable in his efforts to control the Inquisition. But his relations 
with the Catholic Church in Spain and America were decisive in allowing 
this institution to prosper and to continue to be the receptacle of a large 
number of members of the elites. This fact relaxed the tensions generated 
among the nobles by their need for social expansion and would be crucial 
for the social consolidation of the dominant coalition in spite of its inter-
nal structural tensions.
In conclusion, absolutism did cut off some of this dominant coalition’s 
opportunities for expansion. But in other ways, it helped and favoured its 
members by creating channels apt for their forms of social expansion, thus 
reinforcing a difficult but solid agreement between the Crown and the elites.
This was evident in many different developments. No records have 
been found of the collapse, extinction, or ruin of a single great seigniorial 
house during these years. Protected by the mayorazgo, their extraordinary 
incomes, and access to credit, their patrimonies did not dissolve; at most, 
they passed to other lineages through political marriages and inheritances. 
Many secondary branches of these houses satisfied their needs for promo-
tion and increased their power and wealth to the point that they were 
actually able to complete with the central trunks of these lineages. The 
case of the Count Duke of Olivares, who belonged to a lateral branch of 
the Guzmán, is perhaps the most eye-catching example (Chap. 8). But 
something very similar happened with the house of Sandoval. Beginning 
at a relatively secondary position, with limited economic resources, this 
Castilian-Aragonese house not only rode out a number of storms but even 
became one of the most powerful in Castile by the early seventeenth cen-
tury through the person of the duke of Lerma, favourite of Philip III. The 
security offered by the mayorazgo was instrumental to this rise, as was the 
matrimonial policy that allowed it to form ties with powerful lineages such 
41 Sermons on the Bull of Crusade were preached in the hope of encouraging poplar pas-
sion for this institution. For ironic comments, see Leonardo Donato’s view in García 
Mercadal (1999, vol. II, 360).
42 See the example of Madrid in López ed. (1998, pp. 82–7). For a wider vision, Atienza 
(1988), whose figures are presented in the following chapter below.
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as the Gandía; also important was the decisive intervention of members of 
the ecclesiastical hierarchy—indeed, one such figure, Cristóbal de 
Sandoval, was illegitimate. The house’s capacity for promotion is elo-
quently demonstrated by the fact that in the early 1600s three of its mem-
bers possessed the ducal dignity (Williams 2006, pp. 15–30).
Between 1520 and 1631, more than 600 new titles were created, the 
vast majority being conferred upon individuals drawn from the high nobil-
ity, its lower ranks, and the urban elites. Obviously, if these titles repre-
sented the avidity of the Crown to satisfy the desire to purchase dignity 
and to reward service, then this was just the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
the capacity for social ascent. An understanding of the role and influence 
of urban oligarchies in this sector can be gleaned from the fact that of the 
bishops of Castile, more than 50% came from an urban background—a 
vastly disproportionate percentage in relation to the overall population. 
Between 85% and 90% were nobles—an indication of the elites’ enormous 
capacity for promotion and ability to overcome  problems.43 It is not, 
therefore, surprising that open conflict and factional disputes in cities 
should have practically disappeared, being replaced by more pacific means 
of conflict resolution. The resources of the judicial system and matrimony 
allowed families to overcome tensions by sealing alliances. In Murcia, for 
example, the conflict between the Sotos and Riquelmes was largely 
resolved by fear of a total rupture involving allegations of impurity of 
blood—this was a form of self-enforcement between clashing groups who, 
in the end, had similar interests (Contreras 1992).
More widely the process by which elites had become involved in the 
monarchy and empire, and the capacity of both to offer an outlet for their 
needs for social consolidation and promotion, also contributed to a cer-
tain degree of stability in the political system and social order. In this way 
many of the fifteenth- century phantoms that had led to rebellions and civil 
strife—here Spain can be profitably compared to other areas of Europe 
(Chap. 6)—were palliated.
Global forCes and the Mobilization of resourCes
The process described above should be understood in the context of the 
globalization and the incorporation of the Iberian kingdoms into an enor-
mous imperial system.
43 See the figures provided by Barrio in his various studies (2001 and 2004).
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Silver and the Circulation of Elites Within the Empire
American silver and the inflationary process it fed had a corrosive effect on 
some seigniorial economies. Moreover, to the extent that it was accompa-
nied by broader changes in mercantile development, it accentuated a 
number of social imbalances. But it also exerted a stabilizing effect on 
institutions, an outcome that is often forgotten (Yun 1998).
The quantities of silver arriving from America never constituted more 
than 25% of the total income of the Crown (Flynn 1982). This was not, of 
course, a small proportion. Many European princes could only have 
dreamed of something similar, especially as this was a source of revenue 
that was not under the control of the Cortes of Castile. But it is even more 
important to underline that American silver made possible the use of 
mechanisms for the conversion and consolidation of debt described above 
which was the cornerstone of the whole financial system, as well as the 
series of ‘contracts’ between the Court and the different factions of the 
elites. The subjects of Castile paid for a good part of the costs of the impe-
rial system in Europe with their taxes. But it was the forced labour in the 
American mines and the taxes levied on their silver that made possible the 
pact between the monarchy and the elites, thus converting Castile into the 
backbone of the monarchy’s imperial complex. Other countries of course 
underwent similar processes (see Chap. 6), but the arrival of silver marked 
a fundamental difference in the case of Spain.
Also the policy of the Crown with regard to the Iberian aristocracies 
was especially effective thanks to the arrival of Indies treasure fleets. The 
precious white metal facilitated a level of fiscal extraction and a type of 
involvement of the kingdom in the tax system that meant that the pres-
sures on the nobility remained reasonable. The expansion of the amount 
of money in circulation was behind a process seldom remarked upon: it 
meant that nobles could now borrow to perform services requiring their 
direct mobilization, such as their deployment in the war against the 
Moriscos of Granada. Had credit not been available, their only means of 
providing these services would have been through immediately extorting 
their vassals and tenants or by using very painful lines of credit. 
Furthermore, the increase of available specie and the security in the repay-
ment of the public debt that it generated help to explain (they were not 
the only reason) the lowering of interest rates that allowed the Crown to 
decrease rates charged on both juros and censos, whose weight fell upon 
the nobility. Without America, not only the stability of the monarchy but 
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also the financial steadiness of the aristocracy and the opportunity to apply 
the credit policy described above would have been very difficult.
American silver was also crucial for the formation of the powerful net-
work of financiers serving the king, something which contributed deci-
sively to the creation of the Habsburg system and the conflictive pacts 
within it. Captured in America or Seville by the Italian or German families, 
silver energized their financial circuits in a way that would have been 
unthinkable in the fifteenth century.44 As we have seen, American silver 
made possible the circuits between asientos and juros upon the royal taxes 
that characterized the financial system, as well as the mechanisms that 
allowed Madrid to ‘camouflage’ the operations for the transfer of funds 
from Castile to the European theatres of war. American silver was, there-
fore, crucial to overcome the technical and institutional constrictions of 
the composite monarchy.
The flow of silver and the expansion of American commerce were also 
relevant for the consolidation of the urban oligarchies, even if that com-
merce was smaller than usually thought. Global commerce, with the 
American trade as its vertebral column, and the growth of the class of 
merchants tied to it, created tensions in the very heart of the settled soci-
ety. But these developments had an impact on the expansion of the elites. 
Though it was not the main factor, the arrival of the migrant’s remittances 
could not but help to alleviate their internal tensions. Official figures—
substantially less than the real total, without doubt—come to 1.3% of the 
GDP by 1591–1600.45 This is not a huge proportion, but it needs to be 
remembered that an important part of it fell into the hands of a tiny 
amount of the overall population. Since part of this amount was made up 
of payments for exports from the peninsula, it seems logical to think that 
it also enhanced the conditions for the success of a merchant class that was 
able to mix with the old families of the urban elite, thus favouring their 
social and economic reproduction. The impact in Seville is, logically, the 
most evident phenomenon. Not only merchants—some of them of con-
verso origin—but also a good number of mid-ranking nobles and even 
some aristocrats dedicated their time to commerce and made headway in 
this city of blue bloods (Pike 1978). This was often achieved by taking 
44 Although the literature on the matter is huge, a useful synthesis can be found in Ruiz 
Martín (1990a, pp. 16–23).
45 These estimates are based on Hamilton (1975, p. 47) and Yun (1998, Table 2).
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advantage of the noble status enjoyed by certain Genoese families involved, 
directly or indirectly, in American commerce.
Also highly significant were the opportunities the Empire offered its 
elites for circulation and promotion in America and Europe. As a result, 
these dominant groups enjoyed extraordinary geopolitical advantages, an 
exceptional factor—if we compare them with their European peers, with 
the possible exception of the Genoese, who constituted one of the epoch’s 
most stable elites, due to the solidity of their pact with the Crown.
An analysis of emigration to the Indies and of the domestic life of the 
great noble houses might well demonstrate that very few of their members 
went to live in the New World. Certainly there were very few cases of 
mixed marriages with the ‘indigenous nobility’.46 This is logical, given that 
aristocrats sought to marry reflections of themselves that might not be 
perceived in American elites. However, from the end of Philip II’s reign, 
many viceroys—perhaps, indeed, all of them—belonged to these great 
families (Schäfer 2003, vol. II, Appendix I, pp. 381–4). This form of ser-
vice brought in large sums of money as extraordinary incomes, being one 
of the most sought-after benefits of the auxilium. Office holding certainly 
served to soften the so-called crisis of the aristocracy—this was a very mild 
crisis in Iberia—and to confront the internal aspirations within these fami-
lies. In turn this affected not only the leading members of lineages but also 
their collateral branches, many of whose members travelled abroad to 
serve to their great profit and benefit. There are also a few fascinating cases 
of Iberian families creating American branches. The Borja-Gandía lineage 
provides one such example, as does the second branch of the Velasco, who 
created a whole dynasty in México after D. Luis de Velasco y Ruiz de 
Alarcón served as viceroy of New Spain. But these cases are surely symp-
tomatic of a broader trend (Redondo and Yun 2008). The part of the 
aristocracy most affected by this process was, by some margin, the Castilian 
lineages. Yet a number of families of Valencian origin (such as the Borgia- 
Gandía) were progressively tied to the Castilian clans forging ties in 
Aragon and even in Italy. In this way the positive effects of the empire 
were transmitted through these families into and towards an aristocratic 
elite that was increasingly marked by a transnational component and that 
was becoming Spanish more than Castilian, Aragonese, and so on 
(Redondo and Yun 2009).
46 See the case of Moctezuma’s descendants in Hernández Franco (2006).
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Nobles were most commonly employed on the European side of this 
empire. Forever conscious of the dynastic component and wary of the 
multiple layers of opposition to foreign elements, the Habsburgs seldom 
sought to employ subjects from one kingdom in the local administration 
of another state. However, from the second half of the sixteenth century, 
many members of noble families came to serve as viceroys or pursued 
 military careers in Europe. Well-known cases such as that of the duke of 
Alba were not unique or exceptional (Maltby 1983). Careers of this sort 
allow us to trace family strategies, as in this case not only the ‘Iron Duke’ 
himself but all the Álvarez de Toledo lineage became active in the European 
theatre acquiring offices, promoting second-born sons, discharging mili-
tary and diplomatic commands, or marrying daughters with prominent 
families in Italy or elsewhere.47 The monarchy of the Habsburgs of Spain 
required an efficient and stable diplomatic service: by the end of the cen-
tury, the ambassadorships dotted across Europe were generally in the 
hands of members of families of this sort (Redondo and Yun 2009). In 
turn nobles came to assume that this type of office was something like a 
birthright; on the other hand, this kind of position required an initial burst 
of expenditure by the office holder, who usually made use of censos to 
cover this outlay (Yun 2004). Nobles, in other words, were the most logi-
cal incumbents of this sort of office.
The employment of the Iberian nobilities in the imperial system further 
accentuated their ties with other European aristocracies. Families of 
Aragonese origin (the Riquelmes, the Santa Coloma, the Denia, and oth-
ers) and Portuguese origin (the Castro and Silva) used these bonds to 
achieve forms of promotion that relaxed the internal tensions mentioned 
above and which, in time, changed their very nature and relationships with 
their places of origin (Redondo and Yun 2008). This transformation 
offered certain economic advantages and opportunities (noticeably hon-
ours and military habits), thus reinforcing both the alliance that connected 
Castilian nobles to the Crown and the opportunities for promotion of this 
social group. An analysis of the marriages of the members of the Order of 
the Golden Fleece between 1575 and 1600 demonstrates that the Castilian 
families had become the marriage partners of choice for many European 
nobilities (Yun 2016). This matrimonial market opened up avenues for 
47 The clearest case is that of the viceroy Don Pedro de Toledo, whose daughter, Doña 
Leonor de Toledo, married Cosimo de Medici, duke of Florence (Hernando 1994; Palos 
2016). More examples can be found in Redondo and Yun (2009).
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promotion and unblocked the internal tensions of these lineages. While the 
links were weaker with the Flemish houses, an entire chapter might be writ-
ten on their marriages with the Italian lineages of Roman, Genoese, Sicilian, 
or Neapolitan origin. These interactions afforded them not only political 
and social capital but also the economic fluidity that allowed the high and 
mid-ranking aristocracy to face their domestic difficulties. Genoese mar-
riages were particularly beneficial—and lucrative—in this regard.48
This imperial complex stood at the heart of the relationship between 
the Crown and the elites, in large part because of its capacity to satisfy 
those elites’ needs for social and financial capital. Many members of this 
social sector assumed military offices and followed careers that offered the 
chance of social promotion or of avoiding the negative effects of the may-
orazgo system. Figures such as Garcilaso de la Vega, Juan Boscán, and 
many members of the intermediate nobility ended up obtaining habits in 
the Military Orders (Postigo 1988). The martial professions (fighting and 
its related logistical and bureaucratic machinery) and the waging of war in 
America also provided a fertile terrain for these groups (Martínez 1993, 
vol. I, pp. 118–26), which shortly came to see the New World as a promis-
ing area for expansion. The known cases are highly evocative in this regard. 
These elites served as members of aristocratic retinues, as officers in the 
royal bureaucracy, or as businessmen who decided to remain in America. 
These were men drawn from the ranks of the hidalgos, or members of the 
middle classes in danger of falling into poverty (Martínez 1993, pp. 120–3). 
Families such as the Espinosa provide an excellent example of how dynas-
ties incorporated merchants, businessmen, clergymen, and nobles, thus 
establishing transatlantic ties and so taking full advantage of the enormous 
advantages conferred by the empire (Lohman 1968). This social class pro-
vided many of the university students who created the dynasties of func-
tionaries and lawyers who made their living in the New World (Pelorson 
1980).49 These (often temporary) emigrants not only sent money back to 
the Iberian Peninsula; those returning from the New World also brought 
back wealth that also alleviated the internal tensions within this group. 
Waves of emigration were therefore crucial to the process that, whether it 
ended in premature death or fabulous fortune, freed the Iberian political 
theatre of a great deal of pressure.
48 See, for example, the case of Ambrosio de Spinola in Rodríguez Villa (1905) and 
Herrero (2009).
49 For detailed studies, see Hampe and Honores (2004).
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As it has been said, another important absorbent of the tensions within 
the Iberian elites and within the whole society was the ecclesial structure 
in America. Indeed, the expansion of the Church into the New World 
might be considered one of the most significant consequences of this 
emergent global empire. The emigration of churchmen, among them 
many lateral members of noble lineages, to the Indies was perhaps one of 
the most important means of reducing peninsular tensions. No exact fig-
ures can be provided, but it has been estimated that during the sixteenth 
century, some 6000 clerics crossed the Atlantic; this was a significant num-
ber if we remember that a number of them belonged to the tiny middling 
ranks and oligarchies of this society (Borges 1983). And so, aside from the 
fortunes involved, America was used to win over the clergy and to ensure 
the circulation of elites, from whose rank the Church assiduously recruited 
part of its members (McAlister 1984, pp. 94–7).
Mobilization of Resources and the Limits of the System
The status quo established between the Crown and the elites served to 
frustrate profound changes in the central finances. As pointed out before, 
the process was, of course, very far from a financial revolution of the sort 
taking place in Holland. But, more important and against an implicit idea 
very much accepted for years, the outcome, on the other hand, was clearly 
not a prototype for a centralized fiscal state that would allow the total 
concentration of military power and social coercion in the hands of an 
absolute king, as was believed until relatively recently.
In regard to the former, it has to be said that, despite its technical and 
constitutional sophistication, the Castilian financial system differed from 
that of Holland after the 1580s and from that of England after 1688.50 
The key to what happened in these countries was the development of par-
liamentary systems characterized by a relatively high degree of political 
representativeness, which gained control over the budget and public debt. 
In 1688 this system was accompanied by the creation of the Bank of 
England (in 1694) that would advance money to the treasury and, indeed, 
would end up controlling the money supply. Logically, this has been con-
sidered a key step in the development of institutions that allowed a marked 
increase in the capacity to sell state debt bonds (North and Weingast 1989). 
The situation of Castile (let alone the other kingdoms) was very different.
50 Tracy (1985), ‘T Hart et al. (1997), and Brewer (1990).
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It is evident that the Castilian political model was very far from 
achieving the optimal conditions for a financial revolution. The Cortes 
suffered from a lack of representativeness, and some scholars have even 
questioned the ability of the city and town councils to control their own 
representatives in the assembly (Thompson 1989). The Cortes could 
rail against the costs of war and the transfer of money from the kingdom 
but had no control over expenditures. On the other hand, the develop-
ment of the American-Genoese axis (mentioned above) placed the func-
tion that central banks would later perform (the management of debt) 
in the hands of an international corporation, which did not seek to ben-
efit the kingdom but only to secure its own private interest. Here it is 
worthwhile remembering that in reality the Bank of England emerged as 
an institution offering annuities to subscribers, something that set it 
very much apart from the corporation of bankers who advanced short-
term loans at high rates of interest to the King of Spain.51 Behind this 
there stood the fact that the conflictive pact with the Crown was leading 
to a situation in which neither of the twin fiscal and financial poles of the 
 monarchy—the cities and the Genoese—wanted to introduce substan-
tial changes unless it was clearly in their interest to do so. And their 
interests were the opposite (Ruiz Martín 1990b). They therefore cre-
ated a sort of paralysing equilibrium. This was for a variety of reasons 
and despite the fact that the Crown sought to take advantage of any 
dispute between them.
Quite a few of the Crown’s efforts to reform the financial fiscal 
machinery sought to give it the very thing it most urgently lacked: a 
banking system that would allow cheaper credit and, as a result, the 
replacement of the Genoese. The project to convert the House of 
Trade (Casa de la Contratación) of Seville into ‘a commercial bank 
and, at the same time, a deposit bank for the public debt of the Spanish 
Monarchy’ is one of the most significant of these efforts (Ruiz Martín 
1965). This scheme sought to attract private savings, some of them 
tied to the American trade, and so reduce both the high interest rates 
charged in the asientos and the role of the Genoese. The same might be 
said of the project of Valle de la Cerda and Oudegherste. Inspired by 
developments in Holland, which now stood on the brink of a genuine 
51 See the synthesis on the Bank of England of Van der Wee et al. (1991, pp. 246–53).
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financial revolution, the intention was to create a network of local public 
banks. The idea was to attract savings by the granting of censos and the 
negotiation over juros: deposits obtained in this way would be advanced as 
loans to the king, thus displacing the hated Genoese (Dubet 2003).
Problems were compounded by the fact that this fiscal system lacked a 
genuine central treasury that would have permitted officials to make a 
precise estimate of its possibilities. Moreover, the behaviour described 
above (the management of the debt through asientos based upon incomes 
which were more or less known and secure) was just one part of the sys-
tem. Many juros were sold directly by the Crown officials, and many inves-
tors and businessmen had to accept juros as compensation for seized Indies 
cargoes or Crown bankruptcies. Nothing could be imagined further from 
a system of debt based only upon the confidence of subscribers guaranteed 
by the control of the budget by the parliament.
What emerged in Castile—and in the other kingdoms under the 
Habsburgs—was very far from the model of a unified fiscal system that 
might serve as the basis of a centralized military state.
There was (for the epoch) a quite evolved royal fiscal and financial sys-
tem, which was the pillar of the important development of military tech-
nologies (Parker 1972). Thanks to the former, thousands of soldiers—most 
of them mercenaries and not Castilians (Ribot 2008)—were paid in 
Flanders, Milan, and other areas of the composite monarchy. Even the 
American incomes were more and more used to pay for the different bod-
ies of the navy there. But due to financial and logistic problems, theses 
armies were often decentralized in their logistic support, and contractors 
and asentistas played a very important role to the extent that it has been 
possible to identify a ‘decentralization’ that shifted the management of the 
army from the central government to the periphery and from the public 
administration to the private one (Thompson 1976: conclusions). It is not 
odd that some historians have recalled that the empire’s bureaucracy in 
fact involved of a very tiny group of people (see, e.g. Stradling 1981: 
General Introduction).
Furthermore, the relation of tense cooperation that had emerged 
between the Crown and the elites also had a dimension outside of the fis-
cal system, one which is important for the understanding of the specific 
(and relatively limited) role of public finances in the mobilization of 
resources. The auxilium of nobles and aristocrats fed military and bureau-
cratic systems that had emerged in the Middle Ages and had a marked 
private and decentralized character. This involved direct military action by 
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nobles or aristocrats who, having usually obtained financing through cen-
sos and credits, carried out missions on behalf of the Crown. This was a 
common occurrence in frontier areas like Murcia, where the military func-
tion of nobles such as the Marquises of los Vélez had been maintained 
during the fifteenth century (Owens 1980). This is just one case among 
many. The various forms of noble mobilization (cited above) maintained 
the military role of the aristocracy. This was especially commonplace in 
those regions which had close links with areas directly involved in military 
conflict of one sort or another and would become even more usual in the 
seventeenth century. Of course, the nobility was not the only active par-
ticipant in practices of this sort. The cities, in reality collective seigniorial 
estates that are, therefore, also obliged to auxilium and military service, 
performed a very similar function. Seville, Granada, Valencia, La Coruña, 
Murcia, Cartagena, and many others found themselves compelled to carry 
out levies of soldiers and to maintain high levels of direct spending and/
or to assume debts for defence purposes.52
This picture should not surprise us, even though it breaks with the tra-
ditional and overly simplistic view of centralized fiscal systems of military 
mobilization. Recent research on other countries has also shown the 
importance of military entrepreneurs and private armies and mobilizations 
(though in Spain this was not strictly the case, since the señoríos of nobles 
or cities cannot be considered to be private) (Parrott 2012). Perhaps these 
private operations, for all that they attract the attention of specialists, have 
been viewed as less significant in the overall tapestry. It is to be noted that 
these methods and mechanisms, although widely divergent in themselves, 
bear many similarities to those employed in the conquest of the Americas 
(Chap. 2). They were based on a codex of auxilium and an ethos of per-
sonal initiative in exchange for the promise of later compensation.
It is impossible, for the moment at least, to calculate the economic value 
of these mobilizations and the debts they generated. Perhaps their overall 
significance was slight in quantitative terms. But we know, for example, that 
during the years 1589–1593, the censos subscribed by nobles to cover services 
52 Thompson (1976, pp. 11–37). The Morisco rebellion was largely fought with local lev-
ies and contributions from the cities of the south and eastern regions of the country. Seville 
paid 61,000 ducats (p. 18). Valencia came to pay 50,000, and cities in Catalonia, Sardinia, 
and Mallorca had to do the same on a number of occasions (pp. 19, 23). The same hap-
pened on the Cantabrian coast, which contributed 60,000 ducats ‘with no cost to the royal 
patrimony’ (p. 24).
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(principally military) to the Crown rose to 1.6 million ducats, which repre-
sented 18% of the income collected in asientos in these years.53 And it seems 
probable that the cities made military contributions and efforts of a similar 
or greater scale. Though maybe exaggerated, the case of Seville is very 
meaningful. To give an idea, the principal of the censos imposed upon the 
city’s budget by 1595 was about 1.1 million ducats, which, extrapolating to 
the whole kingdom of Castile, would mean the equivalent of the juros’ 
principal at the end of the century. Even taking into account that this is 
(probably) too high a figure and that more than half of it was the result of 
municipal expenses, it represents a large amount that cannot be forgotten 
in any study of the debt of the composite monarchy.54
Mobilizations of this sort worked within the existing fiscal arrange-
ments and demonstrated the reality of conflictive cooperation: they served 
as one of the pillars of the political and social agreement between elites 
and the Crown. They would have a significant impact on the political 
economy of the empire and the process of state building. From the view-
point of fiscal affairs, taxes were generated as a cascade: many of the fiscal 
impositions of the Crown upon the towns were paid by them by advanc-
ing to the king money which they obtained thanks to the subscription of 
censos on their municipal finances. And this was also the case for the pay-
ment of the local militias: to finance them the municipalities asked the 
king for permission to take censos and to create new taxes to make interest 
payments. Thus noble and town debts are important, and any definition of 
the ‘public debt of Castile’ needs to include not only the juros—that is the 
royal debt—but also the censos created for the accomplishment of the pub-
lic tasks and functions (military commitments included) that these arms of 
the state were obliged to carry out.55
53 According to my calculations, the average annual figures in ducats for various periods 
and years are 43,000 (1565–1569); 5400 (1574–1578); 77,500 (1579–1583); 25,000 
(1584–1588); 330,000 (1589–1593); and 96,000 (1594–1598). Cámara de Castilla, Libros 
de Relación, libs. 14, 18, 21, 25 y 26, AGS. The calculation must be taken with some precau-
tions. Probably, the nobles spent important quantities without previously asking for either a 
censo or a mortgage on their mayorazgos. And, in another sense, not all costs derived from 
war spending.
54 See the figures in Martínez Ruiz (1992). I have extrapolated this onto the entire king-
dom by taking into account the population of Castile.
55 See these mechanisms in Ruiz Martín (1994) and in my ‘Introduction’ to Ruiz de 
Celada’s book (Yun 1990).
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The machinery for the mobilization of resources was, therefore, more 
far-reaching than has sometimes been supposed. The same could be said 
about its debts. It is quite possible that, taking all the contributions and 
exactions into account, recent optimistic estimates on the weight of taxes 
and the sustainability of the debt may have to be revised. As we shall see, 
this is also crucial to understand the state-building process.
One result of all of this was that military administration came to be 
characterized by a high degree of decentralization resulting in relatively 
poor performance and fraud. This would proceed to the extent that it 
resulted in what I. A. A. Thompson called the ‘devolution of functions’, in 
which military administration and even the conduct of war were placed in 
private hands. As a whole this system created a complicated and conflictive 
machinery, whose deployment was made more costly by its very character 
and which was permanently marked by clientelism, patronage, nepotism, 
misadministration, fraud, and corruption. This would be as much the case 
in Flanders as in Castile itself, and it was equally evident in the relationships 
between the various theatres of action and the functioning of the fiscal and 
financial system that fed the logistical apparatus.56 Similar patterns were, of 
course, frequently found in other territories of the monarchy. The con-
tracts for the maintenance of galleys in Genoa (especially those signed with 
Andrea Doria) provide a good example; again, arrangements of this sort 
would become more common from 1600 (see Chap. 8) (Williams 2014). 
In regard to the military system as a whole, it has been said that the ‘cen-
tralisation of the Spanish administration was purely personal. In the same 
way that the monarchy was the sum of autonomous and privileged nations, 
united only by their loyalty to the same sovereign, the internal constitution 
of Castile was a conglomeration of liberties and independent jurisdictions 
centralised in the person of the king’ (Thompson 1976, p. 42). Moreover, 
the Council of War was a ‘Cretan labyrinth’ and highly ineffective. 
Controlled by the aristocracy until the reforms of the end of the century, it 
was engaged in continuous rivalries with other councils. It exercised judi-
cial responsibilities that weakened its capacity for quick responses and never 
managed to secure a monopoly over the control of military affairs.
All of these failures had their origins in ‘profoundly structural weak-
nesses’. As in all monarchies of the time, at its heart lay a system of patron-
age for the conferment of offices and loyalties, one entirely consistent with 
56 For these territories, see Parker (1979) and Thompson (1976).
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the principle of do ut des. Patronage did not, to be certain, necessarily 
involve the king (it was often a relationship between nobles involved in 
war and their subjects) or function according to the idea of office as a 
source of benefit typical of the period. As a result, the working of the 
administrative system was clumsy and costly to maintain, functioning 
according to a series of highly complex codes in regard to what today 
would be considered corruption (Yun 1994a). Furthermore, local author-
ities played a vital role in the collection of monies destined for war. For this 
reason much of the royal revenue ended up being lost on the wayside.57 
Finally, the mobilization system did not serve exclusively military ends, in 
part because of its institutional and social limitations. It was also used to 
feed the machinery of distribution of resources that came to be set out in 
the situados and libranzas claimed by nobles, patricians, and ecclesiastics, 
who absorbed the royal taxes at their very point of collection, thus reduc-
ing the remittances to the king. The result, again, was to broaden the 
disparity between the theoretical funds and the actual amounts.58
the eMPire as a solution in PortuGal
Overseas expansion provoked important social tensions but also served to 
stabilize Portuguese society.
If a sizeable number of the merchants and financiers were of Italian 
origin (specifically Genoese), the Portuguese group (especially New 
Christians) was also notable. It became even more so following the expul-
sion of the Jews from the Crowns of Castile and Aragon in 1492. As in the 
rest of the peninsula, this was the origin of considerable tension that was 
manifested as a rejection of religious beliefs but which betrayed an ever 
more pronounced ethnic element. In some way these tensions were an 
Iberian materialization of the more general clash between nobility and 
57 As is well known, this is not a trait exclusive to Castile or to Iberian financial systems in 
general. See Collins (1988).
58 In 1572, the Venetian ambassador Leonardo Donato estimated the income of the King 
of Spain as some 5.6 million escudos but believed that debt interest repayments absorbed 2.2 
million and ‘ordinary spending’ (including the situados and running costs) 2 million. 1.4 mil-
lion was, therefore, the net available sum: this was, very probably, highly optimistic. He 
believed that the situation was even worse in the Low Countries, where ‘nothing comes out 




businessmen. But commercial development and economic growth also fed 
pressure for the social advancement of the urban oligarchies and mer-
chants, which increased tensions within these elites. As in the other Iberian 
kingdoms, the nobility was compelled to increase military costs on the pen-
insula—less so, perhaps, than in Castile—as much as in the colonies (Vila-
Santa 2015, pp. 71, 77, 85, 94, 113–5). And the development of royal 
justice clashed with the expansion of the jurisdiction of the seigniors 
(Hespanha 1989, pp. 414 and ff.), while a mentality of patronage increased 
their social obligations and prestige costs (Da Cunha 2003). The Portuguese 
nobility even came to apply forms of Malthusian self-control that, perhaps 
because they have passed under the historians’ radar, are unknown in the 
other Iberian kingdoms (Carvalhal 2016, pp. 5–6; Boone 1986). This phe-
nomenon, closely associated with a masculine hierarchy of ever-greater 
intensity in the houses of fidalgos and an extension of the morgadio, the 
equivalent of the Spanish mayorazgo (Monteiro 2003), led to the increas-
ing entrance of daughters and second-born sons in the Church, this being 
a way of reducing internal tensions within the lineages (Boone 1986).
But, as in Castile, the overseas expansion favoured the consolidation 
and social promotion of elites (the early forms of this development have 
been described above). A considerable number of fidalgos (many of them 
belonging to secondary branches in the lineage or second-born sons), 
mid-ranking nobles, and even traders found that conquest served as a 
form of social development and gave an outlet to the internal tensions and 
family aspirations. This fact was manifested in what Magalhães Godinho 
(1963, pp.  213–4) called the cavaleiro-mercador, a noble dedicated to 
commerce who, in many senses, can be seen as the updated version of the 
knight errant of the Middle Ages, who had used foreign wars as an instru-
ment of social promotion. Given the mixing of military violence and 
commerce—more often than not, extortion—which marked Portuguese 
actions on coastlines from Morocco to China, the figure of the cavaleiro-
mercador was not necessarily or inherently contradictory (other countries 
were, of course, equally violent or exploitative). Beyond this oligarchy 
consisting of the intermediate nobility, some members of the great aristo-
cratic dynasties could also find an outlet for their desire to reproduce their 
lineage and family through the empire. This was, however, a numerically 
small group. In fact the offices of governor and viceroy in the Estado da 
Índia were divided almost entirely between five families (Da Cunha and 
Monteiro 2005). But the cases are highly significant. The most eye-catching 
example is that of the governor Alburquerque, but he was followed by a 
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considerable number of captains general, governors, and viceroys of the 
Estado da Índia, such as the different members of the Telles, Ataíde, or 
the Sousas Chichorro (Da Cunha 2005; Vila- Santa 2015; Pelúcia 2009). 
With regard to Brazil, families such as the Alburquerque and the Sá were 
prominent also in this process (Boxer 1952; Norton 1965; Viana 1968). 
And, of course, the Church, both secular and regular, offered another 
means of expansion. If only a few bishoprics were created, the Portuguese 
orders in general and the Jesuits in particular were able to impose them-
selves upon both Asia and Brazil, thus becoming a channel for the expan-
sion of the elites. The Crown’s right to padroado (similar to that of 
patronato in Castile) served to satisfy the elites’ need for social reproduc-
tion and the projection of their clients into an ecclesiastical system that by 
now was acquiring global dimensions. The Military Orders created the 
social space fitting for the entrance of members of the nobility and the 
fidalguia—and even, indeed, for commoners (Olival 2001).
As Subrahmanyam and Thomaz have shown, noble emigration was 
small in absolute numbers (1991, p. 319). This is logical given the size of 
the group. But the impact of the empire should not be overlooked. To 
understand this, a wider perspective has to be adopted. As in the Spanish 
case, the empire bestowed upon the kings an extra income that allowed 
them to reduce the pressure of the Crown upon the aristocracy, fidalgos, 
and merchants, which in turn may have reduced tensions within the domi-
nant elites. At the same time, this income extended the Crown’s capacity 
for patronage towards these groups, not only in the colonies but also in 
Portugal itself. It is important to note that, from 1555, the Crown 
obtained from the Pope the titular leadership of the Portuguese Military 
Orders, something which allowed it to intervene in the conferral of habits 
and estates and so became a crucial method of ascent within the nobility 
(Olival 2004). This implied a notable increase in the Crown’s capacity to 
offer patronage to the elites at the same time that it took possession of a 
fundamental tool for the regulation of the internal tensions of this group. 
And it should be remembered that this pontifical concession was consis-
tent with the function of the empire—in Africa and India—as a means of 
propagating the Catholic faith.
This permitted the aristocracy to abstain from a systematic revision of 
the system of enfiteusis which, having created favourable conditions for the 
farmers, was one of the pillars of the agrarian growth achieved in the six-
teenth century. Any attempt to understand the positive medium-term 
effect of the colonies must also take into account the broadening of the 
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ecclesiastical structures within them. This was another balm that facilitated 
the consolidation and resilience of elites. A study of the Portuguese eccle-
siastical chapter houses has underlined that the situation was very similar 
to that of Castile: the basis of a genuine church patriciate, they served as 
spaces for the projection and social development of families belonging to 
the local oligarchy (da Silva 2013). Portugal, in distinction to France, 
England, and even the Low Countries, hardly saw any big social conflict 
in the sixteenth century nor indeed until 1637–1640. This can be explained 
partly by religious factors but also by economic and social ones and more 
in particular by its elite’s capacity for reproducing themselves.
This dynamic would not be broken in 1581. The annexation of Portugal 
by the House of Habsburg may have been violent, but it also meant that 
Portuguese elites could continue with their model of social reproduction. 
As the historiography of both countries has underlined, the Dutch and 
English attacks upon Portuguese possessions after 1580 certainly entailed 
a cost for these elites. But it is also worthwhile remembering that before 
the union of the Crowns—indeed since the 1540s—expansion in Asia had 
been slowed and the defence of the empire rendered increasingly difficult. 
In this light it is not surprising that a large part of these elites saw Philip II 
(Philip I in Portugal) as a solution to both their problems and those of the 
empire (Disney 2009, vol. I, Chap. 10). This is especially true when we 
factor into consideration the indebtedness of some of them as a result of 
their efforts to follow King Sebastian in his extremely expensive and disas-
trous African campaign, which ended in his death and that of many of his 
greatest nobles (Disney 2009, vol. I, p. 179). Many families belonging to 
the high nobility, whose position can be explained also by their previous 
links with their Castilian counterparts, henceforth adopted policies that 
clearly aimed at their mingling not only with their peers from over the 
border but also with groups from other regions of the monarchy, includ-
ing Italy (Da Cunha 2009; Redondo and Yun 2009). And this did not 
entail losing their scope to project themselves on the empire, where vice-
royalties were becoming ever more the preserve of the aristocracy, as were 
the governorships within the Estado da Índia (Da Cunha and Monteiro 
2005). The empire was not only a source of offices and royal charity but 
also of profitable commercial licences granted to many fidalgos and, above 
all, the Braganza (Boyajian 1993, p. 34). This fact allowed these families 
to expand their political capital and even their economic potential. As we 
shall see, the economic upsurge that the Portuguese empire experienced 
thanks to its connections with the Spanish favoured the circulation of 
elites throughout this colonial system.
 THE EMPIRES OF A COMPOSITE MONARCHY, 1521–1598: PROBLEM OR… 
202
Even the commercial bourgeoisie and the New Christians, who may 
not have entertained high hopes for the intolerant fervour of Philip II, 
came to experience an important advance after 1580 (Boyajian 1983). 
The creation of titles—accelerated between 1580 and 1640—would be a 
cause of discontent for some of the old lineages but also an escape valve 
for the ambitions of others. The augmentation of the ecclesiastical institu-
tions was continued, while Philip II further strengthened the growth of 
the Society of Jesus, known for its capacity to recruit young fidalgos and 
aristocrats from both kingdoms (Lockhart and Schwartz 1983).
The Crown’s increased scope for patronage also reinforced these trends. 
As in the other Iberian kingdoms, the king’s power of arbitration was 
strengthened. In Castile this process reinforced the dedication of resources 
to what has been called the economy of legitimation, which in turn contrib-
uted to social stability (Chap. 6). This was fed from the private accounts of 
the elites. But, above all, it was given a more visible expression through the 
development of the Misericórdias. While similar to confraternities and insti-
tutions providing social security in other areas of Europe, these represented 
a more advanced model. They were institutions that, depending upon the 
king, brought together initiatives aimed at fostering solidarity between 
their members, such as charity and alms to the poor (Bethencourt 2009; 
Sá 1997). Thus empire—and the union of the Crowns—had exerted the 
same effect as on the Castilian elites. Certainly, the court and the metro-
politan administration were, more than the colonies, the most important 
spaces for social promotion (Da Cunha 2009). But this phenomenon was, 
at the same time, also the consequence of the growing revenues of the king, 
which mostly came from the colonies. In this way, the empire was a signifi-
cant safety valve to advance and favour the consolidation and development 
of elites, while the king increased his scope for patronage: in this way a 
dominant coalition was reinforced, in which the role of the king was 
fundamental.
The Portuguese fiscal organization, which brought balance to the 
dominant coalition, also supported the reproduction of the social system. 
A form of tax state (Schumpeter 1955) emerged which was broadly similar 
to that of Castile but in which the majority of the king’s income originated 
in his dominions and in the imperial monopoly over the trade of the most 
important products, as well as in the toll revenues. As in Castile, the fluc-
tuations in expenditure had compelled the Portuguese Crown to search 
for a secure and reliable income (even though Lisbon was not saddled 
with the enormous debts of Madrid), and the sisas were used as the 
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alcabalas encabezadas in Castile—as a fixed and more or less predictable 
income useful to endorse long-term public debt (Hespanha 1993a). Thus 
the Portuguese system also worked as a means of creating stable and pre-
dictable revenues upon which floating debts could be consolidated, crucial 
for dealing with fluctuations in receipts. The consequence was an increase 
in the sisas—or taxes upon the sale of products—administered by the town 
halls (câmaras), which enhanced the urban oligarchies’ fiscal protagonism. 
Thus in Portugal, as in Castile, it has become common to talk of a devolu-
tion of functions referred to as neomunicipalismo in relation to the increas-
ing relevance of the cities, whose role and responsibilities grew from the 
1550s (Magalhães 1997). It is possible that, as in Castile, what was occur-
ring in Portugal was a strengthening of an institutional role that had never 
truly been lost rather than an outright devolution of responsibilities. In 
any event, all of this allowed for a notable increase in the royal income 
during the sixteenth century, with a peak being reached at the end of it 
(Hespanha 1989, pp.  110–1). It also allowed for a non-written pact 
between the Crown and the urban oligarchies, which strengthened their 
political and fiscal influence within the towns.
A similar deal was also evident in the more general governance of the 
kingdom. In parallel, and despite the better organization of the central 
finances, government was and remained based upon the Consejos 
(Councils), central institutions that defended not only the rights of the 
king but also those of the kingdom, thus preserving a high degree of 
decentralization and agreement at the same time (Hespanha 1989). 
Thanks to the Ley Mental (1434), the tense pact between king and king-
dom represented in the Cortes was accompanied by a greater resistance to 
the nobles’ efforts to usurp the Crown’s patrimony without eliminating 
each other’s privileges and spheres of power. At the same time, thanks to 
the growing power of the corregidores and royal judges, the king’s justice 
was strengthened. But it should be stressed that private jurisdictions were 
not eliminated (Magalhães 1997). Thus, in spite of increasing absolutism, 
the king and the kingdom were able to find a point of agreement.
But the differences with Castile were also important. Most of them 
could be found in questions of proportion and political structure. Income 
from the King of Portugal’s imperial monopoly ranged from 60% to 68% 
in 1520 (Godinho 1968), a quantity that bears no relation to the 25% that 
the American treasures constituted in their peak years to the incomes of 
the Crown of Castile. The second most important contributor to royal 
incomes came from the import tolls, and to a large extent, these were tied 
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to foreign commerce. In this way the sisas constituted a proportionally 
smaller part, and, consequently, the Crown’s financial dependence upon 
local elites was proportionally lessened. The tax state, defined by 
J. Schumpeter as one involving a high degree of fiscal involvement of the 
kingdom in the state income, was less developed in Portugal than in 
Castile, while its component of rentier state (a state financed by other ter-
ritories) was far greater than was the case in Castile (Yun 2012). Moreover, 
in contrast to what would occur in Habsburg territories, the Avis dynasty 
ruled only in Portugal and tensions over the use of resources to benefit 
other dynastic territories were almost non-existent. Another difference lay 
in patterns of borrowing. In Castile debts had been generated not only by 
the disparity between incomes and expenditure but also by the need to pay 
for distant campaigns that required that funds be sent in advance. 
Furthermore, the much-praised realism of the Portuguese monarchs, who 
did not hesitate to abandon their interests in North Africa in the mid- 
century (Dom Sebastião’s disastrous expedition of 1578 being the only 
exception to this rule), did the rest. Debt never came to exert as much 
pressure in Portugal as in Castile, thus avoiding many problems. Money 
was not devalued, nor was there any need to declare bankruptcy, if we 
except the suspension of payments in 1560, which can hardly be consid-
ered as such (Godinho 1982–1987, vol. IV, pp. 215–6).
Peninsular trends
Some time ago historians such as, first, H. Hauser and then F. Braudel and 
I. Wallerstein described the years after the breakdown of 1558 as a period 
of European-wide crisis and transformation. In light of Castile’s financial 
problems, and those of Portugal in Asia, this idea appears to be corrobo-
rated.59 These difficulties affected exterior commerce, whose crisis was 
deepened by the Dutch Revolt (1566) that destabilized Castilian connec-
tions with the north of Europe as much as those of the Portuguese mar-
kets and financiers (Phillips 1990; Boyajian 1983). During these years 
Seville’s commerce also suffered, and the crisis of the fairs system and of 
Burgos trade began (Lorenzo 1979, vol. I, p. 199; Basas 1994).
59 Of the 15 times that Indies cargoes were seized by the monarchy during the century 
(1523, 1535, 1538, 1545, 1553, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1566, 1577, 1583, 1587, 1590, 
y 1596), five were in the 1550s, and these unblocked the financial crisis of 1556–1558 
(Carande 1987, vol. III, pp. 353–469).
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The domestic economy would also go through problems. Efforts have 
been made to reduce the importance of the bankruptcies of this period—
these were, of course, negotiated, like all of them (Lovett 1980)—but all 
indicators lead us to think that the effects on the financial economy were 
negative in the short term: they produced a breakdown in the credits 
chain, contributing to immobilize capital, and even affected certain indus-
tries.60 Even admitting a reduced level of debt in relation to the GDP of 
Castile—our doubts on this matter have been set out above—the effects 
of the crisis should be measured in regard to the size of the monetized 
section of domestic wealth, which was a fraction of the GDP.
The financial problems coincided with a challenging situation in some 
regions. Since the 1560s the symptoms of a slowing down of agrarian and 
demographic growth had been perceptible in some regions of Castile, and 
in the Duero Valley in particular (Yun 2004, pp. 417–28), while agrarian 
growth in Portugal also tended to slow down (Miranda 2017). Though, 
as was the case of Castile (see below), tax pressure was not great in macro-
economic terms, the type of taxes created in this period, and particularly 
the sisas levied on basic goods, would also have negative effects on arti-
sans’ workshops (2004, p. 344).61
60 As Drelichman and Voth (2014) say, there are good reasons for it. The argument is that 
in all cases they led to renegotiations of debt or compensation paid by the monarch, measures 
which, in truth, have been known about for much time. Still there are reasons to think that 
the effects on the financial economy were not negligible. Not only did these measures create 
uncertainty, but they also could have been a negative factor for transaction costs. They also 
delayed the payments made at fairs at precisely the moment when these gatherings had 
become more dependent upon the injection of money by the Crown at Medina del Campo 
(Abed Al-Hussein 1982, Appendix 2). See also Carande (1987, vol. I, pp. 325–6, 329–40). 
Precisely because the Genoese had constructed a cascade system that absorbed the negative 
effects of the monarchy’s failure to make payment (Drelichman and Voth 2014, pp. 160–6), 
when they themselves were affected, it was difficult for them to satisfy their creditors on time, 
and these, in turn, found themselves in a similarly dire situation. This extended the effects 
throughout all productive branches and even hit the owners of juros (for more detail based 
on primary sources, see Yun (2004, p. 338)).
61 Though some researchers have attributed to us a too strong emphasis on taxes as a factor 
for Castilian decay, we already gave a very nuanced opinion on this in Yun (1990).
Recently scholars have even come to speak of a variant of the ‘Dutch disease’ (Drelichman 
2005): a greater rise in price of the most commercialized goods, which would have made 
them less competitive in relation to foreign imports. Here, however, comparisons remain to 
be fully demonstrated, as wheat can hardly be considered as some of the more commercial-
ized products as Drelichman does (Table, p. 359). It would be more important to consider 
that the rise in wheat prices and other primary goods implied an increase in costs relative to 
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This having been said, the difficulties, if considerable, did not bring 
about an immediate change in the course of the economy. For at least 
20 years (until 1580 or so), most of the regional economies of Castile and 
Portugal continued to grow thanks to a series of readjustments in the 
agrarian sector, as well as thanks to the positive medium-term effects of 
the process of globalization.
In Seville the beginning of a second Atlantic cycle in the 1570s led to 
an unprecedented period of growth, in part as a result of commercial 
diversification. This growth occurred as Portuguese trade with Asia was 
recovering, the trade with Brazil was enhancing the economy of towns 
such as Porto, and its commerce with the North was reconstructed 
(Boyajian 1983; Phillips 1990). Sevillian imports of products such as dyes, 
leathers, and pearls rose quickly (Lorenzo 1979). In turn the emergence 
in America of markets for Castilian commodities and the development of 
mines facilitated the exportation of industrial goods. Nor did the crisis of 
the payment fairs lead to a commercial recession in Castile, thanks in part 
to the increasing connections with Portugal and Seville (Yun 1987). At 
the same time, the development of Seville was happening while the finan-
cial axis was being shifted from the Castilian fairs towards Madrid (Ruiz 
Martín 1990a). The growth of Seville and Madrid partially compensated 
for the problems of the Duero Valley’s fairs.
Similar trends were found in the agrarian sector and demographic evo-
lution. The interruption of population growth and agricultural expansion 
in the Duero Valley and in the interior of Aragon was compensated for by 
the continuation of the expansive movement in the regions of the South. 
The model of growth continued to function, being based on demographic 
expansion and the colonization of southern regions as well as a high degree 
of connectivity.62 At this point the structures and urban networks of Castile 
remained relatively solid. As a consequence, the problems raised by demo-
graphic pressure and the increase of land rent were mitigated by the peas-
ants’ capacity to maintain strong links with urban markets and to recur to 
maintenance of workshops, thus limiting their competitiveness in relation to foreign goods. 
But since Vilar’s called attention on it, this has been a frequently repeated argument that has 
slowly taken different meaning (Vilar 1974). This can be seen in a comparison of prices of 
goods, like wheat, and those of fabrics, for example (Yun 2004, p. 464, Graph 7.6).
62 This appears to be demonstrated by the figures on urban and agrarian population (Yun 
2004, Chap. 4). It is also shown by French emigration into Catalonia which contributed to 
the population growth at the end of the century (Nadal and Giralt 1960; Durán 1998, 
pp. 128–31). The population of Valencia continued to increase (Casey 1983, p. 62).
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auxiliary activities associated with commerce (transport services, the pro-
duction of coarse cloth and crockery, leather goods). All of this was facili-
tated by the continued abundance of common lands (the selling off of 
which would be moderate until the 1580s). The farming of intensive crops 
(such as the vine, silkworm, hemp, and linen), nearly always undertaken in 
small holdings, was also positive, above all when production was geared 
towards the market. Nor did the great estates and farms in the South, 
which benefited from the lowering of real wages paid in cash,  collapse 
overnight. Some areas of Andalusia saw an expansion of olive oil exports 
to America, while the Catalan nobles invested in iron production, and the 
Valencian landowners splurged on sugar mills and silk production.63
The rise of agrarian prices and of land rents increased the elite’s income 
and their demand for urban products. The overcoming of the elite’s eco-
nomic and social problems thanks to the empire enhanced their consump-
tion of luxury goods. In many towns, the building sector (the construction 
of palaces in general and ecclesiastic buildings in particular) seems to have 
increased. The growth during this period of industries such as the textile 
sector of Segovia was closely tied to the production of high-quality goods 
consumed by well-off groups, now including the American elites. Moreover, 
an important feature of this activity was based on the use of raw materials 
whose prices increased very slowly.64 In Catalonia the reorientation of the 
textile industry was even more intense and decisive from the 1550s, when 
a tendency towards a more efficient cycle of agrarian-urban interaction was 
established. A similar dynamism was exhibited by the silk industry in 
Murcia, Toledo, or Córdoba, these latter two being noticeable for their 
progress in adapting to the changing whims of fashion and demand.65
The figures and geography for the arrival of American silver, as well as 
of the types of merchandise purchased with it in 1570–1571, demonstrate 
that the colonial market was now positively affecting some industries.66 
Sectors such as naval construction and related industries (wood felling) 
63 Pérez and Lemeunier (1984), Jover (1997), Herrera (1980), Fortea (1981), Halperin 
(1980).
64 On wool prices, Brumont (1984b) and Pereira (1991, pp. 229–30). The same happened 
with dyes, like cochineal until the 1580s (Yun 2004, p. 428, Graph 7.5).
65 García Espuche (1998), Montemayor (1996, pp. 223–8), Fortea (1981, p. 327), Pérez 
Picazo y Lemeunier (1984).
66 Da Silva (1967, pp. 65–101). On the presence of manufactured goods in the American 
cargos, see (Lorenzo 1979).
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were favoured by the growing demand, above all in Vizcaya, Lisbon, 
Seville, and Porto. The spending of the monarchy clearly contributed to 
this trend as it built a fleet to meet the extravagant demands of its interna-
tional strategy. In Catalonia this led to the development of a fleet of smaller 
vessels serving the Mediterranean ports, a change that demonstrates the 
relative vitality of the principality’s economy.67
* * *
That the two imperial systems were factors for stability in the Iberian soci-
eties is accepted by most historians. Moreover, from a very teleological 
perspective of state building, it has been taken for granted that that pro-
cess was accompanied by the formation of more centralized tax systems 
associated with the military revolution. In other words, it has been sup-
posed that the so-called tax state and military state had to be coincident 
and convergent phenomena.
We have shown here that the empires and, more in particular, the pro-
cess of globalization were not only factors of stability. In many ways, they 
were eroding the social fabrics of both Castilian and Portuguese societies 
and indirectly affecting the other territories. From that perspective the 
way the empires created political and social stability looks a bit different, 
and we need to explain why the stabilizing forces prevailed.
Political and social stability and, therefore, the consolidation and slow 
transformation of the institutional frameworks were the outcomes of 
mechanisms linked to the way the new fiscal system was organized (above 
all in Castile) and the way new opportunities in the credit market were 
used, the opportunities that the empires gave to elites to satisfy their need 
for expansion and, all in all, for reformulation of the ‘contract’ they had 
among themselves and with the Crown. Of course that contract was dif-
ferent in the monarchy’s different spaces. By focusing on the case of Spain, 
we can see that, though contrary to a commonplace, the contribution of 
other kingdoms (viz. Naples and the Low Countries) increased, the devel-
opment of a new fiscal system in Castile created a sort of umbrella that 
allowed other parts of the composite monarchy to preserve their fiscal 
systems almost intact. Portugal, not being a spread-out composite monar-
chy, was slightly different.
67 Goodman (1997) and García Espuche (1998).
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But this perspective of analysis also explains (better than previous 
approaches, I hope) that the outcome of these tensions in Castile was not 
a ‘centralized’ tax state. The reformulation of the agreement between the 
Crown and the elites, as well as among those elites, paved the way for a 
consolidation—not without evolution—of the old institutions. It also 
contributed to enhance a decentralized system of mobilization of resources 
for war of which the outcome was the elite’s great capacity for exercising 
coercion, control of violence, and capability of enforcement. Though it is 
possible that in economic terms the size of the central tax state’s budget 
was higher than that of all of the other corporations combined, the effects 
from the perspective of the political economy and on state building would 
be noticeable in all the territories of the composite monarchy. We will 
return to this.
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CHAPTER 5
The Crystallization of a Political Economy, 
c. 1580–1630
Most of the traditional explanations for the so-called decline of Spain have 
been based on—and sometimes encouraged by—a series of stereotypes 
about its social values and cultural beliefs. These attitudes have been stud-
ied as derived from the mere existence of a society of orders, without 
considering the formal institutions in which they were based. There is, 
therefore, a clear danger of anachronism when speaking about the institu-
tions and political economies of the early modern period. It is quite com-
mon to refer to the central institutions of the monarchy and the way that 
they interacted with local powers in order to administer violence.1 The 
analysis of commercial institutions has also become very common among 
historians.2 And, even if it is obvious that the number of institutions that 
can be studied here is not limited—above all if we adopt what is apparently 
becoming the standard definition of institutions, ‘the rules of the game’ so 
to speak—too often scholars forget to examine in any detail or depth the 
effects that some of the more important of those institutions (the Court, 
the señoríos, the ecclesiastical corporations, the judicial system, and even 
the municipalities) had on the allocation of economic resources, to say 
1 See Tilly (1990). This chapter is, however, principally an attempt to enter into debate 
with the ideas of the new institutional economics and in particular with North et al. (2009), 
especially Chaps. 2 and 3.
2 See Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Hough and Grier (2015).
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nothing of the historiographical obliteration of the role of informal insti-
tutions (personal rules in many cases) both in state building and in shaping 
economic performance.3
This chapter aims to set Spanish early modern values and cultural beliefs 
in their institutional context at the end of the sixteenth century. Old ste-
reotypes will be challenged, and the moral economy of the period will be 
considered as derived from a political economy and a system of institutions 
and personal rules. This will allow a more complete and balanced vision of 
the effects of all of this upon economic development.
IberIan StereotypeS and Cultural belIefS 
In european perSpeCtIve
For many years the so-called decline of Spain has played a major role in 
reinforcing a range of stereotypes, some of which have become so perva-
sive as to assume the role of ‘national character’.4 As is often the case, 
some of these clichés have a basis in reality. Yet, as is always the case, they 
also represent a distortion of it.
The seigniorial lifestyle, a supposed aversion to commerce, and even a 
reputed abhorrence of manual labour and practical knowledge have been 
presented as causes of decline (Defourneaux 1983). Even more damning 
has been the use of these stereotypes to describe a turning point in the his-
tory of the country and to extrapolate supposedly national characteristics 
from them and from an essentialist narrative (‘the Black Legend’), with the 
old clichés presented as crucial features of the ‘Spanish way of life’.
These visions can, of course, be supported from contemporary evi-
dence. The economy of legitimation practiced by the aristocracy (Chap. 1) 
has been presented as a highly irrational use of resources for families 
3 The economic action of the royal Court has been studied (Rodríguez-Salgado 1992, 
1998), but emphasis has fallen on its impact upon economies and its impact on the rule of 
the game has been completely obliterated (Ringrose 1983a or López ed. 1998). In regard to 
the señoríos, much of what is known is derived from the Enlightenment. For an attempt at 
revision, see Yun (2002a). To an even greater extent, the ecclesiastical economies have been 
the victims of these interpretations: while this view cannot be said to be entirely erroneous in 
its analysis and criticism, a greater refinement and balance are clearly needed. The same is 
true for the municipal institutions. To my knowledge no study has dealt with them from this 
perspective despite their importance. On the role of informal institution in other areas see 
Rosenthal and Wong (2011). Also P. Vries (2015).
4 In reference to these questions, Sánchez Albornoz came to speak of a supposedly homo 
hispanicus (1976), and Defourneaux (1983) referred to the ‘Spanish soul’.
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indebted up to their eyeballs. The spending on culture, patronage, charity, 
pageantry, and court luxury has been seen as proof of the truth of these 
stereotypes.5 In fact, many writers of the day, such as Domingo de Soto, 
Luis Vives, and Pérez de Angulo, underlined the prevalent ethos of the 
aristocracy and the employment of wealth, which was channelled into the 
aforementioned ‘economy of legitimation’: help to the poor; the founda-
tion of religious institutions; and patronage and the demonstration—and 
celebration—of status through conspicuous consumption (Yun 2004, 
pp. 56, 269). With respect to businessmen and businesses, the impression 
is often very similar, and the study of middle-class families has tended to 
underline their attraction towards a noble way of life and even—on first 
impression—their desire to abandon trade.6 The famous (or infamous) 
prohibition issued by Philip II on foreign study, the general attempt at 
ideological control, and the Inquisition’s efforts to censor publications lie 
behind the interpretation of a rejection of knowledge and learning (Kamen 
1965). The picaresque and the so-called noble lifestyle have been seen as 
proof of the rejection of work and labour.
Yet a comparative context inevitably adds balance and proportion to 
this image. Many of these traits can be found in countries other than Spain 
(and Portugal, of course). The so-called noble way of life also existed in 
England, France, and even, indeed, in Holland, whose society is usually 
taken to embody precisely the opposite stereotype.7 The other side of the 
coin, the supposed rejection of commerce, can be traced back to Braudel’s 
idea of the ‘betrayal of the bourgeoisie’, a phenomenon that might be 
found equally in these countries and, of course, in Italy.8 The rejection of 
5 An excellent description can be found in the handwritten manuscript Avisos políticos, 
históricos y morales. I am grateful to Fernando Bouza for this reference.
6 See the cases of Medina del Campo, Valladolid, and Segovia, respectively, in Abed 
Al-Hussein (1982), Bennassar (1983), and Ródenas (1990). Rodrigo de Dueñas, of Jewish 
descent, was a businessman and alderman of Medina del Campo and would later be called 
the ‘Medicis castellano’—the Castilian Medici, Caro Baroja (1978, pp. 376–887).
7 For the English nobility, L. Stone (1979, p. 251) speaks of the need to lead ‘a lifestyle in 
accordance with one’s dignity’ as being one of the most important factors in spending. For 
Holland, Van Nierop (1984, pp. 19–34). For France, Jouanna (1991, p. 44) and Gascon 
(1994, pp. 357–68). See also Schalk (1986).
8 Braudel (1976, vol. II, 99–110). For France, Jouanna (1991) and Gascon (1977, 
pp. 303–22 y 357–68). Roland Gascon has written that the purchase of offices ‘drained capi-
tal to the detriment of businesses’ and weakened ‘the great commercial dynasties’. What 
Stone calls ‘the inflation of honours’, with marriages between nobles and the daughters of 
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manual labour—or the marked preference for the noble lifestyle—formed 
part of the era’s value system. Even the phenomenon of the closing off of 
the guilds can be found in other regions of Europe.9
These interpretations and concepts must therefore be nuanced and bal-
anced within quite specific historical contexts. The noble lifestyle was also 
part of a process that had emerged from the auxilium, including royal 
favours, court patronage, and the capture of political incomes in order to 
overcome central tensions within the dynamic of aristocratic families and 
networks (Chap. 4 above) (Yun 2002a, 2005a and 2005b). The economic 
trajectory seen from the middle of the fifteenth century demonstrated the 
scope for development of merchant groups of undoubted potential. 
Families such as the Ruíz, the Dueñas, and the Espinosa, and many others, 
proved not only their trading spirit but also their skills and aptitudes as 
businessmen and bankers.10 As was the case for their counterparts across 
the continent, investments in rents (juros and censos) and land were part of 
strategies aimed at the diversification of business and risk.11 And, as in other 
countries, these families employed matrimonial and familial policies that 
allowed them to establish their businesses, reduce transaction costs, gain 
access to privileged sources of information, create flexible and far-reaching 
commercial networks, reduce barriers on access to certain areas, and achieve 
social promotion for themselves and their relatives.12 The purchase of 
noble titles was a means of acquiring the sort of political capital that would 
be useful for their true interest and purpose—the reproduction of their 
families—which was a priority far above and beyond the financial success 
of their businesses. In a brilliant book, Michel Cavaillac has demonstrated 
the existence of what he labels ‘a bourgeois spirit’, a term whose value 
businessmen can be considered the ‘betrayal of the bourgeoisie’ (Stone 1979, chapter 11). 
Something similar happened in Holland (Burke 1974).
9 In France the artisan masters tended to consider their trade as ‘a patrimony to be reserved 
for their sons’ and sought to prevent the entrance of new members into guilds by a variety 
of means. In Holland the guilds also practiced restrictive measures to keep out newcomers 
(De Vries y Van der Woude 1997, pp. 174–6).
10 Lohman (1968), Lapeyre (1955). On the diffusion of Castilian financial techniques in 
Europe, Van der Wee (1967).
11 Lapeyre (1955), Abed Al-Hussein (1982), Carande (1987, vol. I), Casado (1997) 
among others.
12 Abed Al-Hussein (1982), Casado (1987, p. 220). On the role of the merchants as con-
suls and a means to obtaining information, see the case of the Florentine Ginori, Zamora 
(2014), and Lobato (2013).
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might be debated but that perfectly reflects the ideal of a group that val-
ued merit and championed commerce and work and even advocated an 
anti-war policy in the hope that it might help the development of business 
(Cavillac 1994, pp. 256–410).
Something similar might be said about the myth of there existing wide-
spread prejudice against practical knowledge and work in Spain. The 
capacity for technological development offers considerable proof of how 
mistaken this interpretation is, although it might be added that advances 
were largely achieved through the influence of foreign technicians and the 
assimilation of new knowledge (Chap. 3). Furthermore, it is very signifi-
cant that the majority of the topics discussed in the preceding pages have 
been taken from the works of the arbitristas, the reform-minded writers of 
the early seventeenth century. From 1550 to 1630, men such as Cellorigo, 
Mercado, Caxa de Leruela, and Diego de Deza channelled their energies 
into criticizing the vices of the noble lifestyle—its luxury, indulgence, and 
rejection of manual labour. Yet the true value of these arguments, and the 
reason why they were enthusiastically welcomed, was that their readers 
shared the authors’ revulsion at noble tastes and pretensions in general 
and specifically their rejection of manual labour (Mackay 2006). This posi-
tive assessment of work—and in particular artisans’ work—permeated 
many ranks of society (Yun 2007).
All of this demonstrates the futility of studying the world of social val-
ues as a self-contained reality of permanent, monolithic, and uniform con-
cepts characteristic of national identities. This society cannot have been 
said to have been shaped by either a noble ethic or bourgeois spirit: nei-
ther model advances any serious attempt to understand it, as it was char-
acterized by competing values and ideals that were often applied flexibly 
and pragmatically according to circumstances and conditions, which were 
many and varied. Cultural beliefs were not homogeneous but rather were 
made up by a range of rival visions, each one exerting its influence at dif-
ferent times and to varying degrees.
This starting point affords us a better understanding of both formal and 
informal institutions and the way they strengthened specific cultural beliefs.
formal InStItutIonS
The development of what A. M. Hespanha called ‘the official law’ was evi-
dent in sixteenth-century Spain and Portugal (Hespanha 1989, p. 376). 
This was, without doubt, a step towards the standardization of laws, an 
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objective which, at least theoretically, could affect transaction costs and 
reduce risks. The growing importance of ‘official law’ was manifested in a 
number of developments already mentioned (Chap. 2), such as the compi-
lation of laws or the increasing role and relevance of Chancillerías and 
provincial courts.13 In Portugal, the appointment of non-residential judges 
(usually trained in official law) in the municipalities can be considered a 
manifestation of the same phenomenon (Magalhães 1997, p. 162). A sys-
tem of royal corregidores and other types of local delegates of the king 
charged with the application of the law had also been extended across the 
Iberian kingdoms.14 In Portugal, the Ordenações Manuelinas of 1514 and 
the Filipinas (1595) sought to impose a greater degree of uniformity upon 
the town councils (Magalhães 1997, p. 162; Neto 1997, p. 152). Some 
examples can even be found of the growing role of official law in the 
enforcement of existing adherent organizations by which traders guaran-
tied internal agreements. The Casa de la Contratación of Seville and the 
Casa da Índia in Lisbon represent the clearest examples of this trend.15 
The training of skilled jurists and lawyers advanced quickly and even led to 
the emergence of a small army of law graduates dedicated to the application 
of the law across the entire empire.16 The compilation and diffusion of 
juridical norms continued throughout the reign of Philip II and resulted in 
compendia that would enjoy a long life in all of the Iberian kingdoms 
(Tomás y Valiente 1992, pp.  263–81). Very often these regiments of 
experts, armed with voluminous legal compilations, did not in fact engi-
neer an unconditional support for royal absolutism; on the contrary, they 
underlined the need for the king to respect and uphold the rights of the 
kingdom in question.17 Moreover, a number of publications circulated that 
set out the ideal behavioural norms of the corregidores and specified how 
they should administer royal and seigniorial justice. The Política para 
Corregidores of Castillo de Bovadilla (1597) was one of the most notable 
and influential of these works.
13 Kagan (1981), MacAlister (1984), Casey (1983), and, for a synthesis including America, 
Tomás y Valiente (1992). On Portugal’s judicial system, see Hespanha (1989).
14 For Castile, see Lunenfeld (1987) and for Portugal, Magalhães (1997, p. 161).
15 For an empirical basis for these arguments, see Fernández de Castro (2015), and for 
Portugal, see Ferreira (2015, pp. 82–5).
16 Pelorson (1980), Rivero (2011).
17 See, for example, the case of Juan Bautista Larrea in Volpini (2004).
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The increase in the number of cases brought before the regional court 
or Chancillería of Valladolid (Kagan 1981), which proportionally far out-
stripped population growth, constitutes one of the best pieces of evidence 
for the development of the system of impersonal enforcement under the 
authority of judges. An eloquent demonstration of the character of this 
system can be found in the sociology of the cases brought before the 
Chancillería of Valladolid. According to figures presented by Richard 
L.  Kagan, the most common target of litigation was the king himself, 
something which can be interpreted in principle as evidence of the devel-
opment of a third-party system in which the so-called parasitic absolutist 
king had to play by (at least) some of the rules of the game.18 After the 
king, the Castilian aristocracy were the group that most frequently recurred 
to judicial intervention, usually as the third party in a system of incentive- 
compatible agreements dealing in matters of dowries and matrimonial ties, 
transfers of inheritances, and questions related to the mayorazgo, dona-
tions, and—finally but obviously of great importance in light of what has 
been set out above—debts (Kagan 1981, pp. 11–2). All of this demon-
strates the insufficiency and failings of the system of self-enforcement and 
internal agreements, which had been predominant over the previous cen-
turies and which had often led to violent feudal confrontations (Chap. 1). 
In Kagan’s figures the aristocracy was followed by the cities, which liti-
gated over questions of privileges, municipal lands, and, of course, debts 
(the greatest single cause of hearings in Castile). Finally it can be no sur-
prise to find ordinary subjects and peasants, the latter suing their landlords 
(Kagan 1981, p. 12).
As we have seen (Chap. 2), the registering of written contracts increased, 
as thousands of documents in Castilian, Portuguese, and Aragonese 
archives prove. This development was manifested in the dense network of 
notaries and clerks that had emerged in all of the Iberian kingdoms at the 
end of the century.19 They registered all types of agreements: accords for 
large-scale sales and purchases; contracts for the formation of companies; 
pledges and commitments to marry and, above all, to pay dowries (even in 
rural areas), both of which proved crucial for the economies of aristocrats, 
18 Significantly, many of the ‘thousands of lawsuits’ in which the king was a party were due 
to his duty ‘to protect his vast personal patrimony’ (Kagan 1981, p. 11).
19 For Portugal, see Hespanha (1989, pp. 140–4). Like in the case of the judges, they were 
local offices.
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patricians, and merchants; the cartas de poder (letters conferring power of 
attorney for collecting specific debts or acting on behalf of a trader in gen-
eral matters) exchanged between businessmen operating in distant areas; 
post-death inventories of goods and their division between families; and 
even contracts to postpone or divide the payment of debts or to arrange 
their repayment in distant towns.
For this reason, notarial registers were increasingly used in the Atlantic 
and were established in America as a means of enforcing payments and 
debts (Cachero 2010). The use of identical formats and structures in the 
documents generated on both sides of the Atlantic was indicative of a 
movement towards the globalization of the rules of play. It is also interest-
ing that this type of bureaucrat, in principle dependent upon the Crown—
something which was not the case in other European regions (Yun and 
Ramos 2012)—emerged not only in the royal demesne lands but also in 
the towns under noble, ecclesiastical, and municipal jurisdiction.
As we will see further in this chapter, many of these trends created posi-
tive conditions for economic activities. But this view does not fit a reality 
that was much more complex.
The pact within elites and between them and the king guaranteed and 
even, in certain respects, reinforced both the jurisdictional role of these 
seigniorial estates and the private jurisdictions in general. In Castile, 
Aragon, and Portugal, noble and ecclesiastical estates retained some capac-
ity of enforcement, despite the development of royal justice in the 
Chancillerías (Guilarte 1987, p. 203). At the root of everything was the 
superimposition of different laws and legal codes, which often operated in 
competition with one another (Hespanha 1989). Though the approval of 
the Crown was sometimes needed, the great aristocrats and leading eccle-
siastical institutions retained their capacity of coercion and right to pro-
mulgate council by-laws (ordenanzas) that regulated social life and the 
exploitation of resources (García Hernán 2010). They also had the power 
to nominate local authorities and judges. In the Crown of Aragon, the 
exercise of ‘absolute’ jurisdiction extended the seigniors’ enormous day- 
to- day power. Even in Catalonia, where the process was more ambiguous 
and nuanced, the authority of the jurisdictional landlords continued to be 
highly influential (Serra 1988). In Portugal things were not very different. 
Here, as in the rest of the peninsula, the seigniors retained an enormous 
jurisdictional capacity and powers of enforcement (Hespanha 1989, 
pp. 307–63). The importance of the nobles as nuclei for the mobilization 
of troops or credit (by setting debts in their mayorazgos) only strength-
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ened this situation across the peninsula. The sale of jurisdictions—some-
thing inexistent in Portugal, although the alienation of royal lands had 
been significant in the fifteenth century—multiplied the number of social 
actors who held private jurisdictions in such a way that it advanced the 
fragmentation of the jurisdictional map and who mediated in the Crown’s 
capacity to apply the law, at least in the first instance (Nader 1990).
A similar process took place in the cities despite their more direct depen-
dency upon the king. The growing power of the king through his judges 
or mayors (corregidores) supposed a limitation to both their autonomous 
capacity of enforcement and the extrajudicial imposition of the wishes of 
the oligarchy. But, for reasons set out above (Chap. 4), the cities and 
municipalities retained great control over their fiscal systems, which was 
decisive for economic activity. And they also maintained their capacity for 
coercion and even, in the final instance, for the exercise of violence, in part 
because of their role in military mobilizations. All of this allowed the cities 
to strengthen their economic activities, a process which was accompanied 
by the reinforcing of the ideological justification for their privileges.
Given the similarities between changes in the towns and the system of 
auxilium exercised by the nobility, these trends reinforced the notion of 
the noble status of the city as a counterweight to the more republican 
vision that had previously been prevalent.20 Aware of their character as a 
sort of collective señorío, the cities came to see themselves as a manifesta-
tion of nobility and so advanced rival claims over their ancestry and 
 antiquity.21 This same impulse strengthened the medieval vision of the city 
as being responsible for the common good, a trend which reinforced a 
political economy which was theoretically directed to this end.22 This 
served as a justification for a city’s economic resources and jurisdictions 
and strengthened its capacity for coercion.23 And the cities clearly retained 
20 See the case of Salamanca—many others might be mentioned—in G. Gómez Dávila, 
Historia de las Antigüedades de la ciudad de Salamanca, ed. Facsímil de Salamanca, 1994 
[Prologue of B. Cuart; of the original edition of 1606].
21 The nobility of the city was, by extension, a reflection of the noble status of its families, 
something which consecrated the mimicry between a city and its patriciate. See G. Argote de 
Molina, Nobleza de Andalucía Riquelme y Vargas ediciones: Jaén, 1991 [original edition, 
Jaén 1866].
22 On that vision in the context of an idea of republicanism, see Skinner (2002, pp. 39–117). 
On the urban señorío, Castillo de Bovadilla (1640).
23 The concern for the wellbeing of the poor was very clear, as was the commitment to the 
general good and public services (teaching, health, cleanliness), or religious observance, all 
of which were undertaken with the aim of creating social cohesion and a sort of collective 
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a vigorous array of privileges and coercive prerogatives: the right to pro-
hibit and regulate markets, such as that of wine; the power to police 
weights and measures; and control over prices (Hamilton 1975). Another 
significant right was the regulation of commerce through local intermedi-
aries, a prerogative which was decisive for the collection of both alcabalas 
and millones (Chacón 1979, pp. 342–54). Especially important was the 
system for provisioning the city, which attempted to guaranteed the sup-
ply of bread, meat, and fish through the creation of communal granaries 
and the public management of grain exchanges or through the establish-
ment of a system of contractors who, in exchange for deals with the coun-
cil or mayor’s office, obtained the monopoly on the trade in the product 
in question (see below). Moreover, the publicly funded purchase of com-
mon lands or municipal offices allowed the local oligarchies to control the 
use of considerable resources and functions (De Bernardo 1994).
Many cities also maintained their regulatory capacity over industrial and 
guild activities, which was crucial for economic development. This function 
became more significant when the right to allocate or distribute taxes through 
the branches of industry afforded it a greater degree of interventionism. In 
Seville the ‘municipal council was increasingly responsible for the approval of 
the guild by-laws’ until, well into the seventeenth century, this activity began 
to fall under the control of the Royal Council (Bernal et al. 1978, p. 100). 
Scholars have spoken of a growing ‘municipal interventionism’ in Córdoba 
throughout the sixteenth century (Fortea 1981, pp. 381–8).
In the short term, the institutional evolution described in previous 
chapters tended to preserve the rural councils (concejos) in their different 
juridical formats. Yet here variation was considerable. There were areas—
such as Salamanca and Extremadura—where depopulation took place, 
with the disappearance of small villages and hamlets: this was usually 
caused by the expansion of the livestock economy, the interest of the 
nobility and big ecclesiastic landlords in increasing their direct access to 
catharsis (through great processions like those of Corpus Christi, feast days, and public acts). 
The same can be said of the use of charity, the creation of confraternities, care for orphans, 
or the efforts to implant a civilizing process of courtesy or urbanity through the control over 
time, which led to the widespread purchase and installation of clocks in public spaces (Castillo 
de Bovadilla 1597). In Castile policing was important, but much more so in Aragon, largely 
because of the fight against banditry by cities or unions of cities (Colás and Salas 1982, 
pp. 289–322; Torres 1994, chap. IV). All developments were very similar to what was hap-
pening in Portugal, where the Ordenaçoes Filipinas set down functions and similar ideologi-
cal programmes (Hespanha 1989, pp. 132 and ff.).
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land, or the reconsolidation of settlements. In the Crown of Castile, how-
ever, this process was not prevalent or common in many areas where the 
interest of the jurisdictional landlords—and specifically the importance of 
the tercias and alcabalas to their incomes—led them to support the sur-
vival of communities. Furthermore, the opportunities available to the sei-
gniorial landlords to overcome financial difficulties through access to 
favours generated by the auxilium or easy credit may have acted as a safety 
valve for the pressure exerted on the peasant collectives (Yun 2002a).
These institutions underwent considerable change as a result of a com-
bination of factors: the atomization of community relations brought about 
by the purchase of jurisdictions and the fragmentation of wider spaces of 
shared common land, a growing internal social differentiation, the con-
centration of property within the higher echelons of local society, the 
increasing domination of municipal government by elites, the ever-more 
common ownership of offices by leading families, and so on. But it is cer-
tain that they survived as an essential part of society and the institutional 
and economic arrangements described above (Chap. 3). For this reason, 
the rural community remained an institution that was vital to any under-
standing of the rules of coercion, the informal mechanisms of enforce-
ment, and the regulation of economic activity and allocation of productive 
factors. This is particularly important to remember, as their domains saw 
the most frequent overlapping and clashes of official law and the myriad of 
‘non- official laws’ and customs. Studies for Portugal (which cannot have 
been substantially different from the rest of Europe) show that it was at 
the level of the rural community that the various forms of law and models 
of enforcement (very much based upon compromise) had the greatest 
impact and importance (Hespanha 1989, pp. 363–77).
The process described in the previous chapters explains the survival of 
ecclesiastical justice and juridical autonomy. While remaining dependent 
upon Rome, ecclesiastical justice was faced with an increase in the capacity 
of royal justice to intervene, while the king’s powers of mediation were also 
growing. At times, ecclesiastical institutions themselves required the king’s 
intercession as a third party in their internal relations and disputes or in 
those with members of other religious orders. But the independence of 
ecclesiastical justice over the clergy remained untouched (Domínguez 
1985, pp. 335–440). Moreover, the very fact that there existed such con-
troversy over the ability of the Church to impose corporal punishment 
upon those members of the laity who broke its rules provides clear evi-
dence that the ecclesiastical courts kept a good deal of their capacity for 
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enforcement. Some contemporaries even justified the right of the clerics to 
impose these punishments for infringements such as the sale of substan-
dard merchandise or the charging of excessive prices for goods (Domínguez 
1985). A good number of institutions conceded donativos to the king—as 
we will see, this tendency became paramount in the seventeenth century—
and even became involved in military levies, trends which reinforced their 
power within their domains or allowed them to obtain new privileges. In 
some cases, institutions obtained exemption from the sisas de millones, or 
were compensated for having to pay them, concessions which reinforced 
their capacity for fiscal autonomy. And there was general agreement that 
the Church’s temporal jurisdiction might be used to punish those who lent 
money—not only ecclesiastics—at excessive rates of interest (usury). The 
opposition put up by the Cathedral of Zamora to laws about contraband 
trade with Portugal is indicative of its institutional power to resist the king’s 
justice (Álvarez 1987). The Church continued to wield powerful religious 
censures and punishments; indeed, it even threatened excommunication 
for economic infractions such as the failure to pay the tithe (see Chap. 4).
The developments described in the previous chapter also explain the 
changes and continuities in the guild system. The expansion of the urban 
economies reinforced artisan activities and led to the framing of guild by- 
laws by many artisan corporations. In this respect, cases such as those of 
Seville and Toledo are significant.24 It is very possible that a factor in these 
developments was the fiscal system (and the encabezamientos), which dis-
tributed fiscal burdens upon offices and branches of activity.25 For this rea-
son, the continued existence of these corporations could be vital to the 
ability of the cities to meet their fiscal quota. In order to understand the 
political economy of these institutions, it is important to consider that they 
were not corporations dedicated to a purely economic purpose or end; 
rather, their primary function was to guarantee the social interests of the 
group from which they were formed and to ensure reciprocity between 
them, despite the inevitable rivalries between members of different guilds. 
They had many other functions beyond mere economic regulation: support 
24 Bernal et al. (1978) and Montemayor (1996, p. 208).
25 This connection between corporations and the fiscal system deserves better study. In any 
case, some authors such as Nieto (2006, p. 200) have established that it was reinforced when, 
in the seventeenth century, the corporations made donativos to the Crown, which therefore 
had a great interest in their survival.
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was given to widows; assistance was provided for the burial of members; and 
the benefits of membership of these corporations were frequently projected 
into the public space through a rich visual and symbolic culture. But even 
more important, though in most of the towns corporations were under the 
city authorities’ supervision, they had the function of controlling and regu-
lating the production process, which gave them a high capacity of enforce-
ment and coercion (see, e.g. Fortea 1981; Nieto 2006). The predominance 
of these functions—not only on the peninsula—explains an important fea-
ture of these corporations: their great interest in limiting competition from 
external competitors and in erecting entry barriers for them.
The consulates were to merchants what guilds were to artisans. The 
most interesting of them was, without doubt, that of Seville. As always 
with these institutions, the Seville consulate exercised a notable power of 
regulation over merchant relationships and was important in creating 
mechanisms of confidence—sometimes, informal ones—between its mem-
bers. It was also active in resolving conflicts through nonjudicial means. 
This was achieved through self-enforcement and by forging private accords 
within the mercantile community. Of course, these arrangements existed 
beyond the consulates’ members and their fields of operation. But the 
Consulate of Seville, like its counterpart in Burgos, which it imitated in 
many regards, also had its own justice mechanisms adjusted to the nascent 
Castilian commercial legal code and its growing transnational component 
(Smith 1978, chapters VI and VII). When traders did not reach an agree-
ment through the Consulate—or the House of Trade (Fernández de 
Castro 2015)—mediation, the judges of these institutions also applied the 
laws of Castile in combination with more general customs and practices. 
They exercised a form of justice that was similar to that of the Chancillerías, 
above which there was only the Council of Indies and of the king himself; 
but they also heard cases brought against the king and, most often, against 
the abusive application of his fiscal measures and in many occasions the 
judges of the Consulate acted as ‘watchful dogs’ of the trader’s economic 
interests’ (Smith 1978, p. 147).
Although the Court exhibited the characteristics of a highly informal 
institution, it constituted one of the most important spaces for social and 
economic regulation in this period. The processes described in previous 
chapters led to the emergence of the Court as a political space in which 
patronage was administered and power exercised (Rodríguez-Salgado 
1992, 1998). It became a decisive institution for the administration of 
violence and law, both of which would shape the management of the great 
patrimonies and, indirectly, the country’s economy.
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The composite monarchy of the Spanish Habsburgs had been con-
structed as a constellation of Courts. This having been said, clearly Philip 
II, Philip III, and Philip IV reinforced the role of Madrid Court and capi-
tal within the empire, even above the interests of Lisbon, to the great 
discontent of the Portuguese.26 Madrid Court was in fact the crucible 
where huge economic, social, and political resources were distributed 
and, therefore, the main arena in which the conflictive pact was substanti-
ated. In this political space, royal grace was dispensed, and appointments 
(for viceroyalties, embassies, military commands, etc.) could be obtained. 
These conferrals constituted the other side of the auxilium and were vital 
to elite groups.27 Moreover, the Court was the arena where vital questions 
about seigniorial estates were resolved, where permissions for censos were 
obtained, and where contact could be made with the governmental 
 councils, through which an array of favours could be secured for courtiers 
and their clients. Here the institution of marriage—determinative for the 
management of all estates and for noble patrimonies in particular—was 
arranged. And Madrid was, with Vienna, the most developed matrimonial 
market in Europe. Information on the political, social, and economic cap-
ital of prospective partners was available at these nodes. Three-party 
negotiations were entered into (with the king’s involvement) over the 
terms and conditions of ties. In a sense, Madrid’s king was the greatest 
‘matchmaker’ in the world, as the ties decided here were questions of 
state, and for this reason the Habsburgs, like the Stuart kings of England 
(Stone 1979), had acquired the right to allow—or forbid—any prospec-
tive marriage (Atienza and Simón 1989, pp. 39–40). The Court was also 
a complex world of secrets and intrigues, in which the price of informa-
tion, itself vital for the aristocratic economies and measurable in the cost 
of keeping a large numbers of clients, minions, and servants, was very 
high. Here accords were negotiated and strategies formed, often forcing 
the parties into a direct and personal relationship with the king’s secretar-
ies, administrators, and lawyers, who themselves habitually made valuable 
clients (Rodríguez-Salgado 1992). The rituals of power, and the need to 
generate the political and social capital necessary to secure the confidence 
26 The political and social processes can be found in different works of J. Mártínez Millán 
(e.g. Martínez and Morales (1998)). See also Lisón (1991) and Del Río (2000).




and reciprocity appropriate to informal institutional relationships medi-
ated though the social ciphers of the court and its arcane manners, com-
pelled the high nobility and those above it to maintain a continuous 
presence in Madrid.28
Across Europe patronage and the king’s capacity to distribute eco-
nomic and social resources to clients and lineages would be one of the keys 
to political stability. In this sense Madrid Court was unique.29 In fact, it 
was the balsam that made possible the relations of self-enforcement intrin-
sic to closed societies and that cemented the accord at the heart of the 
dominant coalition.30 Here the effects of globalization and empire were 
evident. Despite the remarkable differences between the multinational 
elites that converged on Madrid, this was the Court of the ‘greatest lord 
of the world’, as the Venetian ambassador, Simon Contarini, remarked in 
relation to Philip III, adding that these characteristics increased the king’s 
ability to temper political ruptures.31 As an institution the Court even 
helped to crystallize relationships between the various nobilities of the 
empire (Yun 2009).
28 This case is very similar to Greif’s description of the great Genoese merchants and bank-
ers (Greif 2006). Pinheiro da Veiga, a Portuguese noble in the Court of Valladolid at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, described the conflict between the marquis of Tavara, 
‘who is very much a youth’, and the duke of Infantado, ‘who is very pro-Portuguese’, over 
errors committed in the use of term of address ‘señoría’ and the expression ‘merced’ (1989 
[1605–1606], pp. 115–6).
29 For a very different view, see N. Elias (2000), who attributed ‘the civilizing process’ to 
the control of violence imposed upon the nobility of Louis XIV at Versailles. Here the aim is 
to study the court as a redistributor of incomes that palliated factional conflicts and its con-
tribution to the consolidation of the political and social system (chapter 9).
30 As elsewhere in this study, the terms employed here follow the usage of North et al. 
(2009), who do not, however, dedicate much attention to the court.
31 ‘Without touching his estate’, Contarini wrote, the king ‘has much to give in two ways; 
on the one hand, for distribution as a reward for the monetary services destined to this end; 
on the other, when he pays and rewards with the exercise of the offices given him, because 
he appoints twenty and more Viceroys […] forty-six general captains […] Distributes mili-
tary orders, encomiendas [grants in rights to land and the services of their inhabitants] […] 
those being are more than five hundred encomiendas, some worth twenty thousand ducats 
and the smallest five hundred […] eight or more Archbishoprics […] the least of which ren-
ders five thousand ducats; seventy-three bishoprics […] most of them worth twenty thou-
sand ducats, and none less than three thousand’. ‘Relación que hizo a la República de 
Venecia, Simón Contarini, al fin del año 1605 de la Embajada que había hecho en España’, 
in L. Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la Corte de España desde 1591 
a 1614, Madrid, 1857.
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The Crown might also be referred to as an institution. It was to a large 
extent responsible for the progress of the Chancillerías and the juridical 
systems that allowed litigants to appeal to official law. At the same time, 
the monarchs sponsored the emergence of the scribe system, the compila-
tion of law codes, and other changes that took place across the Iberian 
kingdoms. The legal treatises of the time also emphasized the importance 
of presenting the king as the final legal authority—that is, above the pri-
vate jurisdictions—and the sponsor of these new compilations of legal 
codes and customs.32 The pact with the elites had helped to give political 
stability to the different kingdoms. The maintenance of social order, of 
which the king was the final guarantee, helped to create good conditions 
for many economic activities.33 The ability to channel the internal dynam-
ics of the elites and deal with their need for social promotion also contrib-
uted to social stability in the cities as in the countryside.
famIly and SoCIal networkS
All Iberian societies—indeed, all European societies—were marked by 
tensions that originated in the relationships within families and extended 
families, lineage, and clients (Chap. 1). Family and kin relations were, 
without doubt, the informal institution par excellence of this society.34 
Furthermore, they were important in themselves but often also the pivotal 
point of wider informal social networks, constructed on the base of friend-
ship, patronage, clienteles, common local origin (paisanaje), and so on. 
The influence and role of the family remained very important as a result of 
the evolution of the elites, which allowed for its consolidation as their 
basic fabric.
32 See the case of the Mental Law and the Ordenações Manuelinas in Portugal (Neto 1997, 
pp.  152–4). For Castile, the most well-known case is the (very meaningfully) so-called 
Recopilación de Felipe II (Philip II compilation), previously discussed. But this is one example 
among many others. It is interesting to note that, unlike compilations of Castile, the other 
kingdoms’ repertoires were published with no alteration at all. That is also the reason why 
the Castilian ones included a mandate of enforcement in the case that they were not identical 
to the previous laws.
33 For the same argument applied to England, see Slack (2015).




As an institution of this kind, family, kin relations, and clientele net-
works (above all else, the patronage system strengthened these for both 
the nobility and the Crown) complied with fundamental functions. 
Familial networks were key to obtaining information. Nobles, like the 
Ataíde of Portugal, the patricians of cities such as Barcelona, or merchants, 
such as the Bernuy or the Ruiz of Burgos and the Echávarri of Bilbao, to 
say nothing of Catalan bandits such as the Nyeros and Caldells, used other 
members of their families to obtain information on court intrigues, city 
conflicts, the movements of adversaries, market conditions, and so on.35 
The personal ties binding them formed the basis of the confidence rela-
tionships that allowed them to operate in various political, social, and 
 economic circles with a degree of risk reduction and a guarantee of suc-
cess.36 Institutions directly associated with familial relationships, such as 
matrimony, were the key to the transfer of political, social, and economic 
resources (this was usually achieved as dowries.) At the same time, matri-
mony and, specifically, the dowry served to put in motion mechanisms of 
self-enforcement aimed at sealing pacts or closing conflicts, sometimes 
ancestral in origin, between families (Yun 2002a). In all cases the family 
and kin ties were vital to the circulation of forms of capital through these 
webs. Using money to situate a son in the imperial, municipal, or ecclesi-
astic administration by the purchase of an office or by the foundation of a 
capellanía (a chapel) was, for example, a way of obtaining political or 
cultural capital that could subsequently revert to the group in the form of 
incomes or the amplification of properties (Yun 2011). It may be interest-
ing to underline that this type of practice was not exclusive to the elites. 
The artisans and peasants also maintained links of confidence based on 
familial relationships or used matrimony with very similar aims.
Family, extended blood and kin relations, and client networks, and the 
informal ties that accompanied them, such as friendship, permeated the 
entire system of formal institutions. If this is perhaps obvious, it is worth 
35 These areas have been studied in great depth. For some examples, see Costa and 
Da Cunha (2006), Vila-Santa (2015), Ruspio (2007), Casey (2007), Priotti (2004, 
pp. 185–95), Casado (1997), Amelang (1986), and Torres (1994, passim and pp. 163 and 
ff.). On family in the Crowns of Castile and Aragon in this period, the pages written in gen-
eral studies by James Casey are essential reading, above all (1989 y 1999), and his analysis of 
the case of Granada is excellent (2007), as are a number of works written or directed by 
F. Chacón; in example Chacón and Bertran (2011).
36 For empirical support of this affirmation, see Casey (2007, Chap. 5).
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dwelling on, as it will be vital to our later discussions. The king was a ‘pub-
lic’ institution but also a member of a lineage and a dynasty, something 
which affected the government of the state in many important ways. The 
cities and seigniorial estates were criss-crossed by, and depended upon, 
bloodline and affinity relationships that bound those who governed them. 
The same was true of the guilds and rural communities. For this reason, 
neither nature nor the working of these institutions can be understood 
without this component. That the public and private domains were so 
indistinct—or difficult to separate—in this society contributed to it. To 
give one example, in certain cases the services of a city might be rewarded 
by conferring privileges upon its aldermen and officials rather than upon it 
as an institution (see examples in Martínez Ruiz 1992). Another example: 
the seigniorial estate, ruled by a lineage whose interests it served, was also 
an essential piece in the systems for the maintenance of law, military orga-
nization, and the government of the ‘republic’. The presence of familial 
and kin relationships within an institutional framework that was, on the 
face of it, modern—sometimes, indeed, erroneously studied through 
Weberian parameters—formed part of the symbolic projection and politi-
cal language of the time. Beyond being simply a metaphor, this provided 
a portrait of the reality and behaviour that was expected of persons. Some 
time ago Otto Brunner underlined this question, placing attention on the 
oeconomia (literally, the ruling of the household) of the seigniorial class 
and the need to understand it as a form of domestic relationship (1992). 
In 1651 the Portuguese Francisco Manuel de Melo wrote ‘that the city is 
a large family and the family a city in miniature’ (Casey 1999, p. 192). The 
metaphor of the king as the father is extremely well known, as is the assim-
ilation of the political community to the family (Walzer 1965, chapter 5).
For a long time, it has been believed that, in common with its counter-
parts across Europe, the aristocracy was a group subject to irrational forms 
of management and disinterested in its lands and possessions.37 Here it 
will be proposed that it is better to see it as a social group composed of 
individuals who operated within networks, and particularly family and lin-
eage networks, dedicated to the reconversion of different forms of capital 
(Yun 2011). It is important to stress that the survival of these networks 
depended upon a properly functioning system of collateral payments and 
solidarity, as this smoothed internal tensions (Chap. 1 and Yun 1994b). 
37 Macfarlane (1973) and Baudrillart (1878–1880).
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The aristocratic households were in fact organizations—in the sense 
applied to modern firms by Simon, Cyer, and March (Yun 2011, 
pp. 329–32)—whose main aim was not, as classical economics would have 
it, economic profit maximization but rather the consolidation, coherence, 
and expansion of the family and lineage itself, as behavioural economics 
would in fact imply (Yun 1994a, 2005a and 2005b).38 The involvement of 
the great houses in the political system offered them enormous possibili-
ties for that reconversion of social, cultural, and economic capital, which 
creates our impression of irrationality. In a context in which social capital 
was of such great importance, the investment in matrimonial alliances 
(dowries), in political clients (patronage), and in the promotion of the 
second-born sons so as to extend the power of the familial networks would 
be crucial (Yun 1994a). The increasing value of merit as a means of admis-
sion into this closed elite made it more necessary to invest in the promo-
tion of military and diplomatic careers of the different members of the 
family and the lineage, at the same time as the acquisition of habitus that 
demonstrated status became more valuable, something which would also 
give impetus to investment in political capital for those members (Yun 
2011). The increase in the king’s ability to regulate relations within the 
nobility, manifested in his control of grace, favour, credit arrangements, 
and the management of the mayorazgo, made social and political resources 
more necessary than ever. This situation also encouraged investment in 
collateral payments within the lineages and the clientele networks in the 
forms of dowries, assistance to second-born sons, and so on, as a means of 
promoting members and maintaining unity by overcoming structural ten-
sions. All of these developments combined with the dynamic created by 
the mayorazgo, which made family possessions inalienable and provided a 
shield against the dissolution of patrimonies by debt payments.
If different in important respects, the logic governing the management 
of ecclesiastical patrimonies displayed certain similarities. Logically, the 
central concern for these estates was not the family, or, to put it in a better 
way: the role of the family was set in different parameters. For most of the 
sixteenth century, the pressure created by the need for land, as well as the 
increase in agrarian production (and with it, a growth in tithe payments) 
and land rent, had allowed these ecclesiastical economies to reproduce and 
expand. But studies of the internal workings of the ecclesiastical corpora-
tions demonstrate that the involvement of members of noble, patrician, 
38 For all this, see Chap. 1 and Yun (2011).
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and merchant lineages became especially frequent in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries (Cabeza 1996; Irigoyen 2001). In many cases the 
entrance of new members brought ecclesiastical dowries and economic 
contributions, sometimes in the form of lands or rents (including censos). 
Chapel-building and the establishment of charitable institutions and other 
foundations fed this trend, often being done ad personem: that is to say, a 
member of an important family, often a less prominent one within the lin-
eage (a woman or second-born or illegitimate son), entered into an eccle-
siastical institution bringing with him or her an economic patrimony. This 
was an attractive outcome for both family and ecclesiastic institutions, as it 
extended the patrimony of the latter and offered an outlet to internal 
tensions within the former, as well as adding to its symbolic capital. 
Consequently, the family power and prestige was subtly extended: a promi-
nent ecclesiastical career, membership in a cathedral chapter with a signifi-
cant spiritual and economic patrimony, discharging the profession of public 
preacher, obtaining access to consciences through confession, and so on. It 
is highly symptomatic that donations and foundations frequently included 
clauses that specifically reserved their use for a family member or for future 
entrants from the lineage. In this way many ecclesiastical institutions 
acquired possessions as an organization while surrounding themselves with 
a genuine constellation of donated properties that operated according to 
their own logic and management rules. The explosion of possessions of 
this sort was often predicated upon saying a set number of Masses, attract-
ing charity or preserving capital for future relatives, priorities which were 
very distant from the search for productive improvements. Frequently, 
these foundations even drew upon resources that uncles of entrants had 
acquired by discharging religious functions and, in particular, by securing 
payments for sermons, Masses, and religious services performed on behalf 
of the congregations of believers (Irigoyen 2001; Latorre 1992). Graphs 5.1 
and 5.2 set out the total number of foundations and those established by 
the high nobility. The increasing transfer of economic resources to ecclesi-
astic institutions—to put it the other way round, the capacity of these insti-
tutions to absorb economic resources from noble, and nonnoble, 
families—is impressive. This was more so if we consider that the phenom-
enon was not confined to elites. It can also be found among peasant families 
and well-off labradores (yeomen) who, on a lower scale, saw these founda-




The way large merchants and urban elites in general managed their 
resources is also better understood if we consider them within the context 
of their family relations. As already explained, networks, which were also 













Graph 5.1 Convents founded in Spain, 1474–1799












































Graph 5.2 Convents founded in Spain by the main aristocratic families
Sources: My own elaboration with data of A. Atienza (2008, pp. 496–519). As the author 
clarifies, they are approximative.
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economic expansion. It should be no surprise, therefore, that the historical 
analysis of events following the commercial crises of the epoch has led to 
emphasis falling on the purchase of public debt, jurisdictions, lands, and 
offices, all of which is taken to be a perversion (‘betrayal’) of the merchants 
as a social group (Braudel 1976). It is easily forgotten, however, that this 
type of investment was structural and formed part of practices that stretched 
back to the medieval period (Casado 1985, 1987, pp. 485–510). These 
practices obeyed social values but also responded to the need to combine 
risky investments with more secure ones or to control spheres of power 
that could be decisive for businesses. In reality this meant the circulation 
of different forms of capital within family constellations. Cases such as 
those of the Burgos-Maluenda, studied by H. Casado, and the Espinosa of 
Medina de Rioseco (both mentioned above), or even the converso mer-
chants who controlled silk incomes studied by E. Soria (2016), demon-
strate that investments in political rents or in symbolic capital—be at the 
level of the kingdom or at local level—seigniorial states, lands, or munici-
pal offices were part of a  family strategy.39 Often these merchants used 
their daughters to transfer money through dowries, as well as to form alli-
ances with oligarchies, patricians, and bureaucrats. For this same reason, 
they invested a fortune in training their sons, particularly second-born 
ones, who could subsequently obtain positions in the royal or municipal 
administration.40 This investment allowed them to place members in deci-
sive positions and constituted a collective strategy of diversification in the 
forms of capital and risk, one that also sought a certain complementarity 
within the family as it exchanged influence for trade and then traded so as 
to have influence and power.
We, historians, have too often forgotten that the basic unit of manage-
ment was the family rather than the business company. For this reason it 
was important to repeat alliances with families of other merchants, as this 
was their fundamental activity—hence their interest in forming matrimo-
nial ties with other businessmen or members of the elite. Within the 
extended family and its multiple kin ties, there were businessmen, scribes, 
bureaucrats, aldermen, consuls, and even royal secretaries: in short, this 
was a form of establishing pathways for the circulation of influence, money, 
39 See the case of the Córdoba’s oligarchy in Soria (2000).
40 In cities such as Seville, the majority of university students came from families of lawyers 
or rich businessmen (Pike 1978, pp. 77, 116).
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prestige, security, and so on within these networks of kinship. Looked at 
in this light, there was a certain logic to the abandonment of business or 
trade based upon the forms of reconverting capital and calculating risk, 
not to mention the cultural beliefs of the day; when these conditions 
aligned, giving up ‘the manual professions’ by some members of these 
coalitions was a logical and rational move in the use of the group’s 
resources. This having been said, in seventeenth-century Spain and 
Portugal, it was not easy to row back, although there certainly were those 
who, having adopted a noble lifestyle, continued to invest in business 
(Pike 1978, p. 119).
Family relationships were also crucial among artisans. As a matter of 
fact, their kinship dynamics, together with corporatist solidarity, were at 
the base of the tendency to closure of the guilds. This point deserves, 
however, some considerations. In many cases, the productive unit, that is 
the workshop, was a family unit and even part of the household. Though 
the studies on the interplay between family and workshops are not many 
for this epoch, this is evident, for example, in the case of the tanners of 
Madrid (Nieto 2006, p. 111), in which kin relationships were part of the 
managerial logic and could affect the credit system (see also Zofío 2005, 
chapter 5). It is not odd at all that fighting for the promotion of their sons 
within the profession was an important part of these families’ strategies 
(Fortea 1981). The recent literature has also emphasized the importance 
of the female members of the family in the workshop. The interference of 
family solidarity (and not only of the family) in the guilds materialized in 
the purity of blood statutes (estatutos de limpieza de sangre) increasingly 
adopted by a number of guilds and corporations from the second half of 
the sixteenth century onwards in order to avoid the entrance of conversos 
and New Christians in general. Such prohibitions were not important 
because it was entirely impossible for a New Christian (and even more 
important for our arguments, for any person) to reinvent oneself and one’s 
family’s past or even to acquire documentary ‘proof’ of old Christian sta-
tus. Rather it was because, regardless of the social condition of the person, 
the verification of any claim had to pass through a complex bureaucratic 
mechanism and required the mobilization of social networks to prove the 
absence of Jewish ancestors in two, three, or more generations. In the 
words of Dedieu, the statutes ‘in reality served as the pretext for a test 
which, rather than focusing on origins, submitted the social power of the 
candidate to a severe examination’ (Dedieu 1986). In fact, this institution 
must be understood in the context of a powerful collective movement in 
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which the solidarity within the artisan families (and other social groups) 
was leading to the formulation of arguments based on a religious—and 
even racist—rationale, which, as a matter of fact, affected not only New 
Christians.
Like in many other institutions, the way family and the institution of 
guilds interlinked would be decisive.
Probably the most important institution of the day—the peasant family—
has received the least amount of attention from the theoreticians of the new 
institutional economics. Its working logic could vary greatly according to 
local contexts: the character and availability of resources, local customs, and 
norms; village institutions; and income levels and patrimony. But overall, the 
outlines are relatively evident.
First of all, we need to make clear that, as D. Reher (1990) has shown 
for the case of the Iberian Peninsula, the family was not in economic terms 
the nuclear family composed only by the couple and their sons. It is how-
ever very common to see that there were very strong personal links joining 
this nucleus to other relatives with whom they could often carry out eco-
nomic activities.
In contrast to the elites, the principal aim of these coalitions of kinship 
and friendship was not the promotion of their members, although this 
objective might be found among the well-off (which we will see was 
important). Nor was the basic ambition to obtain profits, manifested in 
monetary stock (savings), directed to a possible investment in productive 
improvements. Their principal aims were subsistence and the physical 
reproduction of the family. This was very difficult, given the conditions of 
limited resources and the frequency of epidemics and famines that might 
easily carry away some of its members and break the family unit that con-
stituted the basic decision-making cell. The (regionally) very different 
inheritance patterns were vital to the hierarchical relations with the family 
or community. In general, like other social groups, the family was highly 
hierarchical, with the men’s and paterfamilias’ position being decisive, 
although the women played a fundamental role. Women and their repro-
ductive capability were the pivot upon which family unity turned—demog-
raphers have shown that families broke up more easily when the mother 
died. Given the high level of post-childbirth mortality, women were also 
vital in providing an abundance of workhands for the family and the 
assignment of its productive factors. They also constituted a crucial stock 
of work which, when used to produce for the market, was essential as a 
component of economic growth.
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Precisely for these reasons, the peasant family faced its own fragility in 
two challenges: to ensure that the rural community maintained a resource 
management policy that guaranteed subsistence; and to take maximum 
advantage of the available resources, sometimes in competition with other 
family units. Peasant solidarity, which had shone through the religious 
manifestations of the period (Christian 1989), has perhaps been idealized 
and exaggerated; nevertheless, it stood as an antidote to the enormous 
degree of conflict within the rural community. Trust between families, 
which also served to palliate conflicts, depended upon a range of qualities 
or conditions: good personal relationships, reputation (often based upon 
compliance with non-written contracts), the ability to heal wounds by 
recurring to forms of self-enforcement, the application of local commu-
nity customs, and an appeal to the ‘non-material inheritance’ of some 
members of the community (Levi 1985). But the key point for the family 
economy was in fact the availability of resources, which depended on both 
institutions and environmental factors, as well as the economic situation of 
each region. These reserves were crucial during the crises provoked by bad 
harvests and epidemics but also depended very much on demographic 
pressure at a regional level.
This dependence upon factors exogenous to the family had increased 
due to changes in the rural community, mainly its increasing insertion in a 
state system and the growing influence of the more powerful rural elites 
who claimed a larger share of the community resources and a more strict 
intervention on markets’ regulation.
tranSaCtIon CoStS, rent-SeekIng, and alloCatIon 
of reSourCeS: a QualItatIve approaCh
All of this leads to a reflection. Important steps forward had been made in 
the creation of enforcement systems that were increasingly uniform and 
that, making the application of laws more predictable across broader 
spaces where information on the legal rules was, normally, more expen-
sive, could lead to a greater security in economic and social relations. A 
number of developments give us reason to believe in institutional advances 
that would be important in regard to a more rational and homogenous 
application of the law: the king’s growing monopoly over violence, his 
capacity to impose himself upon other powers through patronage, and the 
continual presence of royal authority in important cities and councils in 
the person of the corregidor.
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The rolling out of written contracts, logically, led to levels of compli-
ance and a greater probability of their being used in accords between indi-
viduals who did not know each other personally and therefore lacked 
guarantees based on previous personal relationships to draw upon. This 
development was particularly important for commerce. The written regis-
ter of contracts provided the fundamental support in the expansion of 
institutions, such as the compagnia and the commenda, that would take 
root across all of Iberia and in America and which served as a formula to 
contribute capital and share risks.
The king’s authority and agreement with elites upon the existent status 
quo guaranteed a higher degree of political and social stability which was 
very positive for the reduction of risk and transaction costs. The development 
of militias and the Holy Brotherhood (Santa Hermandad) contributed to 
the maintenance of the internal social order, thus favouring economic activi-
ties as well. The very pact with the elites and the survival of the local militias 
allowed the monarch to mobilize these troops against potential risings in 
these territories, as was made clear in the use of Castilian elites and cities in 
the annexation of Portugal, in the risings in Aragon, and, in the seventeenth 
century, in the Catalan rebellion. It is significant that Castile experienced no 
general social convulsions after 1521 and those that did occur were merely 
local conflicts. If Aragon did face internal tensions and local rebellions, then 
these were contained in the 1580s. As it has been said, after the fifteenth 
century, Portugal would be free from great domestic troubles. Banditry did 
not disappear from the peninsula and was very prominent in the Crown of 
Aragon, but in Castile and Portugal, it would be much less significant or 
intense.41 The cities were, of course, marked by poverty and delinquency, but 
they played a very minor role in the internal convulsions and kept a relatively 
low level of internal conflict compared to other areas of Europe (see Chap. 6). 
The growth of the king’s powers of patronage also increased his ability to 
regulate social relationships and extended his capacity for enforcement; at the 
same time, in quite a few cases, the monarch played the role of a third party 
that regulated the relations between his subjects.
41 The importance of banditry in early modern Castile was rightly stressed by Santos 
Madrazo (2000). What we want to underline here is the progress taking place during the 
sixteenth century. Furthermore, as long as the author considers the nobility the main pro-
tagonist of banditry, the social changes of the epoch suggest some improvements. As we will 
see, this is compatible with the existence of seigniorial jurisdictional coercion.
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As we said before, a new spirit of intervention and improvement of its 
possessions was spreading among the aristocracy (Chap. 4).42 In many 
areas of Castile, the seigniorial domain was not only a jurisdictional entity 
but more and more a set of properties in which economic improvements 
were possible under some circumstances. Not only the members of the 
high nobility but also the urban patricians and middle-rank nobles had 
obtained the absolute property of baldíos and council lands that might be 
improved. In those cases in which they did not have the jurisdiction or the 
possibility of collecting taxes, the possibility for an amplified reproduction 
of capital—not based in the simple extraction of surplus—through tech-
nological or organizational innovation existed.43
The ecclesiastical institutions were not completely devoid of efforts at 
improvement, above all from rural convents and monasteries that were 
sometimes managed by ‘farming monks’. In fact investments in fixed 
capital in the form of granaries, windmills (of flour, paper, and olives 
trees), and other means of production facilitating the commercialization, 
transformation, storage, or sale of products were far from rare (López 
1990). Nor, indeed, was there an absolute lack of investment in irrigation 
systems or in the development of crops directed towards commercializa-
tion, such as olive trees. There were even moves towards a more rational 
exploitation of mountain spaces and/or livestock (this was especially true 
for the vocational agrarian orders, such as the Cistercians and others) 
(López 1990).
The development of the consulates and towns’ authority could have 
had positive effects too. Thanks to their justice systems and capability to 
mediate in conflicts, both developments may have paved the way for a 
justice closer to the subjects and able to generate trust. The rise of a group 
42 This is evident in the treatises dealing with the management of aristocratic patrimonies, 
such as Pérez del Barrio, Dirección de Secretarios de señores y las materias, cuydados y obliga-
ciones que les tocan (Madrid, 1613). Dedicated to the marquis of Cañete, the text explicitly 
sought to ‘increase the estate and property’ and devoted great attention to the need to 
administer haciendas with great care. ‘They were always,’ it reads, ‘administered with enor-
mous curiosity and labour, being cultivated and favoured as if a principal means of support, 
and enjoyed great prosperity and fruitfulness’ (p. 224). The author dealt with how to ‘fertil-
ise the land’, rules for extending possessions, administering offices, appointing groundsmen 
and keepers, book-keeping, and so on (pp. 226v–9v).
43 The process, very similar in some cases to the English enclosure movement, seems in 
principle that could produce economic improvements.
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of letrados, trained in the Roman and common law in the universities and 
many of them working within these institutions (Kagan 1981), was in 
principle a positive development as long as it contributed to create a more 
homogenous system of enforcement also within consulates and cities. As a 
matter of fact, these letrados were the responsible for the introduction and 
emergence of a mercantile law with a very strong international component 
(Fernández de Castro 2015). As we will see, the urban autonomy might 
have negative effects, but it is also true that the cities’ capacity to regulate 
the economic life within them might have been also positive for economic 
activities, as long as they were—or could have been—a third party in the 
administration of the law.
The guilds could also be less obstructive of economic change than 
usually thought. Over the last few years, scholars have engaged in an 
intense debate about European guilds, their capacity for innovation, and 
the reasons for their survival. This discussion has underlined their gen-
eral efficiency, a characteristic that had featured in few, if any, previous 
assessments (Epstein 1998, 2002 among others and Ogilvie 2007). One 
of the arguments for the historiographical rehabilitation of the guilds in 
some European countries has been their ability to introduce technologi-
cal innovations derived from the circulation of human capital and, there-
fore, to acquire technical knowledge and know-how, something which 
supposes a certain degree of willingness of guild corporations to allow 
the entrance of new members, who, of course, in principle did not have 
family relations with the members of the guild. Although we lack an in-
depth study of the Spanish and Portuguese guilds of this period, recent 
research on the Iberian Peninsula tends to corroborate this revisionism. 
It is now clear that many guild regulations were applied with great dis-
cretion and lenience—or simply not enforced at all—thus indicating far 
greater flexibility than has previously been thought. This was also the 
case with those rules that regulated the minimum age of apprentices on 
their admittance to the workshop (Hernández 2007). The available fig-
ures, provided in studies such as Montemayor’s work on Toledo, reveal 
that the by-laws might be revised and adapted to changing circumstances 
(Montemayor 1996, p. 208).44 There was no shortage, moreover, of evi-
44 Of the 30 by-laws emitted in Toledo between 1500 and 1626, 18, more than a half, were 
updated during the same period and, of them 10 were revised more than once. The years 
between the first drafts and the first revision spanned from 5 to 98, but changes in fewer than 
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dence of highly positive adaptations in some corporations until well into 
the seventeenth century—another indicator of greater flexibility and evi-
dence that these guilds were more efficient in reducing transaction costs 
than was previously thought (Casado 2004). Above all else (Chap. 2), 
the development of the verlagssystem itself and the opportunities for the 
employment of merchant capital were considerable and suggest a more 
malleable system. The case of Madrid demonstrates that the number of 
guilds subject to the statutes of purity of blood was lower than was once 
thought (Nieto and Zofío 2016, p. 259). The available figures (admit-
tedly, too few studies have been written) on the degree of openness of 
the guilds in the seventeenth  century may be interpreted in the same 
way. The excellent work of Nieto and Zofío shows that 75% of the arti-
san masters of Madrid between 1561 and 1601 came from other prov-
inces; in 1643–1649 this figure reached 68.2%. The interpretation of 
these figures remains problematic, but, as the above- cited authors argue, 
the fact that by this date many artisans coming from outside regions did 
not even have to register is indicative that access to the guild was even 
easier than it appears.
Nieto has also underlined that there were ways of adapting to increas-
ing demand and changes in the demand structure. The development of 
the verlagssystem that we have described for some towns such as Córdoba 
and Segovia for the sixteenth century was also present in Madrid during 
the seventeenth century (Nieto 2006). This change indicates also to what 
extent the rigidity of the guild system was not so strict and the most 
prominent members of the mercantile community were able to introduce 
changes in the productive process. Furthermore, the artisan workshop 
implemented a system of subcontracts to face changes and increasing 
demand. This system consisted in the use of specialists, sometimes 
belonging to other offices, in exchange for a salary to produce goods or 
parts of the final product for the members of the guild. The method, very 
rudimentary on the other side, shows in our view a certain flexibility as 
long as it allowed for a temporary increase in supply beyond the produc-
tive limits of the family workshops at moments of peak demand, and this 
was done without incurring in structural costs.
30 years were quite common. I took these data from Montemayor (1996: table of pp. 208), 
Of course, these figures only call for a more detailed study since it is not certain that some of 
the reforms served not to open or improve the workshops’ economic efficiency but, rather, 
the opposite effect.
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From the side of the rural communities, it is also possible to find poten-
tially positive developments. The maintenance of the rural community and 
the administrative structure of the concejos with their regulatory activity of 
the crop system kept the possibility to reduce risks and transaction costs in 
the use of the land. Some villages, though not many, were able to buy and 
to keep, which was the most difficult thing, baldíos and councils’ lands and 
incorporate them as propios that belonged to the town hall and could be 
used by community members in different ways. The relation between eco-
nomic resources and the available land could change to a more positive 
equation—as it did in many regions, particularly in the interior of Castile—
and pave the way for an intensive use of them. In this light, it is easy to 
understand why the peasantry was an active agent for economic growth 
when there existed available productive factors at hand—including possi-
bilities of commercialization of their surplus. These advances could be 
achieved by making use of the ties of confidence and solidarity that were 
based upon family relationships.
Therefore, the political and social development did not destroy all the 
possibilities of the institutional system to generate economic growth and an 
efficient use of resources. The key point would be in the balance between 
this positive side and a more negative one that we will study below.
As a matter of fact, political and social evolution would have also a less 
positive side. As long as it also reproduced the private jurisdictions of the 
nobility, the Church, and the cities, as well as their capacity of coercion, 
use of violence, and regulation of economic life, the outcome was also a 
plurality of superimposed powers, often resulting in conflict. The result 
could be a situation very similar to the one North et al. have defined as a 
closed society (2009).
This was a society of orders, with a corporate character and a huge vari-
ety of individual juridical statutes, which were, obviously, a source of frag-
mentation and uncertainty in social and economic relations between the 
different social groups. To litigate against a noble or clergyman could 
entail different implications, something which created marked uncertainty, 
as is demonstrated by the case between Belalcázar and Toledo. This was, 
moreover, a society with a plurality of law codes. As A. M. Hespanha has 
underlined for Portugal, the so-called official law was still a long way from 
displacing local and consensual laws: indeed, in some cases they imposed 
themselves upon and contradicted each other (1989). Furthermore the 
multiplication of laws created a certain degree of chaos. Sancho de 
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Moncada dedicated some memorable pages in which he underlined the 
excessive number of laws (‘there must be more than 5000’) and their 
cryptic character (‘they speak erroneous words’), which left a wide margin 
for arbitrariness for the judges, ‘so that they can squeeze whoever they 
want’ (Moncada 1974 [1619], pp.  201–2). Jerónimo de Ceballos was 
very probably right when he asked in 1623:
Where has one seen, in all the countries, so many tribunals and so little jus-
tice? Where so many judges and less regard for the state? Where more laws 
but lawsuits settled unevenly? And where such multitude of lawyers, nota-
ries, and scribes, but so little attention paid to the causes of the poor, the 
young, and the widowed?45
The old custom of ‘obeying but not complying’ created limits on the 
king’s capacity of enforcement and transferred decisions to corporations of 
citizens, above all to the cities and the Cortes, thus adding some addi-
tional uncertainties. Many conflicts were in the end resolved by systems of 
self-regulation before arriving before the tribunals and even, indeed, after 
having done so. As R. Kagan has written, this society was litigious to the 
point of exhaustion and might recur to the tribunals—and the cases 
brought before the House of Trade of Seville give grounds for suspecting 
the same (Fernández de Castro 2015)—not to resolve a conflict but sim-
ply to put off decisions. For this reason it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that going before the chancelleries in search of justice was, despite being 
increasingly frequent, bitterly criticized by a part of contemporary society 
and that ‘an arbitrated settlement within the confines of the community 
was the preferred mechanism for ending disputes’ (Kagan 1981, p. 18). In 
other words, a system of corporative self-enforcement was very often pref-
erable to a decision reached by judges and the use of official law. Moreover, 
when trying to make use of the tribunals, the important thing in many 
cases was to decide the court or third party before which the suit would be 
brought, as this detail could be decisive in the application of the law rather 
than the letter of it. And the collision of laws and the superimposition and 
confrontation of juridical spaces could only increase uncertainty. Even if 
the decision remained in the hands of the judge, the effect of precedent or 
unwritten law in shaping decisions was inherent to the system itself. This 
meant that the circumstances of the case—the personality, merits, prior 
45 Arte real para el buen gobierno, 1623 (quoted in Kagan 1981, p. 210).
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services and lineage of the parties, and many other factors besides—that 
were very difficult to foresee could have a marked effect on the verdict, 
and so the application of the law was unpredictable ex ante.46
The problems are evident in relation to the fiscal system. If in one town 
a certain tax had been levied in sisas upon a product, in the next town it 
might be set upon another product. Such a disparity was the outcome of a 
growing degree of local-level autonomy in the management of taxes. In 
many cases—the millones, for example—the methods for the collection of 
services conceded by the Cortes had to be approved by the king, but the 
proposals from the towns could differ. Likewise, what in the final instance 
mattered most was not so much how revenues were collected but rather the 
enormous variety of collection methods that appeared on the  economic and 
fiscal map. There were even those towns that complied with the servicios by 
using their own municipal budgets (sometimes renting the propios or 
municipal goods, usually lands), whereas in other villages new taxes on 
consumables paid by commoners had to be introduced and collected.47 
Furthermore the collection of taxes was shaped by informal networks of 
local oligarchies, which meant that a situation of ‘unpredictable arbitrari-
ness’ for any outsider arose, with a very noticeable tendency towards height-
ened risks.48 This situation very clearly became worse during the seventeenth 
century as we will see (Chap. 8) and would be denounced as such in the 
1700s. Vicente Alcalá Galiano described it in a book whose very title is 
highly expressive of the problems and which concluded with this advice:
The contribution paid to the State by each one of its individuals should be 
clear and set out, not arbitrary. The time and means of payment should also 
be specified, and the tax payers should be informed of both of these details. 
Because, without this knowledge, he is exposed to the injustice of the tax 
collector, who can raise and lower the tax when it suits his interests and 
caprices. Any uncertainty in the imposition of taxes encourages the inso-
lence and corruption of those who depend upon the collection of the royal 
patrimony and can take hold of it without any fear; [and it is clear] that the 
46 See also in this respect Fernández de Castro (2015).
47 The leeway enjoyed by rural communities that controlled their own alcabalas was pro-
portionate to their ability to pay the quantities allocated to them by using their own posses-
sions; this was the case until the 1570s, at least (García Sanz 1987, pp. 333–5).




uneven level of contributions will not bring about nor can have such a preju-
dicial effect to the people as can that uncertainty.49
The problem was even worse for interregional trade, where the distance 
increased the difficulties in acquiring the correct information about local 
markets, which were very heterogeneous and opaque, as Regina Grafe has 
demonstrated (Grafe 2012). The aims of social and (above all) commercial 
networks were to reduce costs, to facilitate the transfer of information, and 
to create the confidence that the formal institutions could not provide. 
But the difficulties posed by the kaleidoscopic array of local laws and taxes 
are more than obvious.
Finally, it is worthwhile remembering that the progress in the implanta-
tion of ‘official law’ ran parallel in the different kingdoms. In other words, 
the plurality of pacts between the Crown and each one of its kingdoms led 
to the preservation of a mosaic of jurisdictional systems, all of them highly 
different. Sometime previously the various legal systems had borrowed or 
stolen from one another, but all retained their previous characteristics 
(Tomás y Valiente 1992, pp. 232–97). This meant that the prospect of the 
creation of a homogenous juridical-economical space was increasingly dis-
tant, something which affected transaction costs in operations conducted 
across their political borders.
Some details, moreover, suggest that much of the progress achieved in 
sixteenth-century Castile was reversed relatively quickly from the end of 
the century. From 1580 the activity and efficiency of the Chancillerías 
were clearly reduced. This growing ineffectiveness can be measured in the 
number of decisions passed down by the best-known example (the 
Chancillería of Valladolid), which fell from around 1400  in 1580 to 
between 200 and 400 in 1640–1660.50 And if part of this reduction evi-
dently was due to the interest in presenting great lawsuits in the Court or 
before the Council of Castile, it is worthwhile taking into account that 
there were relatively few of these major cases and that this fall was even 
more rapid than the decline in population. Furthermore, a study of the 
49 V. Alcalá Galiano, Sobre la economía política y los impuestos. Academia de Artillería de 
Segovia, Segovia: 1992, facsimile edition, p. 321. [original edition, Segovia 1781–1788].
50 According to Kagan (1981), the phenomenon was in part due to the progressive replace-
ment of the Chancellery by the Council of Castile after the transfer of the Court to Madrid. 
But even then, the facts are highly suggestive, as the same conclusion appears from calcula-
tions made by subtracting the cases generated in the city itself from the total number.
 THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF A POLITICAL ECONOMY, C. 1580–1630 
244
delays in law cases demonstrates that those of less than two years’ duration 
fell by a notable proportion from 1560 to 1620 (from almost 50% to 
34%), whereas the proportion of cases that lasted for eight years or more 
did not fall and may well have risen.51
What were the causes of this process? From its inception, the chancellery 
system was highly criticized, with elites and the aristocracy being both vocal 
and active in protesting against lawyers and this new judicial order.52 Around 
1600 this opinion had taken root among the arbitristas, many of whom 
represented the concepts of the urban patriciate. As many of them rightly 
pointed out, the costs incurred in law cases were bankrupting peasants, 
businessmen, seigniors, and, of course, cities (Moncada 1974 [1619], 
pp. 201–4). But these criticisms do not appear to have weakened the justice 
system. As J. Owens has underlined, the problem lay in the contradiction 
between the wish for a solid and efficient judicial system and the fact that the 
king could not maintain himself without the backing of the aristocracy on 
the one side and the mid-ranking nobility and urban patriciate on the other 
(Owens 2005, pp. 182 ff.). Indeed, this argument might be taken further 
than Owens himself allows. After 1580 the powerful private jurisdictions, 
consolidated within the conflictive pact between Crown and elites, were 
able to compete with royal jurisdiction (Thompson 1993, vol. II, p. 223).
The crisis of the chancellery system was, very possibly, the result of a 
combination of factors: the growing inefficiency of these courts due to 
the difficult relationships between their judges and the monarch (Kagan 
1981);53 economic problems and the spiralling debts of cities, seigniors, 
municipalities, and private individuals, which meant that recurring to 
slow-moving and inefficient tribunals was an ever less attractive option; 
and—highly important—the continued vigour of the city and seigniorial 
51 Kagan (1981, p. 7, Fig. 1). These figures must be treated with care, as the final judge-
ment was emitted ‘only upon request of the victorious party’. But it is very important that 
the figures of the author show that from 1620 the royal arrangements worked out as cheaper 
than the cartas ejecutorias. In spite of this, there occurred a reduction in numbers at least 
until 1660.
52 Kagan (1981). For Quevedo’s criticism of the lawyers, pp. 72–3.
53 Although this area remains (unfortunately) poorly studied, it is obvious that many judges 
and lawyers entered into the dynamic of clientele systems, which also allowed them to achieve 
social ascent and to be promoted to other positions offering greater remuneration outside of 
the judiciary (Kagan 1981).
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jurisdictions, a lasting feature of the conflictive pact, and the recourse to 
informal accords between parties.
The monarch himself was also a source of instability and violence that 
might run against the common law and create uncertainty and risks for 
economic activities. Despite the nuances introduced above, the reasons 
and arguments of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (Chap. 4) are basi-
cally correct as it comes to the negative effects of bankruptcies and the 
seizure of American cargoes and treasures (2005). Obviously, the 
Habsburgs were not exceptional in many of these measures, and it is even 
possible that other monarchs were more arbitrary or less sensitive than 
them (see Sardone 2018). It is also important to remember that, after these 
measures, there were negotiations that alleviated the financial damage they 
induced.54 But it is difficult to believe that they could not affect ex ante the 
feeling of risk and uncertainty, since those negotiations were always fraught 
and of an uncertain end.
This negative side of absolutism will become even more evident during 
the seventeenth century with the repeated devaluations of money, an 
action that, as theologists like Mariana denounced, was a gesture of tyr-
anny that went against the kingdom’s laws. The authority of the king, 
moreover, and his absolute power might serve as a brake on the positive 
effects caused by the development of justice and the chancellery courts, 
even in Castile itself. The exercise of absoluta potestas by the king over the 
chancelleries could be the cause of arbitrary actions. It was on behalf of his 
absoluta potestas that Philip II could settle an important lawsuit in Toledo 
in favour of the count of Belalcázar against the Archbishop of Toledo, 
without paying heed to previous judicial decisions and acting solely as a 
result of the political alliances at Court (Owens 2005). Moreover, it is pos-
sible to think that Philip II was much less given to this type of interference 
than his sons, above all Philip III. But all that was needed to create a sense 
of risks and higher transaction costs was the feeling that the lawsuits would 
be resolved not according to the letter of the law but in reference to the 
person against whom one litigated.
Though a relatively high degree of social order was a goal of the mon-
archy and its agreements with elites, the differences among the distinct 
54 Years ago historians such as Lovett (1977), Ruiz Martín (1990b), and Rodríguez-
Salgado (1992) devoted very detailed studies to the way the big Genoese bankers got com-
pensations for these actions.
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kingdoms were many. In Aragon, the pact with elites was made in more 
challenging conditions because of the absence of American silver and the 
improbability of establishing fiscal-financial relationships similar to those 
in Castile (Yun 2004). This had made the Crown fiscally weaker and 
reduced its capacity of enforcement, resulting in positive effects in some 
cases. The reduced ability to palliate internal conflicts within the Aragonese, 
Valencian, and Catalan nobility was one of the reasons for the persistence 
of banditry and the related difficulty in maintaining law and order. In pro-
portion to the development of seigniorial jurisdiction, this created a higher 
degree of insecurity whose impact upon economic activity is not known 
but—according to contemporary evidence—appears to have been nega-
tive until well into the seventeenth century (Chap. 8) (Torres 1994).
But the way laws and customs were enforced is not enough to under-
stand the allocation of resources. We also need to consider other less posi-
tive aspects of the institutional development and to what extent they also 
effected the criteria for the management of those resources—above all, 
after having previously pointed out some possible positive effects.
Regarding the señorío, and in spite of the changes, efforts to improve 
the methods of collecting rents and monitoring patrimonies were still 
more important than organizational or technical advances.55 As a general 
rule, the forms or types of property rights were also influential. Lands 
ceded in enfiteusis could not be the object of any (legal) productive 
improvement from the lords’ side, and in a moment of demographic crisis, 
the actions from the peasants’ side would not be frequent for several 
decades.56 In areas such as Valencia and Aragon, the seigniors wielded 
considerable juridical rights and enforcement powers. These prerogatives 
guaranteed the collection of their rents and the defence of their economic 
privileges and so lessened the need to recur to formulas for the amplified 
reproduction of capital.57
The development of the Court had similar effects. Rather than invest-
ing in their properties, for many aristocrats a more rational policy was to 
55 Pérez del Barrio (1613, p. 235).
56 Here the role of the señor might be simply to promote the actions of his vassals (Pérez 
del Barrio 1613, pp. 226v–9v), although this might be increasingly difficult in a moment of 
demographic recession.




redouble the amount of attention paid to the Court and intensify efforts 
to acquire extraordinary resources through political action, a determina-
tion that would elevate the practices of rent-seeking to a prevalent feature 
of the management of the great houses.58 Moreover, aristocratic econo-
mies came to be based on an essential duality that explained the strange 
combination of luxury and indebtedness into which many of them fell. 
The aristocratic patrimonies were made up of two interconnected but dif-
ferent parts. On one side, there were the mayorazgos (composed mainly of 
seigniorial estates) whose incomes and management were subject to 
requirements and rules set down by the king. These were possessions 
whose use was restricted in the sense that they were tied down and almost 
always unmoveable; they could not be sold off or alienated in any way, and 
their capacity for generating liquid incomes could also be very limited. On 
the other side, there existed the favours, offices, pensions, and extraordi-
nary incomes conceded by the Crown to the aristocrats, which constituted 
disposable sources of revenue that could be used immediately.
The result was a very asymmetric form of management. Being the may-
orazgo, a non-alienable and subject to the king’s unpredictable require-
ments and exigencies, the interest of the landlords in the improvement of 
their productivity was very limited. At the same time, the incomes pro-
vided by the mayorazgo were used as a means of obtaining political incomes 
and power, while the extraordinary incomes derived from royal grace and 
favour were only used in exceptional circumstances to improve the enti-
tled properties. Such management criteria were the key to the coexistence 
of luxury and need that, in our eyes, appears an open contradiction but 
which served as a basis for a moral economy whose overall consequences 
would be decisive (Yun 1994a). A moral economy of this kind, tied to a 
series of increasingly firmly rooted cultural beliefs, existed throughout 
Europe. But it was manifested in Spain, above all in Castile, in a more 
pronounced way and with more evident consequences.
As has been said, forces to reduce incentives for improvements existed 
also among the ecclesiastic institutions. The exercise of privilege and spe-
cific property rights over land and rents held by these institutions would 
58 See the account records held in Simancas. According to my calculations, the count of 
Lemos, for example, enjoyed ‘extraordinary’ (additional) income, which came on top of 
those ‘normal’ ones derived from his seigniorial estates: the former brought in around 
440,000 ducats in 1630 (Dirección General del Tesoro, inv. 1, lib. 5, exp. 81. AGS). These 
extraordinary revenues were numerous. See Yun (2002a).
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also affect their management criteria. As had occurred with the mayor-
azgo, the very character of ecclesiastical property—also, by  definition, 
inalienable—led to rentier forms of management, in which important 
improvements were not necessary to maintain the patrimony intact. 
Privilege, in this case embodied in an exclusive type of property right, 
played a fundamental role. As in the lay señoríos, the notable capacity for 
enforcement wielded by many of these institutions allowed them to collect 
their incomes and, in some cases, led to the use of (not necessarily physical) 
coercion as a substitute for investment. Moreover, the make-up and nature 
of their incomes could also further reduce the attraction of introducing 
improvements: the collection of foros, of tithes, and of other gabelles 
required improvements in the forms of monitoring rather than advances in 
the productive system. The extension of ecclesiastical properties and their 
tax privileges reinforced the monopolistic advantages of some institutions 
in the local markets, therefore increasing their temptation for speculative 
management rather than for economic investments (Álvarez 1987).
In many regions such as the Duero Valley or Galicia, ecclesiastical prop-
erties were made up of small plots of land dispersed over considerable 
distances (the result of unordered and unplanned donations) which were 
rented out on short-term leases. This greatly complicated the introduction 
of improvements for both the farmers themselves and the institutions that 
owned them. From the end of the sixteenth century, the control of rural 
credit in the form of censos consignativos gave rise to mechanisms for the 
extraction of peasant income that made agrarian improvements even more 
unnecessary from the clerics’ side. Moreover, these censos consignativos 
became a way of obtaining the ownership of the land itself when borrow-
ers defaulted on their repayments, thus achieving an ‘extensive’ (simple) 
reproduction of capital. This became especially clear when the brutal series 
of epidemics and poor harvests that began in the 1590s combined with 
the sale of common lands and resulted in the ruin of many farmhands and 
workers. At least until economic conditions changed at the end of the 
century, the way many ecclesiastical institution managed credit could be 
negative for economic growth, and that seems to have been the case. The 
model of economic expansion of these institutions based on donations 
from the society and in particular from the elites constituted a form of 
rent-seeking, in this case one that was not orientated towards the Court 
and the state (as was that of the aristocracy) but rather towards society as 
a whole. Family strategies also became incrusted or fossilized, therefore, in 
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the economic management of ecclesiastical patrimonies and encouraged a 
simple form of reproduction for these institutions. The extension of the 
ecclesiastic patrimony through these strategies was more important than 
investment in productive improvements.59 It is worthwhile remembering 
that war stood at the basis of all of these developments and that armed 
conflict was presented in religious terms as the only way to justify the taxes 
derived from it and the efforts and sacrifices demanded from society.
Regarding the commercial institutions, if the consulates could have 
positive effects in reducing risks and transaction costs among their mem-
bers, the opposite effect was also very much present. This would be patent 
in the evolution of both the Consulate of Seville and the Casa da Índia of 
Lisbon. One of the keys to this was found in the systems for the control of 
colonial commerce associated with both empires.
When trade with America boomed from the last third of the sixteenth 
century, it became necessary to compensate the very high value of the sil-
ver cargoes and the arrival of other commodities with a balancing flow of 
exports to the New World (Hough and Grier 2015). Given the difficulties 
in meeting this demand with peninsular production alone (Chap. 7), the 
result was the massive entry of foreign goods, channelled through Seville, 
into America (Oliva 2004). It should be emphasized that this process was 
only made possible through the informal and family ties between Seville 
businessmen and foreign merchant communities. At the same time, this 
situation created the basis for a new relationship between Crown and 
Consulate. The Seville merchants—and the Consulate of the city, above 
all—had long provided financial assistance to the king in the form of fiscal 
‘advantages’; from the end of the sixteenth century, contributions of this 
kind would become regular (Oliva 2004). This arrangement led to forms 
of commercial management that were largely based on advantages derived 
from privileges and forms of rent-seeking. In this context, and in light of 
the notable benefit of intermediation with foreign industrial products, 
another salient aspect of commercial management is easily explainable: the 
reduced interest of merchant capital in general and of Seville capital in 
particular, to invest to dynamize industrial production in Spain. 
Furthermore, this combination of institutional restrictions based upon the 
59 The fact may be seen in the scarce, if not non-existent, quantities that were dedicated to 
these effects in the Cathedral of Huesca (Latorre, 1992). For the cathedral chapels of 
Portugal, see da Silva (2013).
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use of privilege and the permeability of the system to the informal institu-
tions like the family created significant entry barriers for non-members of 
the merchant coalition that pivoted upon Seville. Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson are probably correct when arguing that the Seville monopoly 
served to slow down the institutional development of the country and 
prevented the establishment of positive institutions. But, having said this, 
what is certain is that emphasis should fall on the image of a parasitical yet 
weak king rather than on an all-powerful one.
Something similar happened with the Lisbon merchant communities, 
although their point of departure was different. As in Castile, the Crown 
had established control mechanisms for trade with the colonies, particu-
larly with Africa and Asia. This meant establishing taxes through the con-
trol of commerce. For this reason, the monopoly meant the king’s direct 
involvement in commerce and especially the pepper trade. By the second 
half of the century, however, it was becoming clear that this control was 
insufficient and that, moreover, fraud, contraband, and Dutch commerce 
could not be constrained. This led to the introduction of a system for the 
licencing of commerce. In exchange for a set payment, permission was 
granted to private businessmen to trade with Asia and Africa. This arrange-
ment brought two advantages for the Crown (or, at least this was the 
hope): it obtained funds derived from the payment of the licence and fiscal 
yields based upon this commerce. But, as in Castile, the intrusion of infor-
mal family networks into the system ended up perverting it. In a very 
short space of time, a large number of non-Portuguese families became 
involved in this commerce; these traders were often associated with dense 
international networks of Jewish businessmen originating in Portugal. As 
in the case of the Castilian monopoly, it was an ‘international monopoly’ 
(or, in other words, it was not a monopoly), in which merchants from 
many countries were involved, and the commercial management was 
based upon the exploitation of privileges and institutional advantages that 
rendered unnecessary any forms of investment designed to make the 
country’s economy more dynamic. Equally and, again, as in Castile, these 
practices were brought about by a weak political system that was incapable 
of imposing institutions upon dynamic international commercial networks 
rather than by a parasitical monarchical absolutism that allowed no right 
of appeal against its mandates and structures.
Also a good part of the urban elites were tempted by ways of manage-
ment that were in principle less propitious for the general efficiency of the 
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economy. This situation is partly explained by the development of the 
political system and the methods chosen for the promotion of relatives 
within the family networks. Some of these families enhanced their rela-
tions with the Crown, thus acquiring the chance to obtain a position 
within the empire and the formidable array of political incomes that it 
offered. Emigration to America and Asia (in the case of Portugal), which 
was especially marked among the middle class, also played a role in permit-
ting this group access to additional (and expanding) resources, thus repro-
ducing a scheme little conducive to economic improvements in the 
peninsula. Many members of the rising urban classes saw the foundation 
of mayorazgos as a means of not only obtaining security for them and their 
families but also of enlarging their social and cultural capital.60 The rein-
forcement of the city as a political organism, and the influence of these 
elites in the town councils, allowed them to apply practices of rent-seeking 
and so take advantage of this institution and the privileges it conferred. 
The investment in political capital was often more profitable than in pro-
ductive improvements, which were always risky and uncertain; moreover, 
they were not easy to achieve, as in many cases they implied a challenge to 
the status quo and entrenched rights—for example, in the forms of land 
use, the cultivation system, and artisanal regulations.
In these circumstances, a logical and attractive policy for the local elites 
was to regulate the local market and the use of the recently purchased 
communal lands in their own benefit. Another option was the advanta-
geous sale of goods in local markets that were heavily controlled by the 
town, thus creating important entrance barriers to potential competitors.61 
The private use of the public domain, directly or by an intermediary, might 
allow elites not to embark themselves in forms of production that involved 
greater risks and higher transaction and monitoring costs.62
Artisan families and the way they acted within corporations could also 
lead to not very much fertilizing management. Their attempts to 
limit competition among them and with outsiders could have that effect. 
60 See Guerrero Mayllo (1993), Hernández (1995), Soria (2000), Ruíz Ibáñez (1995), 
Owens (1980), Gutiérrez (1989), and De Bernardo (1994).
61 Castillo de Bovadilla recognized that entrance barriers and the high degree of privilege 
that local powers wielded on behalf of oligarchies were prejudicial to external agents, citing 
in particular the justifications given for the conferral of offices (1597).
62 See many of these practices in Ruiz de Celada’s book, El estado de la Bolsa. Op. cit 
[1777]; see Yun (1990) and also De Bernardo (1994).
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In many Castilian guilds, it was normal to restrict the number of appren-
tices that each master could take on and train. The temptation to impose 
restrictive policies by creating entry barriers and opposition to innovation 
was also present. Furthermore, the most dynamic craftsmen in 
 seventeenth- century Castile, those of Madrid, found in a corporatist clo-
sure the best way to fight against the economic crisis after 1630 (Nieto 
2006, pp. 205). The tendency to increase the money paid by the officials 
for the fees of the exam to become masters was also among the usual man-
agement practices, as was the tendency to reserve this status for the sons 
of the masters (Nieto 2006, chapter 11), to the extent that an author has 
spoken of endogamy and ‘endotechnology’ (Nieto 2006). In Córdoba the 
reaction against the arrival of Morisco artisans (who were especially skilled 
in silk production) appears to have been entirely negative, and not only 
because of religious prejudices, despite the prior existence of a consider-
able group of Moriscos in the city.63 Such an event is also a proof of the 
many obstructive ways that might characterize the guild’s policy. 
Furthermore the case of Madrid on which this revisionism is based so far 
can be also considered as a special case as long as, at least until 1630, it was 
the most dynamic centre of the peninsula thanks to the installation there 
of the Court. The figures of newcomers to the capital’s workshops must 
have been an exception to the peninsular rule, and the low percentage of 
foreigners (6.6% in 1643–1649) is indicative of a relatively limited capacity 
63 In the aftermath of the Morisco rebellion, an important part of this minority, employed 
in activities of an industrial kind, was transferred to the city, creating a range of problems. 
Without doubt these difficulties had a religious motif, but they were also economic in nature. 
In certain sectors, such as silk weaving (which represented a long tradition within the history 
of the Moriscos of Granada), opposition among the Córdoba guilds to the newcomers was 
entrenched (it was extremely strong among the Old Christians). As is ever the case, the new-
comers were criticized for their lack of knowledge, their production of low-quality goods 
(accusations which it is difficult to take seriously, as the very opposite was probably true), 
and, very significantly, for allowing women to work, an accusation that has been considered 
by Ogilvie as a proof of the closing—off of the guilds. Purely fiscal considerations (a large 
portion of the taxes collected by the city depended on them) meant that the Moriscos could 
always count upon the support of the mayor’s office and the Chancellery of Granada, while 
the king was generally supportive of them. Yet one thing is certain: the Moriscos were expelled 
from Córdoba in 1609 with great clamour and popular celebration. The same was true across 
Castile and Aragon, but this form of mass rejection was not simply religious in origin: apart 
from other things, these ‘new Christians’ were also an economic threat to many craftsmen 
who defended themselves with their guild privileges.
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to absorb technical advances originating from outside the country. But 
even in Madrid, the conflicts among the different professions and work-
shops—sometimes in the king’s courts—reflect a high level of tension that 
also leads one to suspect high transaction costs in litigation and fights. As 
we said previously, the case of Madrid is also meaningful in that it is not 
entirely implausible to think that, at least in Castile, the forms of tax col-
lection favoured sclerosis in the corporations. Some technological advances 
or profound organizational change could alter the basic niches of tax col-
lection and even lead to the disappearance of some of the corporations, 
something which could result in a problem for the city authorities. The 
result was a tendency to defend, at least in the short term, the different 
corporations (each of them normally associated with a phase of the pro-
ductive process), which in effect reduced the possibility of major increases 
in productivity and which, moreover, could be easily presented as a mea-
sure introduced for the common good.64
Also among peasants and rural communities, there were ways of using 
resources that were not so positive. Moreover, the evolution of the rural 
councils, which previously had been highly dynamic institutions supporting 
economic growth, could now rebound to the detriment of their members. 
Highly refined devices and systems for the exploitation of land and property 
rights, upon which a very fragile balance of resources had been based, might 
now serve as an obstacle to the introduction of qualitative changes capable 
of meeting the challenge posed by a larger population. And this was also 
largely because these changes threatened to rupture the social equilibrium 
and the rules of community. For the well-off peasants it was now easier to 
recur to the use of communal regulations to serve their own interests than 
to initiate uncertain processes requiring massive change. Their ambitions to 
64 The most eye-catching case is that of Córdoba, where opposition among local patricians 
and merchants involved in the verlagssystem served as a brake on innovations that were pro-
posed to control and transform the phases of the process of production. As Fortea showed 
(1981), this was one of the keys to the disruption of the development of ‘capitalist’ (sic) 
forms of productive organization and the final crisis of the sector. Even in Toledo interesting 
innovations and adaptations occurred in certain sectors (such as silk production), and it has 
been possible to affirm that the office system, being well structured and organized, ‘consoli-
dated the established situation, encouraged parasitism, but discouraged new initiatives. In 
this way, it ended by depriving Toledo of all chance of recovery’ (Montemayor 1996, p. 214).
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control municipal positions, to link with families of letrados and bureau-
crats, or their habit to transfer resources to the Church by funding capel-
lanías, obras pías, and so on, has been clearly demonstrated (Brumont 
1993, pp. 321–36). In other words, for elites, to  convert economic into 
political and cultural capital was also a way to manage their patrimonies. 
This habit has even a rationale: by controlling municipal offices and enhanc-
ing their own prestige, they had the opportunity to mediate in the councils 
and in the regulation of resources in their own profit. For the peasant elites, 
market regulations, the use of the propios or municipal goods, and the 
administration of taxes were sometimes better and for sure less risky than 
the introduction of agrarian improvements. They could not even imagine—
as historians sometimes appear to want them to—the development of agrar-
ian capitalism, which historians have often linked to the emergence of large 
farms or estates. But, on the other hand, this limitation meant that the 
communitarian system itself lost much of the productive potential that 
brought considerable benefits in the sixteenth century.
The institution, established to try to engineer reciprocity and maintain 
a sort of zero equilibrium among peasants based upon a previous status 
quo and formal property rights, was decisive in limiting any profound 
change. As we shall see, only by taking into account economic variables 
such as demographic pressure, the demand to buy and rent land, the 
development of rural markets, and so on can the different degrees of effi-
ciency of the distinct agrarian systems be explained. Only when these vari-
ables combined in such a way that it proved possible to increase quantities 
of labour and natural resources without breaking the community rules was 
it possible for millions of individual decisions to lead to a greater degree of 
efficiency in the fight against death. As we shall see, the situation would be 
very different to that of the sixteenth century; moreover, each region 
would be a law unto itself.
* * *
One of the most frequent errors made when analysing the institutions of 
the ancien régime is to classify them as inefficient in relation to those of 
today’s capitalist economy; another is to judge them purely by their simi-
larity to the ideal model we have of them. There can be no doubt that, 
from this perspective, the study of the reigning political economy in the 
Iberian Peninsula around 1600 leads inexorably to a negative conclusion. 
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Even when they do not accept the stereotypes and values of the new insti-
tutional economics, many historians of early modern Spain have arrived at 
similar conclusions. In reality, this is a legacy of Enlightenment thinking, 
a key moment in the development of the political economy, which saw the 
birth of concepts of progress and economic growth and reflections on the 
role of institutions that fed it. Until very recently, these perspectives and 
assumptions survived largely unchallenged.
But viewed from the perspective of the period, the panorama must be 
not only more complex but also more open in explaining efficiency quo-
tas and growth that, obviously, belonged to a galaxy very far removed 
from those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What emerges 
from the previous pages is that formal institutions and informal institu-
tions, like the family and kinship relations, matter to explain economic 
behaviour and the reduction of transaction costs. But that analysis also 
shows that the institutions per se are not the sole point for the explana-
tion of economic efficiency.65 They were in many occasions twofold and 
could lead to different behaviours of the economic agents (Helpman 
2004). The crucial point would lay in the circumstances that gave prefer-
ence to individual decisions with more positive effects for the whole 
economy—often based on individual choices whose end was not at all 
economic development.
Many of the affirmations set out in the previous pages might be applied 
to other countries. The key point, therefore, is not that the Iberian politi-
cal economy was ill and, therefore, inefficient but to what extent it was 
competitive in a more and more integrated world. The crucial aspect is to 
define to what extent these institutions were able to satisfy the needs of 
countries that had to defend their empires and also to what extent they 
were able to compete in a world in which both political and economic 
rivalries were becoming more severe and global. To look at the problem in 
this way also demands a regional perspective, as does consideration of the 
extent to which the positive and negative potentialities of the institutional 
system were more or less prevalent. This task will be undertaken in the fol-
lowing chapters.
65 For a more quantitative analysis that reinforces this idea, see Ramos (2012).
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State Building and inStitutionS
The schools or disciplines of historical sociology, history, and the new 
institutional economics have shown particular interest in the state- building 
process that took place in Europe from the fifteenth century. In general, 
they have attempted to determine how medieval political formations lead 
to a type of modern state in which the central power monopolizes coer-
cion and administration through a professional bureaucracy that governs a 
geographically coherent territory. In particular, scholars have noted how 
war brought about the construction of a military fiscal system that, in part 
by overcoming other corporate powers, was able to achieve centralization 
of resources and of coercive capacity in the hands of the central power, 
thus serving as a preliminary step towards Weber’s model of the modern 
state. This narrative has almost always been compiled by projecting back-
wards the boundaries of the nation states that were consolidated during—
and as a result of—the Congress of Vienna (1815) and have served as 
fundamental units of analysis for the early modern period. The perspective 
has certain logic if we consider that this type of state is, above all, a territo-
rial one whose evolution we want to analyse retrospectively.
The problem emerges in another light if we follow the arguments set out 
in the above pages, through the analysis of the way in which the territorially 
dispersed composite monarchy developed, a network of geographically sep-
arated polities in which the relationship between the prince and each of the 
polities was based on a series of conflicts and agreements, with jurisdiction 
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shared with (or delegated to) elites, cities, and the Church, who in turn 
maintained horizontal relations—often conflictive—with each other.1
Although his pivotal study hardly touches upon the Iberian countries, 
Downing (1992) provides some perspectives that may be useful to our 
understanding of composite monarchies.2 Building on Tilly’s argument 
for the ‘exceptional case’—that in a context of sustained military pressure, 
access to abundant commercial income could cause a polity to avoid 
bureaucratization and even absolutism—Downing adds that the income 
extracted from conquered territories and external subsidies can have simi-
lar effects (Downing 1992, p. 9). These variables, and their very asym-
metric forms, would create an enormous unevenness between the states of 
the Habsburg monarchy.
Around 1530, when Charles V was crowned Emperor at Bologna, the 
Habsburgs had established an unprecedented dynastic complex. In an 
area that was as politically fragmented as Europe, whose dynamics were 
governed by conflict and the balance between different polities (Jones 
1981), this composite state posed a genuine threat to all. Within it, some 
states—including Castile, although this has not been recognized by his-
torical sociology—had the requisites to create incipient bureaucratized 
and centralized systems: a relatively developed university system that 
allowed the Crown to recruit specialized personnel, an economy with a 
certain level of commercial development that created the bases of an effi-
cient fiscal framework by the standards of the time, and a dynamic com-
merce and a customs regime that seemed to favour tax collection according 
to Tilly’s model (1990).3 But to understand subsequent developments, it 
is necessary to take into account other aspects and factors.
In this respect, it is important to underline that—in contrast with the 
prevailing image that only emphasized the negative aspects—there was an 
evident complementarity between the various parts of this composite 
monarchy. Indeed, this complementarity created the conditions for the 
survival of this system. Thus, the fiscal possibilities of Castile and America 
were really made to work thanks to the financial skills of Genoa—a decisive 
1 The idea of the composite monarchy encompasses two separate concepts or models: for 
Koenigsberger it was a polity ‘including more than one country under the sovereignty of one 
ruler’ (1986, p. 12); but this also implied a ‘profound respect for corporate structures and 
for traditional rights, privileges and customs’ (Elliott 1992, pp. 68–69).
2 For an overview and discussion, see Ertman (1997, pp. 1–34)
3 These are keys to a branch of historical sociology, Ertman (1997) or Tilly (1990), to 
justify the greater capacity to levy taxes in early modern states.
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ally since 1528—and the German territories. In addition, this complemen-
tarity was possible insofar as these financial services were  provided not by 
states (whose institutional impediments would have been very great) but 
by families such as the Welser, Fugger, Doria, or Spinola; that is to say, by 
informal networks whose cross-border character was an essential feature of 
their functioning. To this end, the role of the cash provided by the 
American mines was also vital. Flanders, Castile, Aragon, Naples, and 
Milan (from 1540) had very dynamic and growing populations, which 
enhanced the system’s political and economic vitality. In the previous 
pages, we have emphasized the difficulties involved in the transfer of 
resources, a central argument in our reasoning, but it is obvious that tech-
nically the scope for the mobilization of capital and men was very devel-
oped for the standards of the time and that, in regard to previous 
arrangements, the composite monarchy signified a remarkable step for-
ward. Soon the Habsburgs created a defensive barrier against their most 
important enemy, the Ottoman Empire. This firewall ran from Gibraltar 
to North Africa, Sicily, and Naples and stretched up to Vienna and the 
imperial territories, Bohemia and Hungary, with the complicity of Genoa 
and Venice. Both Venice and Genoa were independent republics whose 
policies fluctuated between obedience and disobedience, depending on 
circumstances. True, Muslim corso often penetrated this barrier, but the 
military capacity of this complex would be demonstrated at Lepanto: the 
forests of the Mediterranean; the iron of Iberia; the taxes of Castile, 
Naples, and Milan; the finances of Genoa, and soldiers and mercenaries 
from Castile, Switzerland, and the imperial territories; wheat from Sicily, 
Italian military, and naval technology; German mining technology; and so 
on. And, above all, the capacity with which the Habsburgs were able to 
combine these resources and tools was perhaps the ultimate expression of 
the strength of a system whose weaknesses are always stressed in relation 
to its distance from a modern state model.
This ensemble of dispersed polities was woven into a highly adaptive sys-
tem, with an awareness of dynastic legitimacy and the notable flexibility 
offered by the family as a system of government. The latter had its great 
weakness in the unpredictable vicissitudes of the life—or death—of its mem-
bers and, consequently, of inheritances. But the dynastic family was also a 
very extensive and flexible institution that could prove to be efficient, as is 
clearly demonstrated by the division of the two branches of the House of 
Habsburg in 1558. This was plainly a proof of (obligatory) strategy if one 
takes into account the solidity of these personal bonds and the chance to use 
them to maintain dominion in the territories governed by each of these two 
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branches which were now united by bonds of solidarity and reciprocity as a 
way of facing their internal conflicts. The annexation of Portugal, again pro-
pitiated by the efficiency and fortune of family policy, would take this mosaic 
of states to an unprecedented situation: a territorial expansion perhaps only 
comparable to that of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century. The 
system would be efficient for the Habsburgs and would last for decades; it 
was founded upon negotiations with the local political constitutions of the 
composite states, its remarkable capacity for propaganda, the imperial ideal 
(Dandelet 2014), and the very solid kinship ties that justified the existence of 
this network. In short, the familial character of the composite monarchy was 
both the strength and weakness of this system.
But it had another strength and weakness that was sometimes forgot-
ten: this was the confessional character that the Habsburgs would soon 
impose upon their dominions; this ethos was derived from their own polit-
ical justification as heirs to both the empire of Charlemagne and the re- 
conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. That they could present themselves, 
thanks to their policy of alliances with the Pope, as defenders of Christianity 
and the faith was important in holding together this federation of patri-
monial states; no doubt, the fear caused by the Turks on the shores of the 
Mediterranean helped. This fact, much commented upon by historiogra-
phy, has one crucial dimension. The Habsburg imperial complex lies 
between those empires in which political power and religious power are 
separated but are inextricably linked and depend on agents with not- 
always- identical agendas: the pontificate and the House of Habsburg, in 
this case. The monotheistic character of Christianity and the dogmatic 
component within it would be decisive in this context. The difference, for 
example, with the Ottoman Empire, is very illustrative. The Sultan exercised 
both religious duties and authority within Islam (Burbank and Cooper 2010) 
and could, therefore, complement them even by implementing some degree 
of tolerance if it was needed (Barkey 2008). But this division of powers 
would be the grounds for crucial tensions for the Habsburgs. The attempts 
of Charles V, influenced by Erasmus, to reach agreement with the German 
princes and the way in which they clashed with papal religious policy are 
very significant in this regard and represent the first line of rupture of the 
monarchical complex. When Philip II ascended the throne, the respective 
positions had been radicalized to such a degree that religion, up to that 
time the crucial cement of this composite monarchy, was henceforth also 
one of the most important causes of conflict, as would be demonstrated by 
the rebellion of the Netherlands. By this juncture, the defence of 
‘Christendom’ (but, to be more precise, Catholicism) had become enmeshed 
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with political and, above all, fiscal theory, to the point that it was hence-
forth the only way to overcome what was the principal obstacle to the 
government of this dynastic complex—the transfer of funds from one state 
to another. The religious component, in turn, had reinforced the religious 
character of the political economy of states such as Castile, where the con-
fessional argument justifying this transfer of funds had to be rehearsed 
exhaustively and so became part of the cultural beliefs that mediated the 
use of financial and military resources.
In this context, the standard national histories are of very little use to 
any understanding of the political economy of the Habsburg domains. 
Today the aberrations and anomalies that can lead to a simplistic analysis of 
the tax revenues of the states of the Old Regime are widely appreciated. 
Although we cannot confuse the gross income and the net income of the 
state, it is significant that the gross entries of it is significant that the net 
income of the Habsburgs in Castile had not only grown faster than that of 
any other European country in the sixteenth century, but by 1600 it were 
twice the size of that of the King of France. If we add in the incomes of 
Naples and Milan, it turns out that these three states alone enjoyed gross 
incomes superior to those of their three principal rivals: France, England, 
and Holland combined.4 The costs of the Castilian debt also create the 
appearance of an efficient complex (Drelichman and Voth 2014; Yun and 
Ramos 2012). Portugal had followed a very different path. The House of 
Avis had remained a secondary lineage in European politics, partly because 
after the Catholic Kings the policy of the Habsburgs had been to ‘neutral-
ize Portugal and isolate France’ (Maltby 2011, p. 29), by seeking an Iberian 
union that the avatars would delay to 1580 and that would only be possible 
through violence. The result was a composite monarchy in Portugal but 
not in the sense commonly used by Machiavelli, who emphasized the vari-
ety of distant and separate states under one dynasty: rather, what emerged 
here was a kingdom made up of superimposed jurisdictional corporations 
that were often in conflict with one another. Portugal would not become 
an element of instability in Europe. Looking at the Atlantic, Portugal’s 
great competitors (and potential ally) were Castile and, by extension, the 
Habsburgs. As we have seen, following Tilly’s model, the chances of build-
ing a military fiscal state in Portugal were considerable. And if we allow 
ourselves to be carried away by some of the ideals that are now frequently 
enunciated by certain historians of the economy, it could be argued that 
4 These calculations, very approximate, are based on Comín and Yun (2012, pp. 235–238) 
and the previous pages above.
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this was the most ‘absolutist’ state in Europe: the parliament met only 
rarely in the sixteenth century, and yet the system of resource mobilization 
functioned with considerable efficiency. But Portugal is really more a case 
of external resources that fits some of Downing’s reasoning and model. 
The first steps towards European globalization—manifested in the expan-
sion into the Atlantic—endowed the king with abundant resources, but, 
critically, these originated from outside the kingdom and for a long time 
rendered unnecessary the transformation from a domain state to a tax state; 
rather, Portugal remained a rentier state until well into the sixteenth cen-
tury (Yun 2012). It helped that its military needs in Europe were smaller 
in relation to its income, and, therefore, the system of indebtedness that 
forced other states to obtain taxes with which to attend to the imbalances 
between the king’s income and his military needs did not lead to an extrac-
tion of fiscal resources as massive as that of Castile.
Portugal, on the other hand, is the counterexample that allows us to 
better understand Castile and the composite monarchy of the Habsburgs, 
to which it would be incorporated in 1580, increasing Madrid’s power but 
also its problems. In fact, the Habsburg complex was only possible thanks 
to the impact of globalization. American silver allowed the operation of 
the international financing system (while putting it to the test at the con-
stitutional level). But this was not because of the availability of silver in 
itself but because Castile found a way of converting silver into military 
spending by resorting to the loans taken out from contractors (asentistas), 
and this allowed it to consolidate its debt, which would not have been 
possible had the Castilian economy not been a relatively advanced mercan-
tile one. This would, in any case, be the most important factor in under-
standing the military fiscal state in Iberia and in the Habsburg domains. In 
Portugal, the local power of the cities and seigniorial lordships and their 
autonomy with respect to the Crown would be notable, but this did not 
translate into an increase in incomes similar to that of Castile in terms of 
its fiscal capacity and the extraction of resources. In Castile, this fiscal state 
operated through a conflictive pact with the elites, the cities, and the 
Church that resulted in the enduring—indeed, even growing—power of 
the urban oligarchies. At the same time, local defensive needs brought 
about a reinforcement of local (seigniorial and urban) militias, which con-
tributed to maintaining a system of dispersed coercion and permanent 
negotiation and overlap with the king’s own forces. This political system 
had little or nothing in common with the model of the centralized military 
state and the uncontested imposition of its authority. And this process 
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created a model that was different from the image of Iberian absolutism 
described by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson.
But, above all, this conjunction of global and local forces increased the 
asymmetry in the Habsburg composite monarchy. States such as the 
Crown of Aragon or Sicily and some imperial polities evolved towards 
‘rentier states’ and experienced few changes in their political-fiscal contex-
ture. In the imperial territories, ‘the fiscal and political structures remained 
stable from the sixteenth-century to the early eighteenth-century’ (Pieper 
2012, p. 168), and the kingdom of Hungary remained under the control 
of the ‘states’ until the end of the empire. Although these were not immo-
bile structures, the shift from the domain state to the tax state (as defined 
by Schumpeter) was postponed (not coincidentally, Schumpeter was work-
ing on the Austrian case). However, the escalation of war costs meant that 
this situation could not last forever, and, above all, it signified that other 
polities more exposed to military conflicts for geostrategic reasons or with 
more favourable constitutions and more scope to forge different pacts 
with their respective elites found themselves compelled to pay more. One 
recurring tradition in Spanish historiography is to think that only Castile 
contributed to the war efforts. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Certainly, Castile became the backbone of the empire. But Naples had to 
contribute with increasing amounts during the sixteenth century and after 
1600 (Chap. 8), and the pressure on Flanders was unrelenting, which 
meant that their contributions continued to grow even in relative terms to 
those of Castile. Along with the fact that the pact with Castile was not at 
all stable, due in part to rising costs and the decline in the marginal profit-
ability of taxes everything led to the first breakdown of the system in 
Flanders. It is very significant that the rebellion of the Netherlands coin-
cided with the resistance of the Cortes of Castile to the revision of certain 
taxes (the encabezamientos), the bankruptcy of 1557, and, very impor-
tantly, the diffusion of Calvinism that put to the test one of the crucial 
elements of the Habsburg system: the religious rigidity that it had acquired 
and which made it impossible to maintain the dialogue and pact with 
elites, the two pillars of its existence. It is in this context that the most 
important reconversion in the history of this system took place: the divi-
sion of domains between the two branches of the family.
It is very important to consider that the study of political formations 
and political economies of the time cannot be undertaken simply from the 
perspective of formal institutions (states, courts, cities, etc.) that main-
tained sovereignty and projected it. Any study must also take into account 
relationships that appear to be informal (family, dynasty, fidelity, patronage, 
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etc.) but that were as important as formal institutions when determining 
political behaviour, state-building processes, and the use of resources. As 
much as a system of cities, principalities, and dominions, composite states 
were a network of informal but decisive families, lineages, and social net-
works (Yun 2009). Although implicit in Ertman’s (1997) vision of patri-
monial state or Mousnier’s work on the venality of offices (1971), not 
many authors interested in state building have taken time to explore this 
aspect of them. An exception is J. Adams (2005), who has emphasized the 
interest of elite families in converting ‘positions of sovereignty into the 
prosperity of their descendants’ (2005, p. 81). This is explained in refer-
ence to the relations of conflict and solidarity that occurred within these 
family formations and were manifested in the need to find an outlet for 
younger sons, women, and even bastards.5 One of the most interesting 
aspects of Adams’s study is that she refers mainly to Holland, apparently a 
modern republic state, and focuses not only upon the aristocracy but also 
on the commercial bourgeoisie that would control the VOC and was a 
group in which the nuclear family was predominant.
The above pages have explored a double—and different—direction. 
They wanted to demonstrate that the state and in particular the empires 
were in part areas into which these elites projected themselves and that 
this method allowed them to overcome the depreciation of a part of their 
income (this was the case for quite a few aristocratic families) and, on the 
other hand, also advanced their efforts at social consolidation and expan-
sion. This also implied a series of agreements with, in spite of the struc-
tural conflicts also inherent to those agreements, the Crown that bound 
them to it by relational ties that would facilitate the maintenance of the 
social order and the political system and that would also condition the 
changes within the latter. It is to be remembered that a good number of 
these conflictive pacts, which implied the assignment of quotas of coercion 
on behalf of the king, were made thanks to absoluta potestas and the 
supreme power of the monarch (this was even set down in the documents 
and licences granted to the nobles and aristocracy for these measures). 
Absolutism as a political practice was not necessarily alien to the multipli-
cation and reinforcement of corporate powers. It is these kinds of pro-
cesses that would explain what Ertman called the ‘patrimonial state’, 
regardless of the appropriateness of this term (1997, pp. 110–125). On 
the other hand, none of these processes were at odds with practices of 
5 See also Adams (2005, pp. 84–85).
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restricting tension within the elites that were mostly achieved by celibacy 
and membership in the Church, a trend whose effects on the economy 
would be decisive.
But, above all, I have wanted to show that such developments, although 
asymmetrical according to imperial spaces and social groups, led to the 
reinforcement of the cross-border character of the elites. They found very 
different spaces in which to expand themselves. America could not become 
the most important area for the promotion and projection of Castilian 
aristocratic houses, although it offered them notable economic benefits 
and additions to their social and political capital. Indeed, the empire pro-
vided their Portuguese counterparts similar benefits overseas. In both 
cases, the chances of fusing the great families with local elites were very 
limited, and this would lead to the formation of colonial elites who, for a 
long time, were well outside the dynamics of the European aristocracies. 
This process of fusion, slow and really based on the reaching out of 
American families to peninsular ones rather than on an expansion of the 
Iberian aristocracies towards the colonies, would not occur until the emer-
gence of an American nobility, which was only beginning to be noted at 
the end of the period under study and whose ability to link with the old 
Castilian families would be limited (Maruri 2007). In the meantime, 
America certainly would provide an outlet—sometimes only temporarily 
but often by creating transatlantic families for a couple of generations—for 
many mid-ranking nobles, bastards, clerics, lawyers, and even some heads 
of lineages; a similar process was also present in Portugal with the peculiar-
ity that the number would have to be smaller given the size of the empire 
and the country itself.
From the perspective of the composite monarchy, this phenomenon 
would accentuate the asymmetry within it. The families of the Castilian 
high nobility became the hierarchical centre of the European Catholic 
nobility and its marital market. But this relationship would not—and 
could not—become a definitive or homogeneous system of links and ties. 
Where these links were intense, bonds were created that tended to stabil-
ity; where they were not, things tended to be more precarious. Looked at 
this way, a rupture was almost inevitable with areas such as the Protestant 
United Provinces, where marriage ties with the Castilian nobility were 
more tenuous in contrast to those with the leading Flemish families 
(Vermeir 2009; Fagel 2009). Moreover, we must suspect that the distance 
between the great Castilian families and the nobility of the northern 
Netherlands—and with it, the obstacles to their incorporation into the 
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imperial system as a whole—may have been one of the keys that led to a 
rapid change within the latter and the development of bourgeois forms of 
management to overcome their problems of social consolidation and 
expansion, with everything that this would mean and entail for the coun-
try’s economy (see Van Nierop (1984) and the next chapter). At perhaps 
the opposite end of the scale was the Neapolitan nobility. With their old 
connections to the Aragonese families, they found in the monarchy an 
important support and a guarantor of their forms of social dominion to 
the extent that these cross-border relationships were increasingly directed 
towards the great families of Old Castile (Muto 2009). In the Iberian 
kingdoms themselves—increasingly, this included Portugal—the marital 
entanglement of aristocratic elites was a way of bringing these societies 
closer together and a factor in the process of state formation and the estab-
lishment of relationships between the various centres of the composite 
monarchy (Yun 2009). And this was not because it was a frictionless pro-
cess, as it often led to divisions within the regional nobility or between it 
and local society. It should be borne in mind that these cross-border aris-
tocracies did not have as their basic agenda the formation of political 
states; rather they sought principally to serve their own house and lineage 
and, in cross-border situations, would seek to secure resources and to send 
out free riders, as would be evident on many different occasions.
The conflictive pact in tax matters and the elites’ ability to overcome their 
problems through various procedures ranging from the obtaining of royal 
mercedes to the use of privileged forms of credit and admission to the Church 
largely explain the political stability of those states upon which the weight of 
the empire fell most heavily, in particular Castile. This was also the case in 
Portugal. Catholic orthodoxy pointed in the same direction, until becom-
ing an essential element of the political economy of the time and of the 
patrimonial management norms and guidelines. In the case of these families, 
entry into the ranks of the Church was at the same time a strategy of repro-
duction for the elites, a part of their moral economy, and a component of 
what we have defined as their economy of legitimization. All this resulted in 
a permanent jurisdictional fragmentation and the survival of private militias 
and armies, which reproduced the capacity of elites to exercise coercion.
It is not, therefore, surprising that all of this propitiated a series of char-
acteristics in Spanish and Portuguese societies that have reinforced an 
image of exceptionalism. But such images do not stand up to comparison. 
On the other hand, the result of these developments was that these infor-
mal institutions and the internal solidarities of the elites permeated the 
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entire institutional system. Thus, forms of wealth management would be 
created and reinforced: these were not aimed at wealth creation but rather 
at rent-seeking, or, at least, those institutions could lead to any outcome. 
And while these institutions would not themselves determine the course 
of economic development, they would have a significant bearing on it at a 
time when productive resources were becoming less abundant in relative 
terms. In turn, this would have an impact on the formation of the market, 
investment and the forms of seigneurial management, and so on, espe-
cially in the centre of the monarchy.
The internal dynamics of the composite monarchy were thus reaching a 
certain blockage point. The pacts between the elites had made it possible 
to overcome the structural tensions of the political and social system. But 
they had consolidated a political fragmentation that absolutism, itself a part 
of the process, could not easily overcome in its attempt at centralization. 
Moreover, institutions once taken by historians to renovate or renew soci-
ety—above all, the king’s justice—actually emerged in a way that did not 
conform to the model of a third party capable of making decisions on the 
basis of a strict and impartial application of the law. It is worth remember-
ing that Iberian historiography has long drawn attention to the difficulties 
of applying the term ‘modern state’ in this period (Clavero 1981, 1986). 
The capacity of these networks to exercise family solidarity, kinship, patron-
age, and friendship would pervert—a loaded term, it is true—an institu-
tional system whose very nature was far from that of modern societies. The 
king’s own justice would itself fall prey to this situation, as is shown by the 
evolution of the Chancillerías. And, importantly, the  ‘military revolution’ 
had not given rise to a state that monopolized the exercise of violence. The 
most effective armies, like the famous Spanish tercios, were sometimes 
dependent on private contractors like Ambrosio Spinola. But, furthermore, 
they were contemporaries—and sometimes complementary—of local 
armies of a stately or urban character. Nor did the military revolution lead 
to a military tax state that would completely control the tax collection sys-
tem. The result was a set of political economies that were far from the ideal 
type of open society designed as desideratum by the new institutional eco-
nomics (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009).
Since the last decades of the sixteenth century, Europe’s insertion in the 
process of globalization intensified. It did so as a consequence of Iberian 
empires’ development. But—this is important to consider—they were not 
alone in this process. On the contrary, it was a poly-nuclear development 
that had important consequences both in Europe and the Iberian world.
In macroeconomic terms, the figures of international trade were still 
small in regard to the size of the European economy. But the direct and 
indirect effects were notable from the perspective of the political econo-
mies of the distinct European regions. This section investigates those 
effects as well as the different patterns of political development that explain 
institutional trends in Western Europe and their economic consequences. 
The different trajectories, we propose, will be important to understand the 
consequences of globalization for Europe and the commercial and indus-
trial competitiveness within it. But external factors, such as religion, also 
would be important in this process.
The question to deal with, however, is to what extent the union among 
the different polities that composed the Habsburgs’ composite monarchy 
and more in particular Portugal and Castile—and, therefore, what we 
could consider the composite empire—would resist the pressure of glo-
balization. To answer such a question, we also need to consider the way 
those empires were constructed and the relationship between formal 
institutions and the social networks on which they were based. From this 
perspective—I hope—some common places regarding the history of 
Iberia, Iberian empires, and globalization, as well as their economic tra-
jectories and the concept of their decadence, will be clarified.
PART III
Organizing and Paying for Global 
Empire, 1598–1668
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CHAPTER 6
Global Forces and European Competition
The elites of the Iberian kingdoms had been able to confront the prob-
lems of reproduction that faced them in the fifteenth century. As has 
been said, the empire was both the problem and solution, particularly 
for Castilian and Portuguese societies. But other areas of Europe con-
fronted similar challenges, the main difference being the way they were 
approached and resolved. The results would be varied and decisive for 
Europe, as they would shape the different political economies of the con-
tinent. In all these cases, and sometimes in an indirect way, these out-
comes were also conditioned by the process of globalization itself and by 
transnational factors, above all the wars into which the global Iberian 
empires would be drawn and the flows and currents of wealth and silver 
that they produced. The indirect result would be a first, if somewhat 
uncertain, step towards a model of greater polarization of growth which 
gravitated towards the north of Europe and linked it to a cycle of the 
longue durée in the relationship between resources and population.1 This 
1 See Braudel (1976, vol. II, p. 791), among others. According to Braudel, the greater 
level of tension between resources and population in the south ended up facilitating the 
introduction of wheat by the Dutch and English in the Mediterranean, which they would 
then supplement with a growing trade in industrial products from the North. His thesis was 
later criticized by J. Israel, who drew attention to the need to avoid speaking of the north of 
Europe but rather about ‘a tiny fringe, the extreme north western corner of the continent’ 
(1989, pp. 5–11, 1990, pp. 133–161).
272
chapter aims at analysing how, in a context of increasing globalization—
for the epoch’s standards—silver flows associated with warfare, market 
integration within Europe, and political-religious developments affected 
the different institutional frameworks and consequently the economic 
competition among distinct Western European regions.
Religion As A FActoR: WesteRn euRopeAn pAtteRns 
oF Development
Economic historians are increasingly interested in the impact and influence 
of religion upon institutions and material development. They have usually 
contented themselves with examining how beliefs had economic effects, 
thinking along lines first suggested by Max Weber (Grier 1997). However, 
it is worthwhile underlining that its effects should also be considered from 
the viewpoint of the functioning of the institutions in question. As we have 
seen (Chap. 5), the influence of religiosity through the specific manage-
ment criteria that it introduced into ecclesiastical institutions was notable. 
Moreover, its impact on political economies that so much depended upon 
social and political stability also should be considered. To this end, it is 
important to remember that sixteenth-century religion meant something 
more than individual and private sentiment with limited effects or impact 
upon public life. Political theory as much as political practices had sacred 
roots and origins as, therefore, did the functioning of the institutions. The 
former was based on the vision of the body politic as a community of reli-
gious ideas. From this concept sprang the idea of cuius regio eius religio. 
The spread of different forms of interpretation of devotion implied a 
rupture of the political and social body. This was a break that could be 
manifested at the level of the body politic and society as a whole, at the 
level of the state as an articulation of different powers and at the very level 
of coexistence and local politics and that above all affected the chances of 
reproduction of the elites’ conflictive pacts.
A brief examination of events in other countries and the means of 
consolidation—or rupture—of institutional systems may cast light on this 
fact and on fundamental differences in the history of Europe.
Economic growth continued in France throughout the sixteenth cen-
tury. If agrarian expansion was extensive, the spread of métayage and farms 
rented by well-off peasants allowed for improvements and investment in 
working tools and organizational innovations that improved the total fac-
tor productivity (Hoffman 1996, pp. 98–107). International commerce 
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and the political solidity of the cities favoured the development of a urban 
network, with crucial nodes in the coastal areas but a strong penetration 
of the interior (Benedict 1989). This fact enhanced the development of 
rural markets and the commercialization of peasant production.
But this growth did not bring about a profound change in the political 
economy that governed the relations between the cities, the aristocracy, 
the Church, and the king. Until well into the century, the French Crown 
was unable to perfect its tax system and so create a fiscal state that involved 
the entire kingdom in tax collection; only some steps were taken towards 
the centralization and co-ordination of this system (Wolfe 1972, p. 104). 
The composite character of the monarchy and its system of checks and 
balances, similar to that of Castile, was maintained (Chap. 1). The cities 
not only retained their autonomy but even increased it to the extent that 
they became the credit bases of the Crown and assumed a sizeable portion 
of its debts (Chevalier 1987, pp. 150–151). Both the états provinciales, 
provincial representative assemblies, and the negotiating power of the 
urban oligarchies remained intact. Moreover, the États généraux”, in 
which the kingdom used to meet, also retained scope for manoeuvre. As 
in the Iberian territories, the aristocratic families faced considerable diffi-
culties in reproducing the social control of their lineages. We know today 
that the vigour of this group did not fall in general. Royal service allowed 
its members access to the wealth extracted by the fiscal system, and its 
incomes could be adapted to the depreciation brought about by the price 
revolution (Russell Major 1981; Salmon 1975, pp. 81–84). The military 
contributions of the ‘second nobility’ created channels for social advance-
ment that contributed to overcome the internal tensions of the patriciate 
and the lower ranks of the aristocratic lineages (Bourquin 1994, 
pp. 24–58). The purchase of fiefs and seigniorial estates from both private 
individuals and the Crown allowed magistrates and businessmen to satisfy 
the need for expansion felt by the urban oligarchies (Salmon 1975, p. 42). 
At the same time, this trend increased the monarch’s capacity for arbitra-
tion, set down in the growing influence and number of the ‘men of the 
king’ in the provinces (Jouanna 1989, pp. 80–90) and in their growing 
role as administrators of the condition of the noble. As in the Iberian 
 kingdoms, the Church served as the machinery for absorption of this 
dynamic of social promotion. This came at the time that its jurisdictional 
autonomy and powers in relation to the king were retained to the extent 
that French royal absolutism has been seen as a relatively well-balanced 
political system (Beik 1985).
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Towards 1550 agriculture entered a phase characterized by falling 
yields while the fragmentation of many farms lowered overall land produc-
tivity. Fiscal pressure was transferred onto the countryside, and urban sala-
ries fell (Neveux et al. 1975, pp. 151–155). War with the Habsburgs led 
to an unprecedented increase in fiscal pressure and a reduction of the 
percentage of the royal taxes that remained in the hands of the cities 
charged with their collection, thus creating even more conflicts. Crown 
debts, which impacted cities such as Lyon and Paris, led to the bankruptcy 
of 1557–1558 (Chevalier 1987, pp. 150–151; Wolfe 1972, pp. 104–118). 
While unthinkable in Castile, the displacement of part of the fiscal burden 
towards the Church forced it to sell off ecclesiastical properties (Wolfe 
1972, pp. 118–123). According to some calculations, during the sixteenth 
century, some 50% of ecclesiastical possessions were sold off. Nothing 
similar happened in Castile, although the seigniorial estates of some clergy 
were alienated. Moreover, the development of the French royal fiscal sys-
tem threatened to break relations with the aristocracy (Chaunu 1977, 
pp.  166–167). This came at a moment at which families such as La 
Trémouille and others had problems achieving the extension of their lin-
eages. The tension among noble households, structural to the system, 
increased.2
For these reasons the differences in regard to the Spanish Habsburg 
dominions were very clear. In geographical terms France was a geopoliti-
cally unified monarchy boasting a high density of population. on the 
other hand, it did not possess an empire with which to offer an outlet for 
the dominant coalition’s needs for consolidation and extension. Nor could 
it count upon a stream of American silver to allow it to form an efficient 
system for assuming and consolidating debts (see Chap. 4). This having 
been said, the breakdown of the medieval model would be brought about 
by an external factor that was totally alien to the previous institutional 
framework and largely absent in Castile: religious division. If the Catholic 
Church had exercised less influence upon the French monarchs’ 
 international politics, the religious rupture would be a key factor in the 
history of the country.
The spread of Calvinism among society in general and the nobility in 
particular (leading to the rapid ‘contamination’ of its clients), and the 
subtlety of its doctrine on the subject of resistance to the king, fell upon a 
2 See the cases of the Guise, Montmorency, and the Bourbons (Knecht 1996, pp. 15–18).
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receptive terrain marked by the growing discontent over the Crown’s fis-
cal policies (Jouanna 1989; Wood 1980, p. 169). This was happening at 
the same time that the ‘aristocratic structure of power was converting a 
civil war into a drama of a religious nature’ (Chevalier 1994, p.  391). 
Coming on top of the radicalization of court factions, religious confronta-
tion would lead France into one of the most tragic periods of its history.
The subsequent conflicts brought into the open problems in the stabil-
ity of the social system and, in particular, of the noble economies within it. 
The ‘state of finances’ that had served as a basis for the continuity of the 
social system was falling apart, and taxes were replaced on both sides by 
pillaging and sacking (Chaunu 1977, pp. 170–175). And with the collapse 
of the old arrangements, the social equilibrium achieved in the previous 
century also disintegrated. The nobility sought to overcome its needs by 
seizing communal lands and extending its dominions, as it had done dur-
ing the Middle Ages. Many cities claimed greater degrees of autonomy or, 
as was the case where the Protestants formed the majority, boosted and 
extended their self-government (Knecht 1996, pp. 53–54). All of this was 
combined with peasant uprisings against taxes, resistance to payment of 
the tithe, and even the radicalization of popular groups in the cities.
As had been the case for the war of the Comunidades of Castile and the 
Germanías of Valencia, the wars of religion brought to the light grave 
problems within the existing social system. But, in the same way as in the 
Iberian kingdoms, the wars convinced the nobility, magistrates, the 
Church, the Catholics, Huguenots, and all the well-off sectors of French 
society that the only way out was order and political stability. And this 
order could only be achieved with a strong and absolute monarch (‘an 
official of God on the Earth’). This figure was finally embodied in Henry 
of Bourbon, King of Navarre, proclaimed King of France after his renun-
ciation of Protestantism in 1594. From this moment, the political rhetoric 
changed in respect to the theories—tyrannicide included—of the sixteenth 
century (Holt 1995, pp. 213–216). The treasury reforms of Sully strength-
ened royal power and gave it new resources of patronage that allowed it 
both to attract elites and to oversee the restructuring of the dominant 
coalition (Salmon 1975, pp. 276–308). If religious conflict did not entirely 
disappear, the confrontation over different creeds was overcome for the 
moment. This supposed a decisive step forward for order and the repro-
duction of the social and political systems. The economic consequences of 
this situation would be crucial.
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In England the institutional system that emerged from the medieval 
crisis had less scope to redistribute rents and revenues among the elites 
(Chap. 1). A large part of the Crown’s income came from its own royal 
patrimony or from import and export duties.3 The social dominium of 
aristocratic lineages was maintained by extending their possessions and the 
establishment of great estates (Brenner 1993). Given the limits of the fis-
cal system, the urban oligarchies enjoyed fewer chances to exploit their 
autonomy or to mediate the collection of taxes. Shortly, they found them-
selves committed to the consolidation of their agrarian properties or to 
commerce as a means of expansion. Although this was a zone of very low 
levels of urbanization at the start of the century, the town oligarchies 
achieved very noticeable levels of economic and demographic growth 
based upon significant improvements in commerce, urbanization, and 
extensive agriculture that brought about an increase in productivity.4 
Probably this growth is most clearly reflected in the accelerating rhythms 
of urbanization. Moreover, these rates may be underrepresenting eco-
nomic progress, if we take into account the extension of the putting out 
system which led to a high level of industrial productivity without a pro-
portional development of the major cities.
The institutional system suffered from crucial problems. As in Castile, 
the aristocracy had to make assiduous use of credit (Stone 1979, p. 509). 
The growth of the regular income of the Crown was being steadily miti-
gated by the rise in prices, while royal expenditure shot through the roof 
at each and every moment of tension in foreign affairs. The Crown’s 
capacity to increase its core revenue in England was lower than in Castile 
(see Graph 4.1). The origin of this limitation lay in part in the difficulties 
and costs involved in the management of the Crown lands (Russell 1988, 
pp. 31–33) and the slow increase in import and export duties, as well as in 
the stagnation in real terms of tax receipts (o’Brien and Hunt 1993). 
Henry VIII governed thanks to the support of the gentry in Parliament 
and the use of statutes that strengthened his absolute authority (Loades 
1994, p. 411); but a system of this kind also increased the demands of 
patronage, manifested, for example, in a certain level of permissiveness in 
the cession of Crown lands to the nobility (Russell 1988, p. 32). As in 
other areas of Europe, the power system was already driven by grave ten-
sions in the first half of the century.
3 See figures in Hough and Grier (2015, p. 144) that come from Cunningham (2007).
4 For this, see De Vries (1994, p. 13), De Vries (1984, p. 56), o’Brien (1996, p. 216), 
overton (1996, p. 82), and Snooks (1994, p. 41).
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The fortuitous factor that would most affect the reproduction of the 
social and institutional model would be Henry VIII’s break with Rome 
and the creation of the Church of England. Despite the personal origins 
of this decision, it must be seen in the general European context, marked 
by tensions between monarchy and pontificate, as well as the Crown’s 
need for increasing resources. Perhaps for these reasons, the effects upon 
the institutional system were crucial. The Reformation allowed the seizure 
and sale by the Crown of extensive ecclesiastical possessions during the 
reign of Henry VIII (monastery lands constituted one-fifth of the total 
land under cultivation) and then under Elizabeth I (the estates of the 
bishops).5 This decision broke decisively with the model as it developed in 
Castile, which was based upon the amplification of ecclesiastical proper-
ties, and would have enormous impact upon the assignation of productive 
factors and the political economy (Chaps. 4 and 5).
The English Reformation also turned out to be crucial for economic 
and social development. It fed the expansion of the noble and gentry 
estates, the principal purchasers of the church lands. It permitted the pro-
motion and reproduction of both social groups upon the basis of the 
establishment of extensive properties and, moreover, strengthened their 
affinities with the Crown as a result of the rupture with Rome, leading to 
a corresponding tightening of Crown control over this new nobility of 
proprietors (Hill 1969, p. 35; Stone 1979).
During the reign of Elizabeth (1558–1603), the rise of the gentry, the 
purchase of honours, and the problems of the old aristocratic lineages 
became more noticeable (Stone 1979, pp. 250–257). Unable to exert a 
firm grip over their possessions as enjoyed by their counterparts in Castile 
(achieved through the semi-public institution of the mayorazgos, com-
bined with the peculiar system of mortgages taken out on possessions tied 
to them), denied access to a highly evolved fiscal apparatus such as that of 
Castile and even France, and without an empire and an international com-
posite monarchy, such as the Spanish one that would allow the nobility to 
enjoy both massive incomes from the state and political space in which to 
expand, the English aristocrats’ indebtedness would lead them to sell their 
possessions, a measure that successively renewed and changed their social 
group.
5 Hough and Grier (2015, pp. 144–145), based mainly on Elton (1953, pp. 247–249) and 
Black (1959, pp. 14–34).
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The social role of the high nobility began to change from the last years 
of the sixteenth century. The need to exploit its estates more intensively 
and efficiently and to invest in different sectors of the economy reduced 
the importance of the economy of legitimation (Chaps. 1 and 4) of many 
families (Stone 1979). The military character of the class disappeared 
almost entirely to the extent that war now depended upon the navy, an 
institution relatively highly controlled by the monarch and therefore cru-
cial for state building (Glete 2000, pp. 67 and 147). If the cities main-
tained functions of social legitimation similar to those of Castile or France, 
their involvement in the fiscal system and in the distribution of resources 
was much less pronounced than in these countries, a factor that would 
affect their role in the institutional system (Chap. 4).
In some regards the political economy of England at the end of the 
century was similar to that of Castile or France. The judicial system had 
certainly developed, but corporative institutions controlled by merchants, 
such as the Merchant Adventurer Companies (Brenner 1993), the cities, 
or the old nobility, created forms of self-enforcement that limited the 
monarch’s capacity for arbitration and juridical coercion. But in this 
regard, the evolution was very different, and, more important, the elites’ 
coalition had been broken, and this led the country along a road of no 
return (in distinction to France), thus making it an exceptional case in the 
history of Europe. Despite the court corruption and patronage denounced 
during the reigns of James I (1603–1625) and Charles I (1625–1649), 
the merchant classes and the high nobility continued to enjoy far fewer 
chances to consolidate and extend its power though the institutions, access 
to political incomes or patronage, and corruption than their counterparts 
in Castile and Portugal—with all their empires—or even France. For the 
English nobles, it was necessary to return to overseas commerce while 
exerting pressure upon Parliament for a foreign policy that ranked com-
merce above dynastic or noble interests and that would override the con-
cerns of those corporations that were constituted as the Merchant 
Adventurers (Brenner 1993). These overseas merchants retained a num-
ber of powers and even enjoyed a noticeable degree of access to violence 
that would afford them a certain advantage in the use of methods of 
enforcement. But they would slowly convert themselves into great agricul-
tural proprietors and mine-owners, while their jurisdictional powers were 
steadily reduced. For this reason, they found it increasingly important to 
introduce productive improvements that would increase the efficiency of 
their mines and farming estates, even if this entailed rising social tensions 
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with their subjects that came to cost them their image as paternalists and 
defenders of the traditional order (Stone 1979). Nothing like a double 
economy as described or as could be found in Castile was discernible in 
the isles, at least not with similar dimensions (Yun 2002a). In contrast to 
the mayorazgos, the English strict settlements were not adorned with any 
institutional mechanism that prevented the dissolution of patrimonies, 
and, consequently, they were not effective in this sense (Habakkuk 1994). 
And nothing like a network of ecclesiastical institutions governed by crite-
ria of pure social profitability and legitimation existed in dimensions com-
parable to those of Castile, France, or even Portugal. Although what is 
referred to in this study as the economy of legitimation appears to be 
highly developed to English historians, who use the term ‘economy of 
welfare’, it is almost certain that English provision and spending would 
not resist comparison with the figures from the continent (Archer 1991; 
Slack 2015, p. 64).
Yet if this process had produced only partial effects, the outcome of this 
rupture was evident before the changes usually dated to 1688 (North and 
Weingast 1989): it would be manifested in social instability and political 
tensions leading to the decisive breakdown of 1640.6
The development of the Low Countries during the Middle Ages had 
been based upon commercial and industrial growth. The nobility, if pres-
ent and significant in many areas, had much less economic, social, and—
above all—jurisdictional power than in Castile or France (Van Nierop 
1984, pp. 38–39; Israel 1995). Political fragmentation was reflected in 
considerable fiscal segmentation, and this compelled Charles V to enter 
into a seemingly endless round of separate negotiations (Chap. 4). Like his 
grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian, Charles V did not attempt to intro-
duce radical changes in political and institutional organizations 
(Koenigsberger 1971, pp. 125–143). Despite reforming the treasury and 
arrangements governing the central finances, he did not carry out changes 
that would have resolved tensions between the Crown and the estates or 
between the provinces. The fiscal needs of the kingdom were covered 
largely by credit agreements set upon Crown possessions. But, given their 
6 These arguments, first presented in a more intuitive way in Yun (2004), have been clari-
fied and given depth by Hough and Grier (2015, pp. 137–149) from whom some of these 
ideas are borrowed. Some nuance should be introduced to the vision presented by North and 
Weingast (1989) where the change is dated to the transformations of 1640 and more specifi-
cally 1688. Both visions are not mutually exclusive.
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decline and indebtedness—in the 1520s they barely brought in 16% of 
overall income—it was impossible not to recur to voted subsidies from the 
estates and the development of the fiscal state.7 The outcome would be a 
marked dependence upon the parliamentary assemblies that controlled 
not only the vote on the services but also the collection of these incomes 
and the emission of renten, debt bonds that allowed money to be advanced 
to the Crown (Tracy 1985). As in other kingdoms, a system of this sort 
brought with it the risk of corruption and bribery that would reduce the 
final amount collected (Koenigsberger 1971, pp. 166–175).
Set in the most dynamic area of European poly-nuclear economic 
growth, and with an ever-more intensive agriculture, the economic expan-
sion of this region was very impressive, as can be seen from its high rates 
of urbanization (Van der Wee and Blomme 1994; Klep 1988; Israel 1995, 
pp.  113–116). This model, however, created important tendencies 
towards social instability. The scope for development of an aristocracy that 
might exercise coercion in alliance with the Crown, and so guarantee 
social order, was minimal. Moreover this group, which also had consider-
able debts, quickly overcame them through improvements in its produc-
tive system (Van Nierop 1984). In reality, this was the only viable option 
in light of the limits of the system for the redistribution of incomes, given 
the overall curbs on a system fully controlled by the states and the extent 
to which Castilian families were displacing their Flemish and Dutch peers 
in the government of the monarchy (Koenigsberger 1971). And some-
thing similar might be said of the businessmen and artisans whose social 
reproduction depended upon their involvement in the international mar-
ket rather than upon political or fiscal incomes that could be obtained at 
the local level. If the cities maintained and even strengthened their fiscal 
autonomy, the urban economy rested upon other pillars that rendered it 
less dependent upon this fact.
Taxes upon commerce and consumption, the Habsburg wars—above 
all those with France—and fiscal demands had a destabilizing effect (Tracy 
1985, pp.  75–107). The preoccupation in Madrid with religious ‘con-
tamination’ led to the establishment of the Inquisition, a measure that 
alarmed and enraged the Protestants for obvious reasons and others on 
the grounds of foreign political interference. The reform of the bishoprics 
and the control that the Crown sought to exercise through them strength-
ened the resolve of the aristocracy, traditionally favoured by the status 
7 In fact, these subsidies accounted for more than 60% of income (Tracy 1985, pp. 30–31).
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quo, at the same time that a number of leading families were replaced by 
the king’s men, thus generating a widespread concern about the repro-
duction of this social group through the two usual channels, the Church 
and the court.
In this context the decisive external factor would be, as in France and 
England, religion. Calvinism, gaining strength over the previous years, 
unleashed a conflict across the Low Countries in 1566 whose intensity 
would previously have been unthinkable. The repression enacted by the 
duke of Alba, together with his efforts to introduce the alcabala, gave 
even greater strength and impetus to the movement (Maltby 1983).
The result of the conflict would be a society very different from its pre-
decessors, in which the division between North and South was clearer.
In the southern provinces, existing economic growth would be slowed 
down.8 The role of Antwerp in the international economy would be tem-
porarily reduced. The Habsburgs sought the creation of a semi- independent 
political entity, in which the patronage of the Crown in relation to the 
aristocracy was strengthened and with it the chances of reproduction of a 
dominant coalition more similar to that of France or Castile.9 The reform 
of the clergy served to consolidate the ecclesiastical institutions (Parker 
1981, pp. 163–164). But favourable conditions for agrarian development, 
the advance of the verlagssystem and of luxury industries (a good part of 
them aimed at the markets of Brussels and Madrid), and the tendency to 
subsidize the fiscal shortfall from Castile favoured economic growth that 
would continue until 1650 and which, as we shall see, would be helped by 
the Habsburg monarchy’s increasing expenditures (Van der Wee 1988, 
pp. 347–351).10
In the northern provinces, the outcome of the rebellion was even more 
positive in economic terms. Despite the leadership of Holland, the United 
Provinces continued to be a fragile confederation and did not even estab-
lish shared fiscal apparatus (Israel 1995, pp. 276–306; ‘T Hart et al. 1997). 
8 Van der Wee and Blomme (1994). The same impression is gained from the population 
figures or the coefficient of urbanization of the whole area (De Vries 1984, p. 46; Van der 
Wee 1978).
9 The previous explanation can be seen in Janssens (1998) and Degryse and Janssens 
(2005).
10 According to the figures of Van der Wee and Blomme for Brabante and Flanders, the 
growth of income per capita may have accelerated to 0.22% between 1610 and 1660 (1994, 
p. 91). For the evolution of the urban population between 1550 and 1650, see Klep (1988, 
p. 267).
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But war—and by implication the external threat—together with Calvinism 
and republicanism, provided the mortar that would bind this society 
together above the pacts among the elites that were very different from 
those of France and Spain. Moreover, the clamour of war was assisted by a 
genuine financial revolution. Although no central bank was created (as 
occurred in England after 1688), the representative assemblies were able 
to control the cost and central budget, something which served to increase 
confidence in the public debt and the state’s ability to generate income 
through the sale of bonds (Tracy 1985; and ‘T Hart et al. 1997). Within 
the space of just a few years, the renten were being sold at interest rates 
lower than those of the juros of Castile (Graph 4.2a and c).
obviously this society was not immune to a degree of political corrup-
tion or the practices of rent-seeking (Adams 2005). But the scope for the 
noble classes and merchant patricians to make use of patronage at the 
expense of the state was reduced. Intensive agriculture, commerce, global 
expansion through the VoC and WIC, and the export of artisan goods 
were the only way out: these were, above all else, the bases for the coun-
try’s prosperity. In fact, the trading companies implied a different model 
for the devolution of functions. These were institutions that obtained del-
egated sovereignty from central power. But they were semi-private institu-
tions that lived by their own capacity to obtain investment and impose 
themselves upon international markets and not by the udders of a state 
that captured and redistributed funds from the kingdom as a whole. The 
key to mercantilism was set down in this way (Adams 2005).
Italy cannot be approached as a whole in economic, social, or political 
terms. It was, with the Low Countries, the most highly urbanized zone of 
Europe, and the poly-nuclear growth of the century would only serve to 
reinforce this tendency. But it had one of the most solid seigneurial systems 
in Europe. This was the case in both ‘republic states’, such as Genoa, 
Florence, or Venice, and dynastic polities, such as Naples, Sicily, and Milan. 
Even in the Papal States, the cities and nobles exercised jurisdictions over 
large seigniorial estates. In the merchant republics, such as Genoa and 
Venice, the capacity to exercise jurisdiction through their central administra-
tions had been one of the keys to the success of the merchants and financiers 
(Greif 2006; González de Lara 2008). In all districts political control and 
the incomes that they generated were crucial to social success and to the 
capacity for reproduction of both the urban patriciate and the aristocracy 
(this was the case even if, as in Genoa or Venice, this had a financial basis).
As in all of Europe, the problems of falling salaries, poverty, the rising 
cost of land, and farm evictions were evident across the Italian Peninsula 
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(Braudel 1976, vol. I, pp. 602–604). And not a few problems originated 
in the rigidities of feudal rents, the need for expansion of the lineages, and 
the social ambitions of the patricians. In the South, banditry, nurtured in 
part by the local nobilities, was increasingly noticeable, and the rising lev-
els of debt began to be a feature of the existence of many families (Villari 
1973; Cancila 2013). This tension was also evident within the commercial 
and financial aristocracy of Genoa, where the fight between the nobili 
nuovi and nobili vecchi in 1575 laid bare to the world the conflicts origi-
nating in the dynamism of these elites (Savelli 1981). War and the demands 
of the Habsburgs accentuated the instability at crucial moments.
Italy, however, would witness the reproduction of the basic institutional 
framework. Religious stability, closely tied to the presence of the papacy, 
was doubtlessly one of the key factors in achieving this. Political fragmenta-
tion and the abundance of small states meant that social and political con-
flicts retained a predominantly local character and were controlled by the 
local oligarchies or by the Habsburgs, who presided over key territories.
The incorporation of a number of these states into the Habsburg 
domains had a destabilizing effect at a number of specific junctures. 
However, in the long term, it facilitated the survival of the social struc-
tures. The southern nobilities of Naples and Sicily, indebted and beset by 
problems of one sort or another, benefited from the patronage of the 
viceroyal courts (Muto 2005, p.  93; Galasso 1994). This also allowed 
them to form ties with the leading Castilian and Aragonese families, with-
out doubt the most stable in Europe, and thus to secure a share in the 
political and economic capital which was to be the basis of the consolidation 
and extension of the elites (Muto 2009). This tie was also evident in the 
case of the Genoese families who provided financial services to the 
Habsbourg and discovered a form of social expansion—and, indeed, even 
ennoblement was possible in Castile—even if this meant exchanging finan-
cial capital for political and social capital in Madrid. Yet the court was not 
the only space within the monarchy that served this purpose. From the 
beginning of the sixteenth century, a tendency was established of mar-
riages across frontiers within Italy or with French or imperial families; 
families such as the Gonzaga, the Colonna, the Visconti, the Spínola, and 
many others fully took advantage of such practices in order to enhance 
their power (see the case of Savoy in osborne 2002). The proximity of the 
papacy and the Curia, whose membership was fed by these families during 
the century (Po-Chia 1998; o’Malley 1981), exponentially increased their 
capacity to overcome their own conflicts and accede to the immense pos-
sibilities of patronage that the papacy and the Curia offered (Donati 1995, 
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pp. 250–257). The Habsburgs (in Madrid and Vienna), the Church, the 
empire, and even France offered local patricians and oligarchies the chances 
of stability and social advancement that were so important to them. The 
case of the Genoese nobili nuovi who were able to gain access to the finan-
cial services of the Habsburg empire is just one example. Their functions 
for the monarchy were considerable (Arrighi 1994, pp. 127–129).
The corollary of such service to the Hispanic monarchy was the 
enhancement of seigniorial jurisdictions and urban estates (in some cases, 
this took the form of the city-state) in many regions of Italy, something 
which went hand in hand with decentralized principles of enforcement. It 
is also evident that the development of the economy of legitimation in 
Florence, Rome, Genoa, or Venice would bequeath to humanity some of 
Europe’s most superb examples of conspicuous consumption and artistic 
creation. This was not an obstacle to investment in the repopulation of 
territories in Sicily or to subsidizing those in Lombardy. But it would end 
by creating rigidities in the productive system. Nevertheless, these devel-
opments did not disturb the Italian Peninsula’s complex political mosaic, 
which remained intact, as, indeed, did the jurisdictional fragmentation of 
each of these political units; at the same time, an urban industrial system 
with a marked corporative element was consecrated.
To the extent that the prosperity of the elites of Italy was founded upon 
providing financial services to the great powers, or in the vitality of the 
artisan sector of the cities, economic growth would continue to be 
 noticeable. But the political and institutional evolution of the peninsula 
strengthened forms of political economy that were to be less efficient in 
the very long run.
globAlizing Agents
The world of 1600 was very different from that of a hundred years earlier, 
and globalization itself was changing.
Informal Globalizing Networks
Looking at the world in 1600–1630, what is striking is how it had gener-
ated forms of integration, control, rejection, and even ecological imperial-
ism that would affect the European political economies in a decisive way. 
Primitive globalization came hand in hand with the development of infor-
mal transnational networks, often based upon what Granovetter (1973) 
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
285
called weak ties, which, if not necessarily Eurocentric, certainly would be 
decisive for the history of Europe.
From the sixteenth century, a process of Catholic renovation, in 
Po-Chia’s phrase (1998), took place. It was to have a global dimension. 
The arrival of the Spanish in America and the Portuguese in Africa pro-
vided the framework that allowed for the global enlargement of the reli-
gious orders in particular and the Catholic religion in general. This process, 
whose only parallel in western civilization is found in the events of the 
decades following the life of Christ, was just another step in the expansion 
of medieval Christianity, including not only the continuation of the 
Reconquista, the eastward expansion of German society, the conversion of 
Northern Europe and Russia, and the movement known as the crusades. 
From the fifteenth century, the religious orders were active in Africa, fol-
lowing the Portuguese lead, the Atlantic, and, from 1500, America and 
Asia. Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians from all Europe found a 
vast area of evangelization in America. They learnt languages, changed 
cultures, created forms of religious syncretism that attracted the indige-
nous populations, and introduced ‘civilization’ (often in a violent way).11
The Council of Trent and the Counter-Reformation accelerated this 
process. The Jesuits were already in the orient. But now they began to 
attach themselves to the centres of power in Japan and China. (Céspedes 
1990; Po-Chia Sia 2010). In spite of their recent ubiquity in current litera-
ture, they were really very few in number and came above all from Iberia. 
In parallel, the Augustinians expanded into the Philippines and South 
Eastern Asia. The establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese empires 
came to be inextricably tied to the expansion of the secular church and a 
network of ecclesiastical institutions that, like the monasteries and convents 
of the religious and missionary orders, established the nodes upon which 
systems of communication, cultural transferal, and hybridization would be 
based. These networks served to move persons and even—as the letters of 
the Jesuits illustrate well—dispatches, news, reports, and books. They 
advanced the cause of cultural integration and created and circulated 
images and stereotypes about different areas; in some cases they even led to 
the rejection of recurrent ideas and descriptions (Gruzinski 2004). These 
networks were even used to spread formulas for religious homogenization 
and cultural control, as was the case for the Inquisition, which was soon to 
11 The literature is vast. See, for example, Disney (2009), Boxer (1969), Russell-Wood 
(1992), and Parry (1990).
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become a global institution (Bethencourt 2009). But, fundamentally, these 
networks, persons, and institutions retained a large margin of manoeuvre 
with respect to the monarchs’ temporal power and, to be specific, to the 
Spanish imperial structure of Philip II and his successors, despite the kings’ 
attempts to control them. European expansion was therefore marked by 
something that has often passed unremarked. Despite the proximity of 
temporal and spiritual power, it was based upon a dualism of powers, the 
spiritual authority of Rome and the temporal power of the monarchs. For 
all the involvement of the latter in the appointment of bishops and the 
exercise of patronage, this was to be a lasting and important dichotomy.
Catholic expansion did not come alone, nor did it represent all of the 
agencies involved in the process. Very shortly the Protestant societies cre-
ated in North America their own nuclei of expansion. At the other extreme 
of Christendom, the orthodox Byzantine Church was involving itself in 
Russia and the oriental frontiers of Europe. The same could be said of 
Judaism, whose development and expansion can be linked to the continu-
ation of the process of expansion. These years witnessed what J.  Israel 
called the ‘revolution in Jewish life’, ‘the decisive change’. Spread across 
all of Europe, and often boasting Spanish origins, the Jews knitted together 
dense networks of cultural and commercial relations. Faced with attempts 
to contain them, these networks expanded into America and Asia (Israel 
1985). Meanwhile, the expansion of Islam through Asia, towards 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malacca, and along Africa’s east coast, the 
Sudan, parts of Ethiopia, and Indian ocean would continue throughout 
the century, being closely linked to the growth of Muslim commercial 
networks in these areas (Céspedes 1990, p.  57). It is also worthwhile 
remembering that, if religious identity formed the basis of these systems, 
these networks were the ideal stage for agents and mediators whose influ-
ence was not confined to a confessional programme. once the contact 
among different cultural worlds was established, these agents transmitted 
many different types of messages (Cools et al. 2006).
To the extent that the Iberian empires became a platform for the inter-
nationalization and globalization of their elites, these institutions rein-
forced a process (mentioned above) that saw the emergence of global 
networks. And this process was more intensive from 1580. As occurred 
with the religious orders, this phenomenon was not limited to the rela-
tions between the metropolis and the colonies. As it also projected itself 
upon Europe as a whole, it bound the old continent and the New Worlds 




These trends were not confined to the elites. According to official fig-
ures, about 130,000 Castilians emigrated to America between 1500 and 
1580, many of them artisans (Romano 2004, p. 64; Martínez Shaw 1994). 
As their correspondence clearly demonstrates, these globetrotting elites 
took with them many servants and maids, members of their retinues, and 
even their friends and relatives belonging to the lowest social strata, all of 
whom contributed to creating global ties at all levels of the social hierar-
chy. And, importantly, the correspondence and testamentary records also 
show that many did not break entirely with the peninsula but rather main-
tained genuine links and networks (otte 1986; Redondo and Yun 2008). 
Military officials, technicians, miners, and sailors, who had been trained in 
Europe, found in America, Asia, and Africa an area of action and even a 
theatre into which they could introduce and spread their knowledge, cul-
tural habits, patterns of consumption, and so on (Centenero 2009, Altman 
2000, Yun 2012). The ‘oceanic world’ (the Atlantic) was populated by 
slaves from Africa, many of them blacks, who, at the end of the sixteenth 
century, were already numerous in the Caribbean (as is widely known, 
New Guinea acquired its name as an allusion to the origin of its popula-
tion). What is less well known is that they often lived side by side with 
Asians, some of whom were also slaves (De Sousa 2015). A respectable 
community of Chinese existed in Puebla, fed by Jewish merchants who 
forged links in Asia and the Philippines (Altman 2000 and Seijas 2014). 
This case provides a study of social groups who rapidly lost contact with 
their original societies but who were highly active in the process of cultural 
cross-fertilization and globalization that marked this period.
Commerce and merchant networks were especially active in the form-
ing of this mesh of social and cultural agents. In spite of the attempt to 
control migration by the Spanish Crown, Italian families—above all the 
Genoese—followed their Castilian and Portuguese counterparts in 
expanding into America, often retaining a transnational component that 
defies any narrow national or political description (Subrahmanyam 2007; 
Bethencourt 2013; Kellenbenz 2000). By the mid-seventeenth century, 
the mixing of Europeans of very different origins was so advanced that 
contemporaries were unable to differentiate among them. This is what 
happened, for instance, in the Río de la Plata (Trujillo 2009), where 
Castilian and Portuguese groups settled. The last decades of the sixteenth 
century saw the flow of Portuguese businessmen into Brazil and the exten-
sion of their activities towards Argentina, whose direct connections with 
Africa consequently increased (Boyajian 1983). The entrance of the 
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Dutch, and subsequently the English, into the Caribbean and Asia is a 
symptom of this mercantile globalization (Boxer 1965). At the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, French skin traders made contact with the 
Iroquois and Huron in North America (Curtin 1984, p. 226).
This global expansion is just another manifestation of changes occur-
ring in the old continent. Here the Jewish commercial diaspora drew in 
communities stretching from Poland to Central Europe to the Near East 
(Israel 1985). The Jews of the Low Countries strengthened their links 
with Lisbon and even with Burgos; from Lisbon they extended their ties 
with Italy (Ruspio 2007). In the other extreme of the commercial net-
work, in the Mediterranean, ‘the “Spanish Jews”, spread out through 
Salonica and Constantinople, or through Ragusa, Split and Valona, taking 
control of the commercial routes of the Balkans’ (Israel 1985, chapters 
I and II). The English, meanwhile, were increasingly active in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, in Venice and Greece (Fusaro 2015), and even in Safavid 
Persia. The Genoese could be found across the Habsburg territories, and 
families of noble financiers, such as the Spínola, the Gonzaga, and others, 
even established French and Austrian branches. During the second half of 
the century, the Flemish presence in Seville increased, while Italian 
 activities in distant areas such as Gdan ́sk were growing (Samsonowicz 
1973, pp. 538–539).
The ensuing and expanding webs of individuals displayed characteris-
tics that are worthy of consideration. The first of these is that the political 
frontiers of empires were no obstacle to these personal connections. This 
would be more and more the case, as the analysis of Portuguese and 
Spanish empires (below) will show. But, perhaps more interestingly, 
though the different groups defined their particular identities according to 
their origin, religion, and family links, it is impossible to describe them in 
terms of ‘national’ networks, even in the case of Europe. This mixing of 
‘nations’ was equally present within the old continent and was projected 
upon it. A Valencian noble family that achieved fame in Rome, such as the 
Borgia (mentioned above), demonstrates this point if we consider its 
American branches (Redondo and Yun 2008). The same could be said of 
the Corzo and the Mañara, both of Italian origin, that established deep 
roots in Castile and extended their reach into America, which in turn 
became decisive for their businesses (Vila 1991). In other words, these 
were not ‘national’ networks spread across the globe but rather a global-
ization or extension across the world of Europeans who, in many cases, 
were often already involved in ‘transnational’ practices. Some scholars 
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might argue that Henry Kamen perhaps exaggerated in his interpretation, 
in which the Spanish empire emerges as not exactly Spanish (Kamen 
2002). Nevertheless, an undeniable sociological basis sustains this view 
on, although the empire was far from singular in displaying these traits.
European Integration
Around 1600, these global networks served as channels for the transferal 
of products, patterns of consumption, and ways of life—and also for their 
combination and rejection (Yun 2014b). This reality was to have impor-
tant effects on the economy. The population of African and European 
origin, as well as their mix with the remaining Amerindians, also grew—
meaning both mestizos, the offspring of Spanish men and Indian women, 
and mulatos or ‘mulattos’ of black and white parentage. As a matter of fact, 
these groups grew in size during the sixteenth century and continued pro-
portionally to do so in the following century, while the Amerindian popu-
lation practically stagnated between 1600 and 1700 and so lost weight as 
a percentage of the total.12 obviously, the type and origin of a population 
cannot be identified with its norms of consumption. But, this having been 
said, it is evident that if this remained a small population in comparison 
with that of Europe, the number of inhabitants who sought goods and 
products from the old continent was growing, while demand for hybrid 
commodities and wares was also gradually increasing. And we should also 
remember that, aside from the ‘whites’, ‘blacks’, ‘mestizos’, and ‘mulattos’, 
the native Amerindian population was also adapting its patterns of con-
sumption. Looked at from the perspective of the circulation of products 
moving in both directions, it is clear that, together with the extension of 
12 It has been calculated that around 1570–1600, Latin America had approximately 10 mil-
lion to 10.2 million inhabitants (Romano 2004, p. 61), around 25% more than the Iberian 
Peninsula. of these, the whites accounted for around 130,000 (between 1.2% and 1.3%); 
blacks, mestizos, and mulattos probably came to 260,000 (2.3%–2.5%) (Konetzke 1976, 
pp.  92 and 93). The rest, 9.8  million (95%), are Amerindians. By 1600 some 120,000 
African slaves had been transported, and European emigration had reached 139,000 to 
Spanish America and 93,000 to Brazil; these figures reached 188,000 and 110,000, respec-
tively, between 1580 and 1640 (Curtin 1969; Romano 2004, p. 64). By 1650 the black 
population had reached 830,000, the mestizos 400,000, and mulattos 269,000; the 
Amerindian population had fallen to 9,175,000, while Europeans had risen to 730,000, a 
considerable increase in both number and proportion (Konetzke 1976, pp. 92–93).
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informal networks (in reality, both developments were part of the same 
phenomena), the empires began to promote patterns of consumption of a 
globalizing character (Kupperman 2012). This process was not easy, being 
marked by rejections, and often depended upon processes that were not 
purely economic in nature (Yun 2012). The diffusion of non-American 
patterns of consumption and hybridization was very often manifested in 
cultural, rather than commercial, processes and even in violence, which 
tended to follow in the footsteps of mercantile dissemination (Yun 2012). 
But, all in all, networks formed in this way accelerated the commercial 
relationship between the different areas of the New and old Worlds. And 
this came at the same time that the presence of Europeans, and the pro-
cesses of conquest and internal emigration associated with them, invigo-
rated the spread of local American products (Saldarriaga 2011), and the 
arrival of Asian products also increased (Gasch 2014).
America began to export dye products, sugar, leathers, and other 
goods; true, the scale of this trade remains difficult to assess due to smug-
gling, but without doubt it grew from the middle of the sixteenth century 
and—something not to be overlooked—underwent diversification. 
Something similar was happening with the Asian trade controlled by the 
Portuguese and, increasingly, the Dutch, which also diversified. Pepper 
was followed by other spices and products, such as silk and cotton, indigo, 
clove, and nutmeg, among others (Boyajian 1993, p. 44 and passim). The 
processes ran parallel to the intensification of Atlantic commerce—and in 
particular of African trade—with America and Europe. Not only did the 
trade in slaves expand, but so did the trafficking of exotic products, fish, 
wine, grapes, dyes, ivory, and many others. And this was matched by the 
exportation of European products to Africa, with zones such as Morocco, 
Senegambia, Sierra Leone, Benin, and the Congo benefiting, while the 
commerce between the Gulf of Guinea and Brazil grew in vigour, and the 
Río de la Plata became more active (Russell-Wood 1992, chapter IV).
These ties not only brought distant continents closer together, but they 
also had a special effect upon trade within Europe. The result was a greater 
interconnection between the European economies. The evolution of 
urban networks is perhaps one of the clearest indirect indicators of this. It 
did not, of course, simply reflect the impulses of international trade. on 
the contrary, these links were closely tied to agrarian development and 
increases in local productivity that allowed for the emergence and advance-
ment of urban industry. But it is very interesting to remember that around 
1600, the process of urbanization was creating ‘a unique urban hierarchy 
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that was going to begin the fusion of the numerous European systems of 
urban’ development (De Vries 1984, pp.  126–128). And even more 
important, between 1600 and 1650, a Europe-wide model of urban devel-
opment was established that was increasingly linked to the advancement of 
the coastal zones and in particular to those of Atlantic Europe that were 
most closely connected to colonial commerce. If this cannot be considered 
to be the only cause of this change, it is evident that this was a factor in it.
The increase in the global circulation of silver gave further impetus to 
this process. As Attman (1986, p. 35) wrote, ‘the enormous quantities of 
precious metals that the Spanish empire in America transferred to Europe … 
were of the greatest importance for global commerce’.13 The development 
of commercial techniques and the means of payment, as well as the increas-
ing speed of transmission of commercial knowledge, had positive effects 
(Van der Wee 1978, pp. 306–332). Financial techniques developed in the 
south were adopted in the north, which hitherto had lagged far behind. As 
a result, deposit banks proliferated. The ricorsa, endorsement of a bill of 
exchange, became an even more common practice among the leading 
European businessmen (Van der Wee et al. 1991). The development of the 
printing press led to the dissemination of treatises on commercial tech-
niques that facilitated the circulation of information on weights, measure-
ments, and book-keeping or accounting, with similar effects (Hoock and 
Jeannin 1991, pp. 373–382). The expansion of insurance techniques was 
helping to reduce risks and transaction costs. Business networks further 
advanced these changes, lowering the costs of both transaction and infor-
mation and making it possible to circulate goods between ever-more-dis-
tant centres. This was important for the extension of commerce into 
markets as imperfect and as different as those of the time.
If qualitative improvements in land transport remain difficult to pin-
point, it is very clear that ever-larger quantities of livestock were used, with 
the number of mules in particular increasing (Braudel 1976, pp. 375–376). 
Changes were also manifested in the growing repertoire of roads and jour-
ney routes; the inn system was improved, as were the available descriptions 
13 The European net monetary stock had passed from some 1021 tonnes of silver equiva-
lent in 1570–1580 to around 2510 in 1590–1600. In this way the monetary mass in silver 
had multiplied by 2.5. Calculations are based above all on Morineau (1985, pp. 581–583) 
and obviously are very tentative. They do not take into account, for example, the melting of 
gold and silver to produce jewellery, which undoubtedly rose in this period.
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of regions and roadways (Maczak 1996, pp. 37–53). But the most rele-
vant changes took place in maritime transport, something which would be 
important in the displacement of the great axis of the economy towards 
the littoral zones in general and those of the Atlantic in particular. The 
pioneering techniques of naval construction of the south were spread 
across Europe and adopted and improved. In Holland this process led to 
the reduction of the sailing time between the Baltic and Spain; it also led 
to an increase in the size of the ships and their holds (De Vries and Van der 
Woude 1997, pp. 355–357). other significant improvements continued 
to be made in the instruments of navigation and cartographical represen-
tation (Parry 1990, chap. 6). oceanic navigation improved thanks to both 
institutional and organizational planning, developments that were mani-
fested in the application of the sciences to the training of sailors in institu-
tions such as the Portuguese Casa da Índia or the Castilian Council of the 
Indies (Chaunu 1959; Schäfer 2003). In the second half of the century, 
galleons and ships began to replace the old caravels, and both the number 
of merchantmen and their overall tonnage increased dramatically (Chaunu 
1977, pp. 242–243 and 271). Writing of the Portuguese case, Godinho 
speaks of a recession after the crisis of the mid-century (1982–1987). But 
it is probable that the increase in the size of design of the ships soon com-
pensated for this contraction to the extent that the highest figures of the 
century were registered in the decade 1581–1590 (Duncan 1986, 
pp. 3–25). This conclusion is strengthened if we take into account the 
upward trend found in the toll registers of both Malacca and ormuz 
(Subrahmanyam and Thomaz 1991, p. 313 and passim). In this context it 
is not surprising that recent research on Portuguese cultural and political 
history in this period has moved from speaking of a ‘crisis’ to a ‘reforma-
tion’ of the empire (Barreto 2015, chapter 1).
By 1600 the growing quantities of spices (already a well-established 
phenomenon) and new colonial products arriving in the old World were 
having a dynamic effect on other branches of trade. By this point European 
consumption of classical spices (pepper or products such as sugar) was ris-
ing, and new colonial products were bringing about changes in European 
(mainly European elites) patterns of consumption.14 At the same time, the 
circulation of those products within Europe was encouraging new return 
14 The global production of sugar would rise thanks to the establishment of sugar refineries 
in Brazil, where output went up from 60 in 1570 to 230 in 1610 (Bennassar 1980, p. 158) 




trade routes between diverse regions and, with them, international market 
integration. Around 1567, for example, the imports of Spanish cochineal 
or Portuguese spices and sugar were already worth around half the overall 
trade between Spain and Portugal and the Low Countries (De Vries and 
Van der Woude 1997, p.  360). This commerce stimulated a reciprocal 
trade in other products, some traditional such as Iberian salt, and even 
reinforced return sales from the Low Countries, whose costs of distribu-
tion fell in line with the growing commercial complementarity between 
these two regions. All of this trade united with the inverse tide of mer-
chandise that paid for the flow of Spanish silver towards the north of 
Europe.
It is not, therefore, surprising that even those scholars who have denied 
the existence of a ‘revolution in transport’ (understood as a continual 
reduction in costs from 1300 to 1800) have underlined the importance of 
the fall in freight costs in European commerce between 1550 and 1600 
(Menard 1991, pp. 228–275).
All of these developments lead to a point for reflection. The process 
described above implied a long-term movement of merchandise that 
remained at a very modest level in terms of the GDP of the countries 
involved in it—above all Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, the Low Countries, 
and England. Moreover, the extent of American demand for European 
products should not be exaggerated compared to present-day standards. 
At the same time, it was a twofold phenomenon. The size of the white 
population in the Americas in 1600 (120,000–130,000) was not much 
greater than that of a city like Seville, which, as we said, still did not entail 
a big market for European products. But, on the other hand, that popula-
tion grew to 730,000 by 1650. This is to say that during the first decades 
of the seventeenth century, America was still a relatively modest market 
but also an extremely expansive one. The outcome was clear: on the one 
hand, there existed ferocious competition for the control of this market on 
the European side, which can be fully understood in light of the colonies’ 
high purchasing power; on the other hand, the market was already too 
large and dynamic for the countries that sought to monopolize it, Spain 
and Portugal, to be able to do so with their domestic production. And this 
situation leads to another consideration: despite the reduced size of this 
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market and even of overall colonial commerce, its impact on the European 
mercantile economies would be quite significant. In fact, this expansion of 
international commerce and globalization brought with it the possibility 
that the more flexible and efficient economies would impose themselves 
upon the more rigid and weaker ones and also paved the way for increas-
ing political and economic tension among Western European polities. In 
this context the impact of religious wars and the circulation of silver within 
Europe, partially associated with Spanish expenditure, would be crucial.
Habsburg Wars, American Silver, and the European Trends
In many ways the Spanish and Portuguese empires provided the crucial 
machinery for the transformation of the European economies.
Before 1566, when the rebellion of the Low Countries first broke out, 
the Habsburg wars had led to a concentration of war spending outside the 
peninsula. Moreover, the intense commercial relationships with the north 
and the Mediterranean also encouraged the flow of silver to these areas 
and the greater connection between them (Chap. 3). But these develop-
ments assumed hitherto unsuspected dimensions from the decade 
1560–1570 thanks to the ‘War of Flanders’ (as it came to be known in 
Castile) and its tendency to drain away from Spain the silver brought in by 
the second cycle of American precious metals (Chaunu 1959).
It is important to emphasize that most military spending on the Iberian 
Peninsula was concentrated ‘on the periphery’ and, specifically, in the 
areas of Catalonia, Navarre, Gipuzkoa, Aragon, on the French frontier, 
Andalusia, Portugal, Galicia, and the Cantabrian coast (Thompson 1992, II, 
p. 11). The flow of silver in the form of military expenditure into these 
regions favoured their incorporation into the international commercial 
routes, the case of Catalonia being a good example (Vilar 1962). In this 
regard, the case of Portugal is also demonstrative. The increasing role of 
the Portuguese in the development of the commercial centres of Castile 
ensured that the Portuguese economy came to depend upon that of its 
Iberian neighbour and American silver—as well as Castilian currency—
flowed in growing quantities to Portugal (Disney 2009), so affecting this 
economy and enhancing its links with international routes. It is worth-
while taking into account that part of the cost was spent on imported 
commodities, such as the woods of the north for ship construction, iron, 
and other goods.
But, moreover, the foreign wars of the Habsburgs affected, in a broad 
sense, the economic relationships between these areas.
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Antwerp’s fall was not a sudden one, as has often been claimed (Van der 
Wee 1963). But, this having been said, there can be few doubts about the 
negative effects of the conflict on the southern provinces of the Low 
Countries (Parker 1979, pp. 177–179). It was, moreover, exacerbated by 
a number of related developments: fiscal pressure was intensified, and the 
blockades imposed by the Sea Beggars affected another pillar of the 
Antwerp economy, its links with the south of Europe. The overall result 
was the dislocation of the system that had been so effective until the 1560s 
(Van der Wee 1963). English cloth would henceforth be directed towards 
other areas, and German commerce would flow towards the Hanseatic 
ports. Portuguese spices and Castilian wool would also be temporarily 
withdrawn from the Flanders route (Phillips and Phillips 1997, 
pp. 254–255). The trade of Lyon with Antwerp was also adversely affected 
by the French wars of religion and the shift of a range of Flemish industrial 
activities towards France (Van der Wee 1963). Antwerp’s links with Italy 
were reduced by the fall in the overall volume of cross-continental com-
merce and the new links emerging between the subalpine peninsula and 
Castile, thus reorientating towards Iberia a significant portion of the ship-
ments which previously had been sent over the Alps.
This succession of reverses would also affect the northern provinces of 
the Low Countries, although in this case the consequences were positive. 
Trade between Holland and the Baltic was negatively affected from 1569, 
confirming the difficulties facing the region and the deleterious effects of 
war (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, pp. 363–364). Philip II’s embar-
goes on Dutch trade had a short-term impact, in part because from 1580 
he was able to use Portugal against the northerners. The war effort forced 
the rebellious provinces into a fiscal policy (resulting, inevitably, in higher 
taxation) that, (again) in the short term, had negative consequences on its 
economy.15 Yet the downturn was only temporary. From the last years of 
the 1580s, the recovery of Dutch commerce and industry became evident. 
The destruction of the Spanish Armada, including many merchantships, 
made the Dutch indispensable in the Spanish traffic between Northern 
and Southern Europe at precisely the moment when they were re- 
establishing their influence in the Baltic, where they gained a foothold in 
the routes to Asia through Archangel; Spanish silver was, of course, vital 
15 Between 1552–1560 and 1588, fiscal pressure, measured as a percentage of an unskilled 
worker’s salary, increased three-fold in Holland. The scale of this change was unique in 
Europe (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 97).
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to Dutch transactions in both the Baltic and Far East (Israel 1989, p. 44). 
Moreover, a series of poor Mediterranean harvests allowed the Dutch to 
penetrate into the inland sea, thus offering them access to markets of ever- 
increasing size and value.
As a consequence, Holland and Spain, while still at war, came to find 
that their respective international economies could not work without each 
other—this was, in fact, highly significant for the strength of international 
commerce. Dutch merchants knew that Spanish and Mediterranean mar-
kets were vital for the wheat that they shipped from the Baltic; in turn this 
supply system was rapidly becoming a provisioning lifeline to the cities of 
southern Spain.16 Fish (a staple food during the long Easter of the 
 Counter- Reformation), light cloths (ever more adapted to suit the 
demands of the sweltering regions of southern Iberia), and other Dutch 
and Northern European products were becoming more and more sought-
after in Iberia. Dutch shipping was also becoming vital to the export of 
Iberian goods to the north. In turn Holland needed ever greater quanti-
ties of Mediterranean salt, not to forget cochineal and spices from America, 
Africa and Asia. Above all else, the Dutch depended upon American silver, 
without which it would have been impossible to pay for their purchases in 
the Baltic regions and more and more in Asia. Little by little, these demands 
fed and merged into the Spanish need for Swedish copper with which to 
mint vellón coins in Castile (coin minting was rising from 1610 to 1620).
But it was not only the trade of the north of Europe that benefited from 
the flow of silver and the expenditure on war. In Italy the effects were 
twofold and very complex. The interruption of the axis between Burgos 
and Antwerp after 1566 caused a shift of the wool trade towards Italy and, 
especially, Florence (Ruiz Martín 1990a). The emergence of the ‘Spanish 
road’, a very narrow strip of territory between France and Germany that 
allowed Castilian silver to be carried to the northern theatre of arms, rein-
forced the position of the Genoese, who now controlled the finances of 
Philip II as never before (Parker 1972). The resultant changes left a trail 
of silver across northern Italy, whose businessmen were also able to take 
advantage of Lyon’s problems to give impetus to the fairs of Piacenza. 
Spanish military spending in Lombardy, and the emergence of the Baroque 
court in Madrid, reinforced that region’s connections with international 
routes (Braudel 1976; Sella and Capra 1984, pp.  109–115). American 




 silver flowing towards Italy must have been a positive factor for the inte-
gration of the regional economies of the Italian Peninsula’s many states. 
Links such as those between Genoa and Naples or Sicily were strength-
ened by the purchase of large estates in the Mezzogiorno by the great mer-
chants and bankers of northern Italy, who saw them as a means of investing 
in guarantied incomes and a way of acquiring wheat that could later be 
sold in the Mediterranean (Delille 1988). In Venice these changes coin-
cided with a new flow of spices exchanged for silver in the Mediterranean 
and a general increase of Venetian participation in commerce from Sweden 
to Poland. This trend coincided with an increasing volume of trade from 
the Eastern Mediterranean areas to Asia through Safavid Persia.
War and silver, two phenomena that were always difficult to separate and 
were linked to the global broadening of economic and political relations, 
were becoming relevant to both the functioning of the European interna-
tional economy and changes in it. These flows of silver sparked inflationary 
tensions in Northern Europe. But they also resulted in a proliferation of 
the means of payment, and this was beneficial to economies characterized 
by a strong commercial sector (at least, by the standards of the age).
By this time the trade between Holland and the Iberian Peninsula was 
restored, in spite of the increasingly ineffective attempts to impose a block-
ade. Annual transfers to the Low Countries grew to almost 4,000,000 
ducats (Thompson 1976), meaning 1.4 ducats per capita each year. To 
this figure should be added the profits from commerce with Spain in the 
1590s, when Dutch and Flemish merchants (the former illegally pretend-
ing to be Flemish) expanded their activities, mainly in Andalusia. The 
strength of economic links between the north and the south of Europe 
had become so important that the city of Seville itself complained about 
the reprisals, both fiscal and military, to which these ‘nations’ were sub-
jected. Contraband and smuggling were the inevitable manifestations of 
this desire to trade (Gómez-Centurión 1988, pp. 257–317).17 And though 
we do not have precise figures, we can assume that these activities sparked 
sectors of the Northern European economy and enhanced the interna-
tional links between the different regions, thus smoothing out the negative 
17 No reliable figures can be given, but a memorandum on the import tolls of Seville put 
the value of the products unloaded at the docks between January 1593 and April 1595 at 
some 3.6 million ducats (Gómez-Centurión 1988, p. 295)—almost 1.5 million ducats each 
year, a figure that represented no more than the tip of the iceberg, given the level of smug-
gling and fraud.
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effects of many political events. To a lesser degree, the new situation was 
also perceptible in the north of France. Here the arrivals of Spanish silver 
and the expenditure inherent to it were lower: 2.8 million ducats per year, 
according to Attman, which meant just 0.14 ducats per inhabitant or 1.8% 
of the agrarian product in 1588 (Morineau 1977, p.  979). Before the 
1590s the positive effects of this commerce with the southern Netherlands 
had begun to be felt in England. From the 1540s trade with the Iberian 
Peninsula had remained relatively resilient; at the very least it remained 
stable and was perhaps growing, buttressed by the foundation of the 
Spanish Company (Brenner 1993, p. 12; and Croft 1989). Again, war and 
embargo did not have a genuinely tragic impact, and so vital were these 
trade lines that rivalries emerged between the merchant groups who oper-
ated in the Spanish Netherlands and the Merchant Adventurers, who 
traded in the Dutch provinces and claimed the right to control both routes 
(Croft 1989; Brenner 1993, p. 15). Another spur to commerce came with 
the foundation of the Turkish Company, the Venice Company, and the 
Levant Company, all of which took advantage of the growing connections 
of Spain with the Mediterranean and the experience of English traders in 
the Iberian Peninsula (Brenner 1993, pp. 16–23). After the disaster of the 
Invincible Armada, this activity grew quickly and even encouraged a 
greater interest in Atlantic commerce.18 Two vital characteristics of this 
trade should be underlined. First, it was increasingly in the hands of the 
English themselves, meaning that an increasing proportion of it fed back 
into the domestic economy. Second, this trade was based not only on the 
expansion of the market for English products in the south of Europe but 
also on the importation of raw silk, woven Italian silks, spices coming 
through the Mediterranean, raisins from Greece, and American products 
(Brenner 1993, pp. 25–27).
The process—very much linked to the first globalization—in which 
Spain’s foreign policy and economy served to spark commercial links else-
where was even more pronounced in Italy. Here political and financial 
events came to oxygenize the economy, ensuring that many regions 
enjoyed a significant scope for expansion and their connections to interna-
tional trade and finance were enhanced. The victory of Genoa in the finan-
cial battle for Madrid, and the continued vitality of the Piacenza fairs until 
1621, meant that the Genoese maintained ‘control over the world’s wealth 
18 See Brenner (1993, pp. 26, 17, 30, 45–50) and Gómez-Centurión (1988, pp. 241–255).
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for a long time’ (Braudel 1976, vol. I, p.  671). This was despite the 
Spanish royal bankruptcies of 1596 and 1607. The need to feed the 
Spanish road also had a crucial impact on Italian trade with Europe for a 
long period (Parker 1972), and, as we shall see, it also benefited its indus-
try until at least the 1610s.19
Several decades of warfare therefore favoured the redirection of trade 
networks in different areas of Europe. More importantly, the Habsburg 
empire and the first primitive globalization with their two main features, 
war and silver, had exerted a strong impact in enhancing a number of spe-
cific trade connections. Such connections were often interrupted but 
remained resilient and vigorous in the long term. But to fully understand 
their different histories, we need also to consider the local conditions and 
the political economies and institutions in which war and silver expendi-
ture were acting.
the gRADuAl shiFt to the noRth
The ways in which different countries faced the challenges and new inter-
national economic context at the end of the sixteenth century would be 
decisive. But this depended upon their respective political economies and 
upon the endowment of productive factors, the position of each country 
in the international economy, and their capacity to compete in more inte-
grated markets. Competition among them also had become increasingly 
decisive on account of this process of economic integration that bound the 
areas of Europe and those of the rest of the planet.
1600: The Problems of Europe
In order to understand the consequences of this competition among econ-
omies, it is, however, important to consider the context that gave rise to it 
and the general problems facing them.
If regional differences were very marked—more so, indeed than national 
ones—by 1600 European society as a whole was facing a problem of 
19 Figures given by Parker leave no room for doubt about the relative importance of Italy 
in the payments made by the monarchy. If 11.7 million had been spent in Flanders between 
1571 and 1577, some 7 million had been invested in the Mediterranean fleet, a considerable 
sum (Parker 1972, p. 232–236).
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resources. The rapid increase of population (from some 80 to 100 million 
inhabitants from 1500 to 1600) and the accelerated rhythm of urbaniza-
tion created evident Malthusian and provisioning tensions in Italy (Braudel 
1976). But similar problems were emerging in France and England, where 
poor harvests and epidemics began a cycle of hardship that would last until 
1630 (Wrightson 1982, pp. 122–123, and 142–148).20 Even in the Low 
Countries, characterized by a form of highly intensive agriculture by the 
standards of the time, growth was based upon the extension of cultivated 
land (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, pp. 27–28). And in Brabant it 
was possible to perceive a certain degree of agrarian stagnation by the 
1550s (Van der Wee 1963, pp. 209–213). The higher rates of urbaniza-
tion of these areas—a trait shared above all by Italy, the Low Countries, 
and some regions of France and England—created provisioning problems 
for the cities that sometimes threatened their economies and, in particular, 
their industrial sectors.
The increase in land rent accentuated this disequilibrium by reducing 
many peasants’ margin of subsistence. To the extent that in many zones of 
Europe this came on top of a process of property concentration and caused 
a degree of social instability, it also brought about a number of productive 
adjustments. Although it remains difficult to measure social inequality, the 
figures produced by o’Rourke and Williamson on wage-rent relations 
demonstrate that the period 1500–1600 witnessed the fastest increase in 
inequalities in the entire early modern period (2005).
Trends in real wages are also downwards in countries such as England 
or Castile (Yun 2004, p. 425, Graph 7.3). If these figures should be used 
with caution, since in many areas of Europe cash salaries formed just a part 
of the incomes of peasants and members of the lower classes, this trend 
brought with it the permanent danger of reducing the purchasing power 
of many families. The result was the social uprooting and indebtedness of 
many peasants (Braudel 1976, vol. II, pp. 117–134). And with this out-
come came the danger that poverty, Malthusian tensions, and social 
inequality would end economic growth.
In the same way as was happening in the Iberian countries, in many 
other areas, the development of the market and the juridical differences 
over the form of access to land provoked an increasing divergence within 
the peasantry. one of its manifestations was the emergence of a genuine 
20 Le Roy Ladurie (1977, pp. 576–585); Clay (1984, p. 126); overton (1996, p. 79).
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‘peasant aristocracy’, increasingly differentiated from the rest of its com-
munity. This change was evident in France and England, where authors 
such as R. Allen have underlined the growing inequality within the rural 
community.21
The inequality in the distribution of income undermined the chances of 
maintaining social stability within the rural community. Europe, and above 
all its cities, became full of poor and migrants from the rural areas (Geremek 
1987). This was advanced by certain measures, such as the increase in the 
power of the seignior or the pressure of the taille and other taxes (Salmon 
1975). At the same time, the development of the artisan sector, seldom 
achieved in direct proportion to the recognition of its political rights, cre-
ated a number of tensions within the cities (Israel 1995, pp. 119–122, 
Lane 1973, pp. 318–319.)
The review of the different Western European economies (above) 
makes clear that tensions were also perceptible within the aristocracy and 
the seigniorial class. Even in those areas where seigniorial estates had been 
more resilient, structural tensions arose on account of the diminution of 
the rate of seigniorial extraction and the increasing expenditures to meet 
military and social requirements (Bois 1976; Asch 2003). True, European 
aristocracies were not ruined, as has sometimes been suggested. But this 
was a group subject to internal changes and in need of transformation. In 
the final analysis, the class that constituted the pillar of the social order was 
changing, a shift that, in turn, altered the basic structure of society.
From 1500 the escalating cost of war made everything worse. Historians 
continue to discuss the validity of the term ‘military revolution’, first 
coined by Roberts (Parker 1995). But what is clear is that the dimensions 
and demands of armed conflicts were growing across Europe, whether we 
accept a centralization of warfare or not. Bureaucratic costs and the need 
to feed the pacts of the dominant coalition increased expenditures, while 
the collection of taxes continued to depend upon highly consolidated 
local powers.
It is in this context that competition among the continent’s different 
economies would act and be decisive. And this was because in these diffi-
cult moments, competition in international markets—including the lim-
ited but dynamic American market—would become very tough and crucial 
for the different regional economies.
21 Neveux et al. (1975, pp. 134–135); Jacquart (1974); Allen (1992, pp. 66–67).
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The Peninsular Interior by 1590–1600: The Limits of a More 
Rigid Economy22
The model for social development, characterized by the consolidation of 
the dominant coalition (Chap. 4) that had configured the political econo-
mies of the Iberian kingdoms (Chap. 5), would make its impact felt from 
1580. If all the Iberian kingdoms experienced similar problems, the impact 
would be different in each region. The peninsula’s heartlands—a wide 
bank of land running from the Duero Valley to the banks of the Guadalquivir 
and from the Iberian System to the Alentejo region of Portugal—would 
suffer the most from this international competition. This was also because, 
leaving aside other conditions that will be examined below, it was here 
where the more negative components for economic growth would have 
greater impact. Since the last decades of the century, the more negative side 
of the institutional system (Chap. 5) would become predominant in the 
allocation of productive factors, which would reduce the competitiveness 
of the economy in a context of epidemic and economic crisis.
 Long-Term Changes
By the sixteenth century, decisive long-term structural changes had taken 
place in this area. Many of the problems examined thus far for Europe in 
general were also present here: the tension between resources and popula-
tion, the rising price of land rents, the fall of urban salaries and the imbal-
ances in the distribution of income, tensions within the aristocracy, fiscal 
pressure, and so on.
But the situation would become even worse in many ways. The prolif-
eration of entailed properties was reaching a very high level across the 
Iberian Peninsula but more in particular in this area. This fact is evident 
not only in the available data series on the foundation of mayorazgos 
(Yun 2004, p. 277, Chart 5.2) but also in the case studies of ecclesiastical 
institutions.23 This irreversible trend obviously had strong accumulative 
22 The bibliographic apparatus and figures for this section can be seen in Yun (2004).
23 Marcos (1985, vol. I, pp.  128 and 178); Yun (1987); Mata (1987); López (1998, 
p. 226); Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier (1984, p. 101). one of the evils of the kingdom, said 
a royal official (corregidor) of Seville in 1591 in an observation often repeated by the arbitris-
tas, is that ‘a great deal of property is being incorporated into the clergy and the religious 
orders by donations, chaplaincy foundations and the testaments of friars and nuns’ (Cámara 
de Castilla, leg. 716. AGS).
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effects and consequences.24 The situation was made worse to the extent 
that the growth of the incomes of some seigniorial houses and religious 
institutions was very slow or even saw falls (Yun 2004, pp. 457–458). 
And all of this was happening while costs were rising and the economy of 
legitimation was gaining strength, propelled forward by the march of the 
Counter- Reformation spirit and the demands of court life.25
All of this had important consequences. one of them was that a greater 
proportion of the surface area and a greater share of the means of produc-
tion were in the hands of the privileged and therefore subject to manage-
ment criteria that, as we have seen, were now not always aimed at the 
introduction of improvements but rather at augmenting the reproduction 
of the political capital of the elites. Consequently, moreover, the rise in 
the price of land rents—a normal feature of the management of these 
patrimonies and one commonly employed over the previous generations 
(Chap. 3)—would affect an ever-larger share of the land surface and reach 
 exhausting quotas.26 Some seigniors even proceeded to raise other extrac-
tions, including the alcabalas.27
As everywhere in Europe, the long-term tendency was towards the 
polarization of incomes and a growing social inequality. This resulted in a 
range of consequences, such as inflation, the fall in real salaries, the rise of 
land rents, demographic pressure, and the shifting of fiscal burdens onto 
basic consumption goods that negatively affected a large part of the popu-
lation. The same processes, together with the consolidation of entailed 
and mortgaged properties and bumper commercial profits, increased the 
wealth of elites. This phenomenon tended towards more progressive 
effects on consumption. on the one hand, conspicuous and luxury con-
sumption was developing, tied as it was to the economy of legitimation, 
court lifestyles, and the double economy of mayorazgos and credit system 
24 See Yun (2004, p. 277, Table 5.2). Some concrete examples in Yun (1987, pp. 254–255), Basas 
(1994), and Gómez Zorraquino (1987, pp. 147–148). Libros de Relación, 18, 21, and 25 AGS.
25 López (1990, pp. 79–80); Martz (1983, p. 172); Latorre (1992, pp. 209–211).
26 Moreover, many seigniors and ecclesiastical institutions had to recur to tougher, more 
demanding rental formulas that would break with the criteria of the enfiteusis previously 
employed (Álvarez 1987, pp. 37–38).
27 A variety of cases can be found in Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier (1984, pp. 98–99), Yun 
(1987), and López-Salazar (1987, pp.  101–102). The Almirante of Castile’s alcabalas 
exceeded 1.3 million maravedís in 1568 and rose to 5.8 million in 1583–1588 and 6.7 mil-
lion in 1589–1596. Libros de Acuerdos (respective years), AHMMR.
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that allowed the nobles to assume debts without running the danger of 
seeing their patrimonies dissolved. on the other hand, the popular classes 
had to orient their preferences towards cheap and accessible products. 
Logically, these changes in demand constituted a challenge to industrial 
production, which had to become more specialized either in the produc-
tion of luxury goods or in the most popular items and thus to compete in 
flexibility with foreign manufacturers.
A great deal has been said about the negative effect of fiscal pressure, 
which undoubtedly was increasing from the 1560s (Chap. 4 above). 
However, it is clear that, in macroeconomic terms, such pressure was not 
excessive, even at the end of the century. Moreover, public spending was 
also increasing (Yun 1998). But these perspectives do not exempt the 
state—or, in particular, the fiscal system—from blame for the coming eco-
nomic difficulties. Taxes in the form of sisas and burdens on the consump-
tion of basic goods (in part a consequence of the conflictive pact) limited 
the capacity of the artisan workshops to meet costs of maintenance and 
reproduction, above all because these ateliers depended upon forms of 
familial economy and apprenticeship. Here it is interesting to underline 
that, as we have seen, public spending was directed above all towards 
regions on the periphery—where wars tended to be fought—or resulted in 
purchases or forced requisitions that were often negative for economic 
activity. Moreover, the fragmentation of the fiscal map, which was a result 
of the pact between the oligarchies and the Crown over the matter of 
resource mobilization, was reaching peak levels.28 And this same fiscal sys-
tem was a background factor in the tendency towards rigidity of the arti-
san structures (Chap. 5). The sale of common lands accelerated from the 
1570s to 1580s and had negative effects in the lands of the Meseta—or, at 
least, in some zones of the Duero Valley.
All of this was concurrently producing a transcendental and progressive 
change in the credit circuits in a way which has no parallel in other 
European regions. In the fifteenth century, the accumulation of incomes 
by the elites had had as a corollary a growing flow of loans towards the 
countryside and the productive sectors in areas such as the Duero Valley 
(Bennassar 1983). Now a sizeable share of this tide of money was going in 
28 The purchase of offices dedicated to the regulation of the local market and taxes col-
lected on merchandise by cities and towns contributed to this process. See the case of 
Salamanca in 1577 in Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda, Libros Registro, leg. 41, sf. AGS.
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the other direction and in particular towards the debts of the state and 
cities. We know, for example, that a new emission of juros doubled the 
consolidated debt between 1566 and 1577 and that by 1587 it had 
reached some 65 million ducats. It is probable that this would grow by 
almost 50  million ducats between 1566 and 1598, around 1.4  million 
ducats a year (Ruiz Martín 1975, p. 739). The overall consolidated debt 
in 1598 had risen, according to the figures (again, somewhat question-
able) of F. Ruiz, by 80 million ducats. Another 20 million or more should 
be added to this figure to account for censos taken out on mayorazgos. This 
is to say that, without even factoring in the rising levels of municipal bor-
rowing, state debt was above 100 million ducats, a figure superior to the 
available estimates of Castilian GDP (Cfr, Drelichman and Voth 2014). 
This is important in itself but is even more decisive if we add that this sum 
was already far above the size of the monetized part of the economy and, 
therefore, would exert a notable weight upon the cash flow and the 
chances of investing in the real economy.29
These developments were to have considerable consequences.
The peasant economies were also gradually losing degrees of resource 
elasticity, a quality that had been crucial to the economic expansion of some 
regions and strongly conditioned their management (Chaps. 3 and 5). The 
sale of wastelands (baldíos) and communal terrain was progressively reduc-
ing the versatility of the peasant economies, a key feature in the previous 
expansion in certain regions of the Duero Valley (Yun 1987). At the same 
time, access to wild fruits, wood, firewood, and other primary materials was 
becoming more difficult, as was the use of pasturelands that allowed the 
peasants to maintain small flocks (Aranda 1984, p. 143). These sales often 
ended jointly owned or collaborative agrarian land use arrangements that 
had been crucial to the previous growth (Yun 2004, p. 466). Many settle-
ments found themselves unable to make use of the opportunities that the 
‘peasant industries’ had previously offered them, manifested in the sale of 
small numbers of such products or of the goods manufactured from them 
(Chap. 3).
The sale of jurisdictions was creating uncertainties about the use of waters 
and soils (Nader 1990) that affected peasant markets and, consequently, 
29 on the way these calculations have been produced, see Yun (2004, pp. 464–465). More 
recently Drelichman and Voth have provided other figures, probably more accurate and 
based upon the asientos, but they do not change the argument.
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the flexibility of family economies. Peasant commercialization of industrial 
products was rendered more difficult, due to the increasing fiscal pressure 
on these activities. Another of the conditions that had guaranteed agrarian 
growth and improvements in work productivity was threatened (Yun 2004, 
pp. 466–467).
It is possible to imagine in this context that the merchants developing 
the verlagssystem could take advantage of this situation by involving peas-
ants in industrial activities, thus improving living conditions for the rural 
masses. But one needs to think that their capital was flowing in another 
direction and that quite probably the growing jurisdictional fragmentation 
increased problems by creating more barriers between the urban business-
men and the rural peasants. But the fundamental cause appears to have 
lain in the above-mentioned changes brought about in the credit circuits 
and the burgeoning fiscal pressure, as is clearly seen in the case of Córdoba 
(Fortea 1981).
This was, then, an economy that was progressively less flexible, in which 
credit circulated in a way that very often was not conducive to productive 
activities, where the land was subject to management guidelines that were 
increasingly rigid and where patterns of consumption were changing as the 
result of two fundamental phenomena: the impact of the crisis that would 
overcome the country at the end of the century and its capacity to face a series 
of problems that were met with greater success in other areas of Europe.
 The End of Century Crisis in Castile
This scenario would be affected by a series of precipitating forces that, if 
not always negative, would severely test the productive system from the 
1580s onward.
The wars in the north, the campaign for Portugal, and the problems in 
Aragon would oblige Castile to make unprecedented efforts that resulted 
in the increase in public spending to mobilize and provision armies and 
would have negative effects (Thompson 1992). The sale of jurisdictions 
and communal lands now reached unprecedented levels. The communi-
ties, already heavily indebted, that sought to buy them in competition with 
nobles and businessmen, found themselves compelled to increase the taxa-
tion on consumable goods.30 Many of those peasants who were able to 




assume control of lands had to support debts for many years. The new 
service of the millones would double the fiscal pressure. And, last but not 
least, the century’s final was marked by a cycle of bad harvests and epidem-
ics of unprecedented severity (Pérez Moreda 1980). Many small farms, 
and not a few large ones, were affected by similar pressures, as was the 
urban and industrial system itself. With regard to the former, some had to 
pay as much as 30% of their produce.31 Factoring in tithes (10%), and seed 
costs (25% in the case of wheat), these detractions could easily entail 50% 
of the net product.32 Given the high degree of land occupation achieved in 
1580, the violent fluctuation of harvests, and the difficulty in emigrating 
to unfarmed soils, this tax burden meant that one of the most important 
pillars for expansion had come to an end (Chap. 3). This situation was 
made worse by the increase in land costs and their stabilization at the high-
est level ever reached during the century in the zones of the south, habitu-
ally welcoming to immigrants, something which demonstrated the 
difficulties in continuing the reoccupation of lands at low cost. The imbal-
ance between pastureland and farmland, with a consequent effect in the 
availability of fertilizer, appears to have gotten worse (Anes 1994), and the 
increase, until at least 1580, of the price of beasts of burden and transport 
considerably complicated any prospective response to this problem (Yun 
2004, p. 473, table 7.3). This came in the context of rising fiscal and sei-
gniorial pressures, with difficulties in securing access to other resources 
and growing rigidities in family economies for the reasons mentioned 
above. In such difficult circumstances, the loans made available to these 
peasants in forms of censos, rather than acting as a stimulus to production 
and the mobilization of factors (as had occurred in the fifteenth century), 
constituted a form of credit on consumption that was vital for their very 
survival but could be lethal if, as often happened, they were unable to meet 
interest payments (Vassberg 1986, pp. 262 and ff.). All of this reduced the 
margin of subsistence and reproduction of the peasant family and rendered 
it more vulnerable to poor harvests and epidemics. And it also produced a 
reduction of both rural work productivity and the range of available 
resources, thus making it impossible to compensate for falling land yields 
as had been possible until the third quarter of the century (Chap. 3).
31 As a result, land rent went up until it reached a century high point in the 1580s (Yun, 
2004, p. 209, Graphs 4.5 and 4.6).
32 Figures based on López (1990), Brumont (1984), and Vassberg (1986, pp. 224 and ff.).
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If such hardships confronted the small- and medium-sized farms that 
predominated in the northern part of the Meseta, the situation was also 
challenging and no more positive for economic growth for the great ten-
ants, who were more important in the southern Meseta and Andalusia. 
Rent from the cortijos (big farms) and pastureland had grown noticeably 
but had tended to level off from 1570 to 1580. Furthermore, a reduction 
had occurred in the real value of daily wages, and rents paid in coin fell in 
real terms. But it is no less certain that these farms were negatively affected 
by the increase in the cost of beasts of burden, which constituted a very 
important and inelastic part of the exploitation costs (López-Salazar 
1986). Moreover, the difficulties involved in the commercialization of cer-
tain goods produced by the great farms (such as wool, whose price stabi-
lized and then began to fall from the 1580s) were notable (Yun 2004, 
p. 74, Graph 7.4; López-Salazar 1987, pp. 30–31). The compulsory pur-
chases for armies increased the insecurity of markets in many areas 
(Thompson 1976). And this came at a time that the large tenants found 
themselves facing stiff competition from the great rent collectors, the 
ecclesiastical and high nobility, when getting their products to the market. 
This also minimalized the potential positive effects of Madrid on their 
economies and on the agrarian development in general or had  consequences 
that were so positive at the same time for Paris and London (Ringrose 
1983a; Izquierdo 2001; Jacquart 1974).
This is not to say that there were not stimuli in this sense pointing 
towards the development of a new model of expansion based upon the 
great farms. As we have said, the very sale of wastelands and communal 
lands provided the basis for an agrarian capitalism in many areas of Castile 
and Andalusia in particular, similar to what was taking root in England. 
But, as we have said (Chap. 5), the result was that in many cases the pro-
cess encouraged a type of management that was based upon the use of 
privileges derived from the control of local power or in the double econ-
omy of the mayorazgos and did not induce processes of innovation on a 
large scale. It is not that the big farms were untouched by changes. 
Considerable innovation was visible in the management of the great olive- 
growing estates dedicated to serve the growing demand from America. 
But, even in this case, this was really a form of farming that was not inten-
sive in terms of local work (rather it depended upon seasonal bursts of a 
couple of months) and did not encourage immigration from the north to 
the south as had been the case in the previous phase of expansion. of the 
distinct possibilities created by the institutional framework (Chap. 5), the 
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less positive ones for economic growth were becoming the most common, 
and many of the most positive aspects of the sixteenth-century model of 
agrarian development were running into the sand.
The situation was no better for the urban economies. The problems of 
provisioning and the high price of foodstuffs posed certain difficulties for 
the cities. Taking as the point of comparison the relative prices of wheat 
and canvas, we can see that in the period 1550–1590, the relationship 
between the former, a basic article for the subsistence of artisans, and an 
item of merchandise that they sold was increasingly less favourable for 
them (Yun 2004, p. 464, Graph 7.6). With an agriculture that had reached 
peak productivity—and, therefore, very high prices of basic products—
and with a tax system whose weight fell on foodstuffs, the artisans’ margin 
for manoeuvre was decreasing. of course, a few factors were in their 
favour, such as the stabilization of prices of certain primary materials such 
as wool or the fall of labour pay rates in the case of industry (Yun 2004, 
pp. 473–474, Charts 7.4 and 7.3). But even then the positive relationship 
was highly selective, because, in effect, other raw materials, such as cochi-
neal, increased noticeably in price (Yun 2004, p. 428, Graph 7.5).
Tax increases during these years made things even worse. This rise in 
duties was not greater than in countries such as Holland where, moreover, 
a large part of taxes were collected as sisas on consumption (Yun 2004, 
p. 474, Chart 7.4). But, as we will see, Holland had clear advantages in 
this sense,33 and, as we have just seen, sisas levied on the consumption of 
basic products at a moment of negative terms of trade between agrarian 
and industrial products could only have negative effects upon artisan 
workshops.
Clearly, the urban industries were passing through very difficult 
moments, but—equally evident—different areas had different capacities 
for reaction to these problems. The textile sector of Segovia was able to 
resist thanks to its growing specialization in high-quality woollen cloth 
(they were even exported to America) and to the use of a salaried labour 
force in some phases of production, which would permit it to externalize 
the maintenance costs of the workforce (García Sanz 1987). Toledo did 
33 It is fairly probable that an unqualified construction worker in Valladolid would have 
dedicated around 30% of his annual income to pay taxes, while his Dutch equivalent would 
have hardly had to contribute more than 20% (Yun 1999c; De Vries and Van der Woude 
1997, p. 97).
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the same, producing high-quality goods (silk fabrics) to meet elite demand 
(Montemayor 1996). But the problems were very considerable in cities 
such as Córdoba, subject to important rigidities and to local negotiations 
about taxes that did not always favour the artisans or their ability to adapt 
to new patterns of consumption (Fortea 1981).
The rigidity of the commercial circuits was also to have very negative 
effects at the end of the century. The problem would also become mani-
fest in the wheat market. The imbalance between supply and demand 
would get worse when, on each bad harvest, the cities proceeded to pro-
hibit ‘exports’ or to seize the cereal passing through their jurisdictions. 
The practice of compulsory purchases and seizures at the price of cost 
(Thompson 1976), understandable and necessary, further increased the 
rigidity of the market and, as usual in these cases, had repercussions in the 
price of industrial products (Yun 1980). Far from fomenting a system of 
multilateral interchange, the outcomes were a greater opacity and a num-
ber of new risks that delayed the adjustment between supply and demand.
In a large and mountainous country, with highly populated cities in the 
interior, effective and flexible networks of distribution that could adapt to all 
circumstances were necessary. But this need did not necessarily ensure their 
existence. The situation has been described by A. Sen in relation to hunger 
in the contemporary Third World: there existed a problem of supply and a 
concentration of demand in the cities; in addition, there existed problems of 
distribution that were related to the institutional framework and the net-
work of local interests in this society (Sen 1981). In this context the transfer 
of the court to Madrid was a significant event. The positive effects of this 
move should not be forgotten. The capital was established far from the fer-
tile soils of the Duero Valley, and in the heartlands of southern Meseta, still 
highly expansive in terms of its agrarian resources. From 1560 to 1600, the 
population of Madrid passed from 12,000 to almost 90,000 inhabitants 
(Carbajo 1987, pp. 132–138). Its positive impact upon the market and the 
surrounding areas was quickly felt. Madrid’s demand contributed to main-
taining New Castile’s expansive wave of agriculture until the last decade of 
the century. Many nobles with possessions in zones near Madrid began to 
invest in agriculture. Cities such as Toledo or Segovia found a vibrant mar-
ket for their products (Montemayor 1996). But Madrid was a strange addi-
tion to the established urban networks. Rather than grow and simultaneously 
provoke the reconfiguration of the urban system, Madrid attracted artisans 
and population from its surroundings, creating a vacuum in these satellites 
(Ringrose 1983a). The urban network of the Meseta would now enter into 
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a process of crisis, which would last throughout the first decades of the sev-
enteenth century (Chap. 8).
In these ways the impulses towards agrarian and urban growth of the six-
teenth century were rapidly diminishing. Many of these problems also existed 
in other regions. But it was the centre of Castile, the region that had been an 
epicentre of economic growth, which was suffering the most from the nega-
tive impact of the institutions and management criteria created by the con-
flictive pact among the elites. The relative delay that would overcome the 
economies of the centre of the peninsula can, however, only be understood 
in relation to the comparative advantages of other areas of Europe.
The Advantages of the Enemies
The degree of flexibility of the different economies and their capacity to 
take advantage of international relationships were crucial. Both factors 
were tied to the institutional frameworks and political economies that 
resulted from the way the different regions faced the century’s structural 
tensions.
In the 1590s the receipts of American treasure peaked at 11 million 
ducats a year, a figure which would not be surpassed for decades to come. 
At the same moment that the Spanish expenditure and the transfer of sil-
ver to the rest of Europe were increasing, the peace treaties of the early 
seventeenth century and the accumulative effect of the improvements in 
commercial and financial organizations favoured a greater fluidity in inter-
national commerce. The results would be a further move towards the inte-
gration of international trade and, with it, a higher degree of competition 
between the various regions: these conditions brought about an unprece-
dented fight for markets. In these circumstances the capacity for reaction 
depended upon the flexibility of economies, which in turn was condi-
tioned by their political and institutional systems.
France’s economic situation by 1600–1620 was much healthier in gen-
eral terms than that in most parts of Spain, particularly its interior, and 
Portugal. France, and its Atlantic coastal regions above all, enjoyed more 
benign ecological conditions, with Atlantic climates bringing greater 
humidity. It also enjoyed proportionally larger woodlands in many parts of 
the country, thus permitting a triennial rotation of crop cultivation. For 
these reasons the agriculture of the north was more easily able to over-
come the productive blockades without having to employ revolutionary 
new technologies (Jacquart 1975, pp. 216–226).
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But this was not France’s only advantage. As we have seen, the aristoc-
racy’s need for economic innovation was higher in France than in Castile. 
This was not only evident in the management of aristocratic estates like 
that of La Trémoille but also in the development of agronomic theories to 
an extent unknown in countries such as Spain (Weary 1977). Ecclesiastic 
properties were less extensive in France than in Spain, especially after the 
alienations of the previous century. The reduction of the taille following 
Sully’s reforms also allowed the peasants—and, in particular, the owners of 
small farms—much more room to manoeuvre (Jacquart 1975, 
pp. 213–215; and Holt 1995, p. 212). In complete contrast to the situa-
tion in Castile, cities in France still enjoyed a more fluid relationship with 
the countryside. The French urban network, centred around Paris and 
gravitating towards the great arteries of international trade in the north, 
would encounter problems in the course of the seventeenth century. These 
difficulties, however, were relatively minor in comparison with the com-
plete collapse and dramatic shift towards macrocephalia of the urban 
 systems that occurred in the interior of the Castilian plain. Taking into 
account the vicissitudes of the various centres, the structure, spatial divi-
sion, and density of the French network became stronger, with some 
scholars even speaking of a period of growing urbanization (Benedict 
1989, pp. 27–39). Even with the changes brought about by the lowering 
of the taille, the fiscal burden appears to have fallen more equitably 
between city and countryside; at the same time, the paulette favoured the 
better-off social groups but only to a relatively small degree (Bonney 
1981, pp. 61–62). The close links between the cities and the great trade 
routes, the development of the verlagssystem, and the strong impetus given 
to the luxury goods industries by the demands of the international market, 
including that of Spain and more and more that of America, may help to 
explain the cities’ dynamism and vitality, which was also a stimulus for the 
resistance of the rural areas.
The results were a more flexible economy, a more even distribution of 
incomes, and higher levels of productivity in France than in most areas of 
Spain. This was especially clear in the areas of the north—those above a 
line drawn from La Rochelle to Strasbourg. Here positive conditions 
were engineered, with both urban industry and rural production fed by 
Parisian demand. Here also the war with Spain and the integration of the 
area into international trade circuits had some positive effects on the tex-
tile production of Brittany, Nantes, and other zones. Papers, books, and 
other products were also positively affected (Lapeyre 1955, pp. 507–596). 
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The development of lines of commerce between the north and the south 
of Europe, the incremental advance of Atlantic trade, and the high levels 
of agricultural productivity contributed to generate a relatively flexible 
and competitive economy in this area.
In England the model of development that had emerged during 
Elizabeth’s reign was gaining strength and momentum. The impetus 
afforded by the markets exerted its impact upon an economy which, in 
clear contrast to the Spanish model, appears to have been exceptionally 
receptive and flexible. one manifestation of this change was the growth of 
London in parallel to other urban centres. As we have seen, the much nar-
rower political incomes of the aristocracy and the need to overcome their 
debts compelled them to diversify and increase their investments. These 
were channelled not only into agriculture but also, increasingly, into min-
ing and commerce—a development without parallel in the other two 
countries (Stone 1979, pp. 335–384). England was progressing towards 
an open society in which entrance into the highest aristocratic circles was 
accessible to the gentry and even to businessmen (Stone and Stone 1995).
An old interpretation, advanced by Kerridge, is nowadays questioned: 
this held that the years 1560–1640 had witnessed the strengthening of 
agrarian capitalism and a period of great innovation on the large English 
estates. Later research has placed emphasis upon a ‘first agrarian revolu-
tion’, led by a vanguard of yeomen and whose bases would be the medium- 
sized farm, the intensification of work patterns, and connection forged 
with expanding local markets (Allen 1992, p. 310). These farms oversaw 
the ‘prolonged transition from mainstream agriculture to alternative agri-
culture’, characterized by the introduction of livestock fodder crops 
(among them clover and turnips) and made possible by a considerable 
degree of flexibility in the patterns of crop rotation (Thirsk 1997, 
pp. 24–25). Whatever the origins of the English agrarian transformations, 
they cannot be understood without taking into account the relatively high 
degree of mobility in the land market in comparison with Castile, thanks 
to a system, the strict settlements, which were less rigid than that of the 
mayorazgos (Habakkuk 1994). In complete contrast to what was occur-
ring in Castile, this development allowed the redistribution of land towards 
the more dynamic and innovative sectors of the economy.
These shifts ran parallel to the greater orientation of the peasant econo-
mies towards industrial activities, which saw the emergence of the ‘new 
draperies’, in part thanks to commercial expansion towards the south of 
Europe. This development can be seen as the prelude to an ‘industrious 
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revolution’, to use the terminology of Jan De Vries (2008). The fact that 
an important part of industrial activity was in the hands of peasants not 
only reduced costs but also avoided the emergence of very large cities 
(London being the exception), with all the provisioning problems that 
this entailed for cities such as those of Southern Europe. English changes 
were also in part made possible by merchants’ willingness to invest in rural 
industries that were the bases for textile exports (Wrightson 1982, 
pp. 143–144). With a smaller tax system, the public debt was also more 
limited than in Castile—and, therefore, its capacity to attract private sav-
ings was also reduced.
This expansive model possibly led to a more even distribution of 
incomes than in Castile and, by extension, greater opportunities for the 
industrial goods market. It also offered greater resilience to increased fiscal 
demands. The growing demands of the parliamentary subsidies notwith-
standing (by 1600 these revenues were worth more than those coming 
from the Crown lands and customs charges), fiscal burdens were easily met 
by a more flexible economy in which peasant multi-activity increased per 
capita wealth at the same time as it regularized income and the monetary 
flow coming from abroad facilitated tax payments. Far from thwarting 
productive activities, the growth of land rents and demographic pressure 
in fact led to an increase in auxiliary peasant activities (transport, peddling, 
domestic industry, etc.) as a means of overcoming these rising extractions. 
Even if this model reached a glass ceiling in the 1630s, still the cycle of 
expansion begun in the previous century had been a long one and may 
even have witnessed the most rapid phase of English economic growth in 
the early modern period (Snooks 1994; Allen 1992). There is no doubt 
that English goods were very competitive on the international market.
The evolution of the United Provinces followed a path similar to that of 
England. As in Castile, the fragmentation of the internal market was 
remarkable due to the uneven fiscal policies implemented by the different 
provinces. As has been said, both countries had similar tax systems, with 
heavy excises levied on basic goods. As in Castile, Dutch industrial produc-
tion was mainly based on urban workshops under the control of guild regu-
lation. The very high degree of urbanization and demographic pressure 
also provoked food supply problems, particularly for wheat, in both areas.
But the economy of the United Provinces was better prepared for 
these challenges. Its central role in international commerce—and particu-
larly in the Baltic cereal trade—mitigated provisioning problems. For the 
reasons explained before, until at least 1650, the Dutch nobility displayed 
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a widespread inclination towards investing in agrarian improvements 
(Van Nierop 1984, p. 138) and were, therefore, more immune than their 
Castilian peers to the attractions of rent-seeking and rentier practices 
until very late in the seventeenth century (Burke 1974, pp. 132, 139). 
Urban patricians who had made their fortunes in commerce tended to 
see high prices and increasing demand as a good reason to invest in the 
draining of relatively extensive areas and the introduction of productive 
improvements (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, pp.  28–29). This 
contrasted with the avidity for land for purely rentier purposes that was 
so common in other parts of Europe, such as Castile. Furthermore, 
regional variation notwithstanding, it was the small and medium farms 
that were crucial in this regard, and the improvements in land productiv-
ity helped to smooth the negative effects of the increasing rents paid by 
peasants at the same time that growing economic multi-functionality and 
diversification  widened sources of income and available resources.34 The 
development of fishing and the attendant pickling or salting industry 
rounded off the incomes of the Dutch people (De Vries and Van der 
Woode 1997). The arrival of immigrant artisans from the southern Low 
Countries in the Hamburg region (Israel 1989, pp. 30–37) and subse-
quently in Holland provided the country with the main economic factor 
crucial to the industry of the time—human capital. This allowed for the 
production of high- value- added goods and, consequently, enhanced the 
taxpaying capacity of industry.
An economy of this sort—oriented to international demand, character-
ized by enhanced productivity and high-value-added activities—was able 
to withstand increasing fiscal pressure on family consumption. But this 
was not its only strength. The solidity, high commercial awareness, and 
relative wealth of the middle classes—both craftsmen and bourgeois—made 
possible the mass issuing of renten, public debt bonds, which facilitated 
the development of Europe’s first financial revolution (‘T Hart, Jonkers 
and Van Zanden 1997, p. 22). Very shortly, these conditions allowed the 
great commercial companies, the VoC and WIC, to sell off huge numbers 
of their shares. In turn these companies came to monopolize trade with 
the West Indies, the Mediterranean, and East Indies (Israel 1989).
34 De Vries and Van der Woude (1997). A definition of these two terms can be found in 
Durand and Van Huylenbroeck (2003).
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These practices led to the foundation of powerful commercial institu-
tions supported by private capital and a multitude of small investors. A 
development of this sort, unthinkable in Castile despite occasional efforts 
in this direction, meant the creation of organisms whose prosperity was of 
direct interest and concern to large parts of the population and which, in 
addition to being directly involved in commercial development, would 
henceforth serve as the basis for the extension of Dutch trade across the 
face of the world (Israel 1989). Progress in sailing techniques would 
shortly culminate in the birth of a new type of ship, the fluyt, whose emer-
gence was primarily possible thanks to the availability of capital, although 
mention might also be made of a variety of other factors, among them 
cheap wood from the Baltic (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 357). 
In 1621 the war with Spain again broke out. By this time Holland boasted 
one of the most versatile, solid, and competitive economies in Europe.
If less dynamic, the economy of the Spanish Netherlands was not 
entirely different, although historians have often dismissed it due to the 
unfavourable comparison with the prodigious Dutch advance. War did, of 
course, provoke enormous disruption, but the recovery was perceptible 
(Van der Wee 1994). As in Holland, the economy was based upon inten-
sive farming, with crop rotation (specifically exploiting tuberous plants) 
increasingly significant in some areas. Reclaimed land, such as the former 
marshes between Dunkirk and Furnes, attracted capital investment from 
the nobility and businessmen as well as the efforts of a multitude of small 
family farmers. Another similarity lay in the flexibility of agriculture, which 
was innovative and less burdened by seigniorial restrictions than was the 
case in Southern Europe. Industrial activity was not confined to the cities 
but was also common to rural areas.
If the great Atlantic-Baltic trade routes increasingly passed around the 
southern Low Countries, then its political links with Spain allowed it to 
develop a flourishing trade with Seville and Madrid (Van Houtte and 
Stols 1973). The consequent external demand, in conjunction with the 
domestic markets, fed industrial production. After 1560 improvements in 
levels of industrial production were only marginal, but the demand for 
luxury goods elicited a quick response in many of the urban industries 
such as silk textiles, tapestries, jewellery, art, and so on. This demand 
coincided with the survival of the industries where the verlagssystem pre-
dominated and that provided popular manufactures (knitted or woollen 
fabrics) (Van der Wee 1988, pp. 347–351). The transfer of Spanish silver, 
which remained stable after reaching a peak in 1605 (Gelabert 1997, 
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
317
pp. 49–54), continued to give impetus and energy to the regional econ-
omy and the circulation of money, a crucial consideration for a dynamic 
and commercialized economy such as this one.
In Italy, even after the peace signed with Holland, Spanish demand fed 
the production of textiles, weapons, tapestries, and other expensive prod-
ucts originating in the north of the country and consumed in the Italian 
and Spanish courts. The flow of silver and spending provoked by war had 
a positive side also here. The war and the strengthening of these trade 
circuits provided impetus to cereal production in the South, a programme 
the Sicilian nobles enthusiastically sponsored as a means of escaping from 
their crippling debt problems (Cancila 2013). Even those Italian scholars 
who argue that the model for growth was broken in the last decades of the 
sixteenth century emphasize the ability to overcome the crisis and the 
resilience of trade networks. Florence made full use of Spanish wool and 
demand for luxury textiles, both of which were crucial to the restructuring 
of its industry towards the production of silk fabrics after 1575 (Ruiz 
1990a, pp. 110–147; Malanima 1978, p. 237). In Milan this same sector, 
with others linked to it, continued to advance with considerable momen-
tum, as did the Venetian woollen cloth industry.
Yet the indicators Ruggiero Romano used to measure Italian vitality 
until 1619–1620, like other sources explored more recently by scholars, 
offer clear evidence of problems. These studies do not, of course, reveal a 
recession of uniform depth and characteristics across the entire peninsula.35 
But, by 1620, the rigidity of the Italian economy was clearly greater than 
those of its northern rivals.
one of the problems was of a Malthusian character, manifest in the fam-
ines and high grain prices of the 1590s and resulting in a lowering of the 
demand for industrial goods. Skilled workers were being squeezed by rising 
costs of living. The result, as one Elizabethan traveller would note, was that 
grain was now more costly than in England—34% more expensive, accord-
ing to Vigo (1998, p. 280). But this was not the only obstacle.
At the heart of everything stood the problem of market integration 
and economic structures. The extreme political fragmentation of the 
Italian Peninsula had meant that the numerous local economies had never 
properly integrated—a fact reflected in the concave distribution of the 
35 The high point of woollen cloth production was reached in 1591–1600; after this point 
the tailing off was unchecked. The fall of the ‘tassa sull’ancoragio’ is also evident from 1603 
to 1605 (Romano 1962, pp. 492 and 501); the same can be said about urban production of 
silk fabrics (Ciriacono 1988, pp. 46–47; Vigo 1998).
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urban network, which had not changed in this respect (De Vries 1984), 
and which raised the cost of the transport of wheat. In moments of 
dearth, the zones with a surplus found it difficult to provision the indus-
trial areas of the north. Political disunity also posed an obstacle to the 
movement of primary materials for industry. An area with such an 
advanced technical division of labour, and with an industrial population 
that was clearly dissociated from food production, easily passed these 
additional costs onto prices (Vigo 1998, p. 280).
Another problem lay in the lack of flexibility and scope for innovation 
among the artisan sector, which reduced the degree of integration between 
city and rural areas.36 Florence provides a good example. Throughout the 
seventeenth century, rural and urban industrial sectors remained separate 
(Malanima 1988). P.  Malanima has stressed that the high opportunity 
costs and inherent risks were obstacles to change in mature economies 
such as these (Malanima 1998). Similar arguments gain strength if we fac-
tor in the existence in Italy of alternative investment strategies which, from 
the end of the sixteenth century, had attracted capital to purchase land 
(but not always to gain higher levels of productivity), fiefs, political offices, 
and so on. All of these considerations underline the fact that investors 
harboured profound doubts about the direction of imperial policy, which 
was very unlikely to be formulated for their benefit.
This structural rigidity appears to have had other consequences. The 
model of an ‘Italian’ agriculture unable or unwilling to change has been 
abandoned, at least in relation to the north of the peninsula. In Lombardy 
and even in Tuscany, efforts were made to improve fields and to extend 
the mulberry tree throughout the seventeenth century; these labours were 
sponsored by the great landowners who invested in them their fortunes, 
which had generally been obtained in commerce. Yet this trend could also 
lead to serious blockages, such as the one that overcame the Tuscan textile 
industry. Here the development of the verlagssystem, with a rural cycle, 
was obstructed by new farming techniques depending upon high-intensity 
labour throughout the year, thus reducing the time that peasants could 
devote to domestic industrial activities (Malanima 1988).
The eye-catching development of the financial and fiscal systems of the 
Italian city-states and kingdoms also had a negative effect. In the city- 
states of the north, as in the kingdoms of the south, these schemes resulted 
in a growth of public debt. In turn bankers and merchants came to see the 
option of loaning monies to governments as ‘much more attractive than 




investing in industry’.37 These were, moreover, political systems that gen-
erated highly evolved patronage structures, offering numerous offices and 
incomes to elites, thus further reducing the attraction of risky investments 
in industry. Another attractive investment for the great noble and banking 
families was the purchase of works of art, buildings, and palaces or in 
financing diplomatic or military careers.
Clearly, improvement was possible in Italy or Southern Europe in gen-
eral. But, when set in comparative terms, the disadvantages of this system 
in comparison to the changes taking place in Northern Europe were obvi-
ous. Set against Dutch arrangements (its chief competitor), the Italian 
‘crisis’ of the first decades of the seventeenth century was one of relative 
recession and readjustment. The maps representing the European urban 
networks in 1600 and 1650 (Maps 6.1 and 6.2) as well as the map repre-
senting the European urban trends (Map 8.3) are very meaningful regard-
ing the extent to which the shift of economic development towards 
Southern England and the Low Countries was taking place.
37 The phrase comes from Davidson (1985, pp. 163–164) and refers to Venice. See also the 
case of Naples (Calabria 1991, pp. 104–147).
Map 6.1 European urban networks, 1600
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
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* * *
By 1600 European globalization had escaped the hands of governments. 
In truth, they had never controlled it. But by this point, a series of infor-
mal networks were beyond their reach. It is often remarked that the king 
in Madrid was unable to exercise his monopoly in the Indies, as well as in 
Africa and, even more, in Asia, to control emigration to them or the mer-
chandise that was sent to—or received from—them. This failure was, how-
ever, nothing more than a reflection of how empires were—and are—unable 
to control the circulation of merchandise, goods, ideas, and persons. 
Understanding this incapacity is vital for what will follow.
At the same time and in spite of the small numbers that globalization 
meant in commercial terms, it was having profound effects on the life of 
Europeans. As we have seen in Chap. 4, its first steps had been crucial for 
the reproduction of the social order and institutional framework on the 
Iberian Peninsula. But the formation of global connections would be also 
decisive for many other areas of Europe: it enhanced the integration of 
international markets within Europe, thus increasing economic and politi-
cal competition among European polities.
Map 6.2 European urban networks, 1650
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
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Here, we have tried to argue that, among other factors which fall out-
side of our study, the capacity of the different countries to overcome ten-
sions and, above all, of the dominant coalitions to reproduce themselves 
was indirectly tied to their position with respect to globalization and 
imperial connections. By analysing how the different challenges that those 
societies faced were addressed, one can better understand the role of their 
empires in Iberian societies and more in particular in Castile and Portugal.
The availability of silver and imperial resources in Castile and Portugal, 
which were also part of the globalizing process, was an important factor for 
the evolution of many Western European regions. And these factors, com-
bining with internal ones, in which religion and religious  confrontation 
were not negligible, were behind the breakdown (or survival and deep re-
composition) of the different areas’ dominant coalitions. Those factors 
were also behind essential changes—often forgotten in the study of 
European political economies—that affected the degree of efficiency in the 
use of resources in relation to economic growth. It should be empha-
sized—and should be clear from the previous pages—that the term politi-
cal economy cannot be reduced to the simple working of formal institutions. 
Essential aspects—such as the creation of confidence—did not depend only 
upon such institutions: nor, in the short term, did growth and crisis. A 
range of aspects such as the position of each country in the transnational 
networks that distributed these resources, the different endowments of fac-
tors, and the way in which they were organized in agro- urban ecosystems 
were important and would continue to be so in the seventeenth century.
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CHAPTER 7
The Luso-Spanish Composite Global 
Empire, 1598–1640
The impact of globalization upon the Iberian complex becomes even 
clearer when we look at the way the imperial systems were created and 
interlinked, as well as at the evolution of the global forces in which they 
were embedded. This perspective also implies a study of the way imperial 
institutions operated and how social networks on a global scale interacted 
with the formal institutions created by the Crown to try to impose its 
authority and to control different agents’ agendas.
The IberIan Complex In a Global perspeCTIve
Two Empires and One World
Recent historiography has underlined, with good reason, the numerous inter-
connections between the Spanish and Portuguese empires (Subrahmanyam 
2007; Bethencourt 2013; Borges 2014; Herzog 2015). Certainly, in institu-
tional terms both empires maintained the rule of their respective institutional 
systems and implicit codes of practice. Portuguese subjects of the Habsburgs 
could not enter directly into Castile’s commerce with America; Castilians, like 
subjects of the peninsula’s other kingdoms, were classified as foreigners in 
Portuguese territories ruled by the same dynasty.
The Council of Portugal, in Madrid, was charged with providing advice 
on the management of Portuguese overseas possessions, and the Council 
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of the Indies oversaw affairs relative to the Spanish colonies. The Casa de 
la Contratación of Seville and the Casa da Índia of Lisbon, two very simi-
lar institutions, operated, however, with total independence of each other. 
The same can be said of other institutions with colonial reach and impact, 
such as the Inquisition. Though one can recognize the sharing of an 
administrative culture similar in some respects as well as the exchange of 
information in some fields, the two organizations acted as separate bodies 
in Spain and Portugal (Bethencourt 2009). Likewise, the respective 
branches of the Catholic Church comprised separate organizations, in par-
ticular in regard to the exercise of patronage rights and the appointment 
of bishops, and so on. And the same can be said about the transfers of 
money and military resources between the two kingdoms, at least from a 
formal and juridical perspective. The problem of the transfer of funds 
between kingdoms in order to defend each other’s interests had not 
abated.
Nevertheless, on occasions this formal separation could be overlooked. 
At the very beginning of the union of the two Crowns, in 1583, an expe-
dition to the Azores had been financed with Castilian and Neapolitan 
money, while Portugal was involved in the Invincible Armada (Thompson 
1976). Similar situations, in which joint contributions served the interests 
of one kingdom, would occur over the coming years, as in the recovery of 
Bahia in 1625. But combined operations would be a cause of controversy. 
In fact, the Portuguese, who had never previously been involved in this 
sort of venture, claimed that they contravened the terms of the Cortes of 
Tomar (1581). Moreover, in time the Castilians would make the same 
claim (Feros 2000, pp. 159–161).
This having been said, the binding or entwining of the Portuguese and 
Spanish empires would gather pace after 1580 (Herzog 2015). Thus, 
when in 1641 the governor of Buenos Aires received the royal order to 
expel the Portuguese for fear of ‘contagion’ of the rebellion in their home-
land, a member of the city elite responded with a strong argument: this 
decree, he averred, broke up ‘marriages’, preventing husbands from ‘liv-
ing a marital life with our wives’ (quoted by Trujillo 2009, 350).
This entwining of Iberians was in many respects the result of two global 
phenomena, which are normally studied as separate processes but which 
were in fact very much linked: the development of new avenues of 
Portuguese trade with Asia from the 1580s onwards and the silver mining 
boom in America after the 1560s.
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The first process is well known thanks to the excellent studies of 
Boyajian (1983 and 1993). According to this author, even if pepper con-
tinued to be the most demanded product, a generation of New Christians 
emerged who took advantage of the Crown’s need to broaden the trade 
into products such as Chinese and Indian cottons, silks, porcelain, dia-
monds, precious pearls, cinnamon, exotic perfumes, indigo, and even 
exquisite Asian furniture. This trade, it is important to note, was some-
times diverted from the African to the American coast, arriving in Brazil 
and, increasingly, in Río de la Plata (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007). The second 
process, the silver boom, was in a certain way a precedent and a cause of 
this new commercial development. Since the 1560s what Chaunu called 
the ‘inter-cycle recession’ of the fifties (Chaunu 1959, pp. 255–352) was 
overcome, and the discovery of new deposits, as well as technological 
advances, provoked a new boom in the production of silver in America 
that would last until the first decades of the seventeenth century (Bakewell 
1990, p. 81 and Hamilton 1975, p. 47). The flow of American silver and 
the difficulty in matching Portuguese imports from Asia with African gold 
made the Portuguese more keen to secure this precious metal, which they 
were already using in their Seville connection. Thus, through Brazil, the 
Portuguese began to obtain a significant part of the available Peruvian 
silver in exchange for increasing quantities of African slaves, supplying the 
basis of the plantation economy. Then, shortly afterwards, a portion of 
this precious metal was diverted towards the Río de la Plata. In fact, these 
exchanges were not only based on the trade in slaves but also on that of 
other less well-known products, such as Indian cotton (Boyajian 1993; 
Russell-Wood 1992; Studnicki-Gizbert 2007).
The impact of these two trends was crucial, and some facets of it have 
been mentioned already. The silver boom came hand in hand with the 
development of the plantation economy and the increasing export to 
Europe of products from these ventures. For this reason, American trade 
was becoming richer and more diversified. But this development also 
enhanced, as we have seen, the connections with Northern Europe, 
from which increasing quantities of goods were brought to Iberia and 
exported from it to the colonies (particularly America), with more silver 
and Asian commodities being exported to the northern half of the old 
continent. It is not, therefore, surprising that the old theory about a 
decline in Asian trade in the second half of the sixteenth century is not 
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accepted today (Boyajian 1993), and recent estimates of Portuguese 
shipping to Asia corroborate this revisionism.1
This same process facilitated the growing dynamism of a new route 
towards globalization: commerce between New Spain (Acapulco) and the 
Philippines (Manila) that completed the silver belt around the world and 
allowed Asian products to reach Mexico—whence some were sent on to 
Seville and Europe in general—in exchange for silver from New Spain. 
This route even skirted the Pacific coastlines of America, reaching down as 
far as Peru where Asian products were sold in return for that area’s silver. 
American silver, being of greater purity—and therefore value—than 
Japanese silver, even allowed for the reduction of the importance of 
Japanese trade in China, thus adding to Portuguese power in the China 
Sea. This trade, like others of its time, did not only depend upon mer-
chants in the strict sense of the word; rather exchanges were conducted 
also by soldiers, adventurers, and above all missionaries who obtained 
notable profits (Gasch 2012, Palomo 2016). And this was also the case in 
the commerce between the Philippines and Acapulco (Gasch 2012).
This new trend also impacted the Iberian Peninsula. The presence of 
Portuguese in Andalusia, and above all in Seville and Córdoba, increased 
(Studnicki-Gizbert 2007; Fortea 1981). The links between the Portuguese 
and the Duero Valley trade (connected to both Seville and Lisbon) were 
reinforced and were even one of the reasons for the positive reaction of the 
Castilian fairs, which prolonged their life until the end of the century in 
some cases (Yun 1987). By 1580 the circulation of Castilian silver in 
Portugal, and with it the influence of its economy, was bringing about a 
noticeable Castilianization of the Portuguese economy (Disney 2009).
All this explains how and why the interlinking of Portuguese and 
Castilians increased in this epoch in the colonial arena, as has been under-
lined (Subrahmanyam 2007). But—and this is often forgotten—the same 
interlinking occurred on the Iberian Peninsula. Both Castilians and 
Portuguese created settled personal relationships and trust networks based 
upon common interests. At this point the formal institutions of the two 
1 The available estimates show that the number of Portuguese ships sailing from Lisbon to 
Asia was revitalized from 1570, following a slight dip in numbers in previous years. This 
trend would reach its peak between 1601 and 1610 (despite attacks from the United 
Provinces) and was maintained at a very high level until 1620. Very meaningfully, Portuguese 




empires had more or less clearly defined frontiers. But the cross-border 
character of their connections was a fact. This does not mean that tensions 
were absent. On the contrary, contact itself was creating conflicts. But 
these were two empires in an increasingly interconnected world. As we 
shall see, this was not a closed system fully controlled from above; nor was 
it a massive trade grid capable of producing a strong convergence of prices 
at the global level (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002). Nevertheless, the 
ensuing connections would be decisive for the history of the Spanish and 
Portuguese empires and for the working of their political economies.
The Problem of Information
The issues outlined above are essential to identifying the great problems of 
the Luso-Spanish imperial complex, as well as the principles that governed 
its political economy and brought about a profound transformation in it 
from 1600 onwards.
One essential, recurring issue regarded information, the slowness of its 
circulation, the problems in obtaining it, and the consequent difficulties 
for government and business. Governors were perfectly conscious of these 
issues and dreamt of obtaining what they called the ‘complete notice’, (‘la 
entera noticia’) (Brendecke 2012). But they also presented a grave prob-
lem for the individuals and, above all, for the merchants who flowed 
through the arteries of this empire.
The slow circulation of news was caused, logically, by the distances 
involved. The voyage between the metropolis and the closest colonies in 
the Atlantic was, in the case of the Spanish empire, some 13 weeks on the 
way out and 18 on the return, while in the case of the English empire, it 
would be between 5 to 8 weeks and 3 to 8 weeks, respectively, according 
to the route chosen (Elliott 2006, pp. 177 and 181). The problem was 
even greater in the case of the Portuguese empire, where the voyage from 
Lisbon to Goa might last as long as 24 weeks. Yet this was not even the 
major problem or principal difference with the British colonies to the 
North. Rather, the great difficulties sprang from the rhythm and rigidity 
in the circulation of reports upon which the organization of the Carrera 
de Indias depended, which in turn was caused by the climate and rhythm 
of the seasons, winds and tides, and so on. While the English empire 
depended upon voyages that were much more staggered and frequent 
over the course of the year until at least the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the Spanish depended upon fleets that could travel to the Caribbean 
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only twice a year and return only at the end of the summer following the 
timetable already set out (Chap. 2). A similar situation affected Portugal 
on account of the monsoons (Parry 1990, chapters 6 and 7). For this rea-
son, the communication systems (essential for political and business orga-
nizations) that crossed over and between these areas faced considerable 
difficulties. If ships departed from Lisbon in March, even with fair winds, 
they would not arrive in Goa until September, and they could only embark 
on their return journey towards January or February, arriving back in 
Portugal, if everything went well, in August or September of the year after 
their departure (Kellenbenz 2000, p. 602). That is to say that the informa-
tion, instructions, and orders could be produced and sent from the head-
quarters of the Estado da Índia only once a year, and the arrival of 
responses in Lisbon might in theory take as long as 18 or 19 months.
Yet this was simply the first step, as within the colonies themselves, sev-
eral weeks might be needed to communicate between the most distant 
parts of the empire and the Caribbean or Goa; for things to work well 
here, a perfect synchronization of voyages and climates and no little good 
fortune were necessary. It is not, therefore, surprising that letters written 
by emigrants were often filled with a terrible sense of isolation and discon-
nection. References abound to entire years in which communications with 
the Iberian Peninsula were interrupted, with insecurity flowing from the 
loss of correspondence or the unexplained disappearance of persons dis-
patched, while consternation was sometimes expressed about the plight of 
messengers sent to find people who were perhaps themselves in transit and 
therefore unlikely to be located. On 20 April 1592, one Pedro de la Huerta 
wrote to his nephew in response to a letter penned in September 1588, in 
which he complained of not having received any word from his uncle in 
almost four years. And in 1562 Diego Martín de Trujillo confessed that it 
had been more than 11 years since he had news of his family. These were 
two cases among hundreds that have survived (Otte 1988). And the same 
problem occurred in the royal administration that, despite a dense net-
work of bureaucrats, informants, messengers, and mediators, still faced 
problems obtaining reliable and timely information (Brendecke 2012).
In this situation, the creation of oligopolistic circuits of privileged 
information gave their members certain advantages. One well-known 
example is that of the Dutch merchants who wrote their famous gazettes 
to Amsterdam recounting the details of American shipments to Spain even 
before the galleons arrived in Seville (Morineau 1985). The circuits  created 
by consuls, nominally merchants, should be understood in the same light, 
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and these were extended across many parts of Europe and very often oper-
ated according to an affinity based upon common origins, as was the case 
of the Italian or Jewish communities. For its part the Society of Jesus came 
to arrange an entire system for the exchange of information, the so- called 
‘Jesuit letters’ (Broggio 2002). In reality many of these arrangements 
were alternatives to the existence of a postal or courier network, although 
something resembling one began to emerge in America at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century (Montáñez 1950). Throughout the sixteenth 
century, the letters of emigrants repeatedly refer to entrusting correspon-
dence to the merchants and sailors who sailed the seas, a practice that 
entailed a high risk of loss and news blackout (Otte 1988). All of this can 
be taken as evidence of the high costs of information and the need to cre-
ate networks of confidence based upon previous relations or mutual ben-
efit that guaranteed the circulation and veracity of reports.
The consequences of this situation impacted governmental systems. 
Without doubt, government both depended upon and collected a multi-
tude of reports, visits, and accounts, which presented a fuller picture of 
events than might otherwise have been obtained. The efforts of viceroys in 
both Asia and America provided a good demonstration of these phenomena 
(Merluzzi 2003, chapter 2). As we have seen, in both Crowns a number of 
centralizing projects were proposed, encompassing political organization as 
well as the news and information systems that facilitated the exercise of 
power. But the news that circulated through official channels was not always 
accurate, and many times the reports that reached Madrid (or Lisbon) pro-
vided ‘not the truth, but rather indications of loyalty and disloyalty’ 
(Brendecke 2012, p. 492). Because of these reasons, the result was a highly 
asymmetric information system that gave its mediators enormous power 
through its transmission and in particular favoured those who collected and 
advanced reports and news in situ, the price for which could only be paid 
through the cession of political capital which made it even more difficult for 
Madrid or Lisbon to implement the king’s orders. The political economy of 
the empire would be highly affected by all of this.
Social Networks and Informal Institutions 
in a Cross-Border Perspective
The projection of elites across this global empire explains why, in part, 
imperial spaces across four continents very quickly became traversed by 
informal relationships that would prove decisive for their history. And this 
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development was evident not only on the vast oceans, upon which histo-
rians have focused their attention, but also in Europe itself. This was, in 
many ways, a phenomenon that was unique to the period and of the fact 
that its politics had a corporate character.
The formation of these networks was often, but not always, an indirect 
consequence of possibilities for the social consolidation and extension of 
elites who had been present in the creation of the empire and in the pro-
cess of globalization (Chap. 4). As we have said, these were social groups 
governed by two essential tensions—between solidarity and conflict and, 
at the same time, between the individual and the collective (see Chap. 1)—
and as such could do nothing but project these same rules of play upon the 
empire itself. If there was a certain tendency towards rupture among the 
branches of each continent, there was also an intention to maintain con-
tacts. In some cases this desire was expressed through networks, where 
contact was essential for the interests of individuals, as would be the case 
for the Jewish merchants and financiers (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007). These 
traders formed genuine dispersed coalitions, transferring capital and mer-
chandise among their members, and their only chance of survival lay in 
avoiding rupture and atomization. At times personal interest surfaced, as 
would happen with the priest in Castro del Río who corresponded with his 
brother and retained the letters in the hope of proving his right to the 
family inheritance (Hidalgo 2006). At other times, as perhaps occurred 
with the American branch of the Borja, these connections served as a way 
of maintaining and conserving this immaterial capital that belonged to the 
house; this was also manifested in the use of the shield of that lineage on 
coats of arms and ornaments (Redondo and Yun 2008).
These networks were based upon familial links and kinship, upon forms 
of recognizing prestige and reputation in the ways described by A. Greif 
(2006) for the case of Medieval Genoa. Family connections and ties with 
more distant relatives were a way to create confidence and circulate infor-
mation. In America, nearly all correspondents of the Corzo and the 
Mañara, the leading Sevillian businessmen, belonged to their family or 
ended up being related to it (Vila 1991, passim). And often this meant 
persons who, while related, resided on different sides of the Atlantic. 
Moreover, dowries, often transferred across the Atlantic, were a form of 
moving family capital from the bride’s side to the groom’s and from one 
side of the ocean to the other (Almorza Hidalgo 2011). Similarly, the 
practice of standing as a godparent, very common in America, allowed a 
person—usually a family member or associate—to bind himself to another 
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family in the act of baptism itself, thus creating links of great value for 
business designed to reinforce personal trust (Nutini and Bell 1980).
Family relations were often strengthened through education and train-
ing with or near to relatives, with the intention being that the parties, 
having reached maturity, would eventually work, trade, or operate together 
(see some examples in Vila 1991). Permanent ties of culture, identity, and 
belonging could likewise be decisive. This was, of course, the case for the 
Jewish merchants. And it was not uncommon to find affinities of language 
binding Italians or members of the same ‘nation’. Even in the world of 
lawyers, support networks were sometimes formed that could operate as 
genuine lobbies active on the Iberian Peninsula and in America or Asia. 
And this was very possibly the case for many Portuguese merchant adven-
turers who, like Bartolomeu Landeiro, operated as intermediaries between 
the Portuguese and the Chinese, sometimes even serving the latter in a 
military capacity (de Sousa 2010; Boxer 1959). No less important were 
the simple friendships that sprouted up in any number of situations. The 
lawyers who formed relationships of this sort in their school days or during 
undergraduate studies at Castile’s universities provide an example of such 
a group, while merchants generally established similar friendship networks, 
sometimes basing them on nothing more than mutual necessity (García 
Hernán 2007, passim; Vila 1991).2 Clientele and patronage relationships 
developed along similar lines, in particular between prominent persons 
such as viceroys and governors da Índia, who often belonged to the high 
aristocracy. In fact clientele practices—at times barely formalized in codes 
of external behaviour—could become decisive in a world much more 
inhospitable than that of the metropolis.
The result was often the formation of overlapping and flexible identi-
ties, as was logical in individuals who had two ways of conceiving them-
selves: as Jews and Portuguese, Castilians and Portuguese, or as belonging 
to a noble house, that is, to a lineage, while being subjects of a distant king 
in Madrid.
If the view from Europe necessarily entails the possibility of eurocen-
trism, then it is clear that the study of the connections within the colonies 
may provide a different perspective. The businessmen of the consulates of 
2 The case of J. de Solórzano is especially interesting (García Hernán 2007). In fact, if we 
review the contacts after his arrival in Peru, we find that, apart from extended family rela-
tions, a notable capacity to create ‘friends’, some of whom dated back to his time in 
Salamanca.
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Lima and Mexico were often connected with groups based in Castile or 
Flanders, and they served at the other end of the network, as important as 
its European part and, indeed, crucial to its very operation, as is clear from 
a careful reading of the work of Studnicki-Gizbert (2007). In light of 
recent studies, something similar might be said of the creole elite that, little 
by little, formed in America and that, more than representing the periph-
ery of a web, performed at times as the centre of a constellation of relation-
ships that were projected out into Asia (or, at times, from Asia) and towards 
Europe. A similar degree of ex-centrality can be found in the networks of 
converso merchants who operated in the trade between the Atlantic, Africa, 
and Asia, at times working in a way that their most important connections 
did not pass through Lisbon and even, on occasion, attempting to impose 
their conditions on Madrid, where they negotiated asientos and rented 
monopolies (Boyajian 1983 and Studnicki-Gizbert 2007).
Precisely because of the distances involved and the consequent prob-
lems of communication, the relationships formed in this way between 
individuals and groups could be fragile and easily broken. The death of 
members, oversight, or a lack of communication could fracture them and 
render them transitory, something that frequently happened.3 But these 
same dangers made these contacts even more necessary and led to their 
substitution and the replacing of defunct pacts and coalitions with great 
speed and efficiency. And these dangers afforded comparative advantages 
to the most solid networks, those based on family and those created by the 
Jews and which drew upon community identity, religion, social practices, 
cultural beliefs, and economic interests.
It is difficult to apply a single significance or historical effect to relations 
of this sort. Certainly, they were key to the conquest and functioning of 
empires. The lion’s share of the available knowledge in military and eco-
nomic affairs circulated through and along their branches, as did the politi-
cal expertise that was crucial to making empire work. To give one example, 
military knowledge acquired in Europe by army captains and soldiers 
allowed for the wars of ‘pacification’ and conquest in America (Centenero 
2009). And little remains to be said of the ability of Portuguese sailors to use 
the great advances of the incipient European military and naval revolution 
to serve their cause in Asia. Their knowledge of latest mining techniques 
allowed German emigrants to America to exploit the Peruvian and Mexican 
3 See different cases in Otte (1988).
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deposits that would irrigate the world with white metals (Sánchez 1989). It 
was in part thanks to the projection into America of German families such 
as the Welser and the Fugger, or many others of Genoese or Portuguese 
origin, that the Habsburg wars and their political system could be sustained. 
And, of course, the emergence of a certain type of law and a specific juridical 
culture—certainly, in this regard Portugal and Castile followed a very similar 
course, both originating in essentially the same university world—that cre-
ated shared codes of legal and political behaviour that were subsequently 
extended across enormous territories (Rivero 2011). In other words, rela-
tionship networks were largely responsible for allowing armadas to sail and 
armies to fight; Audiencias, mines, cities, and viceroyalties were in large part 
also the result of networks of personal connections that, if they had their 
propulsive niche in these institutions, were fed in reality by informal rela-
tions appropriate to these networks of weak ties and links (see some exam-
ples in Centenero 2009).
But our interest, in any case, is the interaction with formal institutions 
and the means by which they interfered in both realities.
‘Perverting’ ‘Perverted’ Institutions?
As we have seen, informal networks were crucial for initial contacts in the 
different areas of both empires. Their development to a certain degree 
would create, however, a tension with the royal administrative and judicial 
apparatus, whose development was crucial in a gradually more competitive 
world where violence among the different polities would be the norm. 
The following pages try to explain this very important change and how 
such a tension would be decisive in a context of increasing globalization.
 Justice, Enforcement, and Distance
The Crown would try to control the exercise of coercion, understood pri-
marily in terms of justice and military organization through the creation of 
formal institutions (described above). The military defence was attempted 
primarily through the system of fleets and colonial squadrons, such as the 
Atlantic fleet (Armada del Mar Océano), the squadrons such as the Armada 
de Barlovento established by the Spaniards in America, or the maritime sys-
tem that the Portuguese set up in Goa. In any case, this resulted in a stra-
tegic military presence that was intended to control the trade, regulate 
economic and social relations, and, in the final instance, wield the power of 
the king (Goodman 1997 and Phillips (1986). In this regard, the institu-
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tions mentioned above, such as the House of Trade of Seville (Casa de la 
Contratación de Sevilla) and the Casa da Índia, exercised, in theory at 
least, a high degree of power of enforcement to the extent that the ‘monop-
oly’ was organized through them. The same was true of the Portuguese 
Conselho da Fazenda (Miranda 2010). Attempts were made to exercise 
control over justice through the Audiencias and the Relaçoes, respectively 
(Tomás y Valiente 1982, Schwartz 1973, Hespanha 2001). Both cases con-
stituted an attempt to apply and uphold the law in the colonies through a 
group of bureaucrats trained in peninsula law or, in the Spanish case, in the 
Indian Laws too (Chap. 2). As mentioned above, both empires proceeded 
to compile laws in the hope that their application in a clear and uniform way 
would serve to reduce risks and transaction costs. In the cities and American 
municipalities, as in the Portuguese câmaras and feitorias, an attempt was 
thus made to apply the king’s justice.
It is not, however, surprising that the assessment of this situation from 
the perspective of the new institutional economics has been very negative 
(Coatsworth 2008). As occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, the efficiency of 
these institutions in regard to the creation of a centralized, transparent 
and predictable system for the exercise of coercion was highly relative. 
Both empires saw a plurality of agents who applied overlapping and, very 
often, clashing forms of coercion (Hespanha 2001, pp. 181–2). This is 
very evident in Portugal, where a scholar has spoken of an ‘estatuto colo-
nial múltiplo’ (a multiple colonial status) to underline the administrative 
and jurisdictional pluralism of the system (Hespanha and Santos 1998, 
pp. 353–61). This was in part a consequence of a diverse range of situa-
tions that even led to the creation of seigniorial estates in the colonies 
(Neto 1997, pp.  154–55). But, in the Spanish system, the plurality of 
agents active in the exercise of coercion and power, often clashing among 
themselves, was also present.
By the same standard, the exercise of coercion was closely linked to the 
practices of social agents. Despite the efforts of the Crown to preserve the 
superiority of its authority, it was impossible to prevent the encomenderos 
and the owners of mines, mitas, and repartimientos, as well as the bandei-
rantes, the owners of slaves and plantations and even the owners of 
 capitanias donatarias, from exercising their capacity for coercion on a 
day-to-day basis. Even, indeed, a number of religious institutions such as 
the Jesuits retained notable use of coercion, to judge by the many exam-
ples and cases found in the seventeenth century. This fact would even 
emerge in debates in which institutions such as the Audiencia of Lima 
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became involved about the ownership of ‘personal services’, a euphemism 
for practices that entailed the enslavement of the Amerindians (Díaz 2010, 
pp. 108–120 and passim). Above all in the frontier areas, violence between 
the Crown’s servants, Jesuits (and other ecclesiastical orders), and parts of 
the Indian population remained common (Ariel and Svriz 2016 and 
Monteiro 1994). Cases such as that of the bandeirantes in Brazil demon-
strate both the vigour and prevalence of these customs of violence—as 
well as the weakness of royal authority—which were basic to the working 
of the overall system and, in particular, to obtaining a slave workforce for 
the emerging plantation economy (Monteiro 1994, pp. 138 and ff). Even 
a very hierarchical institution, such as the Inquisition, though it was 
“mixed’ in nature’ (a tribunal of the Crown but also an ecclesiastical tribu-
nal), did not become completely integrated into the state’s machinery 
(Bethencourt 2009, pp. 316 and ff). Not only could the Holy Office act 
quite independently in the implementation of justice, it could even inter-
fere with the king’s regular justice. Though, in theory, the Inquisition did 
not prosecute economic crimes, it could exacerbate a sense of risk and 
uncertainty among economic agents, which could affect economic activi-
ties and trade in particular.
Merchant sectors in the Iberian Peninsula had clearly achieved a privi-
leged position (Chap. 5). Yet by the same standards, their counterparts in 
the empire were not that much different; in particular, this was true of the 
very powerful Consulates of Lima (1613) and Mexico (1592), behind 
which stood extremely influential groups of businessmen involved in both 
Europe and Asia. A number of individuals, such as Juan de Solórzano, 
who helped to found consulates as ‘justice courts for merchant affairs’, 
saw how they evolved into ‘professional corporations of merchants, thus 
becoming a lobby within the viceroyalty’ (García Hernán 2007, p. 129). 
The information provided by J.  L. Gasch (2015a) presents the modus 
operandi of the merchants of the Consulate of Mexico when faced with 
corruption in commerce with the Philippines. If the consulates themselves 
could positively reduce risks and transaction costs for their members, they 
could also fragment the map of conflict resolution and create barriers to 
the entrance of outsiders.
The forms of ownership established in the colonies were the opposite 
of what the new institutional economics considers the paradigm for effi-
ciency. Although the Crown imposed and exercised its law in specific cir-
cumstances, a large part of property in both empires existed as a form of 
rights ceded by the king (Romano 2004). Moreover, property held in the 
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privileged form of entailment was increasingly extended over time and led 
to the creation of lay and ecclesiastical elites in America. In this way a sys-
tem was consecrated that not only placed obstacles before the circulation 
of land ownership but also advanced forms of management that were not 
always conducive to the implementation of productive improvements 
(Coatsworth 2008).
The political economy of the colonies was consequently characterized 
by the clash of forms of enforcement and by the importance of privilege 
and the opportunity to exercise violence as a substantial part of the pro-
ductive relationships. All of this appears, on paper, a major problem for 
productive development and the efficient assignment of productive 
resources (North et al. 2009).
The imperial reality implied not only the adherence to local legal and 
normative codes but also systems that made distant institutions work and 
created forms of confidence and coercion in overseas spaces.
As occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, the Crown’s scope for interven-
tion as a third party in resolving conflicts was highly limited, although its 
role appeared to be guaranteed by the importance of the Audiencias and 
the authority of the viceroys and local authorities. In regard to lawsuits 
launched from the Iberian Peninsula, there were many problems. Enforcing 
compliance with contracts was sometimes complicated by the difficulty of 
locating persons or the time spent in doing so. In 1543 a Seville banker 
calculated that to prosecute a Fugger lawsuit in New Spain would require 
a year and a half (Kellenbenz 2000, p. 601). The execution of contracts by 
merchants involved in transatlantic trade was highly complex and required 
mechanisms of a mixed character. For example, Seville’s merchants con-
tinually sent orders for unpaid debts to their operatives in America that 
appealed to the king’s justice in the final instance (Cachero 2010). But, in 
order for them to arrive at that point, they themselves had to search for the 
debtors before these orders could be implemented. This revealed a form 
of justice that was accompanied by high transaction costs and that, by 
itself, had a limited capacity to reduce risks. And, if risks were fundamen-
tally determined by other, more important factors (the chances of ship-
wreck, attack, appropriation by the king, the delay of the fleets, etc.), then 
forms of justice partly explain the high rates of maritime insurance (Bernal 
1993). If, therefore, justice and enforcing compliance with contracts on 
the Iberian Peninsula were slow and there existed circuits outside of ‘offi-
cial’ justice, to use the phrase of A. M. Hespanha, then the ramifications 
of this situation were even more emphatically felt in the immense world of 
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global and local relations beyond it. For another thing, the very nature of 
a law that conceded a wide margin of manoeuvre to judges and entailed 
different jurisdictions meant that the problem was to know who was the 
‘best equipped to interpret and enforce the law’ (Rivero 2011, p. 2011). 
In regard to the Estado da Índia, Hespanha has spoken of an extremely 
complex system in which seven areas of political jurisdiction were opera-
tive (Hespanha and Santos 1998).
The entwining of the two empires and their projection over extremely 
distinct societies increased the diverse range of moral and social codes, 
thus making it more difficult for official justice to penetrate the intricate 
social fabric and compelling it to highly complex cultural translations 
between the different social agents. This was the case in America, where 
the slow configuration of the ‘caste society’ (a term that is more a social 
representation than anything else) took place; it was also the case in the 
Portuguese dominions in Asia, where the frontier and the numerous cul-
tures with whom they dealt was complex and porous.
 Dominant Coalitions, Patronage, Rent-Seeking, Corruption, Fraud, 
and Contraband
These trans-frontier networks and webs cannot be understood as separate 
from the formation of elites and dominant coalitions of a local character. 
Indeed, the precise opposite was the case. Logically these webs acquired 
different characteristics according to the specific contexts in which they 
were born and their relations with the Crown.4 Notable differences also 
existed in the weight they could bring to the negotiating table and their 
influence. They were especially powerful and influential in areas such as 
New Spain or the viceroyalty of Peru. Here minorities of powerful creoles 
concentrated, often being linked to the exploitation of mines, the great 
estates or haciendas, trade, and the bank that, enjoying strong connections 
with the royal bureaucracy, exercised an enormous decision-making capac-
ity (Bakewell 1995; Kicza 1999). Its vast economic potential was comple-
mented by its very considerable social capital and its influential and 
charismatic identity as a creole minority whose character was deliberately 
projected to distinguish it from both the indigenous population and the 
Spanish (Gasch 2014). In part exploiting norms of consumption that 
4 A series of case studies is found in B.  Ch. Büschges and B. Schrôter (eds.) (1999, 
pp. 10–82). The cases of Mexico and Río de la Plata, about which a great deal has been writ-
ten, can be studied in Kicza (1999).
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included the use of Asian products as a means of cultural differentiation, 
these creoles proceeded to invent their own tradition by underlining their 
hybrid but unique identity. Their powers were extended through the sys-
tem for the transfer of funds between regions through the situados, which 
conferred a degree of pre-eminence upon them. Theirs were the areas 
which most frequently transferred resources to the poorer regions with 
the aim of not only oiling the bureaucratic machinery but also—and above 
all—priming defence forces (Grafe and Irigoin 2012).
A series of features were repeated in practically all local elites, although 
in different combinations. As perhaps had to be the case, one of these was 
the use of matrimony and family and kinship relations as a means of con-
structing power. Here in fact lies one of the reasons why the family has 
always been credited with enormous importance in the history of social 
relations in Latin America.5 It could serve as a means of connection with 
the international networks mentioned above. In other instances relation-
ships were based on occasional transfers of influence or of political and 
economic resources. The custom was that these networks of local relation-
ships could call upon members who were strategically placed in politics, 
the bureaucracy, the magistrates, or business. This was a means of control-
ling diverse spaces that offered their different members a form of capital 
(economic, social, or cultural) that was easily interchangeable. And, 
despite there being no comparative study of this phenomena, the impres-
sion is that, if things were broadly similar on the Iberian Peninsula, the 
greatest weakness of the conception of a society of orders was that it con-
ferred upon these elites a notable fluidity in the relations between their 
different component parts, above all through matrimony. It should be 
added that Portuguese colonial society in Asia passed through two phases 
in this regard. The first phase ‘was characterised by the mobility of indi-
viduals’ (Russell-Wood 1992, pp.  112–3). Figures such as Bartolomeu 
Landeiro or Fernando Mendes Pinto appear to have been continually on 
the move, being highly skilled and versatile operatives, blessed with a tal-
ent of obtaining information and selling it to the highest bidder while 
operating among local agents—a lifestyle and career, in short, indicative of 
their ‘endemic individualism’ (Russell-Wood 1992, p.  113; de Sousa 
2010). But in a second phase, the presence of Jewish networks, marked by 
5 It is not surprising that the role of the family in the internal relationships between elites 
has been emphasized (Céspedes 2009, pp. 191–200).
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a strong familial character, must have created a broader panorama in this 
area and proven more similar to what had occurred in the Portuguese 
colonies in Brazil, which in turn can be said to have been very similar in 
this regard to the Spanish case (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007, chapter 3). This 
sequence does not mean, however, that both models were not present in 
the whole period under analysis here.
This type of network based on family and kinship would be vital, as it 
would prove to be crucial to one of the essential developments in the his-
tory of the empire—the increasing perversion of its formal institutions. By 
this I mean a process whereby these social networks and informal institu-
tions would be able to take over many different institutions, such as the 
Audiencias, the municipal and ecclesiastical councils, the consulates, and 
many other institutions, and then impose upon them—and therefore upon 
the rest of the society—their own interests, ways of creating trust, and 
forms of enforcement. It is important to note that, as in the metropolis, 
this was also possible due to the ‘unmodern’ character (in the Weberian 
sense) of these administrative and political bodies. In a context in which 
the boundaries between public and private domains were highly perme-
able, this brought about a very high degree of concentration of political 
and economic capital, thus forging one of the key characteristics of the 
political economy of the colonies. Elite Mexican families, for example, 
were able to accumulate and unify their influence in the mines, the agrar-
ian sector, local politics, the royal bureaucratic machinery, the Church, 
and so on and at the same time they were establishing international 
 connections with Seville, Lima, the Caribbean, or the Philippines. These 
networks of interest were highly successful in penetrating the institutional 
system created by the monarchy. In these circumstances, which were far 
from unique, their chances of applying practices of rent-seeking were very 
high, to say the least. They had access to privileged information; were able 
to wield ‘public’ power to their own ends, and marshalled a highly solid 
economic base that allowed them to make transfers to members through 
the exercise of political and even juridical authority; and, finally, if all else 
failed, they could even shift the legal framework if they acted together as 
genuine coalitions.
Equally, their chances of indulging in fraud and corrupt practices were 
extensive, given that their international connections offered them enor-
mous scope for contraband and commercial fraud. Patronage, clientelism, 
and corruption, in fact, were tied to the very model of the Iberian state, the 
character of the composite monarchy as a group of powers and jurisdictions 
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linked together only in the person of the king (Yun 1994b). The outcome 
was the reproduction in an amplified and perfected form in the Indies of 
practices of nepotism, patronage, and so on. One of the best studies of the 
theme has identified the viceroys who arrived in the New World ‘with a 
large retinue of family members and creatures’ as an epicentre of corrup-
tion. This was tied not only to the centre of the political system, but also 
extended out into the localities and “periphery of the administration” 
(Pietschmann 1989, pp. 163–182). Existing studies have also shown that 
strong solidarities existed between royal officials and the owners of sugar 
refineries, which led to similar situations (Schwartz 1973). And yet the 
problem of corruption did not reside only in the negative impact of the 
misuse of public funds. Nepotism, the promotion of clients—then, as today, 
but more so in those societies in which clientelism was rooted in the essence 
of the social fabric and was part of the moral economy of the elites—
depended upon the use of human resources in the pursuit of private interest 
rather than that of the state. The dilemma between personal loyalty—so 
important in the codex of values of the period—and efficiency in state ser-
vice was often resolved by placing the former ahead of the latter; obviously, 
this had important effects upon politics. In fact it was part of the political 
culture and practices of the epoch. At times corruption of this sort did not 
even necessarily require pre- existing family relationships, as it simply took 
root in the forms of payment and the cost of offices. Rather than focus on 
a very well-known field of study, such as the great bureaucrats who came to 
the colonies from the Iberian Peninsula, the example can be given of the 
repartimientos, which sometimes adopted a form of industrial verlagssystem. 
Patch’s research has shown that the mayors (alcaldes mayores), being badly 
paid and in need of making good the money spent in buying their offices, 
fraudulently favoured the backer (aviador), a sort of verlaguer who had 
advanced money or primary material to the official and who thus obtained 
access to the forced labour of the Indians at a very low price (1994). Many 
variants of this sort of corruption can be found.
But the great problem—above all, as we shall see, in constructing a 
mercantilist empire or, simply, one based upon the control of the  markets—
was that one of the most important practices was contraband. This can be 
explained through the enormous power acquired by international net-
works of businessmen. But another factor was that these men, making use 
of their connections with local elites and functionaries, were able to 
 pervert the working of the institutions. Moreover they found apt methods 
for doing so in the very institutions themselves. The renting of a state 
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monopoly, the asientos of black slaves, and so on were means used by the 
very office holders themselves to facilitate fraudulent commerce; at other 
times these methods were exploited to exercise an unfair advantage over 
competitors, who might end up being removed or evicted from the sector 
in question (Studnicki-Gizbert 2007). Some time ago Zacarías Moutoukias 
provided information crucial to understanding another type of corrupt 
operation in the Río de la Plata and underlined the practical confusion that 
existed over what was legal and ‘illegal’ commerce. Indeed the multifunc-
tional character of elites, in which functionaries mixed with merchants and 
their international connections raised smuggling to such levels that the 
monarchy had to ‘legalize’ it in return for money or the concession of 
privileges to its practitioners (Moutoukias 1988, chapter IV). The illegiti-
mate thus became legal. A similar situation ensued in Cartagena and 
Veracruz where the collaboration of royal officials in the contraband net-
works has been very well described by J. M. Córdoba (2015). The same 
happened in Mexico, where members of the Consulate were awarded privi-
leges in return for donations to the Crown of millions of pesos; these pre-
rogatives granted them the right to discharge fiscal functions over their own 
shipments towards Asia (Gasch 2015a and 2015b). The method would also 
be applied in Seville and would be one of the keys to the so-called crisis of the 
Carrera de Indias, as we shall see. This admission—it might even be said, 
‘legalization’—of these practices in return for money testifies to the systemic 
character of corruption in the form of smuggling and contraband.
In these ways the networks of the empire had a series of characteristics: 
a pronounced family component, a marked prolongation of other forms of 
obtaining confidence, and a multilateral character spanning frontiers. It 
could also be made up of individuals belonging to many different ‘nation-
alities’ densely intermingled. In fact it is not difficult to see how in cases 
such as that of the Jewish networks of smugglers not only were the Spanish 
or Portuguese authorities involved in the subterfuge but so also were the 
English, Dutch, and French ones. In short, these were complex and mul-
tifunctional relationships. These agents had a notable capacity to prevent 
interference from the formal institutions which were, by their very nature, 
given to a sort of self-perversion; perhaps indeed, using the terminology 
built by Max Weber to describe modern societies, they can be considered 
as perverse. Though, the right way to express it beyond metaphors is to 
say that they were different and product of their own moment in history. 
In a global context, this would prove fatal to the state that sought to con-
trol this empire. All this does not mean that the Spanish and Portuguese 
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administrative system was not subject to monitoring and control from the 
Crown. The visitas and other types of control were very common, and 
there are examples of major efforts against smuggling, fraud, and corrup-
tion (Bertrand 1999). But one needs to understand that contraband, 
fraud, rent-seeking, and corruption in general, often linked to nepotism 
and patronage as components of the prevalent political culture, were nor-
mal practices and a way to take advantage of previous investments in 
offices or to compensate poorly paid functionaries. In other words, 
 corruption—particularly when it was ‘legalized’—allowed the state to 
externalize a part of its very high protection costs.
CorrosIve GlobalIzaTIon
The great enemy of the Luso-Spanish imperial complex was its own cre-
ation: the process of globalization, understood not only as the discovery 
and contact with new worlds but also as the increasing intertwining of 
distant societies.
Globalization and Regional Economies
The result of the colonization and ‘globalization’ of the New World was 
to encourage the emergence of new internal circuits in it, all of them 
linked at some point with the transcontinental routes. These were regional 
economies that, if they obeyed their own rules, were thoroughly interwo-
ven into processes of globalization.
The development of the cities and mining settlements, both manifesta-
tions of a world that was ever more global, activated the need to provision 
them with products from nearby areas. In the seaboard of the Pacific, a 
coastal complex emerged that served to feed Peru, whose growth was car-
ried forward by its globally important role in the extraction and circulation 
of silver (Mörner 1990, p.  143). The increase in internal American 
demand, a consequence of its connections to the global economy, helped 
the development of the plantation economy. The great estates or hacien-
das of Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil supplied products such as maize, live-
stock, or sugar cane, without which it would not have been possible to 
feed or send primary materials to the areas connected to Atlantic trade. 
Phenomena such as the efforts to colonize new lands or, more simply, the 
hunt for slaves carried the frontier slowly forward into the interior of 
Brazil; certainly the formation of great livestock breeding farms there can-
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not be understood without reference to these international connections 
(Lockhart and Schwartz 1983). In this way the new plantation economy, 
shaped by production destined for internal American consumption and 
which would come to compete with—and complement—the mining 
economy, was also a consequence of its expansion and the global connec-
tions of America. The great fairs of Veracruz, Jalapa, or Portobello, which 
were crucial for the long-range commerce of the Carrera de Indias, also 
became the stage for a growing regional commerce in the Caribbean that 
operated according to its own rules (Macleod 1990, pp. 180–8). The con-
nections between the west coasts of Brazil and Argentina encouraged not 
only these regional trade systems but also the global circuits between Peru 
and the Río de la Plata (Assadourian 1982; Garavaglia 1983), which in 
turn inserted themselves into other circuits of commerce.
These regional circuits in the American continent have been considered 
as key to a debate on the possible existence of a seventeenth-century crisis 
(Israel 1974; TePaske and Klein 1981; Kamen and Israel 1982). But simi-
lar situations can be found in other zones of the planet. The South Atlantic, 
between the coasts of Guinea and the Ivory Coast, on the one side, and the 
coasts between the Caribbean and the Río de la Plata, on the other side, 
constituted a subsystem within global commerce (Russell-Wood 1992; 
Boyajian 1993). Similar circuits had developed, sometimes being built 
upon regional economies already linked before the arrival of the Europeans, 
between the Cape of Good Hope and Japan, where there existed regional 
economies with a certain degree of autonomy and in which Portuguese 
penetration was necessarily limited (Subrahmanyam 1990). The China Sea 
was an area with its own logic, where the silver from Japan was secured in 
exchange for all types of product to feed regional commerce (Flynn and 
Giraldez 2002). An idea of the importance of the regional circuits (not 
separated from the very long distance trade) can be gained from calcula-
tions that postulate that even in the moment of peak export of American 
silver to the Pacific (1600–1640), it did not constitute more than 10–25% 
of the Japanese silver exported to China in compensation for its products 
(Barrett 1990, p. 246). Regional circuits were, therefore, more important 
in volume than long-distance and intercontinental trade.
Without doubt the penetration of American silver and the connection 
through the Philippines with America did more to open up these circuits, 
but they also had their own endogenous logic in many areas of Asia 
(Subrahmanyam 1990). The Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, from 
India to Madagascar, were replete with regional coastal circuits, many of 
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them dating back to before the arrival of the Portuguese whose appear-
ance in fact gave them a new dynamic. But, despite the connections with 
Portugal, the Asiatic economies had their own independence and a multi-
tude of internal circuits. Today it is common to underline the fact that the 
portion of merchandise traded by the Portuguese—and, indeed, by the 
Europeans in general—was of reduced importance in relation to the total 
volume of traffic in these areas.
Globalization also implied the appearance of new routes. This was the 
case of the trade between Peru and the Río de la Plata (mentioned above) 
and that served to divert the route of the white metal that would not be 
channelled through the Carrera de Indias—and, therefore, that would 
not end up resting in the coffers of the King of Spain. It was also a zone 
whose base was smuggling, to which the Crown turned a blind eye, as we 
have seen. Moreover the Portuguese never came to control all of the com-
merce from Asia, as a significant part of it moved through the Red Sea and 
into the Ottoman Empire, thus creating another path of diffusion for 
these products. Carried through Greece and Venice, these goods often 
reached the north of Europe, usually passing through English hands 
(Fusaro 2015). The same effect was achieved by the inhospitable route 
that connected Persia with the north of Europe or travelled over Siberia 
towards the Baltic. The new commercial route between Acapulco and 
Manila strengthened these centrifugal commercial tendencies in the heart 
of the Luso-Spanish empire and, this way, increased the difficulties in con-
trolling and maintaining the monopoly of Seville.
The impetus of both the regional economies, closely tied as they were 
to the expansion of international commerce, and the alternative routes of 
global trade can be interpreted as a symptom of the capacity of the world 
economy: it moved regional resources and generated new routes of eco-
nomic development. It is also known that the fall in silver receipts in Seville 
and the crisis of Portuguese commerce with Asia would occur later than 
has been said. It certainly cannot be dated to before 1620–1630. But, on 
the other hand, it is also clear that these global mechanisms made it 
increasingly difficult to control the circulation of silver or maintain the 
extraction quota of the empire over a buoyant global economy that, even 
if it was in crisis in the short or long term, remained multipolar and with a 
very notable centrifugal component. As we shall see, this character would 
prove to be the Achilles heel of Madrid and of the empire. Would it also 
affect the economic agents who operated in it?
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Problems of Regulation and Internal Conflicts
Historians have recently proposed that these empires might be described 
as polycentric (Cardim et al. 2012). The expression adds little to what 
we already know but has an undoubted graphic value as long as we do 
not forget that some centres had less power than others and that Madrid 
was in many senses ‘the’ centre of the empire. It is important to under-
line, moreover, that all empires in history have been polycentric in many 
ways. Furthermore, one of the problems of the expression is that so 
far it has been applied mainly, or only, on the political and jurisdictional 
levels and that it suggests a certain sense of exceptionalism of the 
Iberian world.
This multinuclear character is, in realty, the fruit of the plurality of 
points of negotiation and, therefore, of decision-making centres that 
affected not only themselves but also the system as a whole. Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of political and institutional history, it is often forgot-
ten that this nodal character became more evident with the development 
of regional economies and globalization. In effect the development of the 
regional economies implied the transferal to each of these centres of an 
opportunity to convert economic capital into political capital. The case of 
the development, almost fraudulent, of the Río de la Plata is paradigmatic, 
although perhaps in this respect the Philippines, Macao, or other areas 
might also be mentioned. In such centres, as economic resources increased, 
a number of agents emerged—that is, new elites and institutions that very 
shortly would negotiate with the Crown and, over time, would become 
decisive for the defence of the American empire as a whole. By 1630 there 
were many poles of regional development: in the Caribbean, Mexico, 
Peru, the Río de la Plata, Chile gradually, the coast of Brazil, the factories 
of Africa and the islands of the Atlantic, Lisbon, Madrid, Seville, Naples, 
Milan or the Low Countries, the coasts of the Indian Ocean, Goa, Macao, 
the China Sea, the Philippines, and so on. Furthermore, these were just 
the most important points, and under each of them were concentrated 
other, lower nodes of negotiation within the hierarchy. In each case we 
find a group in which a variety of agents negotiated with the king and 
among themselves. The case of New Spain provides a valuable example of 
the complex web of institutional relations at play. Here a range of actors—
the Consulate of Mexico, Mexico City itself, the freight shippers to the 
Philippines, the viceroy and the Audiencia—interacted among themselves, 
sometimes each pursuing its own agenda by recurring to institutional and 
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economic privileges and yet, at the same time, also presenting claims for 
redress to the monarch in Madrid. Similar forms of rivalry and collabora-
tion occurred under other types of institutional relations, for instance, in 
the European part of this composite monarchy (Chap. 5).
This situation ensued to the extent that the development of these new 
areas—and the deepening of the old ones—was based on the establishment 
of relations of do ut des with the Crown in which the concession of de facto 
jurisdictional or economic privileges played an essential role (these conces-
sions and prerogatives came, nearly always, to assume a perpetual charac-
ter); the system crystalized relations that were essential to its functioning. 
Still more important, privileges of this sort were seldom the fruit of a pre-
conceived plan of imperial organization. On the contrary, these were rela-
tions borne of mutual necessity in specific conjectures between the king 
and local agents. And they responded to economic and political agendas 
marked by local concerns. The result was that the empire was configured 
as a group of different interests which were sometimes contradictory.
Many examples could be given. One study of the viceroyalties has 
arrived, with good reason, at the conclusion that ‘jurisdictional conflict 
was the order of the day and formed part of the very nature of things’ 
(Rivero 2011, p. 200). This author mentions another aspect of this situa-
tion, the collision of jurisdictions that formed part of the development of 
the European part of the composite monarchy of the Luso-Spanish empire. 
But the statement is also applicable to overseas territories, where institu-
tions and an entire political philosophy had been exported and practices 
for the negotiation of privileges had been developed. For these reasons the 
Luso-Spanish complex existed during the first decades of the seventeenth 
century with a continual tension between placing more resources into the 
development of Pacific commerce—in which a large part of the Mexican 
and Lima elites were involved—and, alternatively, trying to limit and con-
trol it, as the businessmen of Seville and many who operated from Lisbon 
would have wanted and who saw in it a threat to their commerce with the 
Indian Ocean (Gasch 2015a). Even without resolving this question, the 
same phenomenon led to continual prohibitions being promulgated 
against the trade between Peru and New Spain that, if they appear not to 
have been entirely successful, did at least end the chances of uniting forces 
to proceed to the exploration and expansion into the South Pacific, a cam-
paign that was left for English and French navigators (Céspedes 2009, 
p. 160). A similar conflict emerged over the development of trade through 
Buenos Aires, which infuriated the all-powerful Consulate of Seville, but 
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was extremely remunerative for Peru’s and the Río de la Plata’s traders, as 
well as for the slave traders, many of them Portuguese, who connected this 
area with the Gulf of Guinea (Boyajian 1983; Studnicki-Gizbert 2007). 
The development of this route had strengthened the New Christians and 
Portuguese Jews who now, with the help of high-ranking governmental 
figures in Madrid, were coming into conflict with the Genoese over the 
control of the asientos (Ruiz Martín 1990b). Very similar conflicts were 
common in Asia. The opposition of institutions and Castilian and 
Portuguese corporations over China Sea commerce, or between enclaves 
such as Macao and Manila, and the disputes over the Moluccas, or over 
simple questions of naval protocol (and in this period, protocol was a 
means of setting the hierarchy of privileges that formed a part of political 
capital), are other good examples of this same tension (Valladares 2001, 
pp. 9, 20, 24, and 36). But, moreover, these conflicts could—and indeed 
did—have a markedly local character. Cases such as the dispute between 
the viceroy of New Spain and the bishop Palafox in Mexico have been 
considered as a clash of egos. But such episodes demonstrate a type of 
conflict between ecclesiastical power and civil authority that was present 
across the Iberian world (Álvarez de Toledo 2004). A good example can 
be found in the tensions between the Portuguese viceroy Linhares and the 
short-lived Portuguese East India Company, which decisively contributed 
to the failure of the latter (Disney 1978, chapter 9). Frontier zones, such 
as the region of Entre Rios in Argentina, were the stage for conflicts 
between the Jesuits and the governor of Buenos Aires for long periods of 
time (Ariel and Svriz 2016). Numerous other examples could be given 
(Herzog 2015).
It is important to note that tensions of this type—and forms of lobbying—
are present in any polity, from nation state to regional government. What 
makes this a special case are the scale and nature of the problems of dis-
tance, asymmetric information, and monitoring difficulties. But all of these 
disputes, and many others of a more local character, expressed what was in 
reality a problem of regulation and arbitration that, if common to all 
empires, was inherent to the very model of development of the Spanish and 
Portuguese systems. As would happen centuries later to the British Empire, 
part of the problem originated in the difficulties in the very centre of the 
empire (Darwin 2012). If it was by this point difficult to coordinate mis-
sions in the peninsula and in Europe (Chap. 4), it was even more challeng-
ing to do so in the distant spaces in an empire marked by the difficult 
circulation of information and the high degree of autonomy wielded by 
local agents. In 1625 a well-informed expert on American society, Gaytán 
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Torres, decided that the good government of the Indies required not only 
the purification of a thoroughly corrupt administration but also the reform 
of the various Councils in Madrid, whose rivalries and disputes were drawn 
out and debilitating (Amadori 2009). In the case of the Council of the 
Indies, clashes with the exchequer were especially frequent (Schäfer 2003, 
pp. 115–9 and 165–8). Joint actions involving the Council of Portugal and 
the Council of the Indies were not easy to coordinate. Moreover both 
councils (like all others) had more than one governmental function. As it 
has been said, they were also jurisdictional bodies and had to make sure that 
laws, customs, and rights (meaning therefore privileges) of each one of the 
components of the Iberian imperial complex were respected and upheld. 
And these were not always compatible. When Portuguese Jewish and 
Genoese bankers were in conflict, should the Crown back its traditional 
allies, who had mobilized the Republic of Genoa to serve the Habsburg 
cause of controlling Europe or its direct subjects from Portugal? In the 
majority of cases, when its own interest was at play, as was the case in 
debates about when or how it was to advance the exploration of the South 
Pacific that might well introduce even more centrifugal forces, the position 
of the Crown was to favour itself. But this, rather than correct the problem 
of regulation, only made things worse, and in fact it created a problem of 
arbitration from the centre.
World War, money, and men
These features of the Luso-Spanish composite empire were also present at 
its European extreme. Moreover, the problems of regulation in the 
Habsburg domains were not an anomaly in themselves. As we have under-
lined, they were the logical outcome of social and political development in 
tune with the epoch’s political systems.
Problems would arise, however, when increasing pressure was put upon 
the different nodes of the empire in America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. 
Such pressure was not only the outcome of Dutch and English actions in 
Europe but also a side effect of the development of other areas of the 
planet in which globalization had also progressed since the sixteenth cen-
tury. The climax of the increasing tension on a world scale can be seen in 
an event that has always been considered either in a strict European dimen-
sion or in its different parts separately: the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), 
or to be more precise the Eighty Years War, which started with the Dutch 
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Mars and Mercury on a World Scale
The years 1598–1621 were decisive. Fighting on against Holland until 
1609 created an exhausting situation for the royal finances. The reforming 
instincts of Philip III and his favourite, the duke of Lerma, are recognized 
today (Feros 2000). This having been said, patronage, clientelism, and 
political corruption, which cannot be separated from their economic con-
text and which were a constitutive part of the political regime, originating 
in Lerma and his family, appear to have reached unprecedented level 
(Feros 2000, chapter 8). The patronage system, the spine of the political 
economy, developed to the extent that it became impossible to recruit the 
best-qualified servants to government through the client network 
(Williams 2006, p. 355). The dilemma between, on the one hand, clien-
tele loyalty achieved through side payments that kept lineages united and 
softened their internal conflicts and, on the other, efficiency in political 
management was being decided too often in favour of the former. The 
situation was even more disturbing for many as not only had the millones 
tax been increased, but the minting of vellón coinage had been allowed, a 
measure that was considered by many thinkers, such as Juan de Mariana, 
to be an act of tyranny—a rupture of the implicit agreement between the 
monarchy and its subjects since 1469 (de Mariana 1987).
If they could not provide figures to substantiate their claims, contem-
poraries were very much aware of what was happening. This was especially 
true of the arbitristas, who flooded the Cortes and the desks of governors 
with proposals for reform and remedies (J. Vilar 1974; Gutiérrez Nieto 
1982). If the solutions proffered were very diverse in nature, then their 
diagnosis of the problems remains extremely valuable in regard to their 
analysis of the political economy. According to the arbitristas, when com-
pared to its European competitors, the Spanish economy had clearly run 
out of steam. The empire had fallen into a type of bad government that 
was being taken advantage of by other ‘nations’, among whose number 
figured not only the Dutch, French, or English but also—and above all—
the Genoese, the Moriscos, and the gypsies.6 The Portuguese equivalent to 
the arbitrista literature, the so-called literature of remedies (la literatura 
de remedios), also dealt with similar topics and placed emphasis on the 
problems of the empire and of the Estado da Índia. The overall arguments 
6 See an example in Sancho de Moncada (1974 [1619]) and the introduction of Jean Vilar 
to his work (1974, pp. 78–81).
 B. YUN-CASALILLA
351
were very similar, but they were exactly the same in their consideration of 
foreigners and, above all, in taking the union of the Crowns as one of the 
main problems of the empire and of the country (Curto 2009 and Borges 
2014). It is precisely this negative impression of foreign influence that led 
to the fluorescence of a sense of Spain and Portugal as a dual political 
identity that would be the basis of subsequent reform projects infused 
with a clear mercantilist character.
In the case of Spain, among the reasons for this new feeling were the 
difficulties in overcoming the United Provinces of the Netherlands, with 
which a truce had been signed in 1609.
By 1634 a painting was hung in the palace of the Buen Retiro in 
Madrid, which had been built for the greater glory of Philip IV (and, indi-
rectly, for the Count Duke of Olivares). Its subject was an emblematic 
event: the recovery of Bahia in 1625. Laden with overt political symbolism 
(Brown and Elliott 1980, pp. 194–202), the work also appears today to 
reflect a number of elements that are crucial to understanding the political 
economy of the empire in these years: the likelihood of the Dutch attack-
ing Portuguese areas of the empire, the fragility of Dutch efforts, and the 
considerable ability of the monarchy to react, despite its many problems. 
Without knowing it, the painting therefore confirmed the thinking of a 
group of Amsterdam merchants who, as we shall see, were increasingly 
convinced that the best way to penetrate the Luso-Spanish empire was by 
commercial infiltration rather than full frontal assault (Boxer 1973). 
Brimming with religious iconography and the representation of an impe-
rial composite monarchy, the work of Juan Bautista Maíno perhaps dem-
onstrates that the war with Holland was not a religious conflict. But 
neither was it a question of maintaining the unity of Habsburg patrimony; 
nor was it an economic war, despite its marked economic component, or 
one fought for reputation. Rather, it was all of these things at the same 
time. But, above all, this canvass allows us to understand that this was a 
global conflict fought by a geographically dispersed composite monarchy 
and dynastic world empire.
This unique combination of themes underlines the dilemmas of Spain 
when faced with its precise opposite, a small confederation of provinces: 
the Dutch Republic was a small and badly connected political system, an 
antistate (Elliott 1990); however, it drew strength from its spatial concen-
tration and the high degree of interaction between its elites and govern-
ment thanks to a system that permitted discussion and informal relations, 
in which conflict was often resolved with joint actions in defence of the 
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economic bases of the country. It is not that corruption was inexistent in 
the Netherlands and even less the case that family networks were failing to 
penetrate its institutions in a similar way to what was occurring in Spain 
(Adams 2005). But its political skeleton was very different.
Any comparison between the Luso-Spanish empire and those that fol-
lowed it, particularly the English and the Dutch, underlines this fact.
First, in contrast to the Iberian imperio, these were political formations 
in which the colonies were appendixes to proto-national states that com-
prised territorial unities and pursued a basically mercantilist agenda. In 
effect the great problem of the Spanish monarchy from 1598 to 1648, and 
more specifically from 1618 to 1648, lay in waging war on a number of 
fronts across Europe from a mosaic of polities that were governed by a 
very wide range of political agendas, with very strong geopolitical con-
strictions and constitutions, whose interests did not always fall in line with 
those of the king. To this must be added that the dynastic nature of this 
ensemble created the duty of serving the general strategy of the House of 
Habsburg, manifested—it is only one example—in the participation in the 
Battle of the White Mountain (1620) in defence of the Austrian branch of 
the family and then sending help to repulse the attacks of Gustavus 
Adolphus of Sweden in Central Europe (from 1630). This role also cre-
ated strategic problems that led to actions which were not only absurd but 
also enormously exhausting. This was the case in the attempted conquest 
of Mantua, undertaken to prevent the Nevers, a family tied to the French 
branch of the Gonzaga and therefore to Louis XIII of France, from seizing 
power in the duchy.
Second, such difficulties resulted from being a composite monarchy 
and empire. In an international war fought on various fronts, the obstacles 
created by the political theory, inherent to the composite, states to the 
transfer of funds from one state to another would pose a crucial problem. 
But this was also the case when it came to colonial areas and the need to 
use Portuguese and Castilian resources in a coordinated way. This diffi-
culty became even worse to the extent that it coincided with the first glo-
balization, which made the Iberian complex extremely alluring to  maritime 
and commercial states such as Holland and England. In Europe, the prob-
lem was even more serious because of the pincers around France created 
by the semicircle of the Pyrenees, the routes of the Spanish road and 




Third, in many areas of the world, this was an empire of arteries and 
widespread neuralgic points. Its political and economic functioning 
depended upon a series of routes that tied together nuclei condemned to 
assist each other but whose local elites, bound by their separate and inde-
pendent bargains with the Crown, found that their interests seldom coin-
cided. For this reason, the geopolitical situation was implacable: the 
so-called Spanish road and the Mediterranean route from the East coast of 
the Iberian Peninsula was one of the most important but delicate routes, 
with an especially vulnerable point, the Valtellina pass in the Alps. The 
maritime connections between the Cantabrian coasts and the Low 
Countries were also vital. Along both routes men, military resources, and 
silver flowed, without which everything in the War of Flanders might have 
been lost. The connections between Lisbon and Brazil and their extension 
to the Río de la Plata were vital, as were the routes to Africa (where Guinea 
was also crucial) and the Indian-Pacific Ocean complex (in which Mombasa, 
Ormuz, Goa, Malacca, Manila, and Macao were stress points). Commerce 
was based in these sea lanes, as was the lion’s share of Philip IV’s income as 
King of Portugal and, most important, the loyalty of the Portuguese to 
Madrid. The other artery united Seville with the Caribbean, whence the 
fundamental routes to Mexico, Panama, and the coast of Tierra Firme ran; 
and in turn these points connected with the American Pacific and the links 
with the Philippines. Any enemy action against this artery threatened to 
interrupt the flow of silver to Castile, which in turn would endanger the 
financial nerve system of the empire. To give an idea of the distances 
involved, this network covered some 100,000 kilometres across oceans and 
along coastlines—two and a half-times the length of the equator.
Some of the fundamental characteristics of the Habsburg imperial sys-
tem were, therefore, its dispersion and patrimonial nature, the obstacles to 
the mobilization of resources imposed by its character as a composite 
monarchy, and the strategic importance of some of the arteries and nodal 
points of the empire. Many empires have faced similar situations: their 
growth makes it more difficult to control frontiers faced with insupport-
able and continuous multilateral pressures, the variety of constitutions 
compels them to multilateral negotiations with local elites, military costs 
are always high, and so on. Indeed, some of these features have even been 
used to explain the failure of empires in general (Kennedy 1988). But the 
combination of all these characteristics in a moment of increasing global-
ization and fight for colonial markets would be decisive.
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In these circumstances, the strategy used by the Dutch and English was 
to focus on delicate points to assault or infiltrate, thus taking advantage of 
the problems in co-ordination and negotiation between local agents and 
Madrid, as well as the attendant logistical constraints.
A quick glance at events between 1580 and 1635 is highly significant. 
From the end of the previous decade, the English corsairs (Drake, 
Cavendish, and Hawkins) had attacked a number of points on the coast of 
Peru, California, Cadiz, and the Caribbean. The point of outbreak was 
always a neuralgic node for the transport of silver and the expanding plan-
tation economy. At the same time, the Dutch had increased their presence 
in the Caribbean and the coasts of Brazil, being especially drawn by smug-
gling sugar and slaves. The powerful network of Portuguese New 
Christians would prove a great help to them in the moment of a boom in 
the plantation economy. But the Dutch intention was also to gain access 
to Peruvian silver, which they obtained by selling their goods in the New 
World and more in particular in the Caribbean and along the Northern 
coast of Brazil. The truce of 1609–1621 also allowed the Dutch to sell 
their industrial products directly to Brazil, while ‘dozens of Dutch vessels 
sailed from Portugal to Holland’ and carried merchandise in the other 
direction (Israel 1990, p. 117). Access to Peruvian silver through Brazil 
was getting ever closer. In the 1590s, at the very height of the war, the 
Dutch also began their own expansion towards the Orient. According to 
Headrick (2010, p.  87), they drew upon a number of advantages that 
allowed them to build fortresses in the ‘Spice Islands’, where they ran into 
the Spanish, who were based in the Philippines (Israel 1990, chapter 3), 
and Portuguese. By 1617 the Dutch had established around 20 strong 
port fortresses and were ‘the strongest European power in Asia’, having 
supplanted the Portuguese, even if then they also had to face the English 
(Israel 1990, pp. 104–106), whose penetration into Lisbon’s empire was 
more subtle, if no less inexorable. These were also the years in which the 
English defeated the Portuguese at Surat (1612) and obtained trading 
privileges from the Great Mogul in return for providing protection to 
Muslim pilgrims (1618).
For these reasons, it is possible to understand why, when the truce 
lapsed in 1621, the prowar Spanish faction had in mind not only religious 
and dynastic ideals. Many people, and not only nobles such as the Count 
of Benavente, thought that Spain needed a ‘good war’ to avoid the coun-
try becoming effeminate and to satisfy the proto-national feeling surging 
within Castilian society (Elliott 1990, pp. 86–99). The Iberian merchant 
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communities also saw Holland and, to a lesser extent, England as a threat 
that had to be faced down. But the Dutch strategy persisted. Despite the 
problems that it would cause Dutch trade, the war also provided the pre-
text for a new offensive, an important early move being the seizure of 
Bahia and infiltration into Portuguese commerce between Africa and the 
Brazilian plantations (Brown and Elliott 1980, p. 195), a crucial road for 
the Luso-Spanish trade networks. The capture of Recife (7 March 1630) 
and the control of the large Portuguese region of Pernambuco 
(1630–1654) had the same meaning (Boxer, 1973).
A replica of events at Bahia was the help of the English to the Sha of 
Persia to conquer Ormuz (1622), which allowed them to forge the land 
route to Aleppo thus connecting with the Mediterranean, as we have said. 
At the same time, the Dutch established their headquarters at Batavia 
(Yakarta), whence they organized their entire military and commercial sys-
tem, even nurturing the idea of ‘becoming a territorial power’ by attracting 
huge numbers of Dutch colonists to it; this plan was never implemented 
(De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p.  386). After 1630 English and 
Dutch incursions into the trade of the Luso-Spanish empire only grew. 
These years saw the Dutch position at Pernambuco gain vigour under the 
government of Joh Mauritius (Boxer 1973). In Asia they gained a foothold 
in trade between China and Japan, taking Formosa (Taiwan) in 1641 and 
expelling the Portuguese from Ceylon and Cochin (Kochi) in the 1650s.
It is to be noted, however, that the Iberian complex was not stressed 
only by European agents. Some of these attacks or resistances, and those 
in Asia in particular, were the outcome of the alliance between the Dutch 
and the English with the polities in the region. But, more important, the 
multipolar process of globalization (Chap. 1) was also behind the situation 
in the seventeenth century. By then Russian expansion to the East was 
reaching a crucial point. The Rurik and then the Romanov dynasties 
(1613) had created an empire with many similitudes to that of the Iberians, 
where the tsar negotiated power with the boyars in exchange for access to 
economic resources and labour (mainly based on serfdom) as well as with 
state servitors, who were rewarded with conquered and confiscated land 
(Darwin 2008, p. 73). By the 1640s the new Romanov dynasty dominated 
land from the Asian Pacific to the coasts of the Northern Sea and the 
Baltic. This reinforced the fur trade from Siberia and also the trade from 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea with the north of Europe, 
thus connecting to the different branches of the Silk Road (Fusaro 2015). 
As we have seen, since the sixteenth century, the pressure of the other big 
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agent of globalization in Eurasia, the Ottoman Empire, on the Indian 
Ocean increased, and it became even stronger after the Battle of Lepanto 
(1571). The English-Ottoman alliance in Ormuz was part of this process. 
The rise of the Mughal Empire during the sixteenth century and its expan-
sion in India would be another important trend. After the Second Battle 
of Panipat (1556) and with the conquest of the Deccan since 1590s, the 
Mughal created a new and more centralized political formation, which 
would be more reluctant to establish alliances with the Portuguese, in part 
due to religious reasons, and keener to befriend the Dutch (Costa 2014, 
pp. 176–181; Flores 2015). Equally important are the development of 
Japan and the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate during the first decades of 
the seventeenth century. This more centralized political system was espe-
cially disposed against the religious interference of the Iberian missionaries 
and sought to weaken the trade they established with the daimios (Findlay 
and O’Rourke 2007, p. 172).
It is to be noted that these trends are associated with the rejection of 
religious interference from the West, as well as with the spread in Asia of 
European warfare technology. Again, globalization elicited negative 
responses to the Iberian power, which would find crucial points in its 
nodal scheme under increasing stress.
The period until the early 1630s cannot, however, be considered one of 
implacable defeat for the empires of Philip IV, which retained a consider-
able capacity for reaction. But the strategy to hit its Achilles heel (i.e. its 
nodal arteries) was already designed.
What was happening? Some time ago J. Elliott drew attention to the 
way that the English adapted and adopted the legacy of the Spanish empire 
(2006). In the same way, the Dutch and English were imitating the meth-
ods used by the Portuguese in Asia since the fifteenth century: the founda-
tion of factories and emporia trade—of long tradition in this area even 
before the arrival of the Portuguese (Chaudhuri 1985, pp.  105 and 
107)—, the concentration of military force and commercial actions in stra-
tegic nodes, and the reduction of protection costs by balancing violence 
and negotiation on the local level. It is not the case that the Dutch did not 
try to conquer inland regions. The projects of Coen in Batavia (Israel 
1989), where a vertical integration between spice production and trade 
led to the occupation of large territories, are good examples. The con-
quests of Bahia (1624) and then of Pernambuco (1630), with the inten-
tion of displacing the Portuguese from their continental dominium, are 
also a proof of this. But both campaigns showed that these were very risky 
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and costly endeavours. The recovery of Bahia by the Spanish-Portuguese 
navy (1625) showed the inconsistency of this type of actions, and the fall 
of Pernambuco in 1654 was in part the consequence of the fact that in 
Amsterdam, ‘the great merchant houses preferred an empire of trade and 
the expectations of quick profits to the uncertain and more distant returns 
from colonization’ (Boxer 1957, p. 258).7 This preference was, however, 
as old as the hills and provides one of the keys to understand what was 
happening. Although the Dutch could have been making a virtue of neces-
sity, from the early years of the seventeenth century, many Dutch business-
men were very clear that major campaigns of conquest against the Spanish 
should be avoided because they ‘involved large, open-ended financial 
commitments’ (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, p. 386). Behind this 
preference is the idea that conquering extensive regions, and so having to 
meet the high inherent protection costs, would have compelled them to 
maintain an expensive bureaucratic apparatus and therefore to open nego-
tiations with colonial elites on the basis of the Spanish model and transfer 
political capital to local powers, thus giving rise to massive levels of contra-
band and political problems. At least in this period—as perhaps today—it 
was easier to infiltrate an empire than build one.
But it is important to note that the Dutch and English were also taking 
a step forward in the history of the colonization of the world and in the 
relations between formal and informal institutions. The key here lay in the 
commercial companies. As public and private enterprises (Chap. 6), they 
created internal mechanisms for the regulation of conflicts between mer-
chant interests and political concerns. K.  Chaudhuri expressed this per-
fectly when he wrote that the VOC ‘symbolised one of the most powerful 
and prestigious combinations of trade and political objectives that the com-
mercial world of Asia had witnessed’ (1985, p. 83). Of course quarrels and 
fraud permeated all aspects of the companies (Chaudhuri 1985). But their 
capacity to resolve tensions was in sharp relief with the difficulties in recon-
ciling the interests of merchants and monarch in the Iberian world. Their 
mixed character—simultaneously public and private—and their ability to 
finance their own military apparatus allowed them to create long- term 
7 The opinion of Boxer remains all the more interesting to the extent that he placed special 
emphasis upon the human factor as a cause of the re-conquest of the island by the Portuguese. 
But his account also makes clear that the resistance of the Portuguese and Spanish moradores 
(residents) and the difficulties in obtaining logistical help were crucial to remove the power-
ful Dutch interlopers (Boxer 1957).
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strategies to resolve the classic economic dilemma of ‘guns versus butter’. 
To be specific, in contrast to the Luso-Spanish empire, the Dutch were able 
to adapt and tailor their decisions in two senses: first, to delay the payment 
of dividends to their shareholders until their military power had allowed 
them to acquire and consolidate a solid position in the market (De Vries 
and Van der Woude 1997; Chaudhuri 1965) and second, and this was a 
crucial difference with the Luso-Spanish complex, to guarantee that the 
lion’s share of available capital was used in costs that fed back into their 
own activities, something which emphatically did not happen with taxes 
paid by Iberian traders, an important part of which would end up in 
Flanders defending dynastic interests or, as Quevedo said, ‘buried in 
Genoa’, if not in the pockets of the bureaucrats, the aristocrats and what I 
have called the dominant coalition in general—let me add.8 In addition the 
companies, acting as cartels, were able to regulate their competition and to 
lower the prices of the products that they bought (Chaudhuri 1965), 
something equally unthinkable in a system as unregulated as that of the 
Iberian world, whose independent companies—based on the model of the 
Italian medieval compagnia—tended to have a very short lifespan and com-
pete among themselves.
What was the impact of Dutch and English competition? Was it able to 
provoke an immediate decline in Luso-Spanish trade? The prevailing inter-
pretation has been that from 1600 all of this was having a devastating 
impact upon Iberian commerce. This view is quite logical, as when things 
are examined from the Dutch or English perspective, the impression is of 
an inexorable rise of both powers (Israel 1990; Brenner 1993), and the 
perspective from Spain has always underlined the enormous problems of 
the Catholic monarchy and the deep depression that accompanied them. 
But this idea deserves to be nuanced in degree and chronology.
The official figures of this trade are very revealing. The number of sugar 
refineries in Brazil increased during the first decades of the seventeenth 
century at the same rate as the figures for the official exportation of this 
product (Mauro 1960). Something similar can be said of the dimensions 
of the Portuguese merchant fleet in this region, which grew without inter-
ruption between 1583 and 1629 (Costa 2002, p.  173). All indicators 
invite us to conclude that the trade in these products, as in others such as 
indigo and cochineal for which only the merest hints exist in the archives 
8 This is obvious in the Spanish side of the empire, but even more in the Portuguese 
dominions, as Boyajian has pointed out (1993).
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(Hough and Grier 2015, pp.  288–9), increased noticeably—or at least 
stabilized—during this period. A similar impression is conveyed by an 
analysis of maritime trade by the total tonnage of ships employed in the 
Carrera de Indias. Here a certain degree of Spanish resistance can be 
found, with figures remaining relatively high until the 1620s, with a nota-
ble fall occurring in this decade and a precipitous decline only in the 1630s 
and 1640s (Chaunu 1977, p. 255). This impression is corroborated by the 
evolution of the silver shipments arriving at Seville for private owners, a 
very important part of which were made up by consignments from emi-
grants and silver used to pay for merchandise sold in America (Bernal 
1993). Figures for this sum, which provide a good reflection of the official 
commerce of Seville with America, reached their maximum proportions 
between 1616 and 1630 for the entire period 1500–1650.9 If we add to 
this sum the value of the goods that came in these shipments, most of 
which was the fruit of colonial commerce (Bernal 1993), the impression is 
even more positive. And this is even more the case if the noticeable expan-
sion of the commerce carried by the Manila galleon is taken into account, 
with the massive arrival of products from Asia in New Spain and a consid-
erable reverse flow of silver (TePaske 1983, Gasch 2012). None of this can 
be considered strange if the upward cycle of silver production in the first 
decades of the century is added into the equation (Bakewell 1991); nor 
should it be forgotten that these years witnessed a marked expansion of 
the urban economy as well as the plantation economy and the linking 
together of economic networks in Latin America (Carmagnani 2011).
The same impression is given if we analyse the figures presented by 
Duncan some time ago for Portuguese trade in Asia (1986). Arrivals in 
Lisbon, as in Asia, without doubt the most reliable variable of the rhythm 
of commerce, remained high until 1620 and the more dramatic fall did 
not take place until 1630. Such a conclusion is reinforced by Boyajian’s 
analysis, according to which private trade, particularly in the routes to Asia 
but also those to the Cape of Good Hope, ‘did not collapse with the 
advent of European competition in Asia in 1600’ and was in fact in its 
zenith during the two first decades of the seventeenth century (1993, 
p. 241).
9 Using Hamilton’s figures as a basis, I have calculated that these proportions constituted 
85.5% between 1616 and 1620, 81% between 1621 and 1625, and 81% between 1626 and 
1630; while in the overall period 1580 to 1650, only on one occasion, 1646 to 1650, did it 
reach the figure of 85% (and figures for this period are highly uncertain). In general the fig-
ure had moved between 60 and 75% (see Hamilton 1975, table on p. 47).
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But what lies behind these figures?
It is worthwhile underlining that the infiltration of foreign businessmen 
and products into this commerce was highly important in the centres 
around which all else turned, Seville and Lisbon.
Contrary to the image of the Carrera de Indias as a monopoly system 
for the control of trade, it is to be noted that Seville was the main loading 
point for the shipping of non-Iberian products. The Crown’s cession of 
the right to register products carried to America to the city’s Consulate in 
return for sworn declarations of their worth and then, later, for fixed fiscal 
evaluations of the value of the contents of the shipments (see Chap. 5 
above) was having its effects. This process continued during the seven-
teenth century. In return for a gift to the Crown (donativo) of 200,000 
pesos (see below), in 1629 the system was changed to that of avalúo, in 
which tax assessment was made according to the weight of the crates and 
not the value of their content, a good deal of it being composed of high- 
value low-weight commodities.10
All of this acted in combination with the very system of financing the 
Carrera de Indias. Seville trade was predominantly based upon the ‘loan 
at risk’ (préstamo a riesgo) in which the lender, who assumed the risk, 
advanced money to a borrower who would repay the loan in America once 
he had sold his merchandise. Given that this restitution was made by an 
exchange of money between Spain and America and that considerable risk 
was involved in it, the interest rates of these loans were very high (nor-
mally between 80 and 100%). This meant that only the great merchants 
could undertake operations involving very large shipments and that, fre-
quently, the loan consisted in the handing over of merchandise whose 
value, plus interest payments, would have to be returned to Seville after its 
sale in the colonies. For this reason this system ended up favouring opera-
tions among the great international merchants (inserted in networks with 
their epicentres in the Low Countries, England, Italy, etc.), who took 
advantage of Castilian front companies with presence in the Consulate to 
insert their products in America, using the main artery of this trade. This 
was an authentic example of ‘legalized contraband’, which allows us to 
understand why, despite the figures on commerce remaining relatively 
high until the 1620s, their positive effects on the Spanish economy in 
10 This is in itself a persuasive reason for thinking that figures produced by Hamilton and 
Chaunu should always be assumed to be lower than the real ones, as they referred in most 
cases to shipments of high-value fabrics.
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general and its industry were less than could be expected. The system was 
aggravated—and this was the accusation of the Seville shipping mer-
chants—by the presence in their city of the so-called peruleros, Peruvian 
traders who operated in the zone and who, after the foundation of the 
Consulate of Lima (1613), were able to defend their interests more effec-
tively before the Crown. Their arrangement consisted of obtaining loans 
from private individuals in America and, having transferred the monies to 
Seville, the purchase in big quantities of products that would then be 
shipped back across the Atlantic (Oliva 2004, p.  36). The advantages 
acquired over the previous decades by the industries of the north of 
Europe, the lower prices of goods from these areas, and the strength of 
the foreign wholesale traders made them especially competitive in the 
markets of Seville and America.
It is interesting to underline some notable parallels with changes in 
Portuguese commerce. In contrast to the Castilian model, this was not a 
royal estanco ceded to national merchants, in which most royal income 
came from taxes paid on commercial activity and the taxes in America and 
mining activities. In Portugal it was the Crown itself that retained its rights 
to trade. But, in any case, the system of licences—which, as we have seen, 
proliferated from the end of the sixteenth century—implied that the 
Portuguese king’s ships would be loaded by non-Portuguese merchants 
and that, by extension, the majority of the profits would not remain in the 
country or have a small positive impact on the sectors that might have cre-
ated added value (Godinho 1982).
It is therefore evident that colonial trade from Seville and Lisbon 
remained very dynamic but also that part of it was already in the hands of 
transnational merchant networks.
Important as the infiltration of foreign merchants in the ports of both 
Seville and Lisbon was, evidence also suggests that direct smuggling 
between other countries and the colonies under Portuguese-Spanish con-
trol was also increasing and would gain momentum from the mid-1620s. 
To justify this assertion for the Asia trade, one can recur to a comparison 
between the ships arriving at Lisbon and Holland from Asia (Graph 7.1). 
But the fact is also obvious in the increasing losses of Portuguese ships—in 
a good deal due to Dutch and English attacks—during this period, as well 
as in the way ‘the private traders conducted by royal officials, soldiers and 
private merchants’ undercut the Crown’s exclusive control of this trade 
(Schwartz 2007, pp. 27–28). Something similar can be said of American 
trade, if we take into account the marked increase in freight prices in traffic 
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to Brazil, a variable that was also partly influenced by the security of com-
merce.11 The importance of smuggling, and the redirection of the trade at 
the expense of traffic in the Carrera de Indias between Seville and the 
Caribbean, is also clear in research on the Río de la Plata.12 There is also 
the suspicion of a growing Dutch presence in the area, allowing more 
effective contraband from the 1620s onwards, something which is cor-
roborated by qualitative data.
In conclusion, the most probable explanation of what was happening is 
that between 1580/1590 and 1630, America witnessed very marked 
growth, thanks to the coincidence of the last cycle of mining and an explo-
sive burst forward of the export-orientated plantation economy.13 Rates of 
urbanization, if rather crude and not directly dependent upon the devel-
opment of plantations, endorse this view too. Similar deductions can be 
made from quite a few qualitative indicators. Thus, the strong growth of 
the American economy was able to sustain expanding trade within the 
New World and also an increasing official and contraband trade towards 
other continents at the same time until 1630. Something similar must 
have been happening in Asia, where Europeans as a whole were diverting 
11 According to the figures of Leonor Freire Costa (2002, pp. 76–7), it is clear that costs 
grew between 1580 and 1600, before stabilizing and even falling during the truce of 
1609–1621. After this point they shot upwards.
12 Moutoukias’ study presents its most consistent figures for the period 1650–1700, but his 
data also underlines the dynamism of the early decades of the century in the formation of the 
Peru-Buenos Aires smuggling axis (Moutoukias 1988, Chapter 2).
13 The growing number of slaves carried to the New World supports this analysis (Engerman 
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Graph 7.1 Ships arriving from Asia to Lisbon and Holland
Sources: My own elaboration with data from Israel (1989) and Duncan (1986).
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towards the west a growing proportion of the local and interregional trade 
that, as Subrahmanyan says, was very voluminous and therefore allowed 
them to redirect greater quantities towards the old continent without suf-
fering adverse effects.
From 1625 to 1630, the advance of Holland and England would be 
even clearer, and by 1648, when peace was finally signed with Holland, 
the system had reached a dramatic and ironic perfection. The policy of 
striking against weak points and infiltrating the trade of Lisbon, Seville, 
and other peripheral areas of the empire was yielding results. In both cit-
ies, the so-called monopolio now benefited many other countries. 
Moreover, smuggling was practised from strategic points in the Caribbean, 
Africa, and Asia. This situation was even more dramatically ironic if we 
take into account that the Catholic monarchy was seeing its spending rise 
for both the protection of these empires and the preservation of their mar-
kets (see below). Mercantilism was not only impossible but also benefited 
foreigners in proportion to the efforts to apply it. The outsiders had now 
found their ‘Indies’, as Thomas Mun would say in a work published post-
humously in 1664 (Chap. 6). They had first imitated and then adapted the 
Portuguese techniques, at the same time as they learnt from the errors of 
the Spanish colonial system. Mun himself, as a director of the English East 
India Company, had been one of the protagonists in copying and perfect-
ing existing practices and well knew the high cost that alternative experi-
ments might entail. The Dutch and English were able to continue to trade 
in many American zones without having to take the trouble of conquest, 
thus saving themselves costs associated with social control, coercion, and 
administration.
Around 1620 Seville was brimming full with Flemish merchants and 
merchandise; representatives of other northern nations and Italians were 
equally prominent. The rise of the American market was now beginning to 
have a very positive effect on the industries of different areas of Europe, all 
of them more competitive than Castile. The English had gained access to 
the Mediterranean, and their ‘new draperies’—light, fashionable, and 
adapted to the climates of the South—were starting to be worn by a good 
deal of the urban population both in the Iberian Peninsula and in the colo-
nies (Brenner 1993; Coleman 1977). The Dutch, thanks to their multidi-
rectional growth and expanding global markets (Israel 1989), were 
establishing a centre of information and exchange whose tentacles reached 
into every part of the world economy and through which data and intel-
ligence were gathered, costs lowered, and predictions made as never 
before. Economic development and political independence—achieved 
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through military efforts—meant that the Dutch hub was much more effi-
cient than Antwerp had ever been (De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, 
p. 667). The French were a growing presence in Spanish and American 
trade and were setting down the basis for a system that would reach its full 
maturity and potential in the second half of the century. All of this was 
achieved at a time in which the presence of Italian industrial products in 
the international markets was declining, as these were now hindered by 
diminishing competitiveness in terms of their cost and capacity to adapt to 
market demands, as well as the inability of Italian political systems to exert 
influence successfully in a world increasingly shaped by mercantilist con-
siderations and policies.
Global Wars and the Relevance of the Imperial Periphery
The traditional view of what was to occur is quite clear. The decline in 
American revenues, traditionally associated with the mining crisis, reduced 
the Crown’s income precisely when the domestic economy was weakened 
and the Thirty Years War, understood as a European conflict with some 
colonial extensions, reached its climax. Under such circumstances, Castile 
would remain the only territory disposed to endure the conflict’s enor-
mous burden.14 However, if a wider global perspective is adopted to anal-
yse this period, the final impression may be very different. Any such 
attempt may even cast a great deal of light on processes that reshaped the 
empire and were essential in the long term.
 Cash for the King on a Global Scale
It might be said that we are dealing here with an economy of war in many 
senses. This is evident in the fact that military spending, and the payment 
of debts contracted to meet it, by themselves constituted more than 60% 
of Castile’s ordinary expenditures.15 This stress provoked by war is also 
14 A number of excellent studies can be consulted, in particular Domínguez 1983, Ruiz 
Martín 1990b, and Gelabert 1997, 2001.
15 By 1598 spending in Flanders and in general defence rose to 3.45 and 3.4 million duc-
ats, respectively, more than 50% of total governmental expenditure as a whole, and in 1621 
they reached 3.1 and 2.9 million, respectively, equivalent to half of the total. Moreover the 
second most important part of governmental spending concerned the servicing of debts, 
most of which derived from military spending. Payments on juros alone constituted 5.6 mil-




evident in the subscription of both asientos and juros and paved the way for 
the bankruptcies of 1607, 1627, and 1647 (Gelabert 1997; and Ruiz 
Martín 1990b).16 The problems accumulated after 1580 with a cessation 
of growth in the interior zones of the Meseta and the end of expansion in 
Andalusia, the most highly taxed areas of the Crown, had a deleterious 
effect (Castillo 1965). Due to the limitations of what we have called the 
conflictive pact, the fiscal system was reaching the limits of its efficiency: 
clientelism, corruption in local and central management, disorder in the 
collection of taxes, and many other deficiencies were now becoming a 
problem (Domínguez 1983).
In this context, the war economy would reach its fullest extension. In 
the first decades of the century, the sale of baldíos and common lands had 
continued, as had those of jurisdictions and royal rents, reinforcing tax 
pressure upon the remaining royal domain. And if the alcabalas were 
hardly increased, these had now to be paid in some areas that contained a 
decreasing number of persons.17 The outbreak of war in 1621 made things 
even worse. The decade would be marked by the negative effects of the 
minting of vellón coins, which brought about a rise of more than 40% in 
the premium of silver money in just eight years.18 International payments 
(above all those effected in Flanders) could only be made in gold or silver: 
the result was a drastic reduction in the capacity of the monarchy to attend 
to the international dimensions of the war (Parker 1972, 247–65). These 
effects were even more prejudicial since between 1600 and 1640, the guil-
der rose in value by more than 30% in relation to the silver real (Graph 7.2). 
And from the 1630s, new payments of the millones taxes were introduced, 
their value quadrupling in many areas (Artola 1982). But, above all, this 
situation led the government to the arbitrios, or extraordinary measures, 
which on many occasions were not negotiated in the Cortes.
16 The evolution of the asientos is indicative in this regard. They increased between 1602 
and 1605, before falling, doubtless because of the bankruptcy caused in 1607. From around 
(approximately) 1616, a new growth cycle began, reaching a peak for the reign in 1623–1625, 
with the bankruptcy of 1627 on the horizon, after which a new dip can be seen. The war of 
Mantua, and specifically the entrance of France into the conflict, brought about a dramatic 
increase, which lasted until 1642 (Gelabert 1997, Graph 1.1, p. 323).
17 In Segovia the alcabalas hardly rose between the 1570s and 1620s. But this quantity had 
to be paid by a population that had fallen by almost 25% and which now also had to pay the 
millones and other burdens (García Sanz 1987).
18 It has been calculated that this led to an appreciation of up to 120% by 1648 as a result 
of the repeated minting of new vellón coin, with another royal bankruptcy in 1647 (Hamilton 
1975, pp. 105–12).
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The complex constructed by Charles V was thus trembling (see our 
description in Chap. 4). The fiscal pact between the Cortes of Castile and 
the king was now weakened; the system for the consolidation of debt was 
taking on water like a sinking ship, and would continue to do so to the 
extent that the dynamism of the economy was falling. This was all the 
more evident since the other fundamental pillar, the royal American reve-
nues, was also now cracking. The royal silver shipments, which had begun 
to fall in 1600, reached a level in 1616–1620 that did not exceed that of 
1566–1570, when the Seville boom in metals began (Hamilton 1975, 
p. 48). Thus, the lubricant that served to obtain asientos and then to con-
solidate them as juros on Castilian incomes fell short. This would have 
very prejudicial effects, not only for the phenomenon in itself but also 
because it struck a blow to a fiscal system that was by now very highly 
indebted.19 Even the other pillar, the credit provided by the Genoese, now 
began to weaken as did the difficult and fragile alliance with them. The 
bankruptcy of 1627 made it clear to Olivares and, indeed, to everyone else 
19 If in 1598 the juros absorbed approximately 45% of Crown incomes (4.6 million ducats 
from 10.22), in 1621 it had already reached 60% (5.6 million from 10.52). This is all the 
more revealing in that these years had seen a fall in the interest rate on debt from 7.1% to 5%, 



















GUILDER/REAL in gold GUILDER/REAL in silver
Graph 7.2 Guilder/Real ratio in gold and silver
Sources: Posthumus (1946, Tables VI to VIII) Feliu (1991, Table II.1), Hamilton (1975; 
p. 85, Table 4) and Yun (2004). For more details see Yun (2004; p. 142).
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that now was the time to replace the Genoese or at least to counterbalance 
their enormous power (Boyajian 1983; Ruiz Martín 1990b). A policy of 
approximation to Portuguese Jewish bankers and conversos was therefore 
introduced. If the final result was not the credit monopoly falling into the 
latter’s hands, then it did, over the century, produce a greater number and 
range of asentistas and agents, to whom the monarchy was much more 
closely tied for reasons of international political strategy (Sanz 1988).
But what was the real role of the colonies in this situation? Can we 
reduce the problem to a crisis of the Crown’s colonial revenues, meaning 
a reduction of Asia’s and America’s capacity for sending money to the 
peninsula? Nothing could be further from the truth, although this inter-
pretation has predominated when the problem has been viewed from a 
strictly peninsular perspective.
Certainly, the Portuguese system was facing difficulties. Here smug-
gling and the growing Dutch presence in Asia were bringing about a 
financial crisis in overseas incomes. But the other big problem was in the 
licence system, that is, in the fact that a big proportion of the colonial 
benefits were going to private hands, especially those of transnational and 
global agents. The kings of Portugal were seeing a fall in their income for 
this reason from 1588; by 1627 they hardly garnered a quarter of what 
they had at the beginning of the period, a sum that practically disappeared 
between 1632 and 1641 (Hespanha 1993b, pp. 197–205). Furthermore, 
as in Castile, a phase of sharp inflation in the 1630s eroded the buying 
power of the tax intake (Hespanha 1989, p. 112). Once again, the prob-
lem was the stress experienced by a global system that had functioned rela-
tively well during the sixteenth century but that generated insuperable 
tensions not only at its centre, as is normally said, but, more important, on 
its periphery.
But the case of Castile is more meaningful. As we can see (Graph 7.3 
and Table 7.1), the decade 1601–1610 saw a fall in the shipments of silver 
reaching the king from America that would continue until the 1640s, 
when a definitive collapse occurred. In these conditions it was extremely 
difficult to meet the needs created by the renewal of war in 1621 (Lynch 
1969, pp. 71–6).
But, more than a crisis in the colonial tax system, what in reality was 
taking place in the long run was a downward trend in the proportion of 
the silver brought to Castile, with more remaining on the empire’s periph-
ery. Thus, if 64% of income in Lima were sent to Spain in 1591–1600, this 
proportion fell to 45% in 1601–1610 and ‘to about one third for the next 









































































































































IN LIMA sent to CASTILE
Graph 7.3 The distribution of the Spanish Crown American income
Sources: My own elaboration with data from TePaske and Klein (1982, Appendix).
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two decades’. In the 1670s it hovered around 8%, and in the following 
decade, it had fallen to 1% (TePaske 1983, pp. 427–8). This tendency was 
repeated in Mexico, which moved from sending around 90% to Spain 
between 1581 and 1610 to almost 60% in 1641–1650. The remainder 
either stayed in America or was employed in the Philippines (being directed 
above all to defence, as we have seen) (TePaske 1983, Table 4, p. 444). 
These facts have even greater relevance given that in New Spain, in differ-
ence to Peru, mine production and, therefore, the incomes derived from 
it appear not to have diminished. Table  7.1 which represents the total 
income in America and the proportion sent to Castile is very meaningful. 
The total income fluctuated until 1680–1691 and only decreased in a very 
substantial way in the last decade of the century. But the proportion sent 
to Castile dramatically decreased during the century and more in particu-
lar after the big effort of 1631–1640, with the entry of France in the 
Thirty Years War.
There are a number of reasons for this, but one above all must be 
underlined: growing proportions of metal remained in the colonies to 
meet their own needs and above all the defensive costs that were rising in 
response to the Dutch and English attacks. Thus, one of the reasons for 
the growing military problems in Europe was the global character of the 
war and empire. In broader terms, the difficulty lay in the growing needs 
of a global empire that had to establish and defend a multitude of local 
interests and centrifugal forces spread across a vast geographical area and 
Table 7.1 The distribution of the American Income (Spain)




% sent to 
Castile
1591–1600 29,290,549 33,683,302 22,270,657 55,953,959 52.35
1601–1610 27,960,747 38,006,115 23,772,246 61,778,361 45.26
1611–1620 17,816,355 34,664,082 15,720,600 50,384,682 35.36
1621–1630 18,159,998 33,319,795 18,939,319 52,259,114 34.75
1631–1640 26,217,176 37,686,150 25,844,488 63,530,638 41.27
1641–1650 17,937,904 44,162,913 14,411,753 58,574,666 30.62
1651–1660 12,912,496 32,077,933 16,182,019 48,259,952 26.76
1661–1670 7,559,713 30,655,309 15,796,262 46,451,571 16.27
1671–1680 12,056,228 27,249,881 34,104,600 61,354,481 19.65
1681–1690 5,078,377 27,166,234 28,013,250 55,179,484 9.20
1691–1700 3,422,516 19,606,978 20,199,095 39,806,073 8.60
Sources: TePaske and Klein (1982, Appendix)
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whose local elites demanded that the empire attend to their protection 
costs by spending a growing proportion of their taxes. It is important to 
note too that, if the silver collected in America remained at very high levels 
until 1681–1690, all available figures on mining production indicate an 
unbroken fall that began from 1620 to 1625 and continued until 
1660–1670 (Barrett 1990, Figure 7.1, p. 238). In other words, a sizeable 
part of the shortfall was now coming not from the mines but from the 
pockets of the American population. It is not odd, therefore, that bigger 
parts of the budget were contributing to maintain the defensive system 
and the American colonial administration.
It should be noted that this is not only the case of America. In a revi-
sionist study published years ago by Storrs (2006), this author made clear 
that the effort of the Habsburg empire’s non-Castilian territories of 
Europe also increased during the last 30 years of the century. But this can 
be said also for the previous decades, in spite of the Union of Arms’ fail-
ure. Thus royal incomes in Naples rose from some three million to almost 
six million ducats between 1600 and 1640, a 100% growth in nominal 
terms. This in fact meant a considerably larger contribution in real terms, 
since the fall of prices in the kingdom after 1620 also brought about a 
reassessment of the taxes levied, thus increasing the overall contribution of 
this state in real terms. In this kingdom, the consolidated debt grew by 
65% between 1605 and 1638 (Calabria 1991, p. 91).20 Something similar 
occurred in the territories of the Crown of Aragon, although on a some-
what lower scale (Bernabé 1993). Catalonia had already increased its 
extraordinary tax payments in 1599 up to 1,100,000 lliures a year (Elliott 
1963). But, very importantly, in all of these kingdoms, new taxes were 
created on productive activities and commerce. These payments entailed 
contributions to the war or support for military units in situ. And, as in 
Castile, the municipalities had to impose sisas (sales taxes on items weighed 
or measured) to meet the costs of war (Bernabé 1993).21 It is very difficult 
to work out the monetary contribution of the Low Countries. These 
monies remained in the treasury of the army, which in any case appears to 
20 According to figures presented by Calabria, the Crown incomes in 1638 were about 
5.6 million ducats, whereas the public debt came to 3.2 million (1991, Appendix I, Tables 1 
and 6, pp. 134 and 142).
21 The viceroys of the Principality of Catalonia were able to extract more from towns, with 




have acted as an extractive mechanism, and when taxes were raised by local 
authorities, they proved barely sufficient to cover the cost of their own 
defence. But G. Parker has calculated that from 1600 to 1640, the ‘obedi-
ent provinces’ contributed some 4,000,000 florins a year (almost three mil-
lion ducats) (Parker 1972, 144).22 In Milan the system of contributions by 
compensation (compensazione) and levelling off (egualanze) for the main-
tenance of troops was equally indicative of how war and the overall mili-
tary system of this composite monarchy generated costs and how its 
‘peripheral states’ were obliged to increase their incomes, as well as their 
contribution to warfare.23
 But Not Only Cash: The Real Burden of the War
The contribution of the periphery of the monarchy to the imperial efforts 
on its many battle fronts is even clearer when the focus of attention moves 
from money to men. In effect, the economy of war was characterized by 
the use of forms of resource extraction that, in addition to taxes, resulted 
in the direct mobilization of troops and military units on the local level 
and battlefield. This is important in this case, since, as has been said in 
Chap. 4, the fiscal system is too often confused with the system for the 
mobilization of resources sensu lato. Yet this consideration is crucial to 
understanding the impact of war on the empire and not only—or so 
much—because of its weight but also because of its footprint on the politi-
cal economy.
As expected, this type of contribution was very much present in Castile. 
Continuing the tradition set up in the precedent century, many cities—for 
example, Seville, Mérida, Segovia, Salamanca, and the coastal ones—came 
to contribute in this way with armies which were sometimes better paid 
than those of the king himself (Thompson 1976, pp. 134–5). There are 
some reasons to believe—though no overall figures can be provided—that 
22 This is, perhaps, an exaggerated figure. In fact, it comes close to the contribution of 
Castile itself to the war, if we follow the figures of Thompson (1976, p. 288). But other 
calculations hold that Flanders provided 25% of the resources for the war, which is at least 
one-third as much as Castile and not negligible (Esteban 2002, pp. 62–3). This makes sense 
if we add to the figures for ‘Flanders’ given by Thompson those relating to ‘defence’, some 
three million ducats in 1621.
23 Buono (2008, pp. 35–48). The author describes ‘compensation’ as the right of local 
inhabitants to be compensated for the real cost, including the destruction of property, the 
lodging and keep of troops; in this arrangement zones that had not seen active fighting or 
billeting contributed to the costs of those that had.
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efforts of this sort were extended in the 1630s, above all because of the 
war with France, which threatened the very Spanish territories (Mackay 
1999, pp. 80–96). Thompson puts the value of the salaries and military 
equipment given by Seville at some 170,000 ducats during these years. In 
Murcia, the most exhaustively studied region, the city paid for armed men 
at its own cost and maintained its walls. It was also involved in skirmishes 
on the coast of Africa and even contributed to the maintenance costs of 
Orán (Ruiz Ibáñez 1995, pp. 227–9 and chapter VI.3). By the same stan-
dard, the city of Cartagena was directly involved in privateering offensive 
and defensive activities organized from its harbour (Ruiz Ibáñez and 
Montojo 1998).
Also like in the preceding century, this was not only a business of towns. 
Nobles were actively involved in raising men as a form of service paid for 
from their own pockets (or by advancing money). Troops of this kind 
were, at heart, a form of ‘tribute in kind’ rather than in liquid money, 
although at times this sort of contribution might be commuted for pay-
ment in metallic (Mackay 1999).24 Thompson has argued that the fact that 
the treasury receipts of Philip IV did not exceed those of his grandfather 
‘is an indication not that the costs of government had remained unchanged, 
but that the central administration was now taking a smaller share in the 
management of the state’ (1976, p. 141). In other words, the treasury 
figures do not provide us with the full picture, as has often been assumed. 
Moreover, all of these political actors contributed to the mobilization of 
troops, as was normal in a corporate composite monarchy.
But, as with the flows in cash, the contribution of other kingdoms was 
not negligible at all. The case of Milan, just mentioned, is perhaps one of 
the most expressive (Maffi 2009), as long as the compensations were 
associated with military mobilizations in situ, which opened the door to 
possible excesses related to the transfer of nonfiscal resources to the cen-
tral power from the areas affected by the presence of troops. Moreover 
the levies of soldiers, their billeting, the forced purchase of provisions, 
and other actions, constituted a compulsory contribution that cannot be 
calculated but which should not be hidden behind the figures derived 
from treasury and exchequer accounts (Buono 2008). To the body of 
60,000 men under arms, all paid for by the Crown, can be added the 
24 A meaningful evidence is that of the total number of censos taken out by a wide section 
of estates belonging to the titled nobility between 1580 and 1640, 18% were for military 
services (Yun 2002a, p. 175).
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urban militias supported by the cities. This mechanism for the mobiliza-
tion of resources, which often did not leave records in the central treasur-
ies, was also employed in Sicily and Naples (Rizzo 1995, and Muto 
2007). Though sometimes mixed with flows of cash, it also proved very 
common in the battlefield of the Low Countries (Parker 1972). We also 
know that local levies were raised in the Crown of Aragon, sometimes 
even as a result of forced agreements conceded by the Cortes (Bernabé 
1993). The billeting of troops was especially costly in Catalonia during 
the war against France, to the point that this ‘contribution’ was another 
reason for the disaffection of the Catalans towards the House of Habsburg 
(Elliott 1963, chapter XIV).
Though there were differences and natural diversity, this type of mobi-
lizations was very much present in America, from New Spain to the vice-
royalty of Peru or Río de la Plata (Ruiz Ibáñez 2009). The formats 
employed ranged from the establishment of pacts between captains, 
Jesuits, and friendly Indians, who acted as sort of mercenaries in exchange 
for a range of concessions or advantages, to the formation of militias 
(Giudicelli 2009; Ariel and Svriz 2016). From the end of the sixteenth 
century, the urban militias were being rolled out in other territories and, 
indeed, across the Iberian world and its principal cities, most of them 
coastal, to the point that this was almost a global phenomenon (Ruiz 
Ibáñez 2009).25
The importance of all of this is difficult to exaggerate. As has been said 
(Chap. 4 above), it represented the military functioning of a composite 
monarchy. And it affects not only scholars’ quantitative assessment of the 
war effort but also our understanding of the monarchy’s overall debts—
that is, not just those of the King of Castile. This was also because a size-
able part of these operations continued to be paid for not only by the 
incomes of these kingdoms and corporations but also by increasing their 
debts. This is also important because it was a crucial phenomenon that, 
regardless of its quantitative impact, underlay the configuration of pacts 
that definitively affected the institutions and the political economy of the 
different territories.
* * *
25 See the works by Descimon (1993) and M. Prak (2005).
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In less than a century, the Habsburgs had managed to put together the 
two greatest European empires. In both cases the expansion had produced 
great advantages. But in both cases, this expansion had also been possible 
thanks to the projection upon them of informal networks that, despite 
their going beyond the family and not being only or purely of a familial 
character, had their transcendental weight in this institution. It could not 
be any other way, as the networks of relatives and those that could be built 
upon them played an essential role in this society. In fact they served as the 
basis of the expansion itself, which was also the result of the needs for 
expansion of social elites for whom the themes set out in the previous 
pages—family and extended family relationships, clientele systems, patron-
age between groups, friendship understood as a political expression and an 
economic action, a sense of local and religious identity—provided the 
internal structural forces that shaped the strategies for the reproduction of 
the social order. This would be fundamental to all developments.
In a brilliant essay written in 2007, Stuart Schwartz set out the dynamic 
of Portuguese commerce as the product of the clash between public insti-
tutions and merchants’ private interests. The idea is excellent, and the 
above pages have attempted to reformulate it. The argument does not 
serve simply for the Portuguese empire. Nor should it be limited to com-
merce and merchants, since networks of trade were on many occasions 
only a part of informal and multifunctional webs that were much more 
extensive and widespread. And the outcome was logical: to the extent in 
which the institutions of the monarchy were imbued in this same social 
and ideological structure, the history of both empires can be understood 
as a process of continual perversion of the efforts towards centralization by 
the Crown. All of this stood at the base of a political economy in which the 
practices of rent-seeking, the capture of privileges, corruption, the con-
tinual use of privileged information of a very asymmetrical character, and 
so on would be essential components. It would be these networks, the 
very agents that had contributed towards the establishment of the empires, 
which would weaken the power of the Crown, which without doubt must 
be seen as the most important and the most powerful of all agents but, in 
the final analysis, simply an agent in these pacts. And this was so much 
more the case to the extent that the very process of globalization would 
end by turning upon those who had created it.
The deficiencies in the system of the Carrera de Indias and commercial 
licences as well as the need to attend to the necessities of possessions in 
America, Africa, and Asia were leading to a fall in the Crown’s revenues on 
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the peninsula. This drop in revenues affected the sophisticated edifice con-
structed by Charles V. Yet this situation did not imply a long-term reduc-
tion of global commercial traffic. Under these circumstances, intra-colonial 
commerce grew, and even the official traffic centred on Seville and Lisbon 
resisted better and longer than has often been thought. At the same time, 
through these cities or through direct or indirect contraband with the 
colonies, commercial networks centred outside of the peninsula, in such 
centres as Amsterdam, Mexico, Manila, the coastal areas of Brazil, and 
others, increased their participation in this traffic. This change, moreover, 
also resulted from the fact that competitor states such as England or the 
United Provinces were conscious that it was easier and cheaper to infiltrate 
Iberian markets than to affront the risks and the costs of protection and 
administration that the conquest of such vast territories would have 
entailed. A tentacular empire is attacked at the nodes of its tentacles.
Such a subtle process of invasion took place during the conflicts of the 
first half of the seventeenth century. Though the Thirty Years War was 
lived in Europe with great intensity, its extra-European dimension would 
bring out key elements in the working of the empire and the construction 
of the state. Far from being a narrowly European conflict, the war was a 
global phenomenon that compelled this composite global empire to 
mobilize in its peripheral areas. The consequent mobilizations, moreover, 
were far greater than is usually recognized when attention focuses only on 
flows of cash. Precisely because of its dimensions and characteristics, this 
conflict brought to light the limits of the military revolution and its effects 
upon the system for the mobilization of resources, which unsurprisingly 
were more appropriate for a composite monarchy than for a modern state 
(this latter assumption being the starting point for most visions). And it 
led to mobilizations in peripheral areas of this composite global empire 
that would be far greater than is usually recognized when the European 
dimension is the sole focus of attention. For all these reasons, war would 
shape and mark the equilibrium of the dominant coalitions, the political 
economy, and the path taken by the Iberian world, which was very differ-
ent from the direction embarked upon by countries such as England. But, 
above all, it would lead to a process of dispersion of resources and even 
decentralization that would be decisive for the future of the empire. Local 
elites, particularly in America, would find in this situation the bases for 
more and more power of negotiation with the centre and for increasing 
autonomy. The next chapter will explore this aspect.
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CHAPTER 8
Ruptures, Resilient Empires, 
and Small Divergences
The warfare and global tension to which the Luso-Hispanic complex 
found itself exposed undoubtedly posed the greatest challenge faced by 
the accords on which it had been based since the sixteenth century. This 
challenge would appear particularly in the system for mobilizing resources 
and in taxation in the different territories, which comprised an integral 
part of that system. It would, moreover, emerge most clearly in the extent 
to which the composite states’ most important principle, that which lim-
ited the transfer of resources among their parts, continued to be violated.
The ensuing political ruptures, with many parallels elsewhere in Europe, 
would take the form of conflicts between the periphery—and the empire’s 
different parts—and the logic of the government at the empire’s dynastic 
centre. The result would be important for the history of these diverse ter-
ritories, as well as for their political economies.
Olivares’ Challenge tO the imperial elites
One of the most important reactions to the stress imposed upon the impe-
rial system undoubtedly entailed the reformism and increase in fiscal pres-
sure from Madrid. Although a well-known development, its fundamental 
landmarks merit consideration in relationship with this book’s argument 
and, in particular, from the perspective of the relations between the Crown 
and the elites in the framework of the balance between accord and conflict 
consolidated during the sixteenth century (Chap. 4).
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Reformism
The reforming spirit in Spain was most clearly embodied in the person of 
the Count Duke of Olivares (Rome, 1587–Toro, 1645). A member of the 
Guzmán family hailing from Andalusia and a lateral branch of the House 
of Medinasidonia, don Gaspar de Guzmán provides an exceptional por-
trait of the sort of noble who, without being the head of a major lineage, 
found—and took—his chance to advance in the fluid situation created by 
the circulation of elites (Chap. 4). In an episode that was typical of the 
internal tensions within these lineages, his family had found itself con-
fronting the head of the lineage, the duke of Medinasidonia, over the 
claims of his grandfather, don Pedro de Guzmán, to the duchy (Chaps. 1 
and 4). Thanks to his services in Seville and abroad, don Pedro had enjoyed 
the favour of Charles V. Like so many other families, this one carried the 
stigma of conversos in its past. Don Gaspar’s father, don Enrique de 
Guzmán, made use of his notable political capital to marry a daughter of 
the Count of Monterrey, bringing him a dowry of 60,000 ducats and ties 
to one of the kingdom’s most prominent families. His bride, doña María 
Pimentel de Fonseca, enjoyed the inestimable immaterial capital of having 
been miraculously made healthy by Teresa de Ávila, or so at least it was 
said. Don Enrique, Count of Olivares, served as ambassador in Rome and 
as viceroy in Palermo. His career meant that his income, drawn from 
important estates in Andalusia, was supplemented by extraordinary emol-
uments and also strengthened his political and personal capital by adding 
transnational qualities and ties. Thus the future Count Duke, despite 
being the youngest of three brothers, was baptized by the Cardinal 
Aldobrandini, the future Pope Clement VIII. Upon returning to Spain, 
don Gaspar was able to fritter away a large part of his fortune in a spending 
blitz at court that at least secured him a good marriage. This gesture was 
typical of the ‘double economy’ of the nobles’ patrimonial management 
(see Chap. 5). ‘The prodigality of his gestures’, says Elliott, ‘would 
strengthen his claims to the status of grandee of Castile’. The squandering 
of money was obviously a form of investment. After a few years in Seville, 
don Gaspar returned to Madrid and navigated the conflicts between court 
factions with considerable skill, eventually binding himself to the Zúñiga 
faction, the family of his wife, and thus securing access to the new king, 
Philip IV, on the death of his father (Philip III) in 1621. The future Count 
Duke had a solid humanistic training, in part acquired in Italy, and was 
well acquainted with the world of Spanish universities, having been sent to 
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study at Salamanca precisely because of his status as third-born son. While 
a student at Salamanca, he had in fact served as the university rector 
(Elliott 1990, chapter 1).
His years in Seville gave Olivares a good understanding of the urban 
world and the internal conflicts and agreements between the oligarchies; 
Seville also taught him to understand the monarchy’s global dimensions. 
Olivares’ time in Madrid coincided with the outcry for reform. His solu-
tions to the problems are well known and above all were set out in the 
scheme for the so-called Union of Arms, a sort of army agreement to be 
imposed upon the different kingdoms, and the establishment of local pub-
lic banks (erarios) (Elliott 1982; Dubet 2003). The two schemes went 
hand in hand. The erarios were conceived as a means of financing the king 
and even of making credit circulate through society, as well as a way of 
sustaining a series of army units in the peninsula. But, also—this was the 
purpose of the Union of Arms—Olivares sought to engineer the creation 
of permanent army units in all kingdoms and provinces, including America, 
with the firm proviso that they would provide each other with mutual 
assistance. He also fully believed that a new merchant spirit should be 
encouraged among the aristocracy (without doubt this idea was a legacy of 
his life in Seville)—that the Crown should make better use of the non- 
Castilian nobilities and that trading companies, similar to those of Holland 
and England, should be established (Elliott and de la Peña 2013).
The modernity or character of this programme cannot be assessed here; 
what concerns us is the way that it affected the pillars upon which the 
dominant coalition had been built and its ulterior effects on the country’s 
political economy.
Despite his maxim of multa regna sed una lex, Olivares was not a ‘stat-
ist’ in the modern sense, nor had he overcome the patrimonial concept of 
the monarchy. The Union of Arms implied, as has so often been stated, 
the ending of key aspects of the status quo, as it broke with the idea that 
the resources of each of the separate kingdoms should be employed only 
in its own defence. And, worse, this scheme would be implanted not only 
in Castile, where this precept had already been tacitly applied (even if the 
Castilians were loath to admit it), but across the empire. It also implied a 
strong displacement of the power of coercion and the administration of 
violence towards the monarchy, even when, as Olivares himself  recognized, 
the local authorities were to be permitted to recruit troops.1 Even more 
1 According to Elliott, ‘Olivares was highly disposed to promise that the recruitment and 
payment of these troops would be managed entirely by local officials’ (1990, p. 255).
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destabilizing was the programme for the erarios, despite their being some-
times supported by the procuradores in the Cortes themselves. It at least 
made it very difficult to arrive at an agreement. This plan, which had been 
reformulated several times since its original version, fell short of a financial 
revolution of the sort that was cementing the success of the United 
Provinces (Chap. 4), given that Olivares’ erarios operating with debt had 
nothing in common with a system of budget and debt bonds endorsed by 
the Cortes. Why, then, did the local elites resist them so bitterly? First, the 
deposits of these banks, far from being the outcome of the voluntary pur-
chase of debt bonds (as was the case in Holland and, after 1694, England), 
were to originate in forced loans. On another level the plan also entailed 
an implicit attempt to remove decisive power from the urban oligarchies 
and the Genoese and to give it to the Crown. The oligarchies viewed the 
prospective eclipse of the Italian financiers with some relish but were 
rather less keen on the prospective loss of their capacity to control the 
king. Many patricians also resented the proposed reform of the tax system 
on the grounds that the abolition of the millones would entail their loss of 
power on the local level (Ruiz Martín 1990a). And these misgivings were 
often combined with others about the wisdom of Olivares’ plan to substi-
tute Genoese bankers for Portuguese financiers of Jewish converso origin, 
which added an element of religious prejudice into the equation. The 
Genoese at least benefited from the cultural capital afforded by their status 
as Catholics untainted by suspicion; this same concept or ideal provided a 
basis for the conflictive pact and, it could be said, the mortar that united 
this society.
If the Union of Arms also worried the nobility, then the arrogance of 
Olivares in seeking to overhaul its economic grounds was hardly the best 
balsam. The favourite probably allowed himself to be carried away by the 
image of a Seville aristocracy that tried to reconcile activities based upon 
commerce with its noble status (Pike 1978), of whom the most eye- 
catching example was, of course, the duke of Medinasidonia, up to his 
neck in illegal commerce in his estates in the lower Guadalquivir 
(Domínguez 1973). But trying to introduce merchants’ habitus among 
the Spanish nobles went against not only their cultural beliefs but also 
against a form of moral economy that, if more complex than is sometimes 
believed, was at the heart of an economy of legitimation that fed the 
group’s social capital. Despite the complaints of the Cortes that local 
banks were unfair because the nobility contributed little to them, the very 
existence of the erarios implied that a good part of the noble auxilium 
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should not be understood in the context of the direct and personal service- 
favour (do ut des) exchange with the king that was the basis of their social 
consolidation and even survival as a class and power. Moreover, the Cortes 
themselves complained that ‘this contribution is not voluntary, but forced 
and the nobility has never paid a personal contribution of this sort’ (quoted 
by Domínguez 1973, p.  23). Something similar could be said about 
Olivares’ plan to see the nobles educated at the universities, which was also 
a way of moving processes for the formation of social and cultural capital 
away from the family and lineage into the public domain. If this sort of 
measure might have had particular appeal to the second-born sons of 
noble houses—Olivares himself cannot have been entirely unaware of this 
element of it, as a third-born son—it would have broken with the idea that 
the best education for a member of the first estate was to be trained in 
court intrigues and knowing who was who. Rather than receive an intel-
lectual schooling—which was not entirely absent from the aristocracy, as 
the biography of Olivares himself shows—the most profitable activity for 
the titled nobility was to acquire social and relational capital in Madrid. If 
this were not enough, in Castile the idea of further integrating the periph-
eral nobilities in the functioning of government was seen as spitting in the 
faces of those who extended their lineages and families precisely through 
these political resources, which were crucial to their social promotion.
The reaction to these proposals was quite varied. At one extreme stood 
the direct opposition in the Cortes of Aragon and Valencia, although this 
soon gave way to acceptance; at the other extreme was their total rejection 
in Catalonia; at other points they gave rise to struggles over specific aspects 
or projects and their general context. Some of these struggles elicited bru-
tal criticism and biting satire from most refined practitioners of the 
Castilian language (Egido 1973). An army of wordsmiths, Quevedo 
among them, was mobilized against these plans. All of them made use of 
channels of communication that, if based upon the incipient public sphere, 
were the product of patronage and clientele systems that meant these 
quill-wielding soldiers ultimately served the interests of noble factions.
Fiscalism and Upheavals
Plans for reform were to be frustrated not only by resistance to them but 
also by the urgent and overwhelming need for money created by war, 
which compelled the government to take the existing status quo to the 
very limits of its possibilities and prioritize day-to-day solutions rather than 
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the long-term reforms. Indeed Olivares brought the balance of this system 
near to the very limits of an absolutist regime—that is to say, to tyranny.
Olivares’ measures would enrage all sectors of the Castilian elites, 
beginning with the urban oligarchies. This is the basis of the traditional 
interpretation that underlines the conflict between Olivares and this social 
sector. Thus the Cortes of Castile were urged to concede more services—
millones, above all (Artola 1982)—and even to impose a levy on flour and 
salt, both of which would have had a major impact on the groups with the 
lowest incomes, or to create new taxes, like the so-called cientos, and the 
media annata, and withhold the payment of juros.2 The impatience and 
determination that characterized Olivares led him to introduce measures 
that could only be justified by the assumption of absoluta potestas. This was 
emphatically the case in the manipulation of the vellón coins whose value 
was permanently reduced, despite many later efforts to reinstate their pre-
vious worth (Hamilton 1975, chapter 4). This course of action was first 
undertaken by Philip III. But the reign of Philip IV was marked by pro-
cesses of currency devaluation and later revaluation that gave rise to a 
period of inflation and deflation whose effects were even worse than the 
simple minting of coins. Moreover, these acts were accompanied by the 
seizure of shipments from the Indies, forced loans, and so on. On top of 
all of these measures came frequent recourse to forced loans in the form of 
donativos that at times took the form of asientos.3
An additional problem lay in Olivares’ treatment of the Cortes, over 
whose parsimonious processes and procedures he would trample, to the 
outrage of many. On top of this came the debate on the nature of the vote 
of the procuradores, which was alternatively understood to be decisive or 
consultative. The cities had previously sent their procuradores armed only 
with a consultative vote, that is to say a preliminary or advisory one, on the 
proviso that they would then return to the municipal councils for permis-
2 (Domínguez 1983, pp. 295–309). The cientos consisted in a raising of the percentage of 
the theoretical rate of the alcabalas. The media annata was a tax on the inheritance of offices 
and other mercedes. Taxes were also created on the use of paper and so on.
3 Domínguez Ortíz found 13 such donativos or general loans—that is to say ones that led 
to general campaigns for their collection across the kingdom—during the reign of Philip IV, 
with a noticeable intensification in the 1630s and, above all, from 1635, when war with 
France broke out (1983, chapter VII). In addition to these measures, there were individual 
or specific donativos, sometimes given to offset previous ones with individuals or corpora-
tions. These were grounded in the idea of auxilium, closely tied to the ‘antidoral’ theory 
present in the moral economy of the time (Clavero 1991).
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sion to vote definitively (voto decisivo). The heart of the matter lay, logi-
cally, in Olivares’s shortcutting of this second phase by taking the first vote 
to be decisive, thus saving time and giving the procuradores, who were 
more manageable than the oligarchies of the town halls, greater freedom 
of action and corruption (Fortea 2008).
But the absolutist methods of Olivares also affected the nobles. It is not 
certain that the Count Duke really sought to apply measures trying to 
limit the grants aristocrats received from the Crown (Yun 2002a, chapters 
6 and 7), but any hint of a policy of this sort could create problems among 
a group who considered themselves to be the rightful recipients of royal 
largesse. That he began by awarding offices in Castile to the members of 
other aristocracies (Elliott 1982) should be seen in this light too. The high 
nobility saw its interests prejudiced by the currency devaluations, which 
considerably reduced its incomes in coin and made them more difficult to 
collect at a time when they were growing much more slowly than prices 
and even beginning to fall in real terms (Jago 1982; Valencia 2010, vol. I, 
pp. 542 and ff). The measures to reduce the official rates of interest the 
Crown paid for the juros may have followed market tendencies but also hit 
the pockets of many nobles, for whom they constituted an important 
source of income (the same was of course true for urban elites). Worse, on 
several occasions Olivares established criteria with regard to the conferral 
of favours based upon service that in many cases did not take into account 
what the high aristocrats considered to be distributive justice (in their 
view, considerations of rank meant more that offices and grants should be 
made mainly to them (Cárceles 1994)). The effects of such a policy could 
not be positive among a group that felt all of its interests to be threat-
ened—its economic incomes, its political opportunities at court, and its 
access to the king, which the valido sought to limit or mediate. And the 
same effect was produced among the high aristocrats and the elites in gen-
eral by the retention of half of the yields from juros (Domínguez 1973).
The fiscal absolutism of Olivares even touched the Church. On top of 
the Three Graces (subsidio, excusado, and cruzada; see Chap. 1) came a 
number of other voluntary donations (donativos; see Chap. 4) and ser-
vices. If the fiscal weight of these revenues was being reduced by inflation, 
it was frequently the case that they (and above all the cruzada) were not 
used for the cause for which they had originally been granted, a ‘misuse’ 
which created considerable indignation among the clergy. But the princi-
pal problem was the millones, a service from which churchmen considered 
themselves to be exempt. For obvious reasons, they saw their interests 
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prejudiced by the tax on franked paper, papel sellado (Gelabert 2001, 
pp. 150 and ff. 168). Their sense of injustice was even greater in relation 
to the war with France, which could hardly be presented as a fight for the 
defence of Christendom.
In this context, it is not difficult to understand why some have spoken 
of ‘the convulsions of Castile’ (Gelabert 2001). An uprising took place to 
protest the imposition of the salt tax in the Basque Country, whose fisher-
ies and salting industry were badly affected (Fernández Albaladejo 1975). 
A long series of reactions against the taxes and the manipulations of the 
vellón currency occurred, and even after the fall of Olivares, there were 
altercations in cities such as Lorca and Palencia and in the Rioja region 
(Domínguez 1973, p. 20). Tensions would lead to risings between 1647 
and 1652  in Andalusia, where even Córdoba and Seville were affected, 
when the poor harvests aggravated an already difficult situation and the 
local patricians were unable to control the people and in one case even 
incited them (Gelabert 2001; Domínguez 1973). Highly significant was 
the presence among these rebels of members of the local elites and clergy-
men; sometimes indeed it was they who led risings or encouraged them 
through their incendiary sermons.
If the cities broke with the valido, the nobles soon followed suit. They 
even went as far as a collective rebellion, a sort of a ‘strike of the nobles’, 
an inelegant but eloquent act—the abandonment of the political and con-
stitutional functions of their class, specifically through their refusal to 
accompany the person of the king as a gesture of auxilium and consilium. 
The most serious noble protest was, however, the conspiracy led by two 
relatives of Olivares, the heavily indebted duke of Medinasidonia and the 
Marquis of Ayamonte, who took advantage of the rebellion led by João de 
Braganza in Portugal and, indeed, sought his help (Domínguez 1973; 
Salas 2013). In a certain way, this act provides yet another example of the 
tensions inherent in this sort of extended noble lineage frequent at court. 
But this episode had deeper roots and might even be profitably compared 
with events from as far back as the fifteenth century, when tensions of this 
sort were capable of combining with more general political processes to 
destabilize the entire political system. And this movement continued in 
1648, being carried forward by the duke of Híjar in Aragon. Among the 
clergy things became so bad that a cesatio a divinis was sometimes pro-
claimed, meaning that they refused to administer religious rites. The bish-
ops of Seville, Murcia, and Osma led acts of resistance or protest 
(Domínguez 1985, pp. 366–7). The wars of Mars were almost strangling 
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the good works of Minerva; the grounds for complaint and rebellion were 
at times motivated by private interests but increasingly justified by the 
reigning political theory of the day.
Castile: Change and COntinuity
Reshaping the Conflictive Pact at the Core of the Empire
The protests discussed above would lead to important changes, but rather 
than rupture the conflictive pact, what emerged was a re-composition of it.
Despite these tensions, the Cortes and urban elites were able to resist 
the demands made of them. Many of Olivares’ measures eventually led 
to—or, indeed, were from their very inception designed to achieve—more 
centralized forms of financing. Other proposals maintained and even, in 
some cases, strengthened the power of elites and their capacity to renego-
tiate with the Crown, even if—and this was the crux of the matter—they 
provoked a series of changes with the apparent agreement of both sides.
The negotiation over the millones and the subsequent sisas continued, 
and this was not necessarily bad business for the oligarchies, as an 
eighteenth- century text, Ruiz de Celada’s Estado de la Bolsa de Valladolid, 
showed (Yun 1990; Ruiz Martín 1994). Even if urban tax systems were 
beginning to experience insolvency, the chance to exercise the dual roles 
of lender and manager of the debt, as a member of the town council, 
offered the elites notable advantages.4 The sale of offices or the failure to 
abide by promises to absorb those already sold—a measure for which elites 
clamoured—meant that the oligarchies retained a social capacity to repro-
duce themselves. As in the previous century, the sale of noble titles contin-
ued to be seen as an opportunity and spigot for the ambitions of the 
oligarchies.
A very interesting part of this phenomenon lay in the donativos. This 
system was doubly useful for the elites in spite of their appearance of forced 
loans. In exchange for all manner of privileges, the king received a series of 
4 This mechanism has been set out in Chap. 4. It is worthwhile, however, to underline that 
the censos, unlike the juros, were not set on the debt of the treasury in general but on specific 
revenues. In this situation, whenever there were problems in claiming payment, they had to 
be resolved by the monarchy’s administrators. For this reason a regidor, a member of the 
town council, always had a say on the order of payment, which was crucial in times of 
difficulties.
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‘donations’ in money. In some cases, these were practically forced pay-
ments and provoked resistance, but normally it was not difficult to arrive 
at an agreement of some sort whereby the king provided important com-
pensations. Only in the 1629 donativo Seville provided a loan of 500,000 
ducats (5% of the income of the royal tax system at this point). In compen-
sation it received, among other things, the return to its jurisdiction of 
towns or villages that had been recently sold and diverse judicial benefits; 
another privilege, which curiously benefited the patricians rather than the 
city itself, meant that officials (specifically, the jurados and regidores) of the 
municipal authority could not be arrested for having failed to pay their 
taxes (Martínez Ruiz 1992, pp.  266–7). In Andalusia, where extensive 
municipal properties existed, the towns asked for the right to privatize 
common lands to the benefit of a city or, sometimes, an individual (De 
Bernardo 1994). All of this constituted an attack upon the inalienability 
of the royal patrimony, a precept which the cities had so jealously guarded 
in the fifteenth century (Chap. 1). Also involved in trade-offs of this sort 
were monopolies on trade or on fishing, hunting, and taverns. Equally 
the municipal councils obtained privileges over their own jurisdictions: 
improved or extended scope to regulate the local market or the right of 
appointment to municipal offices which were previously of a royal pre-
rogative, such as alcaldías mayores or veedurías (overseer of the local mar-
ket) (Andrés and Lanza 2008). Given that normally these donativos were 
paid for by sisas (excise taxes) set on the consumption of basic products 
and that many of these political and economic resources were habitually 
employed to benefit the oligarchy, it is easy to see what lay behind all of 
this. But subscribers to the donativos were not only cities and towns. 
Moreover, many donativos were subscribed to by private individuals. As 
one royal decree put it, donativos were about ‘speaking to all’ 
(Domínguez 1983, p. 203). Among their subscribers we find nobles, 
who managed to obtain permission for censos to improve or sell parts of 
their mayorazgo. Equally some guilds and individuals of all kinds figure 
in the records (Domínguez 1983, chapter VII). In the final analysis, the 
donativos pulverized the relations between king and kingdom by making 
these relationships much more atomized and individualized. This was a 
genuine revolution that broke with the corporate force of the Cortes, 
even if this institution sometimes managed to intervene in their admin-
istration (see below).
Highly significant to this new relationship of atomized corporatism was 
the aforementioned Consulate of Seville, which would prove positive and, 
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more important, comfortable for both parties and perpetuated an 
American commercial policy that would be highly harmful to the applica-
tion of any sort of mercantilist programme, as we have seen.
Another crucial point in this new arrangement between the Crown and 
the kingdom was the resolution of the dispute over the consultative vote 
against the decisive vote. The kingdom, embodied in the Commission of 
the Millones, enjoyed a period in which it appears to have held a strong 
hand in negotiating with the king. This occurred, however, in parallel to 
a situation whereby each city with a vote in the assembly maintained its 
right to reach its own private agreement with the Crown in regard to both 
the concession of taxes and (especially) their method of collection (Fortea 
2008). The end of this story would be crucial. The cities themselves, con-
scious of their power and influence, came to prefer to put an end to the 
Cortes, whose importance had in any case been declining. Everything 
indicates that they now preferred not to reconvene as an assembly, many 
of them being keen to establish a direct relationship with the king. The 
king, of course, seems to have been of the same opinion (Thompson 
1993). This development, one of the keys to the evolution of Castilian 
constitutionalism, can be explained by the shift from a concept of the 
procuradores as representatives of the kingdom to one that, in practical 
terms, had them as representatives of each city with votes in the Cortes 
(Fortea 2008). This, of course, was a very different trajectory to the one 
followed by countries such as England.
Be that as it may, the result of the pressures generated by the Count 
Duke, and the need to relax them in order to reconstitute relations 
between king and kingdom after his fall, resulted in a greater degree of 
absolutism (evident in measures that went against the laws of the king-
dom, such as the monetary manipulations) but which, without parliamen-
tary mediation, would reinforce a growing localism.
The high aristocracy found itself in a similar situation. Despite the 
efforts of the Count Duke, it was impossible to sever the service-favours 
relationship, as it was essential to the patronage system and, indeed, to the 
political culture. A study (Yun 2002a) demonstrates that this group con-
tinued to receive many favours, privileges, and offices; in fact, no reduc-
tion in their conferral can be discerned. If, perhaps, comparison should be 
made with the concessions made to families from outside the titled 
nobility—something which in fact does not appear to have been frequent 
for this type of favour—then it is clear that the conferral of monetary pay-
ments (ayudas de costa), offices, positions at court, noble titles for family 
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members, and estates and habits in the Military Orders was not only fre-
quent but remained at the same levels seen in the previous period. In these 
decades the diplomatic service became ever more dominated by the aris-
tocracy, as did the viceroyalties. Even measures such as the reduction of 
interest rates on juros or the minting of more money were cushioned: as 
the lowering of interest rates also affected the censos taken out on their 
mayorazgos, the nobles were able to substitute existing debts for new cen-
sos taken out at lower interest rates. Transfers of this sort were nearly always 
done with the permission of the Crown, which had few reservations about 
allowing them. Again, this policy can be seen as another form of royal 
favour and a means of relegating the mutual relationships. In other coun-
tries the sale of noble titles has been seen as a symptom of an ‘inflation of 
honours’ that prejudiced the high nobility; yet in Spain it also meant that 
many second-born sons and other members of these families acquired 
titles. For this reason its effects in Castile—and, perhaps, elsewhere—were 
perhaps not negative for the high aristocracy, even if they must have left 
some imprint or mark on the internal changes of this social sector. Despite 
the effects on the high aristocracy of new methods for raising troops (see 
Thompson’s views above), the need to maintain a military mobilization 
system that had yet to eliminate private armies raised by contractors in fact 
strengthened the role of great nobles and the seigniors with peasants on 
their estates. It has even been said that as a result of the recruitment drives 
by nobles, ‘the señorío, both as a source of soldiers and honorific coronels, 
and as a power structure that held administrative sway over much of 
Castile, assumed new importance in an age when its economic resources 
had never been so ill-fitted to the needs of the Crown’ (Mackay 1999, 
p. 130). Far from the image of slumbering seigniors and great nobles who 
were finding their capacity for enforcement steadily reduced, what hap-
pened in Castile was a much more selective process; this having been said, 
it absolutely did not amount to the loss of power by the seigniors. If some 
cases can be found to suggest the ‘fall of the nobility’, these are more con-
vincingly explained by absenteeism, the distances involved in managing 
estates, and the related problems of control and monitoring that were so 
common and exploited by stewards (mayordomos) and local agents. 
Perhaps it is not possible to speak of a process of ‘refeudalization’, but the 
relationship of symbiosis and conflict between nobility and Crown was 
strengthening the theoretical power of the former (Yun 1994a). And this 
was achieved on the basis of the disappearance from 1538 of a corporate 
institutional relationship in the Cortes. That is to say that, in the same way 
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that was happening in other sectors of society, an absolute king now nego-
tiated and formed relationships not with a corporation but with each and 
every noble house.
Something similar could be said of ecclesiastical institutions. Their 
resistance to taxes was logical, and the mediation of two Popes, Urban 
VIII, decidedly pro-French, and then Innocent X, in proroguing the mil-
lones, previously conceded to Philip II, was especially corrosive (Domínguez 
1985, pp. 232–3). Yet the concession of some taxes was almost logical, as 
the Pope also received a part of them. But it has also to be taken into 
account that some contributions, like the cruzada, were not paid by the 
clergy but rather were the result of bulls sold to the faithful. Moreover the 
fraud was common in payments by the clergy, as became very clear in a 
well-known case from Valladolid (Gutiérrez 1989; Yun 1990). The 
Church was not deprived of the resources that originated in its special 
relationship with the Crown. Ecclesiastical entitled properties, so criti-
cized by the arbitristas, increased in number, the very opposite of what 
was happening in many other countries of the time, France included 
(Chap. 6).
In this context it is relatively easy to understand developments in the 
king’s justice and, specifically, the Chancelleries, as well as the fragmenta-
tion of the juridical system that we have mentioned before (Chap. 5). Very 
possibly this situation did not serve to increase juridical security or to 
reduce the transaction costs for many economic activities; on the other 
hand, it certainly reflected the many means and varied methods of enforce-
ment of the law and the clashing of jurisdictions, a legacy of the sixteenth 
century that was growing in strength. This, inevitably, would have an 
impact upon the allocation of resources and economic performance. As a 
matter of fact, for some decades this do ut des paved the way for the mana-
gerial criteria less conducive to economic improvements (see Chap. 5).
Patrimonial Management, the Economic Resilience of Elites, 
and Property Rights
Very few of the changes for which the arbitristas had clamoured—and 
were still clamouring—had been introduced. The quantity of mayorazgos 
founded between 1600 and c. 1650 is not known. But we do know that 
the institution not only grew in strength but also became increasingly 
valued by local elites who saw in it both an economic strategy and a highly 
rational way of conserving and recycling their social and political capital 
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(Hernández 1995). Many continued to invest massively in political 
resources and privileges, as can be seen in the rise in the price of the office 
of regidor in both Madrid and across Castile (Gelabert 1997, pp. 166–167). 
Putting money into the Military Orders—that is to say in social and politi-
cal capital—remained at the same level and perhaps even grew, at least 
among urban elites (Hernández 1995, p. 226). The use of public proper-
ties, common lands, and propios lands (as we said those belonging to towns 
and villages) for private profit did not come to an end (De Bernardo 
1994). As we have seen, such practices diminished the possibilities of 
agrarian innovations. As was by now commonplace, the traders of the 
Consulate of Seville continued to manage their businesses on the basis of 
their privileges, thus favouring both the arrival of non-Castilian products 
and the sky-high profits obtained by foreigners (Bernal 1993).
These practices, and above all those that allowed the acquisition of polit-
ical capital, were not always—or only—implemented by regidores and direct 
members of the town councils but also by their relatives (Hernández 1995). 
This practice constituted an effort to maintain a logic of interfamilial rela-
tionships that would continue to resolve conflicts through lateral payments 
in the form of social promotion and that would corrode an institutional 
system which, by its very nature, was, according to new institutional eco-
nomics, inefficient. Rent-seeking, which some historians have openly con-
sidered as corruption, was the great blight of the town councils and other 
institutions (see, among others, De Bernardo 1994; Cárceles 1994).
The halt in economic and demographic growth must have been one of 
the reasons for the reduction in the establishment of religious institutions 
(Graph 5.2). But the existing stock of foundations, nearly all of which had 
lands tied to them, and the large amount of entitled goods (a major bug-
bear for the arbitristas), was not reduced by an inch, and their weight now 
fell on an economy that was not growing or did so only very slowly. In 
other words, not only did they have a dissuasive effect on the development 
of productive investment, but they actually absorbed a growing portion of 
the GDP of Castile. Our existing knowledge of cases makes it clear that 
the religious order par excellence of the sixteenth century, the Jesuits, 
retained their capacity to absorb productive resources until at least 1620—
or, indeed, even until 1640.5 Viewed from the crisis at the end of the 
century, it is impossible to overlook the avidity of the ecclesiastical institu-




tions in extending their properties through purchases or the creation of 
censos that originated in the purchase of lands from heavily indebted peas-
ants (Pereira 1991, pp. 84–101). Even if the demographic crisis reduced 
the internal pressure within the families of the oligarchies and the wealth-
ier peasants, it is also evident that, for several decades, the ecclesiastical 
institutions continued to be capable of integrating into their ranks a size-
able number of members of these groups. Indeed they even helped advance 
the expansion of what F. Brumont called the ‘peasant mayorazgos’, that is 
to say the creation of chaplaincies and religious foundations that offered 
elite rural families the chance to settle a relative in them and were just one 
part of the broader strategies for the reproduction of the political and 
cultural capital of these lineages (Brumont 1993, pp. 289–99, and 32–33).
The sale of titles was also taken advantage of by new families originating 
in the urban patriciate, who found in it a means of access into the high 
nobility.6 If many of them acquired or had acquired a seigniorial estate, 
sometimes with incomes of a jurisdictional sort, it is clear that land income 
was usually the most important component in their mayorazgos. Of course, 
this process occurred in regions such as Andalusia or Extremadura, where 
the character of the seigniors as great landowners and the abundance of 
large latifundios went far back. But it also became more common in the 
Duero Valley (Yun 1987). Rather than a seigniorial (or feudal) class, it 
appears to have been a group of landowners, in the literal sense. And, as in 
previous periods, some did invest in improving their mayorazgos, even if the 
requests for censos to this purpose appear to have been relatively few and 
marginal, barely touching 7% of the total (Yun 1999c). But, at the same time, 
this group was overcoming the fall in its incomes thanks to the replacement 
of censos (mentioned above) and by its service to the Crown, from which they 
acquired not only debts but also additional incomes and favours that, in cer-
tain cases, came to equal those generated by their estates (Yun 2002a).
6 The advance of the number of title holders is the following:
Year N° de of title holders % growth % yearly growth
1520 60 –
1554 68 13 0.4
1581 100 32 1.2
1597 124 24 1.5
1631 241 194 5.7
1700 533 221 3.2
(Atienza 1987, p. 41)
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Judged by the simplest and most vulgar gradient, the overview of these 
trends confirms the well-known Enlightenment view of the forms of man-
agement used by elites in Counter-Reformation Spain. Still it is worth-
while underlining that these economic strategies were not resistant to 
change or in any way irrational. Rather, what prevailed was a unique mas-
tery in taking advantage of patrimonial resources during an age in which 
elites, like the rest of society, faced growing difficulties. They knew how to 
manage their mayorazgos, how to make good use of dowries, how to buy 
lands from peasants who were in beyond their depth, when—and when 
not—to free censos, and even when silver should be melted down to con-
vert it into jewellery in view of its increasing value in respect to vellón. The 
land-purchase strategy employed by the ecclesiastical institutions was per-
fectly rational for their purposes and highlighted their intention to avoid 
the dispersal of plots of land (see, e.g. Mata 1987, p. 171 and Brumont 
1993, p. 286). The fact that the price of the office of regidor increased 
more quickly than the value of land demonstrates that many buyers had 
good knowledge about where the best opportunities lay; but, by the same 
standard, the diversification of investments was very clear. We even know 
of efforts to introduce improvements to farms owned by the Jesuits in 
Villagarcía de Campos or by the Benedictine Monastery of La Espina (Yun 
1987; López 1990). Of course, these measures did not keep the crisis from 
the door of the elites. And, worse, many of these strategies were the direct 
result of falls in agrarian income and prices, the declining profitability of 
juros, and the dip in rents paid on houses within the mayorazgo in which 
the temptation, though existing, of investment was not very high.
A Balance
The sense that the policies of Olivares were a total failure has created 
among historians a certain idea that the period was characterized by a 
complete absence of changes. The reasoning is logical: if the reforms 
failed, everything remained as before. But this line of thinking is incorrect. 
Many things did in fact change.
It is clear, on the one hand, that at times the arguments of Acemoglu et 
alter on absolutism present a reasonable view of the situation, particularly 
for the 1630s and 1640s. This having been said, it should be stressed that 
this is not really the case for Acemoglu’s views on services, donativos, and 
other measures, as the majority of them ‘were not, technically speaking, 
taxes that the Cortes had to approve’ and were therefore acceptable on the 
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juridical level (Fortea 2008, p. 249). But, certainly, Acemoglu is correct in 
that they, in themselves, were not particularly positive for economic devel-
opment. Above all he is right in regard to the monetary manipulations—
although rather absent in his reasoning—the seizure of shipments from 
the Indies, and the unilateral declarations of bankruptcy. But again, even 
here, it is impossible to forget that what was limiting the chances that the 
metropolitan economy might gain from its Atlantic empire were not acts 
of parasitic absolutism but rather pacts between the monarchy and the 
Consulate of Seville and the systematic sale of privileges in return for 
financial assistance.
In any case, attention should fall on the scale of resistance to Crown 
policies, the conflicts generated by them, and the fact that, in the heart of 
the empire, these disputes did not move beyond being phenomena of a 
purely local character. Historians have been much concerned by the (logi-
cal) question: why did Castile, the core of the empire, not witness a gen-
eralized upheaval similar to those of France or England? Certainly, there 
were conflicts—and many of them—but the ‘Fronde’ of Castile failed to 
become a massive and general movement. Instead it remained a bewilder-
ing and random series of uprisings, resistance, and isolated outcries of 
discontent. This failure to transform itself into something more substantial 
remains difficult to explain—this is, perhaps, always the case when it comes 
to saying why something did not happen in history. A posteriori, it is easy 
to fall into speculations, sometimes facile ones. Perhaps most important 
was that in 1643—the decisive moment—Philip IV chose to dismiss the 
Count Duke when faced with the rebellion of the duke of Medinasidonia 
in Andalusia, the revolt headed by Juan de Braganza in Portugal, and the 
insurrection in Catalonia. At a stroke, this measure removed the major 
grounds for complaint and perhaps ensured that additional risings were 
unnecessary. But if we want to speculate further on the effects of the polit-
ical economy on politics, it might be possible to argue that the reformist 
‘acts of aggression’ were bringing about a scenario in which these Frondes 
were increasingly undesirable. This was the case not only for the cities but 
also for the aristocracy and, in particular, for Madrid, where the immense 
possibilities offered by this empire could still unlock a flow of favours and 
patronage. And without Madrid—and here was the crucial difference, as 
Paris stood at the epicentre of the Fronde—it was difficult for the separate 
and isolated conflicts to coalesce into a general rebellion. By this point the 
Cortes—think of the leading role of the Parliament in England in the 
1640s—was reasonably well controlled, and, indeed, its procuradores 
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enjoyed both a certain degree of autonomy from the cities they repre-
sented and the favour of the Crown. Be this as it may, regardless of the 
Crown’s ability to dissuade prospective rebels from rising in Castile, in the 
midst of this fight, the elites were sorting out their own problems or even 
gaining the upper hand in many battles, rendering an all-out war unneces-
sary. By this period, moreover, the role of the local institutions in politics 
and fiscal collection was proving an obstacle to the general processes of 
collective action. These battles took the form of isolated episodes between 
each city or group and the Crown, thus rendering any combined move-
ment more difficult. Of course, one crucial element—the political culture 
of the day—is missing from this analysis; but, nevertheless, there are 
acceptable grounds for tentatively proposing these explanations for what 
is, without doubt, a very difficult issue.
The conflictive pact that had maintained the dominant coalition from 
the sixteenth century was being reformulated in many ways. It was no 
longer the same as it had been. The nobility had seen its military functions 
reborn for a while—indeed, they had even seen the traditional function of 
their seigniorial estates strengthened during the war with France. But the 
exit of Spain from the great stages of international war after the Peace of 
the Pyrenees (1659) made this role ever less important—at least this was 
the case for the old nobility—and gave rise to a change in the form of its 
military service. A new nobility would come to serve this function (and 
would consolidate its role during the eighteenth century). Rather than the 
mobilization of their vassals, this new system would be based on money, 
which allowed them to enlist and equip troops, purchase captaincies, or 
finance the establishment of army units in exchange for their military ser-
vice; the seigniorial estates played only a very marginal role in the great 
majority of these cases (Andújar 2004). Although it retained its vigour in 
many senses, the seigniorial estate was less important in regard to military 
organization. The development of the colonial system itself would end up 
by establishing a nobility whose origins lay either in the American elites or 
in commerce or, very often, in both, thus changing the essential nature of 
the group (again, this development reached full maturity in the eighteenth 
century) (Yun, forthcoming). Many of these families came from the urban 
elite, and their relationship with the Crown would be direct and personal 
(Felices 2012). This would not be a corporate relationship in any sense.
The new fiscal system and, above all, the development of the donativos 
system with the disappearance of the Cortes—whose demise was an indicator 
of much more profound changes—were steps in the same direction. As set 
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out above, the relationships between the king and the urban oligarchies—the 
need for an understanding between them—would continue to be present. 
The destruction of their corporate character brought about many changes, 
and, of course, this was important because it was altering a crucial element of 
the composite monarchy. This is also a decisive fact for the new institutional 
economics approach and the study of the political economy of this monar-
chy. It was to be a key phenomenon in the construction of a state that modu-
lated a different type of conflictive pact. In this new model—without the 
Cortes—a financial revolution of the English style, where the role of the 
Parliament after the Glorious Revolution was crucial, was just unthinkable. It 
is also important for the historiography of political economies, which have 
made the revolution of 1688 the fundamental turning point (North and 
Weingast 1989). In Castile, the long- term evolution of the relationship 
between king and the elites was preventing any comparable process.
The overall result would be a system that for long periods fed the econ-
omy of legitimization and sustained the cost of a decentralized system of 
welfare, led by elites. This turned out to be relatively inefficient on the 
material level: helping the needy, preventing death and curing illness, and 
so on. But, as was fitting to a period and a form of Catholicism that under-
stood welfare more in terms of the wellbeing of the soul than attending to 
the travails of the body, it perhaps served much more effectively as an 
antidote to growing discontent which might easily have manifested itself 
in massive conflicts. It might, therefore, serve to explain too the relatively 
low—in comparison with countries such as France or England—level of 
upheavals seen in Castile in this period.
The outcome would be the maintenance of property rights. Except for 
the alienation of communal and royal lands and the increasing concentra-
tion in land property, few substantial changes had occurred in the juridical 
nature of land property. And even these had a slow effect on the produc-
tive capacity of some zones. Moreover, in more than one case, there had 
not even been any sort of privatization; rather what had happened was that 
these lands were bought by the councils to be used henceforth solely for 
the benefit of the oligarchies and also obstructing any possibility for pro-
ductive improvements in those lands. Privilege, in the sense of new institu-
tional economics rather than as political prerogative, was now an important 
means of gaining access to wealth in a society that was closed rather than 
open and exclusive rather than inclusive; this was a society in which it was 
normal for personal networks to pervert even further the working of for-
mal institutions, which were now very far from the Weberian ideal.
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Yet this growing absolutism was based on a system that continued to be 
characterized by counterweights and balances in the exercise of power. In 
this period pacts, and not the all-embracing power of the king, were at the 
base of the most inefficient side of formal institutions (in the sense estab-
lished by North and others).
ruptures and COntinuities: a deCadent empire?
Approached from the viewpoint of the political economy, it would be an 
error to think that the various forms of conflictive pact established between 
elites and the Crown were determinative in the processes of rupture and 
continuity that were seen in the empire in the middle of the seventeenth 
century. An entire historiographical current, elegantly synthesized for 
Spain by X. Gil (2006), has rightly argued that the problem also needs to 
be seen from the perspective of intellectual history and political thought. 
But the perspective we are adopting here can (partially) illuminate the 
causes of the process as well as its effects on the political economies of the 
epoch.
Ruptures in the European Peripheral Kingdoms: Portugal 
and Catalonia
As all seventeenth-century European societies, those of the Iberian world 
witnessed political ruptures that are crucial in understanding its skeleton 
and history. Not only Castile, as we have seen, but also Naples, Sicily, 
Portugal, Catalonia, the American colonies, and so on went through simi-
lar experiences. Here we will consider the last three cases as a way to test 
how the relationship between the Crown and the elites affected the empire.
 The Portuguese Rupture: Globalization Against the Composite Empire
Given their coincidence in time, it is normal for the crises of Catalonia and 
Portugal to be studied in parallel (although seldom are they placed in any 
sort of comparative framework).7 There are good reasons for this, although 
the phenomena were very different. The crisis of Catalonia was another of 
the ruptures experienced by the composite monarchies of dynastic charac-
ter on account of the pressure of war: Naples and Scotland, for example, 
followed a similar pattern. And Portugal had elements of this. But the 
7 See an excellent exception in Elliott (1963, pp. 489–522).
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causes and the development of this latter conflict provide evidence also of 
the difficulty of maintaining a global empire such as the Luso-Spanish one 
in the context of a process of globalization and upon the basis of a com-
posite monarchy, during the period that witnessed the dawn of the mer-
cantilist policies of the seventeenth century.
Everything began, as is well known, in 1637 with the rising of the city 
of Évora and the regions of Alentejo, the Algarve, and Ribatejo. The work 
of local nobles and churchmen, the movement was suffocated without dif-
ficulty because of the lack of aristocratic support. But its second coming 
was decisive. After the Cortes of Tomar, an important tension had emerged 
over the efforts by the monarchy to involve the kingdom in the raising and 
lodging of troops (Schaub 2001). This tension had grown because of the 
attempts to implement the Union of Arms but reached its maximum 
intensity when Portugal and its fidalgos and nobility, Dom João de 
Braganza included, were asked to collaborate in the repression of Catalonia: 
on 1 December 1640, an uprising occurred in Lisbon that Braganza would 
soon take over and lead. As in Catalonia, the conflict quickly acquired an 
international character, with the involvement of France, attempts to inter-
fere in Andalusia through the duke of Medinasidonia, and the arrival of 
help from England (Costa and Da Cunha 2006; Valladares 1998, 
pp. 37–45).
The Portuguese Restoration is understood as a rupture of the pacts 
formed with the Habsburg monarchy. As has been said, a sizeable part of 
the Portuguese aristocracy had formed unions with Castilian families 
which allowed it access to the favours of the empire. But, in complete dif-
ference to what happened in Catalonia, the most important family of the 
kingdom, the House of Braganza, though it had obtained economic 
awards, had remained rather outside the network of Madrid Court, some-
thing that afforded it considerable freedom of manoeuvre (Costa and Da 
Cunha 2006). Its ties to the Castilian aristocracy—Dom João’s marriage 
to the sister of the duke of Medinasidonia, an outsider to the court 
dynamic of Madrid—rather than being a balsam for his discontent, was 
instead a help to the rebellion. Olivares had made great efforts—perhaps 
coming too late—to incorporate the peripheral nobilities into the govern-
ment of the monarchy (Elliott 1982, pp. 513–6). But, ‘to the extent that 
it was reducing the role played’ by the Portuguese nobility, ‘the solidarity 
of its nobles [with Madrid] was dissipating’ (Bouza 2000, p. 229). Only 
one Portuguese—Braganza himself—had been granted membership of 
the Order of the Golden Fleece (de Ceballos-Escalera y Gila 2001, 
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p. 294).8 No Portuguese noble had received the title of Grandee of Spain. 
If the royal favours had been fewer than desired, the Crown’s attempts to 
revise the Ley Mental (a measure to return lands usurped up to the six-
teenth century to the royal estates) were not the best antidote to discon-
tent or, to be more specific, passivity when faced with open rebellion 
(Bouza 2000). Yet with all of this, the Portuguese aristocracy would 
remain the group most loyal to Philip IV: the revolt of 1640 produced a 
division within the high nobility rather than an unconditional support for 
Braganza (Schaub 2001; Bouza 2000). Moreover, some of the families 
that passed to the side of Dom João did so by a trans-frontier policy that, 
rather than pledge loyalty to a sole monarch, sought to maintain the inter-
ests of the houses on both sides of the border (Terrasa 2009).
As was the case across all of Europe, the rebellion had a fiscal compo-
nent. In listing its causes, historians frequently mention measures which 
preceded the rebellion of Évora, such as the real del agua (a tax on the 
consumption of wine and meat), or the increase of the sisas. A number of 
taxes might be mentioned here: the medias annatas (introduced in 1631) 
was perhaps the most significant. On top of this came military mobiliza-
tion after 1639 (Schaub 2001). But in reality the fiscal problem should be 
understood in the wider perspective of the tax systems of Portugal and 
Castile.
As we have seen, Portugal had created a tax state, but most of the 
incomes of the king originated above all in his empire, with the kingdom 
itself contributing very little. This remained the case until the seventeenth 
century, as can be seen in the budgets for 1607 and even 1621, which still 
maintained a surplus. The absence of costly overseas wars had prevented 
the development of public debt in the way that had occurred in Castile 
(Hespanha 1989, p. 198). But this arrangement was now unsustainable. 
The problems in the overseas empire meant that, from the 1620s, the 
Estado da Índia entered into a chronic deficit (Godinho 1982; Disney 
2009). The reduction of commercial activity also provoked a fall in 
incomes derived from the overseas sector and the tolls on imports and 
exports. And this came at a time when defence costs were rising, some-
thing which, if not entirely the result of Habsburg policy, appeared to be 
the fault of Madrid to many Portuguese. All in all, from the third decade 
8 The honour was conferred in 1581 upon the sixth duke, Dom João de Portugal. His 
grandson, Dom João de Portugal (the eighth duke), was also made a member of the Order, 
although this would subsequently be annulled in light of his rebellion (de Ceballos-Escalera 
y Gila 2001, p. 341).
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of the century, a historical change occurred, one unknown to the 
Portuguese: if until then a substantial part of the Portuguese Crown’s 
expenditure had been afforded by the king’s imperial revenues (Chap. 4), 
now the kingdom, and not the king, had to increase its contribution to the 
budget, deal with debt, and face growing military costs. The increase in 
prices, which devalued the income of the Crown, meant a doubling of 
these efforts (Hespanha 1989, p. 112). So the Union of Arms, in which 
Portugal was assigned responsibility for 16,000 soldiers, not only endan-
gered the treasured principle of the ‘kingdom’s resources for the king-
dom’ but was also accompanied by a breaking of the rules of play between 
king and kingdom. To all of this can be added that, through a number of 
new forms of behaviour, Castilian interests were increasingly interfering 
in Portugal, creating notable conflicts of competence and jurisdiction 
(Schaub 2001).
It would be an error, nonetheless, to see the rebellion only from the 
perspective of the Iberian Peninsula. Its origins lay in the combination of 
a composite monarchy of many states and a global empire that character-
ized the monarchy as a whole. This is the principal difference with 
Catalonia, Naples, or Scotland and what gave the events in Portugal their 
specific and unique character.
Historians have usually placed emphasis on the political discontent 
with Madrid Court that, according to many Portuguese, governed only 
in line with the interests of Castile. The failure to defend Ormuz and the 
ridiculous campaign led by the Count of la Torre to save Pernambuco in 
1638 further advanced these arguments (Elliott 1963). But, in reality, 
what lay behind all of this were problems that were more difficult to 
resolve.
One of these issues derived from the need to mobilize resources on a 
global stage that, to all extents and purposes, compelled the monarchy to 
undertake combined and complementary actions such as the recovery of 
Bahia. The drawback was that mobilizations of this sort were very diffi-
cult and were not always undertaken without problems. In fact, Castile 
complained of having to employ its funds in defence of Portuguese inter-
ests (Borges 2014). But the Portuguese, for their part, could take this 
problem as far as schizophrenia. Not only were they worried about the 
movement of resources out of the country to defend Castilian interests 
but also that help from Castile could lead to mistakes that might lead 
Castilians to make some claim upon Portuguese domains. The polemic 
on the ‘re-conquest’ of imperial territories taken by the enemy and a 
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number of actions such as those in Asia in these years are highly signifi-
cant in this regard (Cardim 2014; Valladares 2001). The appointment of 
Castilians to colonial offices, as happened in Maranhão (Schwartz 1964, 
p. 41), could only increase these concerns.
The abundance of cases in which the interests of Castilians and 
Portuguese appeared to be in opposition moved things in the same direc-
tion. Certainly, the intertwining of both empires was more than evident. 
But from Pernambuco (Schwartz 1973) to the Río de la Plata, to the 
Chinese Sea, scenarios were created in which this relationship could lead 
to conflicts between imagined communities of Portuguese and Castilian 
or, simply, appear in this light and be transferred to Madrid or Lisbon in 
their most problematic forms (when neither Madrid nor Lisbon was creat-
ing these issues). In this way the mingling of Portuguese and Castilians in 
colonial spaces was producing a surge of feelings about imagined commu-
nities existing on top of one another. A point of convergence was found in 
the condition of both peoples as Catholics, which led one observer from 
Madrid to argue that they had the ‘same nature’ (Elliott 1963). But these 
communities came into conflict with one another to the extent that each 
also created itself through opposition to the other. This is not surprising if 
we take into account that it was in the colonies, perhaps more than on the 
Iberian Peninsula itself, that the seeds of imagined communities that 
increasingly defined themselves as Portuguese and Spanish were sprouting 
(Bernal 2007, pp.  324–325; Herzog 2015). The way that histories of 
Castile (ever more closely identified with Spain) and Portugal proliferated 
in this period underlined the apparently contradictory nature of the two 
states and was a good symptom of this change (Cardim 2014). Such evi-
dence reveals how the empire and the tensions that ran through its heart-
lands generated and reinforced imagined communities that were 
suffocating the empire’s very principles.
This clash of interests—or the way that elites, in both Madrid and 
Lisbon and the overseas territories, conceived of them—did not only affect 
the colonial world but also the relationships between it and Europe. The 
Portuguese found it difficult to understand the prohibition on trade with 
the Dutch, which meant that the salt trade with the Low Countries, which 
had sustained their international commerce from the fifteenth century, 
was now classified as contraband (Schaub 2001). Equally the critical phase 
of the war, which obliged Madrid to concentrate forces in Europe, was 
hardly compatible with the state of permanent attack in the colonies, 
where Portugal faced powers which by now were practising a purely mer-
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cantilist policy. If Portuguese perception was that the war in Flanders after 
1621 had drawn attention away from Brazil, the outbreak of war with 
France in 1635 would only accentuate this feeling of suspicion. This situ-
ation was worsened to the extent that the defensive system, which was 
more effective in the Spanish colonies, deflected Dutch attacks towards 
Brazilian colonies, the weakest point militarily and also a very interesting 
one economically. If this were not enough, from the very beginning, the 
conflict between the Habsburgs and Portugal had a global root: if the war 
efforts imposed by Madrid’s strategy were exhausting, in reality it was the 
decrease in colonial income from the Estado da Índia that rendered unvi-
able a system that until this point had been more or less effective. Such 
factors went far beyond the Madrid’s incapacity to resolve Portuguese 
problems—or, indeed, any insensitivity to them. This was a structural 
problem and one very difficult to resolve.
In this world of opposing interests, with an empire faced with enor-
mous problems of regulation and arbitration, with expensive, slow, and 
asymmetric information, globalization—manifested in the intervention of 
outsiders into what the Spanish and Portuguese Courts understood as a 
monopoly—presented a daunting challenge. A river of ink has been spilt 
to try to justify the policies of the Habsburgs by the aggression of the 
English and Dutch against the Portuguese empire. But, can anyone really 
imagine Dutch merchantmen moored in Amsterdam waiting for permits 
to trade with a world—beginning with the Portuguese empire—that, as 
Grotius himself said, should be open to all countries? And, did this not 
mean, in any case, a peaceful and inevitable invasion brought about by 
infiltration into the very Portuguese monopoly and the system of licences?
In this way globalization, a multipolar phenomenon by definition, was 
an obstacle to keeping the two empires united. The composite and dis-
persed character of the monarchy moved things in the same direction. And 
together these things created a lethal combination that could only have 
been overcome—and even then it is debatable if any such programme 
could have been successful—by profound reforms in the political constitu-
tion of both kingdoms and their empires.
This global dimension of the composite monarchy was not only present 
in the causes of the conflict but also in its development. It is well known 
that the beginnings of the conflict had a multipolar and global character 
that was manifested in areas from Brazil to Angola, from New Spain to 
Cartagena de Indias and even Ceuta, Tangier, and as far as the coast of 
lower Andalusia (Valladares 1998, pp. 31–45). It has even been said that 
the rebellion began in 1634 in Asia, with the disobedience of the viceroy 
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Linhares, who, taking advantage of distance and the slow movement of 
information, refused to obey Olivares in the matter of agreements with 
England (Valladares 2001, p. 56). And this list does not include the con-
frontations in the Río de la Plata, the Philippines, and many other areas of 
Asia. Portugal’s victory also had a great deal to do with the global dimen-
sions of its empire, which quickly became a temptation that England could 
not resist, seeing in these dominions an area of potential indirect influ-
ence; London’s help would be decisive in achieving independence from 
the Habsburgs and for the recovery of Pernambuco from an enemy—
Holland—which in principle was much stronger (Boxer 1957). This same 
attraction would explain the marriage of Barbara of Braganza, the new 
monarch’s daughter, to Charles II of England, which would seal the anti- 
Habsburg pact. The empire’s multipolar structure also proved decisive, as 
revealed by Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides’ expedition from Brazil to 
seize Angola from the Dutch at a moment in which the peninsular war 
against the Habsburgs was decisive (Costa 2014, pp. 191–3). And, at the 
same time, the empire proved decisive in that it became money of exchange 
for peace with Holland (in the treaty of 1661–1663) when it was most 
necessary to concentrate forces on the peninsula against the Habsburg 
troops (Costa 2014, p. 208). Equally the victory of the Portuguese must 
be related to the Juan de Braganza’s capacity to attract, over and above the 
attacks of the Inquisition, the financial help of the global networks of con-
versos and Portuguese Jews, at precisely the moment when the Spanish 
bankruptcy of 1647 brought to light the ill will and rancour towards them 
felt in Castile on account of their status as bankers and Jews (Sanz 1988). 
On the side of Castile, this was a demonstration that an informal and 
global network could—in specific circumstances—become a factor in the 
dissolution of political ties that it had attempted to restrict through the 
control of formal institutions.
As we have seen, at the heart of the matter stood the high degree of 
decentralization exhibited in these networks’ economic and social organi-
zation. The combination of both characteristics, and the presence in them 
of actors with very different agendas, meant that it was very difficult for 
political power in Madrid to control them. One group of Jewish converts, 
for example, was able to adopt positions with totally different political 
effects in Madrid, Lisbon, or other parts of the empire—indeed, some-
times just one individual member of them was able to do so. This fact 
explains—in this case economic rationale had a lesser role—the case of the 
Jesuits, who were able to adopt political positions that, if well negotiated 
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and never free of cost, were very different. In Asia, for example, the Jesuits 
supported the Portuguese side with no embarrassment (many of them 
being Portuguese in origin), while in America they fell on the side of 
Madrid. The only options for this empire were either disintegration or a 
high degree of negotiation and autonomy of the different nodes of these 
networks. And the outcome of these tensions could only be the split of the 
two imperial formations.
 The Catalan Crisis or the Problem of a Composite Monarchy
In Barcelona in 1640 a rabble of harvest workers stormed the city, and the 
rebelling inhabitants were able to take control of it. In May 1652 groups 
of unemployed harvest workers from Galicia broke into the cities of 
Córdoba and Seville and sparked an uprising of the people against their 
governors and patricians. Although a part of the urban oligarchy and the 
well-off initially participated in these tumults, they then would suffocate 
the upheaval. The Barcelona revolt ended with the death of the viceroy 
Santa Coloma and was the opening of a civil war led by the elite of 
Barcelona and the Generalitat.
Neither conflict can be explained only by the attitudes of the urban 
elites. It would also be an error to look upon the Catalan elites as a coun-
terpoint to their Castilian peers. Notable parallels can be found between 
these groups: their desire to control municipal life, their capacity to reach 
agreements with the king for the maintenance of order, the interest of 
some families to enter into the client networks of the court, and their use 
of dowries as strategies for social reproduction and similar practices 
(Torras 1998; Amelang 1986, pp.  86–91). Both groups had common 
aims and customs: the same affection for rentier incomes, their invest-
ment in public debt or in social and political capital, and their desire to 
marry into noble families, their use of ecclesiastical institutions as a means 
of reproducing family relationships. A careful reading of Xavier Torres’ 
work demonstrates that all of them needed to promote their members 
and to give an outlet to their needs for social expansion (Torres 1994, 
pp. 201–23 and 234–40). The Catalan succession system, based on the 
hereu in which the main body of the inheritance passed to the eldest son, 
only increased this need. Many of these traits—with the exception of the 
inheritance system—were present in Castile and across Europe and, of 
course, throughout Mediterranean Europe (Delille 2003). Yet this does 
not mean that there were no differences in degree that, as we shall see, 
would have considerable importance. These differences were also condi-
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tioned by the different forms of relationship between elites and the mon-
archy and were mixed with the existence of differing constitutional 
practices and traditions. These points of divergence were superimposed 
upon other differences such as language, whose importance can never be 
overlooked, and even a process in which separate imagined communities 
were formed that in part owed their origins to the impression—confirmed 
by later research—that Castile was attempting to advance a growing sense 
of identification between the concepts of Spain and Castile.9
By 1585 the expansive wave of Catalan commerce appears to have 
reached its temporary ceiling. Catalonia’s role as an important route for 
the dispatch of money towards the Spanish road had positive effects for 
the country’s economy. But the difficulties of the Castilian fairs very pos-
sibly affected the Catalan merchants’ capacity to introduce their products 
in Castile and even in America and reinforced the need to recompose the 
commercial networks towards cabotage trade in the Mediterranean (Elliott 
1982, p. 52; García Espuche 1998). This was happening at a time of com-
petition from products from other countries in Seville and in particular 
those channelled through the Consulate into America, which also went 
against the interests of the principality—and, of course, those of the indus-
trial cities of Castile. As P. Vilar said, the decades that preceded the rebel-
lion were not marked by economic crisis, as a recovery had occurred. But 
the Catalan economy gravitated less towards Castile than it had in the 
sixteenth century.
The progressive distancing of Catalonia from the Habsburgs, however, 
was not brought about by purely economic factors. In the Cortes of 1585, 
the fundamental conflicts came to light: on one side, the conflict between 
the king and the Generalitat, which Philip II sought to reorganize and 
control; on the other side, the Catalan claims to limit the number of 
familiars of the Inquisition and restrain the institution’s power. The oli-
garchy of Barcelona, which at the beginning had been one of the closest 
sectors to the monarchy in Catalonia, found itself from 1586 in an open 
clash over the naming of ciutadans honrats (honoured citizens) which, far 
from daunting the Crown, led it to make a series of scandalous appoint-
ments. And, if a compromise agreement was eventually reached, an 
important short-term tension occurred (Amelang 1986, pp. 46–62). This 
came at precisely the moment when the Catalan Cortes increased their 
9 Elliott (1982, pp. 42–7); Simon i Tarrés (1999). For the idea of Spain as an extension of 
Castile, see Thompson (2005) and Cardim (2014).
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contribution to the king (500,000 libras in 1585 and as has been said 
1,100,000 in 1599) and when they came to normalize the payment of the 
quinto, a tax on the fifth of taxes and municipal sisas (Hernández 1996, 
passim). In a country that had managed to maintain the principle that 
each kingdom should meet its own costs, the Union of Arms would be 
rejected by force. And the exasperation and rudeness of Olivares when 
faced with the slow proceedings of the Cortes would add fuel to this fire 
(Elliott 1982). In this context, during the 1630s Philip IV had preceded 
to the massive sale of positions of ciutadans honrats (Amelang 1986).
But, above all, the conflictive pact between the Catalan elites and the 
monarchy was different to its equivalent accord in Castile. Certainly, the 
great noble families—the Cabrera, the Cardona, or the Requesens—had 
formed solid ties with Castilian and Valencian families and, by this route, 
with the Crown. Absorbed by—and at times secondary within—the great 
Castilian lineages, some of these houses would be closer to the court and 
the king than to Catalonia’s internal problems. And there was no shortage 
of patrician dynasties, such as the Franquesa, that managed to prosper 
thanks to their ties to the Court in Madrid. But the economic difficulties 
of the provincial nobility and their problems in reproducing their lineages, 
manifested in banditry (Elliott 1990, p. 117), provide evidence of their 
more problematic integration into the empire’s patronage system and, 
consequently, the relative difficulty of this group in thereby achieving its 
social survival and promotion. It is very significant, for example, that only 
14 of the 1400 members of the Military Orders in 1625 were Catalans 
(Elliott 1963, p. 74). This fact not only marked differences in respect to 
Castile but also to Aragon and, above all, Valencia, where the Military 
Orders and the presence of the mid-ranking nobility in them had been 
very significant. Various similarities existed between the elites of Castile 
and that of Catalonia, which played a vital role in the conflict of 1640. 
But, to an extent that was unthinkable in Castile, the Catalan elite was 
made up of lawyers and university graduates who had mixed with the 
semi-urban, mid-ranking nobility that was also increasingly university edu-
cated (Amelang 1986). This gave the elite economic independence and, 
more important, a type of constitutional vision of politics that sat badly 
next to the sort of absolutism that Philip IV and the Count Duke were so 
keen to promote.
The Catalan fiscal system, much less efficient in tying Crown and county 
than its Castilian equivalent, had not created a clear integration; nor had it 
forged as solid a conflictive pact between the king and urban oligarchies. 
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A part of the oligarchy of Barcelona had subscribed to the censals emitted 
upon the tax system of the city to pay for the king’s debts. And the same 
had happened at a lower level in many towns of the principality (Elliott 
1963, p. 139). But the independence of the Diputació with respect to the 
king, its ‘dubious financial actions’ (Elliott 1963, p. 141), and the tempo-
rary character of the services had prevented the Principality’s tax system 
from becoming a continuous and systematic support for the debts of the 
king. It was impossible to imagine in Catalonia a single city becoming a 
‘pensionopolis’—a fount of pensions and offices—that, according to 
Fernández Albaladejo (1992), had been crucial for the fiscal pact between 
the king and kingdom (1992) in Castile. And it was also impossible to con-
ceive of something of the proportions of the accord over the collection of 
the alcabalas or the millones, upon which the same pact had been estab-
lished in Castile. As has been said, the very system of setting censos on may-
orazgos, so important in binding nobles to king in Castile, functioned 
differently throughout the Crown of Aragon, where royal permission was 
not necessary (Abadía 1998). In certain circumstances in Catalonia, favours 
and privileges were granted to elites. Above all, this was done to continue 
or prolong the meetings of the Cortes. Nor did the Catalans entirely fail to 
secure appointments to positions in the administration. But the monarchi-
cal state was not as developed as in Castile and nor, therefore, was the scope 
for patronage and clientele arrangements. With the great offices and favours 
of the empire in the hands of the Castilians, the prospects of the Catalan elites 
were more remote, except for those  members of families (mentioned above) 
belonging to the highest branches of the aristocracy (Vilar 1962, vol. I, 
p. 368; Molas 1996). In other words, the political system was much less 
efficient than in Castile at creating conditions that would have allowed the 
empire and the composite monarchy to become the solution to the domi-
nant coalition’s social development and expansion. On the contrary, the 
destabilizing effects of absolutism would make themselves felt (see Chap. 4).
The pressure exerted by the duke of Alcalá on Catalan towns, with the 
billeting of troops and the other measures introduced by Olivares, broke 
the previous pacts. Despite the Cortes refusing to back the Union of Arms, 
Catalonia’s contributions to the defence of the monarchy also increased, 
as we have seen (Bernabé 1993). The sense that the Crown did not carry 
out its fundamental duty to control banditry and maintain order came to 
add to the negative effect of the devaluations of Castilian money that cir-
culated in considerable quantities in Catalonia (Elliott 1963, Chapter 3). 
Yet the conflict that was unleashed in 1640 was much more than the sum 
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of these parts and cannot be explained solely from this perspective. It had 
deeper political and even cultural components whose origins lay in tradi-
tions and also, importantly, in language. But, fundamentally, the political 
economy that created this weaker variant of the conflictive pact lay beneath 
these uprisings of 1640. This view can even in part explain the solution to 
the crisis. Catalonia—and above all its governing class—was divided into 
supporters of the French Bourbons and the Spanish Habsburgs. And after 
13 years of war, the problems of both countries brought about an agree-
ment that led to the domination of the latter over the principality. The 
conflict was very expressive of something shared with the Portuguese case: 
the mixture of civil war and international conflict found in both episodes.
What followed lies beyond the scope of this study. The result would be 
a very unstable conflictive pact between the Crown and the elites. Above 
all, the tension continued to manifest itself in the fight over the system for 
confiscation and the return to previous levels of self-government (Simon i 
Tarrés 2011, pp.  61–97). But it also resulted in a process of drawing 
together that passed through the renovation of a group of ‘honoured citi-
zens’ of Barcelona thanks to the king’s appointments, as well as those of 
the local aristocracy itself (Amelang 1986) that, if it did not lead to a total 
agreement with the Crown, at least put in place better bases for it and—
according to some authors—even led to a greater presence in Madrid 
(Soldevila 1962; Vilar 1962).
From the perspective of this study, the differences with Portugal have a 
heuristic value. Both conflicts took an international character. Quite pos-
sibly the insertion of Catalonia and Portugal within Castile’s social and 
economic life was to a similar degree. The benefits their elites received 
from the Spanish empire were also very limited in both cases. The elites of 
both countries had developed a sense of imagined community based on a 
linguistic distinction and so on. But Catalonia, without an empire, was less 
attractive to an exhausted France, than Portugal was for an England which, 
coming out from the ashes of the revolution, increased its aspirations over 
a very promising Portuguese empire. Catalonia lacked the international 
imperial webs almost impossible for the Habsburgs to control and which 
even allowed for expeditions like that of Salvador Correia de Sà. Nor had 
it the possibilities of obtaining international support in exchange for privi-
leges and trade concessions, such as those obtained from the Dutch in 
1661–1663, which allowed the monarch to concentrate forces on the pen-
insula. In part as a consequence of such factors, Catalonia could not even 
dream of dynastic alliances like that of Barbara de Braganza and Charles II. 
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It is impossible to know if, having met such conditions, Catalonia would 
have become independent. Furthermore, many more differences could be 
added. But reasoning in this sense helps to better understand to what 
extent globalization, again, was influencing the live of Europeans and 
more in particular of the Portuguese.
The Renewal of the American Colonial Pact
 A Renovated and Difficult Agreement
The American colonies provided the opposite case to Catalonia, Naples, 
and Portugal. Here there were also confrontations. But, far from leading 
to a general rupture, a series of pacts was set down in depth and in the 
creation of a space of understanding with the Crown.
Until almost 1570 the general American fiscal burden, leaving aside the 
quinto of the mines, had been relatively light (Chap. 2). But the military 
commitments in Europe and the costs associated with the construction of 
the colonial state rendered the incomes from the mines insufficient and 
forced Madrid to try to increase its fiscal demands. The measures employed 
to this effect were to be the same as, or very similar to, those used in Castile 
and implied a relationship with elites that was formally very analogous. This 
led to the increase of the alcabalas, to the sale of wastelands and public 
offices and the introduction of the media annata (again, a tax on the suc-
cession to offices) and similar measures, the majority of these being part of 
bargaining with the colonial elites. To mitigate the increase in the alcabalas 
and the imposition of new tax burdens, the cities were given the chance to 
oversee their collection and management through the creation of sisas 
(Amadori 2012, pp. 10–15), something which, as in Castile, strengthened 
the power of the oligarchies and created areas of agreement with the 
Crown.10 The same could be said of the creation of juros, to which the oli-
garchies subscribed (Adrien 1981). The municipal authorities even recurred 
to the seizure of Indian possessions to swell the cajas that, it was claimed, 
were to be used in the defence of the weaker areas of the empire (see below 
and Moutoukias 1988). They also developed the system of donativos that, 
as we have seen, was a form of exchanging resources in money, men, or 
equipment, for economic and political privileges (Amadori 2012).
10 For a more specific list of the areas of fiscal income in America, see both TePaske (1983) 
and Amadori (2012, pp. 19–23).
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Things were not, however, confined to fiscal level. In difference to 
Castile, the Crown did not yet recur to the sale of titles and jurisdictions. 
But the rhythm of legitimizing alienated lands (composiciones de tierras) 
continued or even increased, as did the granting of property rights to soci-
ety in general and to the elites in particular. As Ruggiero Romano has 
shown in his excellent study (2004), the way that these grants were con-
ferred meant that the Crown became the final guarantor of property 
rights. In this way, from the end of the sixteenth century, the emerging 
elites bought large tracts of land with which they established the great 
ranches of Mexico or the sugar or tobacco farms, to give examples from 
New Spain. And the same happened in Peru. Moreover the process of 
granting mining rights continued (Bakewell 1990, 1991).
On top of all of this came similar deals with the merchant and financial 
elites. The great traders of Lima and Mexico benefited from privileges to 
continue to feed their growing economic resources with this political capi-
tal. As we have seen, the Mexican elite involved in the Consulate were 
able, with the support of the town council, to secure advantageous accords 
with the Crown in exchange for money. Cases of this sort are very expres-
sive of the type of practices that lay at the basis of this relationship. And 
similar practices can be found in the fiscal negotiations between the 
Consulate of Lima and the Crown (Gasch 2015a; Amadori 2012).
The development of colonial society brought about important changes 
in ecclesiastical organization. America—or the zones of greatest Spanish 
presence—became full of parishes, ecclesiastical councils, archbishoprics 
(five), and dioceses (thirty, plus four in the Philippines); these were allo-
cated important sources of income: lands, tithes, and even industrial estab-
lishments in some cases. On top of this there were, from an early stage, 
charitable foundations and piety projects, confraternities, and other eccle-
siastical institutions in whose government laymen played a very prominent 
role. And these were very wealthy institutions. In addition, an expansion 
of the religious orders took place from the moment of conquest itself. The 
evidence of this process (see, e.g. Céspedes 2009, pp.  250–63) can be 
used in an interpretation that comes close to the one presented here for 
Castile (Kicza 1999). The transposition into America of an economy of 
legitimation similar to that of the Iberian Peninsula fed these foundations 
and their growing wealth thanks to donations by elites. These endow-
ments were the result not only of cultural beliefs very suitable to the politi-
cal economy of this society, but also, and as in the peninsula, these 
institutions were soon to become an area into which elites would expand, 
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one offering an outlet to many of their members. This development turned 
the Church into a ‘less indigenous’ institution, but it certainly did not 
reduce its enormous power over a population where Catholicism, often 
highly mixed in with older beliefs, exercised great influence (Céspedes 
2009). It was precisely its proximity to the lowest ranks of society that 
gave religion its enormous stabilizing power upon the social system. But 
this is better understood if we take into account the notable control 
exerted by the Crown over ecclesiastical resources (Elliott 2006, p. 205).
The Church was also key to establishing and maintaining a certain 
social order in a world of enormous internal differences. But it was not the 
only factor. The Leyes Nuevas had created a framework in which the rights 
of the Indian were theoretically recognized. The establishment of Indian 
rural communities and towns enjoying a certain degree of autonomy and 
which, despite the usurpations, retained control over common lands 
(Coatsworth 2008) operated to the same effect. So did the recognition of 
misappropriated lands which, if elites took the lion’s share, also benefited 
the lower echelons of society (see the figures given by Romano 2004, 
pp. 88–90) who, in this way, came to see the Crown as a guarantee of their 
claims on their possessions. And from the end of the sixteenth century, 
property rights were guaranteed increasingly by ‘the application of Spanish 
laws’ rather than by registers dating back to before the conquista (Elliott 
2006, p. 203), thus tying them all to the king’s decisions and creating 
dependence and loyalty. In the end, the possibility of flight, a common 
practice given the difficulty of controlling America’s enormous spaces and 
huge range of available resources, acted at the same time as a safety valve 
against uprisings among the lowest levels of that society, be they Indians, 
slaves, mulatos, or any others.
The consequences of this conflictive pact in the colonies were not con-
fined to the strengthening of the ties with the Crown and internal stability. 
We should also think of it being set down upon other values, among which 
religion—in opposition to the Protestant faith of the enemy—must have 
played a highly important role (Schwartz 2008). But, above all, the imme-
diate consequence was the social amplification of the reproductive capacity 
of the elites. As in the Iberian Peninsula, the opportunity to move and 
circulate its members from the Church to commerce and administration 
and so on, and to provide an outlet to tensions, was established in its 
heart. It also offered them the chance to maintain their multi-functionality 
and to circulate different forms of capital within these networks which, at 
times, were dispersed in space (Chap. 7). What had been established was, 
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moreover, for the moment a much more flexible elite than that of the 
metropolis, where the prejudices of honour, for example, were much more 
evident. As a result of all of this, America would be an immense space for 
the use of political, economic, and social resources, marked by a high 
degree of social mobility among the elites that could, in this way, satisfy 
aspirations for promotion with considerable ease and thus avoid the social 
and political ruptures that aborted institutional development and secured 
the prevailing political economy.11 This process, at the same time, being 
based on vertical negotiations between the Crown and very dispersed 
and diverse groups, contributed to maintaining the empire’s poly-nuclear 
character.
The colonial pact was not based only upon the hierarchical relation-
ships between the Crown and the American elites. A system of interre-
gional co-responsibility developed that strengthened the defensive 
capabilities of the colonies and, therefore, property rights when faced with 
other powers. In this way a step forward was taken in the organization of 
monetary flows between the different treasuries or cajas (Chap. 2). And, 
from the end of the sixteenth century, the regions of special sensitivity in 
the colonial defensive system, such as Puerto Rico, began to receive grow-
ing quantities of silver from other parts of the empire, such as New Spain 
(Vilar 1974; Pacheco 2012, pp.  115–24). The same was happening in 
other areas of strategic importance, such as the Philippines, where the 
figures are also highly indicative of how until 1645 defensive costs far out-
stripped all others (Alonso 2012, p. 282). This capacity to move sums in 
imperial circuits without many juridical problems, which constituted a 
fundamental difference in respect to what was happening in the European 
states of this composite monarchy, has been considered as the ‘secret of 
the empire’ or, put in other words, the key to its long survival (Marichal 
and von Grafenstein 2012).
Behind these developments was the growing decentralization in the use 
of imperial military resources and in the development of the local militias 
mentioned above (Chap. 7). These military efforts, which resulted in a 
high degree of local autonomy, did not prevent the capture of small islands 
in the Caribbean, and particularly in the West Indies, by the Dutch, 
11 One of the consequences of this situation lay in the enormous capacity of certain families 
of the Latin American elite who, being denied mechanisms for the preservation of their lin-
eage and memory similar to those of European aristocrats, were in many cases able to survive 
until today.
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English, and French, some of whose settlements would be recognized by 
Spain in the Treaty of Munster and then the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 
(Céspedes 2009, map XIV, p. 277). But this form of decentralized military 
organization most definitely was one of the reasons—if not the only one, 
as we shall see—that prevented these European rivals from bursting into 
America and achieving control over huge dominions in the continent, as 
had happened at Pernambuco.
The colonial system had arrived at a status quo that would only gain 
strength and be further consolidated and reshaped in the following 
decades.
The relationships between the metropolis and the American elites had 
been consolidated. Despite there being some anti-fiscal movements—
such as the revolt of Peru in the 1590s—a long series of local tumults and 
even a permanent situation of structural conflicts and of tensions within 
the elites, as in the case of México (Israel 1975; Ballone 2017; Álvarez de 
Toledo 2011), and many movements of resistance, nothing similar to the 
Catalan, or Portuguese events, happened in America.12 There existed a 
sort of equilibrium that constituted a variety of the prevailing formula in 
Castile and in which tensions but not generalized rebellions were the 
norms. This is not to present a narrowly materialist interpretation of the 
reasons for the support and loyalty of American societies to the Crown. If 
recent views that underline the colonial pact from the perspective of the 
political economies have a fault, it lies in that they overlook the enormous 
importance of ideological factors that were implicit in it. They focus 
overly on demonstrating how this pact was also the result of a political 
economy that, as is generally recognized today, was based upon bartering 
and negotiation.13 As in Castile, this relationship between elites and the 
monarchy lay upon transfers of immense volumes of economic resources 
and social and political capital in both directions. The result was a collec-
tion of accords and pacts with corporations and social groups who, with-
out having a common representative body before the king similar to the 
Castilian Cortes, were arriving at an entente with Madrid. They had 
12 We still need a general study on the very complex social and political upheavals in Latin 
America which offers a typology and interpretation, but the reader can find a fast synthesis in 
Bennassar (1980, pp. 221–252).
13 The phenomenon has been very clearly set out for the eighteenth century (see, among 
others, the works of Grafe and Irigoin 2012). Here our interest focuses on showing how the 
empire arrived at this situation.
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established property rights over lands, mines, and even privileges in the 
use of political and fiscal resources that together conferred autonomy 
upon the American oligarchies. These same property rights and privileges 
afforded them a degree of security that raised the opportunity costs or the 
risks involved in any break with Madrid or drawing closer to other powers. 
Part of this accord was also based on the practice of turning a blind eye to 
smuggling and to the increasing presence of forced labour—camouflaged 
under different formulae—in America. This is not to present a cynical 
vision of the actions of elites but merely to show that the political econ-
omy of the empire would be one important component of its longevity.
At the same time, the investment in the military and protection system 
had been strengthened, thus assuring these elites of a certain level of con-
fidence in relation to any possible attack by outsiders as well as a coercive 
system that, should the need arrive, would serve to maintain the colonial 
order. If such defences were not enough, the foreign powers that employed 
highly aggressive mercantilist policies had been able to seize enclaves that 
did not entail high protection costs and from which it was very easy to 
organize contraband with Spanish colonies. For the reasons we have 
explained, it was better for Amsterdam, London, and more and more Paris 
to infiltrate the empire rather than conquer it. The peace treaties signed in 
1648 and afterwards consolidated this situation. Concessions such as the 
settlements in the West Indies, the asiento on black slaves to England, and 
so on would be, as ‘legal smuggling’ had also been, the recognition of a 
fait accompli that would frame the history of both the empire and Spain 
itself. The system guaranteed not only the longevity and political ‘loyalty’ 
of this empire—but also its economic consequences and specific place in 
the history of the empires, as we shall see.
 Ecosystems, Globalization, and Plenty Versus Formal Institutions
This very delicate and unstable scheme was able to maintain itself thanks 
to one other fact: economic growth. This development may appear even 
more eye-catching to the extent that, as we have seen, a sizeable number 
of the institutions the Spanish implanted in America were scarcely condu-
cive towards it. At least this is the case when viewed from the usual per-
spective of institutional economics (chapter 7; Coatsworth 2008).
Certainly, the economic history of Latin America has been viewed as a 
failure. And this impression, logically, has been extended to its capacity to 
generate economic growth. The more empirical forms of research have, 
however, pointed in another direction. In R. Romano’s excellent compari-
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son of the ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’ in Europe and America, it 
became clear that the iron century was not, in comparative terms, a period 
of recession in the American economy as a whole (1993). The same author 
has also provided additional proof to support his thesis, as well as further 
in-depth explanation of it (2004). Similar conclusions have been reached 
by Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2016), using more refined—and risky—
calculations.14 Taking both works together, it is fair to argue that, within 
regional differences, the American economy regained a path towards 
growth from the end of the sixteenth century, and this phase lasted until at 
least 1630–1640. After the establishment of the plantation economy, the 
boom in urbanization, and the intensification of regional economic circuits 
(Chap. 7) and despite a brief crisis of uneven regional impact, from 
1640–1650 onwards, practically all indicators point towards (moderate) 
expansion. As a matter of fact, population figures in 1700 were higher than 
in 1600, in spite of the mid-century problems.15 This is also reflected in the 
demographic recovery, due as much to internal factors as to migrations, 
within which an important role would be played by the forced movements 
of people associated with the trade in slaves (Romano 2004, pp. 63–7).
What were the reasons for this expansion, which came into its own 
from the midpoint of the century? In reality, rather than be a continuation 
of previous trends, it must be seen as a series of regional impulses with 
widely diverging roots. To understand it in its general framework, it is 
necessary to begin, to my mind, from various assumptions that acted in 
combination: (a) the limited impact of formal institutions—state institu-
tions, if you wish—on the assignation of productive factors in an economy 
in which informal economy was so much developed, (b) the enormous 
abundance of resources per person derived from new regional ecosystems 
after the dramatic demographic recession of the sixteenth century, (c) the 
scope to put these resources to use through the introduction of European 
technology, and (d) the positive impact that international commerce and 
globalization would have in this context.
As we have seen, forms of property, the importance of forced labour 
regimes, the fragmentation and limits of the juridical system, the scope 
for using private violence, and so on appear in principle not to be very 
14 I must thank the authors for providing me with a copy of this study before its publication 
and allowing me to cite it.
15 Following Romano’s reconstruction of the figures, the population of Latin America had 
passed from 10 million in 1600 to 11.8 in 1700 and 19.3 in 1800 (Romano 2004, p. 61).
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conducive to economic development—at least, this is the case from any 
perspective based upon the new institutional economics.16 But in a terri-
tory as immense as Latin America, benefitting from such a positive rela-
tionship between resources and population, the (negative) effect of these 
institutions would have to be, necessarily, limited.17 If the capacity for 
enforcement wielded by state institutions was reduced, then so was their 
scope for negative effects.
The collision of ecological systems had led to the destruction of the 
original ecosystems. But the result was the triumph of new variants draw-
ing from a wide range of resources: large unpopulated zones belonging to 
no one (outside, therefore, of the property rights that appear to have been 
so negative for economic development), enormous herds of sometimes 
semi-wild livestock, thick and rich woods, minerals that could be readily 
exploited, and so on.
The primary sector underwent important changes. One of the most 
significant was the use of ploughs and agricultural iron tools of European 
origin, water mills, and other inventions whose effects remain unstudied 
and, therefore, unknown. But perhaps more eye-catching was the diffu-
sion of mules as a beast of transport and burden.18 According to Romano’s 
calculations, in the eighteenth century, these would reach an animal-per- 
human ratio that was more than double the European level. This provided 
a source of exosomatic energy whose overall impact upon the productivity 
of work would be double that in the Old World. But, in addition, an out-
come would be seen in forms of ‘livestock breeding’ that were not only 
based upon inexhaustible supplies of land (very often belonging to no 
one) but also on hunting and the herding of wild livestock for sale, as 
occurred in the Argentinian Pampas, to give just one example. Progressively 
the ecosystems destroyed by ‘ecological imperialism’ were substituted by 
others in which wheat was extended (and, little by little, the vine), as were 
sugar, cacao, tobacco, coffee, and many other products closely tied to 
16 To use Coatsworth’s words: “as in most premodern states and empires, however, Iberian 
institutions were not designed to promote factor mobility, technological change, or friction-
less transaction” (2006, p. 256).
17 It is worth remembering that we are referring to a surface area of some 19,197,000 km2, 
that until 1492 had supported a population of between 30 and 50 million (Livi Bacci 2008, 
3–19).
18 The phenomenon also gave rise to the development of a mule market of transcendental 
importance and trans-regional in scope, as Sempat Assadourian has shown in some of his 
studies (1982, pp. 18–55).
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globalization. And there even took place a development in the use of 
products originally from America, such as the evergreen tree, maize, or the 
cassava tree, whose expansion European agents facilitated (Garavaglia 
1983; Saldarriaga 2011).
The impact of these advances was not only felt in what can be called 
(according to today’s classification) the primary sector. The expansion of 
the sugar industry, for instance, was also made possible by the chance to 
dedicate extensive land areas to graze the oxen and beasts of burden 
employed in these farms. But, in addition, the dynamism of this sector 
would be vital to the technological improvements. The expansive rhythm 
of the construction of windmills is proof of this, as is the diffusion of many 
of the Brazilian advances, such as the use of three vertical cylinders or the 
system of cauldrons for cooking (Gómez-Galvarriato 2006). Thus the 
existence of forced labour—and even the prohibitions that existed in some 
areas of Spanish America against it—did not necessarily abort productive 
expansion or technical improvements. The industrial growth was also seen 
in the textile sector and made evident in the development of the obrajes. 
These were workshops designed for large-scale production, based on the 
vertical integration of the distinct phases of production and represented an 
important advance on the production in small workshops that predomi-
nated in the Iberian Peninsula (Miño 1991). Their spread is evident 
between 1580 and 1630, both in New Spain and in Peru, although from 
this point they entered into crisis in the first of these areas and stagnation 
in the latter (Miño 1991, pp. 135–41). Even if they appear not to have led 
to continuous technological improvements, this was clearly a sector that 
also progressed despite being predominantly based upon forced reparti-
tions and forced labour as a form of debt payment.19
Other important industries of the period, such as construction, are also 
highly significant in this regard. The sector played its part in a notable devel-
opment between 1580 and 1630–1640. This ran parallel to the develop-
ment of urban life (Kagan and Marías 1998) and the advance of religious 
institutions, whose vitality in building has been measured (Van Oss 1976). 
And this in turn was tied to the great cycle of the mining economy, the 
increase in the waves of immigration, and the branching out of elites into 
the ecclesiastical sector. The economic recovery can also be related to the 
diffusion of European building techniques and was undertaken despite the 
predominance of semi-forced salary systems, such as work to pay for debts, 
19 The system consisted in giving workers forced loans that they would have to repay with 
their labour and which thus served to retain them.
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which were very much at odds with the rules of a free market (Romano 
2004). The naval industry also expanded in some zones to the extent that 
they dedicated a greater portion of their budgets to defence and introduced 
European techniques in shipbuilding (Goodman 1997). If during the 
period 1551–1600 the vessels built in America constituted just 2.7% of 
those in the Old World, this proportion rose to 26.5% and then 22.06% dur-
ing 1601–1650 and 1651 and 1700, respectively (Romano 2004, p. 261).
Mining, where the expansion of mercury-based systems of amalgamation 
provided a good example of the same march forward, also offers another 
dimension of this phenomenon: in spite of the well-established inefficiency 
of the Crown’s chosen systems, growth in this sector would be a fact. The 
case of iron mining, vital for this growing economy, and of the use of 
potassium nitrate and sulphur, vital to the production of gunpowder, or 
salt, whose production was supposedly controlled by Crown monopoly sys-
tems, are very expressive (Romano 2004, pp. 145–8). If, perhaps, its devel-
opment would have been still greater in another institutional context, still 
the production of these goods grew thanks to clandestine or semi-clandes-
tine forms of production typical of an economy where informal networks 
and their capacity to generate confidence played a highly relevant role.
Contraband—an expression of the lack of efficiency of formal institutions—
was, however, the cornerstone of a commercial growth that was pushing for-
ward many of these sectors. These were illegal or semi-legal systems that by 
definition functioned on the basis that it was impossible to recur to the Crown 
as a guarantor of contracts and as a form of reducing risks and transaction 
costs. But at the same time, these were activities in which informal networks 
were able to generate forms of confidence through reputation, family, and 
extended family networks and formulas of a similar sort and so push forward 
an economic expansion.
All in all, the outcome of formal institutions that were in principle an obsta-
cle for economic growth was not economic inactivity or recession. Rather the 
development of an informal sector of the economy that added to—and some-
times mixed with—activities more easily detectable by the authorities gener-
ated increasing quantities of wealth.20 As a result, the so- called ‘crisis of the 
seventeenth century’ appears to have been more a coming together or super-
20 This is not to say that state action did not have effects upon the economy. To give just 
one example, everything indicates that the crisis of the New Spain’s workshops or obrajes 
after 1630 should be understood in relation to not only the momentary crisis of the mining 
sector in the region but also to the Crown’s prohibitions of commerce with Peru, as a means 
of protecting the export of these goods from the metropolis (Miño 1991, p. 108).
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imposition of alternate economic cycles which, since the middle of the six-
teenth century, had brought about more or less constant growth. Of course, 
another matter was the type of society and political regime that generated this 
system, as well as its effect of exacerbating economic and social inequalities 
and intensifying the imperial exploitation of thousands of peoples.
regiOnal reCessiOn and new grOwth patterns 
in iberia, C. 1600–1668
As in other areas of seventeenth-century studies, the vision of the Iberian 
economy in this period has been very negative. Not only was it seen as 
being in crisis but also in recession and even in decline (Llopis 1994). 
From an international perspective, Spain and Italy served by their very 
nature as the stages for the crisis of the seventeenth century brought about 
to a large extent by the survival of feudal structures (Hobsbawm 1954).
A vision of this sort should, however, be set in the context of a wider lit-
erature that has revised downwards the capacity of the state to extract 
resources from society (Collins 1988) and poses the question of the real 
impact of formal institutions upon the economy. It is also interesting to study 
the so-called ‘crisis of the seventeenth century’ in relation to the general 
changes occurring in Europe’s economy, whose relationship with the process 
of globalization was very close indeed. In this sense, and as Jan De Vries has 
shown (1984), Europe passed from an urban model based on the develop-
ment of the cities of the interior to one which, progressively but decidedly, 
was to unfold in the coastal cities, which were more directly affected by inter-
national commerce. This process also combined with the shifting of urban 
dynamism towards the north of Europe and specifically into an area between 
Paris, Hamburg, and London. And this change was associated with the 
capacity of countries such as Holland, England, and, increasingly, France to 
build mercantilist political formations capable of capturing higher propor-
tions of world commerce. See these trends in Maps 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4.
The question, therefore, is: did the Iberian economies adjust to this 
scheme? And what were the transformations and factors that conditioned 
them?
Big Trends, Big Numbers: Recession in the Empire’s Core
Recent studies on the Spanish economy of the epoch have shown that in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, a fall in real output per capita 
occurred that was even more intense and long-lasting than in other 
countries, Italy included (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2013, 
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Map 8.1 European urban networks, 1700
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
Map 8.2 European urban networks, 1800
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
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Map 8.3 Growth and recession of the European urban networks, 1600–1700
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
Map 8.4 Growth and recession of the European urban networks, 1700–1800
Sources: My own elaboration with data from De Vries (1984) and my data of Spanish towns.
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figure 7, table 1). This situation appears evident in the centre of the 
Iberian Peninsula, and above all on the Castilian plateau, where the end 
of the sixteenth-century crisis gave way to an economic recession accom-
panied by structural changes.21
The dismantling of the previous urban network continued, while Madrid’s 
macrocephaly was reaching its zenith (Gelabert 1995. See Graph 8.1 in this 
chapter). The organization of an empire in which rent-seeking management 
and royal favour were good choices for palliating the rigidity in seigniorial 
incomes further accelerated the migration of noble and patrician families 
towards Madrid, where royal patronage was dispensed, information costs on 
the marriage market were lower, and informal lineage networks were more 
efficient. With the shifting of conspicuous consumption to the court, the 
service and construction sectors, the two most highly affected by elite spend-
ing patterns, entered into recession in the cities of the Duero Valley.22
21 The reader can find some of the following arguments with more visible empirical evi-
dence in Yun (1999c, 2002a).
22 Cases such as that of Valladolid are highly expressive (Urrea 1996). Madrid, in contrast, 
underwent the very opposite process (Ringrose 1983a, pp. 112–4). On the migration of 







































MADRID VALLADOLID SEGOVIA PALENCIA MED. de RIOSECO
Graph 8.1 The demographic crisis—and recession—of the cities of the Duero 
Valley and the expansion of Madrid
Sources: Yun (2002b).
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Without being the only cause of the problems (Chap. 6), fiscal pressure 
did not help industry while monetary manipulations negatively affected 
trade in one of the peninsula’s more monetized areas. The peace settle-
ments of the early 1600s facilitated the country’s inundation by northern 
light fabrics, thus aggravating the difficulties of Castilian industries, which 
were unable in the short run to challenge the imports by imitating 
northern techniques. Yet this was not simply the result of political devel-
opments: it was, in many regards, a consequence of the function of inter-
national commercial networks. The growing need for silver and other 
colonial products for Dutch commerce in the Baltic intensified even fur-
ther their interest in capturing these goods in Spain and America and, by 
this route, attempting to level out the commercial balance with Castile 
(Israel 1990, pp. 44–5, and 54). Despite the occasional blip, English com-
merce in the Mediterranean continued to expand, and increasing quanti-
ties of raw materials for industry, such as silk, travelled to the North, while 
ever greater amounts of British ‘new draperies’ were sold in the 
Mediterranean areas (Brenner 1993, table 1.3). Spain became the ‘leading 
market outside northern Europe for English cloths’, and by 1620 Albion’s 
merchants were selling products at below their production price purely as 
a means of gaining access to goods from America (Brenner 1993, p. 30). 
It was no coincidence or accident that several regional industrial centres 
should have collapsed at this juncture or that the silk industry of Toledo 
was also running into difficulties. Granada had already entered into crisis 
and was now more focused on the export of raw silk. Furthermore, for-
eign competition in silk fabrics and other Asian products in the American 
market became more intensive.23
Madrid represented exactly the sort of marketplace that was relatively 
easy for foreign products to penetrate. Being a highly concentrated market, 
it involved relatively low transport and distribution and retailing costs, once 
foreign products had passed through its city gates; these were, precisely, the 
conditions most favourable to foreign goods, given the high proportion of 
their final price that derived from expenses incurred in their shipping and 
delivery. Research into the five great guilds of Madrid (the Cinco Gremios 
Mayores de Madrid) in later periods demonstrates the complex framework 
of competing interests that facilitated the distribution of imported goods 
(Pérez Sarrión 2016). Once Madrid had been taken, a very high percentage 
of the Castilian market had been won. The other important market, 
23 Gasch (2012), Boyajian (1993).
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America (in other words, Seville), had similar characteristics (above all else, 
a high degree of spatial concentration) and operated according to rules that 
were highly favourable to foreign production (Chap. 7).
The restructuration of the interior urban network was accompanied by 
important changes in the rural sector. The demographic trends both in 
towns and the countryside of this area are of evident recession (Yun 2004). 
The trends discernible in the tithes show similar tendencies, and wheat 
production declined by some 30% between 1600 and 1630 (Yun 1999a, 
table p.  54). In previous centuries the slow movement of inhabitants 
towards the south had brought overall benefits (Chap. 3). This was no 
longer the case, as emigrants no longer relocated in order to farm high-
quality soils; nor was this process as positive for the redistribution of land 
and labour as it was in the sixteenth century. On the contrary many dis-
placed families flocked to Madrid, whose growth continued unabated 
until 1630–1640 due to the arrival of artisans but also of marginalized 
people. The new model of the urban network in the interior, with Madrid 
disproportionately large and influential, and a very weak urban network 
around, made this commercialization more difficult. It was also accompa-
nied by a system of forced purchases exercised by Madrid (Ringrose 
1983a) that, being focused on the large proprietors, redistributed the 
commercial benefits among a very small elite of the peasantry.
Similar trends occurred in Extremadura and the interior Andalusia, as 
well as, quite possibly, in the Alentejo, in part because of the relative dry-
ing up of the flow of emigrants from the North. There are reasons for 
suspecting that the level of resistance to collapse may have been greater in 
these regions. But an agrarian system based on large properties, many of 
them devoted to less demanding labour crops—or only requiring seasonal 
work, such as harvesting olives trees—or to livestock farming, retarded 
demographic recovery and at best provoked stagnation. In the interior of 
Spain, only New Castile retained any resistance to decline. To be specific, 
baptisms recorded in the rural areas of this region fell more slowly than 
those of the Duero Valley (at least this was the case until 1640), as did the 
tithes (until 1630).
Crisis and Adaptation in the Peninsula’s Periphery
As we have seen, if the problems in the periphery should not be over-
looked, then the depth of the crisis and recession in the Iberian interior 
has led to extrapolations on the overall peninsula position that are not at 
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all correct. Above all, the calculations of Prados de la Escosura and Alvarez 
Nogal have to be nuanced. In a pioneering and seminal study, these schol-
ars base their estimate of GDP on the evolution of the cities. This approach 
predominantly reflects the decline of the central areas where the biggest 
cities were concentrated and which was the largest of the country. 
Therefore, if in terms of ‘Spain’ the figures can be correct, these estimates 
do not represent the regional differences, which are crucial in an economy 
composed in fact by the aggregation of regional subnational circuits. The 
resulting figures fail to include a more precise vision of developments in 
the peripheral zones, where small population centres and reasonably active 
rural economies were very dominant. In fact, the crisis did not have the 
same chronology and outcomes in other regions of the peninsula, and 
whether or not the crisis led to a recession depended on many factors, 
ecological conditions among them.
The problems were very obvious in the region from Galicia to Navarre, 
roughly the so-called Atlantic Spain (Chap. 3). Here, again, there is the 
sense of a world that was full to the brink and was being punished for its 
demographic hubris with outbreaks of disease. The ‘boom’ of the Armada 
years was followed by a deep ‘bust’, in which naval construction ran into 
serious difficulties (Goodman 1997). The severing of trading links with 
the north of Europe, the outbreak of wars with Flanders and England, and 
the growing privateering threat in the Atlantic posed a range of problems 
(Fernández de Pinedo 1974, p.  31). These did not, however, end the 
Basque iron industry, although it was comparatively resistant to change 
and technical innovation and clearly affected by the contraction of internal 
demand. For these reasons the sector was unable to replace lost imports 
and reduce costs, thus forfeiting its competitive edge in relation to its 
overseas rivals (Bilbao 1987, pp. 52–7). And all of these setbacks came on 
top of the contraction of the trade that linked some of these areas to other 
regional economies in the interior of the peninsula (Lanza 1991, 
pp. 121–2; Yun 1987). Around 1600, then, many of the sectors that had 
facilitated the expansion of the previous century were in trouble. Contact 
with outside regions was limited, as is demonstrated by the fall in com-
merce with the Duero Valley from 1610 to 1620 (Yun 1987) meaning 
that it was increasingly difficult to gain access to specie. The scarcity of 
cash had always been crucial to economies of this sort, which needed it to 
overcome deficits in basic products. Though many nuances should be 
added, one could accept the proposition that the region went through a 
crisis between 1590 and 1615–1620.
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Yet, the overall pattern would be very different from that of Castile. 
The region’s ecological conditions meant that it was always able to turn 
slowly to new alimentary resources such as rye, the chestnut tree, and mil-
let crops or those provided by the fishing industry or domestic livestock 
breeding. The abundance of forests guarantied the existence of a valuable 
cattle livestock and of a wide spectrum of food resources (Anes 1994). 
This ecosystem was receptive to the slow but continuous diffusion of 
maize from the beginning of the century, which greatly favoured its resis-
tance to the food crisis.24 And the fiscal burden took different forms here. 
The tax model based on sisas levied on commercial products would have a 
lesser impact in a region where family self-consumption was more com-
mon. Indeed even the products upon which taxes fell appear to have been 
less decisive—this was the case with wine, for example—and the final result 
was to avoid a recession of great intensity and scale (Saavedra 1993). The 
Crown had never sold lots of common lands in this region. The mid- term 
impact of the wars in Northern Europe was less than has been thought, 
and naval construction recovered sooner than has been thought (Grafe 
2006; Valdez-Bubnov 2011, pp. 73–88). These features help to explain 
why, for all the problems of the early seventeenth century, in Galicia, 
Asturias, Cantabria, the Basque Country, and Navarre, the fall in the num-
ber of baptisms came later and was slower than in other regions of Spain 
to the extent that the impression is more that of a crisis with stagnation 
rather than recession (Yun 1999a; Lanza 2010).
A picture of similar balances and nuances emerges from the great arc 
that runs from the Catalan Pyrenees through the Levant coasts to Eastern 
Andalusia. The problems affecting this large strip of land were in part simi-
lar to those of Castile: the consolidation of the seigniorial system, the rela-
tive depreciation of landlords’ incomes and the consequent struggle for 
produce, and the increasing indebtedness of the aristocracy and the rise of 
a peasant elite were also present here. As in the hinterland, landlord debts 
and pressure upon vassals were also factors (Casey 1983, pp. 135–6). In 
Valencia, for example, the uneven balance of pasture and arable lands 
posed considerable difficulties and was exacerbated by the crisis in trans-
humance livestock breeding (Casey 1983, p. 53). These problems were 
even clearer in Murcia. The expulsion of the Moriscos from 1609 also 
deprived these two areas of very valuable human capital with great skill in 
24 See Saavedra (1985), Barreiro (1984 pp. 296–303), Anes (1988 pp. 34–5), Fernández 
de Pinedo (1974), and Lanza (1991 pp. 158–77).
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irrigation, intensive agriculture, interregional trade, and silk production 
(Casey 1983; Vassberg 1996). The urban economy, industry, and trade 
were also sailing into choppy seas. Partly this was because the money mar-
ket did not favour the free flow of capital towards productive activities, as 
can be understood from the complaints about the censals levied on land-
lord incomes in Valencia (Casey 1983, pp. 95–7). The growth of the bor-
rowing by municipalities and the Generalitat in Catalonia must have had 
a similar effect. The silk industry of Valencia was being squeezed out by 
more competitive rivals. As in Castile, silk was slowly being transformed 
from a primary material used in domestic industry into a raw material 
exported to other areas of Europe (Casey 1983, pp. 89–92).
There were, however, some differences with Castile, which affected both 
rural and urban dynamisms. The spiralling number of estates and mayor-
azgos was not present to the same extent as in Castile. Moreover, in this 
broad eastern arc (and in Catalonia especially), the lower participation of the 
nobility in the imperial endeavours limited the importance of rent- seeking 
strategies and the search for political rents in the court as a substitutive for 
better economic management.25 This led, as we have seen, to banditry and 
insecurity in the countryside, which might have meant high transaction 
costs, but also improvements when the problem almost disappeared during 
the second half of the century. The agricultural sector was, moreover, nota-
ble for a certain dynamism in some areas. In Catalonia changes were occur-
ring that saw the diversification of crops linked to the masía and a more 
intensive agriculture in relation to the interior of the peninsula.26 Until 
1620–1625 the French emigration into Catalonia and, to a lesser degree, 
Valencia continued, and Murcia was able to repopulate uninhabited areas in 
these decades.27 Not even a blow such as the sale of the tierras baldías y 
concejiles had the effect that it might have done in areas of Castile.
Eva Serra’s study (1988) also reveals a growing diversification of pro-
duction which was part of an agriculture aimed at producing goods for 
the market and based upon wine, rice, the mulberry tree, and citric fruits 
(Vilar 1962, vol. I, pp.  389–90). These efforts not only allowed it to 
commercialize a greater percentage of its final produce but also to defraud 
25 Of course, this consideration did not include the juros in relation to Catalonia (Vilar 
1962, vol. I, pp. 357–62).
26 Vilar (1962, vol. I, p. 371), Durán (1998, p. 133), Serra (1988, pp. 404–5).
27 On Catalonia see Nadal and Giralt (1960, p. 69) and Durán (1998, pp. 128–31). On 
Valencia, Casey (1983, pp. 6–7).
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a higher proportion of rent due to landlords, thus reducing the pressure 
upon the peasantry. In both Valencia and Murcia, the expulsion of the 
Moriscos meant a lost opportunity for agrarian improvements but eventu-
ally resulted in the redistribution of economic activity and population, 
allowing for the emergence of a cereal-based agriculture in the dry lands. 
This switch entailed major changes. In Valencia the population was 
increasingly concentrated in littoral zones near the capital, a transforma-
tion which, it seems reasonable to assume, led to closer links between the 
countryside and city. As in Catalonia, hopes were founded on new com-
mercial crops. This was the case for rice, the vine, maize, and barilla, a 
plant linked to the booming glass industry and the production of soap. 
These advances were matched by drives to expand the irrigation system 
and even efforts dating back to the previous century to break new grounds 
(Casey 1983, pp. 51–8; Pérez and Lemeunier 1984, pp. 115–119). The 
development of the market can be discerned behind all of these initiatives; 
other significant factors were the reorganization of property, leading to 
the concentration of lands in medium-sized farms which represented a 
greater balance between the available lands and the workforce (Furió 
1995, pp. 324–6). Landlords of the sort found in Valencia, who drew 
their incomes from partición de frutos (the sharing of rent in kind) or 
farms leased over the long term in enfiteusis, could only encourage 
improvements in production: in this regard their interests coincided with 
those of their peasants or vassals. Property rights were positive here for 
economic recovery (Furió 1995, pp. 329–31). Combined with a greater 
flexibility in the land market and the lower impact of entitled lands, the 
overall result was a slow but clear recovery (Peris 1989, p. 501).
Cities too were in crisis but also far from collapsing. The arrival of new 
spices from Asia through Mediterranean trade (Chap. 7) would have a 
positive effect upon ports such as Alicante, which became a point of distri-
bution towards the peninsula’s hinterland. Alicante would also become a 
conduit into the Mediterranean for goods coming from America (Casey 
1983, pp. 82–4). Until at least 1620, the benefits of American trade and 
the northern commercial networks were felt from Malaga to Almeria 
(Pulido 1993). Other sectors of the economy remained active. Even at the 
end of the sixteenth century, the silk trade continued to be relatively stable, 
with links stretching from Valencia and Murcia to Toledo. In Catalonia and 
Valencia, the fiscal burden had not grown here as much as in the Meseta, 
and the type of taxes was not as negative as the millones. Furthermore, the 
coastal regions of eastern Spain had suffered on account of the censales. But 
 RUPTURES, RESILIENT EMPIRES, AND SMALL DIVERGENCES 
428
the more moderate character of institutional debts—if we compare with 
the Castilian state’s juros and the municipal censos—meant that the devia-
tion of capital from more productive investments like commerce was less 
intense (Vilar 1962, vol. I, p. 360). With bonds now providing lower yields 
and levels of seigniorial indebtedness having reached their natural limit, a 
more logical choice for investors was henceforth to plough their monies 
into commerce and productive activities. This conclusion was not entirely 
unexpected, for, as we have seen, in countries such as England, a similar 
process had occurred, albeit to a greater degree. The most important case 
was the textile sector of Barcelona. Here the problems of the guild-based 
industry would give rise the verlagssystem, more efficient and flexible at 
balancing offer and demand (Vilar 1962, I, pp. 383–387). Being situated 
on the coast, the eastern cities had the considerable advantage of a secure 
and regular provisioning system.
These positive forces also had an impact on the Mediterranean coasts of 
Eastern Andalusia. Although the crisis of the Granada silk industry was 
apparent, it did not disappear (Garzón 1972). More important, the coastal 
areas began benefiting from the slow but clear recovery of Mediterranean 
trade. The arrival of the Dutch and, above all, English animated small 
ports of the area and cities such as Malaga. Another part of this trade con-
sisted of products arriving in Seville and connected with the rest of the 
Mediterranean. One effect was the beginning of the cultivation and trade 
of raisins, which would subsequently become the most dynamic sector 
from the end of the century.
In many respects Portugal and, specifically, its littoral zones were simi-
lar to the description of the coastal areas of the Mediterranean and 
Cantabria. The available measurements on GDP per capita, as well as those 
of agrarian production, show that growth slowed from 1570 but that, 
after a levelling-off until 1625, they experienced a slow but sustained 
expansion until 1700. This phenomenon should be tied to American com-
merce and left its mark in the expansion of cities such as Lisbon and, above 
all, Porto. The second half of the seventeenth century witnessed an agrar-
ian expansion similar to that of the Spanish littoral: based on enfiteusis, it 
began with the development of commercial crops—wine would be the 
best example and the Porto zone the most important—and even exports 
(Barros 2007). Ties with England, more solid after the Restauraçao, were 
behind this expansive process and gained strength thanks to English inter-
est in exports to Brazil. It has been convincingly demonstrated that due to 
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this development, the empire’s contribution to seventeenth-century 
Portuguese growth was very positive (Costa, Palma and Reis 2015).
Thus, the so-called seventeenth-century crisis came later in some of 
these regions and was smoother and shorter than in the centre of the 
peninsula.
A New Pattern of Growth
It is impossible to deny the drama of the problems of the first decades of 
the century, above all if one considers that it was accompanied by the 
enormous loss of lives and poverty and that the economy was unable to 
comply with its fundamental mission in ancien régime societies: to main-
tain population levels.
But this is only evident in some regions, and the crisis also set down the 
grounds for a new expansive model, which was characterized by the major 
dynamism of the Iberian periphery (Ringrose 1996). Though intensities 
varied, the economic recovery was also felt in the centre during the sec-
ond half of the century. This is not the place to attempt an explanation of 
this revival.28 As always in pre-industrial economies, it was due to readjust-
ments of a Malthusian type, a better balance between livestock and crops, 
and the lowering of land rents (Anes 1994). The crisis also had positive 
effects as long as it provoked a redistribution of income. Variables such as 
the land rent-wage ratio, measuring the imbalance between landowners 
and workers, fell between 1590 and 1650 (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de 
la Escosura 2013, p. 9). These readjustments were also due to changes in 
the distribution of property. The concentration of land property and the 
emergence of new seigniorial estates in which land incomes rather than 
seigniorial rents were the basis of revenues activated the need to lease out 
lands thus creating better conditions for peasants able to rent those prop-
erties and for agrarian recovery. The concentration of capital in the hands 
of ecclesiastical institutions meant that they were increasingly able to offer 
censos and loans to farmers at interest rates below official levels. Beyond 
this, an even more complex bundle of factors was also at play. In any case, 
this explanation appears clear from this date when the evolution of bap-
tisms is examined (Graph 8.2). And the same can be said of the develop-
ment of tithes and even of the indicators of interior commerce (Yun 
1999a).
28 The reader interested in my own view can see it in Yun (1999a).
 RUPTURES, RESILIENT EMPIRES, AND SMALL DIVERGENCES 
430
It is very possible that, looked at as a whole, the evolution of the 
Spanish economy of the period may have been very similar to the Italian 
one, as described by Federico and Malanima (2004). The existing stud-
ies on Portugal also point in this direction (Palma and Reis 2016). In 
the final analysis, Portugal was simply another peripheral region of the 
Iberian Peninsula. This having been said, the subalpine crisis was shorter 
and  perhaps more creative than its Iberian counterpart (or, at least, that 
of Spain). But what happened in Spain was not different from the devel-
opmental model that was emerging in Europe, although perhaps its 
intensity or rhythm was. Maps on the density of town and city habita-
tion demonstrate that Spain—though more slowly—did recover its six-
teenth-century levels of urbanization (Álvarez Nogal and Prados de la 
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peripheral cities such as Lisbon, Porto, Barcelona, Cadiz, Malaga, and 
Valencia replaced the dynamism of the centres of the interior such as 
Segovia, Salamanca, Toledo, or Valladolid. See Maps 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 
8.4, which show patterns similar to the rest of Mediterranean Europe 
with urban recession between 1600 and 1700 and the slow but clear 
growth of coastal cities, with the exception of the Cantabrian coast.
In the second place, this recovery was achieved without a radical overhaul 
of the basic institutional framework, even if small rectifications had been 
made to it. This is all the more interesting to the extent that, as we have seen 
(Chap. 5), this framework was not in itself very positive for economic devel-
opment. As in the American case, but at a much more modest level, the rela-
tive abundance of resources, ecological conditions, small changes in property 
rights, leasing systems (such as the spread of enfiteusis and long-term leasing), 
and international commerce could create conditions in which recovery and 
growth were possible. Also, the fact that the pacts among elites, and the insti-
tutional framework derived from them, were very different in each region, 
which was logical in a composite monarchy, reduced the chances of the 
obstructions presented by the institutional framework prevalent in Castile 
from affecting the peninsula as a whole in the same way. As a result, the recov-
ery of specific regions was perfectly possible. And, with all its limitations, 
these were capable of generating stimuli to the extent that they consolidated 
a national economy. But this matter really belongs to the history of the eigh-
teenth century (Ringrose 1996).
Around 1668, when the Treaty of Lisbon established peace between the 
Habsburg and the Braganza, the peninsular model of economic growth 
was already designed in a manner very similar to that of the rest of Europe.
This situation coincided, moreover, with a critical point at which both 
dynasties saw their own and their metropolitan territories’ capacity to ben-
efit from the possession of empires as very limited. The networks of inter-
national commerce operated in a way little favourable to such benefits 
(Everaert 1973) and globalization in Asia, Africa, and America were 
behind this circumstance. The institutions created in these processes were 
inefficient for such purposes, not by nature but, rather, because they were 
becoming obsolete. The paradox was evident: in a world like that of the 
eighteenth century in which growth would centre on the coasts and on 
ties with international commerce, two of the countries most oriented 
towards global circuits would grow slowly. Yet this is not the place to 
explain this situation. In any case, it is worthwhile to recall that Spain as 
well as Portugal witnessed important attempts at reform as early as the 
final decades of the seventeenth century, which demonstrate a certain 
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capacity for adaptation (Storrs 2006). Many changes were still taking 
place. The increase in the number of noble titles was generating a new 
aristocracy, coastal areas grew to the rhythm of international exchanges, 
and cities like Barcelona or Cadiz benefited from the process and nurtured 
promising mercantile groups. Nevertheless, international competition 
would be fierce and the changes perhaps slower than desired. A new stage 
began in the history of empires and, therefore, of globalization.
* * *
Were these, then, decadent empires? From the moral perspective set out 
from a Whig view of history—in other words, the perspective of the 
Black Legend too—this was obviously the case. Corruption, as so many 
Enlightenment writers including Spanish and Portuguese thinkers 
claimed, was the order of the day in Iberian countries and their colonies. 
The same is true if we limit ourselves to the outcomes of international 
treaties, such as Munster (1648), Westphalia (1648), the Pyrenees 
(1659), and Lisbon (1668). Madrid was losing influence, and the 
European dominions of the Habsburgs were retreating, at the same time 
as the interference of other countries in the colonial monopoly was being 
legalized. Lisbon was starting to create a new state whose backbone, not 
by chance, would be a tax state with high implication of the kingdom but 
whose empire would very much depend upon English support.
On the other hand, neither today’s moral perspective nor the first steps 
towards the disintegration of the imperial project provide the only view-
points from which to assess the reality of the so-called Spanish and 
Portuguese empires and the composite monarchy that served as their 
bases. What the Enlightenment interpreted as corruption was part of a 
political system and a conflictive pact that afforded the empire its longev-
ity. It flowed through its very heart, as a part of the need for the consolida-
tion and circulation of elites. And this came at the same time as the 
American economy maintained a high capacity for recovery and the 
Spanish and Portuguese economy was passing through a long crisis but 
one that was not in any way exceptional in qualitative terms in the 
Mediterranean context and from which it would eventually recover, 
despite everything. On the other hand, a basis had been established in 
Spain that, once the separation from Portugal had been overcome, allowed 
the pact between the distinct centres of imperial power—and, above all, 
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those between Madrid and the colonies—to survive for many years. That 
was also the case of Portugal with the very few remaining centres in Asia 
and Africa and, more important, with Brazil. The principal objective—and 
perhaps another way to assess the empires’ success—was achieved: their 
own survival. No further essential disintegration would occur until the 
advent of the final crisis from 1808, nor would any major state succeed 
from it. The problem, as the epilogue will show, is that many things had 
changed in the international political landscape in or around 1668. And 
also a very important change had taken place in Iberia: the construction of 
absolutist systems in which negotiations between the Crown and the elites 
were based less and less on corporative bodies, such as the Cortes, and 
more and more on a tension, increasingly unequal, between the king, on 
the one side, and a myriad of social actors who often maintained different 
and clashing interests. This situation was not necessarily negative for some 
of these social actors but would make it more difficult to create wealth for 
the whole society.
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Organizing and Paying fOr glObal EmPirE, 1598–1668
One of the great problems in the history of Spain since the birth of the 
Black Legend has been that of exceptionalism. If less affected by the ideo-
logical tints of this hoary view, the history of Portugal has also been stained 
with this problem. A comparative history of this age underlines, however, 
that neither of these kingdoms constituted an anomaly in European his-
tory. Rather they are variants, shaped and determined by their imperial 
ventures, of a common model or ideal type. Other political formations of 
the time, including England, were characterized by the overlap, collision, 
and diversity of powers, by the existence of conflicting pacts with the 
elites, and by the coexistence of agents who exercised coercion. This is in 
fact the reason why, in the words of P. O’Brien, they were not efficient 
states ‘that can be represented as sovereign authorities governing success-
ful economies that provide high, stable and rising standards of welfare for 
their citizens.’
In England it has been possible to speak of a ‘federation of counties, 
each with its individual ethos’ (Smith 1997, p. 139). Phenomena such as 
royal patronage, rent-seeking practices, court corruption, monopolies that 
raised transaction costs for the outsiders, and so on were the order of the 
day. In France, the sale of offices is the best-known, but not the only, 
manifestation of how absolutism was maintained through pacts with the 
elites and by sharing—again not always peacefully—quotas of sovereignty. 
The same was true of the fiscal system and of French absolutism in general 
(see Mettam 1988; Beik 1985, and many other). The Frondes would 
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bring to light the existence of privately owned armies whose importance 
has been emphasized by different studies on the seigneurial households 
(e.g. Béguin 1999).
This disavowal of exceptionalism does not mean that all societies are the 
same. What captures the attention about the Iberian ones in general, and of 
the Castilian and Portuguese cases above all, is their remarkable social stabil-
ity and capacity to reproduce their political structures. This is all the more 
striking because they were connected to developed commercial and global 
circuits, something that stands in contrast to the historiographical tendency 
to see a link between commercial development and political change (as well 
as with a certain modernizing vision of globalization).
While not exclusive to Iberia, it was precisely this aspect of it that could 
provide the variant. The empires and the positioning of these societies in 
global networks served to stabilize them. This is not to claim that they did 
not change, and this is (one reason) why Pierre Vilar’s notion that the 
Spanish empire represented ‘the supreme phase of feudalism’ (an affirma-
tion that, mutatis mutandis, has also been applied implicitly to Portugal) 
cannot be accepted today. Furthermore, similar visions have been applied 
to countries such as France, in regard to which P. Anderson (1974), and 
Marxist historians in general, spoke of a form of feudal income centralized 
through the tax system, which also has its parallels in Castile and Portugal 
and which (supposedly) acted in the same sense while facilitating its elites’ 
reproduction. It was in this context that religious phenomena acted. 
Catholicism was ingrained into the heart of the composite monarchy: it 
served not only to justify empires but also the system for the transfer and 
mobilization of fiscal and military resources. It is enough to reflect on the 
cases of England or the Netherlands and the way in which their religious 
fractures led to ruptures that would end up illuminating alternative forms 
of the state to underline the importance that religious orthodoxy had in 
the Iberian kingdoms and the way in which it contributed to the repro-
duction of an institutional framework that was important for the forms of 
allocation of productive resources.
From 1600 globalization—even if it still yielded insignificant trade fig-
ures in relation to overall European wealth—would coincide with a grow-
ing tension over market control and competition between European 
regional industries. In this context, the transfer of resources tying these 
two empires to Northern Europe, and in particular to the Netherlands 
and England, would also be important to spark decisive changes in these 
societies.
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In all, the effects of Spanish silver and the expenses generated by war—
the second of these being negative for the economy in the short term—
would only be positive to the extent that the political and institutional 
systems evolved in a different way, especially in the cases of Holland and 
England. This occurred while in Iberia the capacity of the aristocracies to 
overcome the depreciation of seigneurial income both strengthened them 
and tied them more closely to the state. In other words, the capacity of 
trade and globalization to dissolve the fortunes of aristocratic elites and to 
erode their socio-economic bases was reduced and even reversed. The 
result would not be a recession—decline is still spoken of—as dramatic as 
the one successive generations of scholars conjured up; but it did lead to a 
loss of competitiveness of the industrial sector, even in the domestic mar-
ket, and a re-composition of the economic map of the peninsula which, 
even if fell within general European patterns, would henceforth be so slow 
that the subsequent readjustments would not be able to achieve the same 
degree of efficiency as the Northern economic centre for a long time.
The great problem of the Iberian empires would originate in their own 
structure and context. Together they had launched European globalization, 
but soon things became rather more difficult. Empires were the spring-
board for the making up of informal global networks that did not always 
bend to the interests of rulers. In fact, they were so important precisely 
because the formal institutions created by these rulers were not efficient 
enough in generating trust among economic agents, who continued to 
resort to the same systems that their predecessors had been employing for 
many centuries: family, reputation, friendship, reciprocity, and so on. The 
result was that these networks, which had a transboundary character and 
were impossible for governments to control, would render obsolete and 
inoperable any imperial models based on the command of the most impor-
tant commercial circuits, such as the Indies convoy (Carrera de Indias) or 
the State of India (Estado da Índia). In addition, the hybrid nature of these 
networks (merchants, officials, etc.) would encourage and foster patronage, 
clientelism, nepotism, rent-seeking, fraud, and even corruption, which 
would become constitutive of the system itself and would affect the func-
tioning of formal institutions created in these empires. This fact, neverthe-
less, and in spite of the difficulties of political control from the centre of 
these empires, would not imply a reduction in the global networks’ overall 
commerce, thus demonstrating, once again, the efficiency of informal 
mechanisms for creating confidence, even if they also rerouted a good part 
of the riches these empires generated to other political formations.
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If the difficulties in states’ control of colonial resources have almost 
always been viewed from the perspective of what happened in these two 
empires, the truth is that we need also to view those empires from the 
perspective of what happened in their peripheries and even outside them. 
This has much to do with the fact that the Iberian empires were, as has 
been said, one agent among many in this process of globalization. The 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire, its early projection to Asia in the fif-
teenth century, served not only to create an element of contention in the 
Indian Ocean from the mid-sixteenth century but also to promote global-
ization routes inaccessible to the Iberians. These routes came to be 
strengthened by the religious toleration practised by the sultans and the 
very nature of the empire as a collector of incomes generated by the mer-
cantile networks that spanned its territories. From the early seventeenth 
century, the English routes that fed the trade of the Mediterranean Levant 
also had this function (Fusaro 2015). Moreover, to the extent that the 
Portuguese had only been able to control a small part of the Asian trade, 
their circuits could be redirected towards other actors, such as the Dutch, 
who operated with noticeable efficiency. From 1644, the new Qing 
dynasty, creator of another empire, limited European expansion in the 
South China Sea, while the trade of the Estado da Índia had already been 
subject to vampire-like attacks by non-Portuguese traders who proved dif-
ficult for Lisbon to control. In these same years, the Tokugawa consoli-
dated an imperial system that would soon affect Portuguese trade in the 
South China Sea and across the Pacific system (Flores 1998). The prob-
lems experienced by both the Estado da Índia and the Crown revenues 
would be greatly affected by these changes. The incorporation of America 
into the process of globalization through the development of regional 
trade flows and alternative routes to those that linked the Caribbean with 
Seville also weakened the King of Spain to the same extent. And this 
occurred while the English colonies in North America expanded their ille-
gal trade in the Caribbean and with Spanish and Portuguese colonies, with 
a concomitant impact upon the king’s revenues. All this would also weaken 
the imperial pact between Lisbon and Madrid.
In this way and if, indeed, colonial commerce continued to provide a 
small part of the wealth of different European countries (in spite of its 
registered growth from the late sixteenth century), the important tensions 
generated around it would end up affecting political systems and would 
constitute one more factor that, in a context of general political  competition, 
would accentuate the need for fiscal reforms and place unprecedented 
pressures upon composite states.
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This was the case even if powers such as the Netherlands or England 
were undecided about whether to attempt to conquer territories con-
trolled by the Portuguese and Spanish, suspecting that the post-conquest 
costs of protection would be exorbitant; these concerns, in conjunction 
with failed ventures such as those of Bahia and Pernambuco, ensured that 
the colonies remained under the Habsburg government of Madrid. But if 
these arrangements represented good political business for the Habsburgs, 
they were not sound commercial practice and became a problem from the 
standpoint of the fiscal system. Madrid and Lisbon paid for the costs of 
protection, externalizing the payments of their officials in the form of 
compensation for fraud, nepotism, patronage, and smuggling; but this 
came at the expense of a great deal of trade and economic resources elud-
ing the monarchy.
The change in American ecosystems would allow a new phase of expan-
sion that would also be beneficial for the king, who no longer claimed the 
lion’s share of the general wealth generated by his dominions; indeed, his 
proportion was an ever-smaller part of it. To the extent that colonial elites 
had increased their economic capital, these same groups had also augmented 
their political decision-making capacity. Their increased ability to withhold 
resources—even military resources—at such a delicate time as the Thirty 
Years War was a good indication of the change underway in the balance 
between colonies and metropolis. What W. Maltby called the ‘drift toward 
autonomy’ was taking place: in reality, this was nothing more than an indi-
cation of the impossibility of applying a mercantilist policy in a composite 
monarchy, a formation that had none of the hallmarks of the proto-national 
systems typical of mercantilism (Yun 1999a). But this situation presents us 
with an image different from that of the immobile empires. Having sepa-
rated in 1668, both the Spanish and the Portuguese empires constantly 
reconfigured themselves on new bases. The former depended upon a colo-
nial pact that included a high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Creole 
minorities and systems of interregional transfers of funds for their defence—
and defence was no longer undertaken simply in the interests of Madrid but 
also on behalf of these elites who had resisted any loss of autonomy through 
conquest by other rival powers such as England or Holland. Portugal would 
turn to Brazil, where gold mining would create new bases for the develop-
ment of the plantation economy. Moreover, at the very height of mercantil-
ism and the war against Holland (after 1648 Amsterdam had allied with the 
Habsburgs), Lisbon would find in England an ally interested in maintaining 
an empire that brought it remarkable benefits. In both cases, areas of domi-
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nation and influence were being lost, but the survival of very substantial 
parts of the colonial system was guaranteed.
Of course, all this was accompanied by ruptures in the composite mon-
archy of the Habsburgs. And again, these breaks cannot not be under-
stood without considering the process of globalization and its overall 
effects. As the remittances of American silver arriving in Seville for the 
monarchs declined, and as American tax systems increasingly operated so 
that a (growing) portion of their resources remained in the New World, 
the composite monarchy began to be endangered. This failure of the 
global system allows us to understand the need to increase the fiscal bur-
den on territories such as Catalonia, Portugal, Naples, and others, some of 
which were already used to a steady increase in their contributions. As we 
have emphasized, this reduction in the flow of Atlantic resources arriving 
at Seville did not happen because there was a lasting recession in the 
American economy as a whole but because Madrid’s share of resources 
was limited by the centrifugal forces created by globalization and the pacts 
that this forced upon it. The rebellions in Portugal, Catalonia, and even 
Naples were more than fiscal movements. But they were also proof that 
one of the pillars of the pact between the Habsburgs and the European 
local elites over the mobilization of local resources was the efficiency of 
the royal revenue collection system of the empire and the functioning of a 
Portuguese system that was already unsustainable. In this case, moreover, 
the problem was not only the difficulty of maintaining the Portuguese 
fortress positions in Asia. It was also proof that these problems and devel-
opments strained relations between the king and elites in Goa and Lisbon 
until they were incompatible with the basic constitutional principle of the 
composite monarchy: that the resources of each kingdom (and by exten-
sion of each empire) should be employed for the benefit of its subjects. 
The far more drastic fiscal reforms that Dom João de Braganza would have 
to introduce after 1668 are a good symptom of what was happening: 
regardless of whether the Portuguese were right or wrong to see tyranny 
in the policy of Count Duke in the 1630s, the state could not be main-
tained with the existing parameters and basis; steps, therefore, had to be 
taken to strengthen the tax state within the kingdom.
Though gradually weakened, up until 1668 the Castilian elites had 
managed to preserve the essential components of the unstable pact made 
with Charles V within their frontiers. But the composite monarchy was no 
longer efficient, and neither was it an effective political system for this new 
world of globalization and mercantilism. These elites had succeeded in 
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reproducing their status quo. Undoubtedly, the nobility was renewed to 
the extent that the circulation of elites (Yun 2004) allowed the ascent of 
new families. Now, at the end of the seventeenth century, a new Amerindian 
nobility was beginning to enter the peninsular social arena. The urban 
oligarchies of Castile had had to open up their ranks to new members. The 
asymmetry within the composite monarchy was creating a statist ideology 
and even an imagined Castilian community that was assimilated with 
Spain, as if Spain were a simple extension of Castile. But this political sys-
tem would remain a composite state even after the disappearance from 
1665 of the Cortes that represented the kingdom. And, more importantly, 
this coincided with the development of a model of absolutism in which, 
after the disappearance of assemblies, the territorial component of political 
representation was replaced by a system of direct and bilateral relations 
between the king and the oligarchies of each city or corporation. This 
model of constitutional development was similar to those of other 
European countries, such as France, but it was very different to the English 
model, which would prove itself capable of creating the most efficient 
state for the defence of markets and thereby reducing for its subjects the 
transaction costs of international trade.
In any case, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, the founda-
tions of a new absolutism that depended upon a proto-national state with 
an empire, rather than a dispersed composite monarchy, were created in 
Spain and Portugal. In the case of Spain, this was achieved by the crisis and 
dismemberment of the Habsburgs’ composite and dynastic monarchy. A 
new growth would emerge on this new foundation and the slow re- 
composition of the regional economies and relations among them; logi-
cally, this growth would be slow and limited in both countries. And this 
was a manifestation of another fact: the ability to generate economic 
expansion—at the levels prevailing in pre-industrial economies—might 
depend upon the institutional framework and property rights, but these 
were not the only variables. The performance of this institutional frame-
work must be seen in the context of the availability of resources at any one 
moment. What could not be expected was that these institutions would 
witness a qualitative change of the scale of the Industrial Revolution, which 
would knock on England’s door within a few decades. In other words, 
this eruption was difficult to imagine in political formations in which the 
state—not because of the Crown’s parasitism but because of its political 
constitution and pacts with elites—systematically exploited private mar-
ket activities rather than simply regulating them (Jones 1981, 2000). 
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The political reforms and consequent flexibility of the economies of 
France, Portugal, and Spain in the eighteenth century would be very 
favourable and serve to explain the growth in these countries. But they 
were still far from that of England. Meanwhile, the development of inter-
national trade, linked to globalization, would mark the geography of 
growth in the Iberian countries, which occurred mostly in the coastal 
regions. Such considerations do not imply that countries such as England 
were free from the corrupt and corrosive effects of informal networks. It 
only indicates that the relationship between such institutions and the 
state’s capacity for enforcement would be different and that, at the same 
time, systems would be created for the canalization of state resources 
towards defensive systems more effective than those of the Iberian coun-
tries in the seventeenth century. It is very possible that the comparison 
between China and Great Britain that has been carried out by P. Vries 
(2015) is also applicable to the case of the Iberian empires.
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Both the Spanish and Portuguese empires—as is almost a rule in the his-
tory of empires—have had bad press. From contemporary commentators 
to the current historiography, many authors have emphasized the most 
negative perspective or have made implicit comparisons with the present 
that have led to pessimistic assessments. When not seen as lost opportuni-
ties for the formation of national states, these empires are considered a 
drag on economic growth and even an obstacle to Spain’s and Portugal’s 
economic modernization.
From the political point of view, both empires—but above all the 
Spanish—have been considered as anomalous in the process of state for-
mation. It has been generally accepted that the Spanish Empire was the 
key to an abortive process of constructing a Spanish nation state, which 
consequently could not evolve either on the English parliamentary model 
or according to the French Jacobin one (Bernal 2005). It can, however, be 
argued that other forms of state building were possible. Here it has been 
maintained that, at least until c. 1640, the Spanish empire was the key to 
the composite monarchy’s high capacity for reproduction. We do not 
know what would have happened without it, but all available evidence 
leads us to think that this political system could not have survived, at least 
in the form that it did or for as long as it did, without the empire. The 
truth is that, as far as Spain is concerned, rather than an unfinished project 
(an argument that hides a certain anachronism tinged with pessimism), 
the empire allowed a composite monarchy consisting of diverse polities—
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crowns, kingdoms, principalities, seigneurial and urban jurisdictions—
with separate institutions and, above all, different parliaments, to reproduce 
itself. This political formula is not surprising for its time. Nor should it—
viewed from the current perspective—be regarded as an aberration, in 
view of other, even longer, later and more complex processes of nation- 
building, such as those of Germany or Italy. As has been said many times, 
composite states are not the exception but the rule, in the history of early 
modern Europe.
In regards to its economy, the Portuguese empire has been considered 
the cause of its backwardness, which was based on the export of raw mate-
rials in exchange for industrial products. It has also been seen as the cause 
of the draining of human capital into the colonies, which, apart from other 
evils, aborted the formation of a solid bourgeoisie in the homeland.1 In 
the Spanish case, the negative visions are curiously contradictory and bear 
the hallmark of monetarism. For many authors, the colonies were the 
cause of inflation, which rendered the goods produced in the homeland 
uncompetitive and, at the same time, led to an increase in wages, which 
reduced industrial profits. The result would be an unfavourable trade bal-
ance that would end up ruining Castile. On the other hand, it is still said—
indeed, a number of contemporary theorists first noticed this trend—that 
the external payments of the monarchy in the European wars must have 
both encouraged the growth of other countries and limited the chances of 
domestic development.
As we have seen, recent studies on Portugal rather tend to strengthen 
the idea that the empire had a net positive effect on the economy. No simi-
lar estimates had been made for Spain. This having been said, in the above 
pages, it has been argued that the impact on the economies of both coun-
tries has to be studied from the viewpoint of institutions. In both cases, 
the empires contributed to—and were based on—the development of 
political economies that were efficient for a long period but, after 1600, 
were unable to feed domestic growth above a certain level of resource 
utilization and international competition. Furthermore, when this epoch’s 
economic growth is studied, the impression is that it took place not 
because of the efficiency of the institutions—as the new institutional 
 economic describes them—but in spite of them. This was largely because 
the empires contributed to accentuate the elites’ capacities to acquire 
1 See a brief state of the art in Costa, Palma, and Reis (2015).
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incomes rather than their interest in innovation, to use the binomial 
expressed by E. J. Jones. Moreover, the positive effect of Spanish silver on 
other economies—particularly the Dutch one (Chap. 6)—should be 
related to the fact that in these areas, with different institutional and social 
structures and with different ecosystems (particularly in the agricultural 
sector), the Habsburgs’ expenditures increased their competitiveness. The 
result, in any case, was a series of readjustments in Iberia rather than an 
economic decline throughout the whole peninsula.
This being the case, it would be even more illusory to expect these 
empires to have produced a modernization of the Iberian economies or 
something similar to modern or intensive economic growth. Whatever the 
value of the concepts of the ‘Great Divergence’ and the industrial revolu-
tion, none of the current general interpretations of them have any heuris-
tic significance from the perspective of Spain and Portugal in 1600. In 
Castile and Portugal, high salaries and emigration to America or Asia and 
Brazil did not lead to an investment in technology and the transition to a 
labour-saving and technologically intensive economy for obvious reasons 
that have to do with their political economy and institutional framework, 
the inexistence of an economically efficient state, and the still-limited 
nature of globalization.2 It is important to stress how different the world 
of 1750 was from that of 1600: in regard to both foreign and interior 
markets, the state and globalization at the time of Philip III of Spain were 
far from those of England under Pitt the Elder. It is therefore clear that 
Iberian domestic growth of the sixteenth century had to be limited. 
Furthermore, to demand that industrial capitalism emerge from this 
growth and, though comparisons must be always welcomed, to judge the 
achievements of empires by their inability to sponsor and sustain intensive 
capitalist growth are simply an exercise in historical stupidity which few 
historians now posit.
Our view of Spanish and Portuguese imperial organization has also 
been dominated by an idea of exceptionalism. This is especially the case if 
the subject is approached from an anachronistic perspective based upon a 
simplistic understanding of the empires of the nineteenth century. But 
many of their supposed traits and failings are typical of almost all empires.
All empires have been based on a negotiation between centres and 
peripheries or on the plurality of decision-making centres, as is clear from 
2 For an interpretation along these lines for England, see Pomeranz (2001).
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studies such as that of Burbank and Cooper (2010) and the relations they 
describe for empires such as those of the Ottomans, Chinese, Romans, 
and others. But this is also the case if we focus on post-Iberian empires. 
Darwin (2012) has seen the English empire as an unfinished one, partly 
because of the existence of very diverse decision-making centres and inter-
ests that did not always converge. Its experience in India and the transfer 
of sovereignty to the East India Company is very significant in this regard, 
as it is also the case of the Netherlands with the VOC and the existence of 
very diverse decision-making centres in its overseas domains (Adams 
2005). Another weakness often highlighted for the Portuguese and 
Spanish empires, the high cost of war and the way in which the mobiliza-
tion of military resources affected the chances of development, was set out 
long ago by P. Kennedy (1988) as a characteristic of all empires. By their 
extension all empires have experienced problems of communication and 
information, and they all must face the challenge of asymmetric informa-
tion that affects the relations between their diverse centres, in particular in 
regard to those between the metropolis itself and its peripheries. Precisely 
because of the above, the negotiation between the centre and periphery—
or between the different centres—led to transfers of not only political but 
also economic capital to the elites and resulted in rent-seeking practices 
among them, something that has often led to the use of the term corrup-
tion. And we could go on.
It is quite possible that the way to understand these empires better is by 
focusing on their specificities in their concrete historical context and in 
relation to their competitors of the day. Undoubtedly, their greatest rival 
until well into the seventeenth century would be the Ottoman Empire. 
This may be highly significant. Here Burbank and Cooper (2010) have 
offered very suggestive ideas. From the perspective of their respective 
political economies, there are many similarities. Like its Iberian competi-
tors, the Ottoman Empire increasingly relied on taxation, especially after 
1580, in part in response to the war efforts and in part because of its con-
frontation with the Habsburgs (Pamuk 2012). Like in the Portuguese and 
Spanish empires, this resulted in the local elites enjoying greater auton-
omy, which both increased their freedom of action and the decentraliza-
tion of the tax state. But there was one fundamental difference: at no point 
before the eighteenth century did the Sultan try to implement a protec-
tionist policy. Thus, there was never anything comparable to the Carrera 
de Indias in the Ottoman domains. On the contrary, the Sultan’s principal 
concern was that commerce should flow through the various trade routes 
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and networks—often under the control of non-Muslims—with the inten-
tion of collecting taxes and facilitating domestic supply systems, especially 
in Istanbul. Hence, the Sultans were able to meet, and even benefit from, 
the challenges of globalization that corroded the income of the Kings of 
Spain and Portugal. And the Ottoman Empire would also remain a very 
decentralized polity until the nineteenth century.
More important, however, was that the composite character of the 
Spanish empire and the monarchy hindered the transfer of funds from one 
state to another within it and that this occurred not only for technical 
reasons but also, and more importantly, because it created ‘constitutional’ 
frictions between those territories; this is to say that it affected the pacts 
with the various elites, especially in the European territories but also in the 
relations between Portuguese and Castilians, vital between 1580 and 
1640. As I have repeatedly stressed, the Habsburg system was not a proto-
state, a nation with an empire, but, rather, a network of polities, one of 
which, Castile, had created an empire (Yun 1998, 2012, 2015). The prob-
lem was not only that the Habsburgs had many theatres to attend to and 
deal with but also that their entire system was based on the theoretical 
precept that no transfer of resources could be made between their states. 
This system—based on a principle which was not always respected by the 
Crown—was efficient for the reasons set out above but only until political 
formations arose that, despite not being modern state units, increasingly 
resembled the formula of homogeneous proto-national states from the 
point of view of their territorial integrity and that, at the same time, built 
colonial systems of an eminently commercial character and sought to save 
costs in the administration of these colonies. This was the case for Holland 
and England in the seventeenth century. These political formations best fit 
the most efficient model in the emerging mercantilist world.
In both cases, Britain and Holland, this meant a territorial continuum 
which, despite its political fragmentation, allowed for a more efficient cus-
toms system, based upon a narrow fiscal space in the metropolis whose 
customs duties, fuelled by foreign and colonial trade, accounted for most 
of its income. This does not mean that those empires, including the 
British, were free from corruption, nepotism, smuggling, patronage, and 
the negative effects of informal social networks. The recent literature in 
this respect is very significant (see, e.g. Rothschild 2011). But, above all, 
these empires—and in particular England—also witnessed genuine finan-
cial revolutions which, from the end of the seventeenth century, supported 
more efficient tax systems and issued debt at interest rates even lower than 
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those of Spain and with more payment guarantees. More importantly, 
from the late seventeenth century, the English empire would achieve all of 
this while a more efficient and competitive economy emerged and flour-
ished. In this sense it is revealing that, although there was contraband in 
the English empire, it was often based on the fraudulent export of indus-
trial products of high added value, which was positive for the country’s 
economy as a whole.
There is another aspect to consider. The two Iberian empires belonged 
to an epoch in which family and extended kinships ties were crucial for the 
articulation of political, social, and economic life. They were in fact the 
DNA of those societies and therefore that of their empires. This is not new 
in history. On the contrary, family and kinship—in their very different 
variants—also had been crucial components of the social fabric and all 
primitive empires from the Romans to Tamerlane and even afterwards. As 
we have seen, imperial endeavours were in part a direct or indirect product 
of the dynamics of family and lineages and of the networks they supported, 
which were vital to the empires’ constitution and functioning. This fact 
had many implications, and a very important one for our arguments is that 
one of the Iberian empires’ key traits was the relative commercial effi-
ciency of informal institutions that pivoted around kinship and went 
beyond it—and, in particular, of the mercantile networks that built trust 
upon mechanisms of enforcement that often operated on the margins of 
the state. Insofar as these networks had much to do with solidarities within 
the very extended family relationships and the political economy of the 
time, they not only corroded the monarchs’ agenda for centralization but 
also contributed to the perversion (to our eyes) of the formal institutions 
and to the weakening of their states, making it more difficult to be com-
petitive in the mercantilist world of the seventeenth century, particularly in 
America and even more in Asia. Above all, the Iberian empires could not 
maintain the primacy that they had enjoyed previously (in the sixteenth 
century), as states like England began to develop formal institutions more 
efficient in terms of protecting their markets. In short, the Iberian systems 
of the second half of the seventeenth century resulted in rich elites, weak 
states, and economies that found it inherently difficult to achieve expan-
sion. The peninsula’s tardiness in the implantation of a new regional model 
of growth based on the dynamics of the periphery is very meaningful.
Nevertheless, at the same time, attempts at reform and adaptation dur-
ing the reign of Charles II (1665–1700) and the first Braganza kings—
João (1640–1656) and Alfonso (1656–1683)—demonstrate that these 
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empires were not inert bodies, unable to confront the many challenges 
they were facing. Indeed, it is not surprising that Storrs has been able to 
present a much more positive image of this epoch (Storrs 2006). Thus, the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires cannot longer be seen as subject to a fatal 
decay. Moreover, their skeletons, in the form of arteries, strategic enclaves, 
and positions with specific negotiating agendas, provided them with an 
enviable flexibility. To the extent that these points also gained—or main-
tained—autonomy, their survival was possible and could even increase the 
wealth they were able to generate for the various elites of the most impor-
tant nodal points, both in the overseas territories and in Europe. 
Furthermore, although they were not administered by stupid or inexperi-
enced statesmen, history shows that no one is immune to making serious 
mistakes. Then, in the following century, the Bourbon and Braganza 
reforms were a way of rethinking the pacts with elites in Europe, America, 
Africa, and Asia that allowed Madrid and Lisbon to fulfil the essential 
agenda of governments: that they and their empires survive, in spite of the 
trickle down of possessions captured by their competitors, above all in Asia 
and the Caribbean region.3 Nevertheless, for well-known reasons, in the 
long run, these reforms would eventually break down the empires’ inter-
nal equilibriums and pave the way for their fracture in the nineteenth 
century.
3 Only after completing this volume could I consult the illuminating book by Storrs (2016) 
on the first decades of the eighteenth century.
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